FOR:  SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:  MajGen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret), Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

SUBJECT:  “Improving the Total Force using the National Guard and Reserves,” a Report for the Transition to the new Administration by the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

- The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is a federal advisory committee established in law to provide you with independent advice and recommendations on strategies, policies and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components.

- At the quarterly public meeting of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on September 15, 2016, the Board voted to provide you with our latest report titled “Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves.” This comprehensive report contains a series of fourteen recommendations and relevant reference material for consideration by the next administration. These recommendations are:
  - Emphasize the Total Force Policy
  - Formalize the Operational Reserve
  - Increase Active Component/Reserve Component Integration
  - Establish Department of Defense Policy for Computing Personnel Costs
  - Enact Reserve Component Duty Status Reform
  - Enact Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Parity
  - Allow Reservists to Accrue Post-9/11 Benefits while on Medical Hold
  - Integrate the Reserve Component into the Force of the Future
  - Maintain Reserve Component Readiness
  - Include the Reserve Component in Cyber Mission Force Requirements
  - Implement Individual Ready Reserve Management Reforms
  - Transition Service Members at Home of Record Reserve Component Sites
  - Minimize Installation and Infrastructure Duplication
  - Retain Adequate Reserve Component General Officer/Flag Officer Structure and Grade

- As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, this report and its contents were deliberated and approved in several open, public sessions.

COORDINATION:  NONE

Attachment:
RFPB Report FY17-01, “Improving the Total Force using the National Guard and Reserves”

Prepared by:  Col Bart Pester, 703-681-0600
IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE USING THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

A Report for the transition to the new administration by The Reserve Forces Policy Board

RFPB Report FY17-01
This report, Report FY17-01, is a product of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The Reserve Forces Policy Board is, by law, a federal advisory committee within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As mandated by Congress, it serves as an independent adviser to provide advice and recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components. The content and recommendations contained herein do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Title 5, and the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, Section 102-3 (Federal Advisory Committee Management), this report and its contents were deliberated and approved in several open, public sessions.
IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE
USING THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

A Report for the transition to the new administration
by The Reserve Forces Policy Board
A Letter to Secretary Carter:

I have the distinct privilege to transmit to you as Secretary of Defense your Reserve Forces Policy Board’s Transition Report entitled “Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves.” This report contains a series of recommendations for consideration by the next administration, and is meant to build on your efforts to strengthen the reserve components and the Total Force as a whole.

Our report comes at a time when the reserve components enjoy strong support from the Department as we fulfill our statutory duties to you. As Secretary of Defense, your fully engaged leadership and unwavering support of the Guard and Reserves, along with the staunch support of a dedicated group of military and civilian leaders, has made it possible for the RFPB to develop a variety of policy recommendations that will improve the readiness, capabilities, and effectiveness of the Guard and Reserves, and capitalize on the numerous gains achieved in recent years. Significant progress has occurred but there is more to be done to ensure the reserve components remain a viable operational element of the Armed Forces to meet the unique security challenges we face while protecting our national security interests at home and abroad.

In this report, the RFPB has outlined a number of priorities that can be implemented in the near term and others that will optimize the Guard and Reserve for the long term. These actions include emphasis on a Total Force Policy to provide critical guidance, oversight and priorities for the Services; formalization of the Operational Reserve to ensure the Reserve Components remain a ready, relevant and responsive element of the Total Force; improved active/reserve integration to increase readiness and enhance operational effectiveness; and the establishment of a Department standard in computing personnel costs to better inform decision making by senior leaders. The Department should also continue your efforts to simplify the overly complex system of 32 distinct duty statuses used to manage the reserve components and eliminate the disparity in benefits between active and reserve service members.

These, and other recommendations aimed at optimizing the Total Force for the longer term, are detailed in this report.

On behalf of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,

Arnold L. Punaro
Major General, USMCR (Ret)
Chairman
A Letter to the Head of the Transition Team:

The Department of Defense faces significant challenges in a number of critical areas, some of which will take years to address. Hampered by a difficult political and an unpredictable fiscal environment, and encumbered by unprecedented national debt, today’s security situation is arguably more challenging than before. Providing for our National security will require adaptability and innovation, and any serious discussion aimed at confronting these challenges must recognize the National Guard and Reserves as vital national assets and an essential part of the solution.

By statute, the Reserve Forces Policy Board provides the Secretary of Defense with independent advice and recommendations designed to strengthen the reserve components and thus, the entirety of the Armed Forces. To assist the next presidential administration, the Board has identified fourteen recommendations that would create immediate improvements in the reserve components and lay the foundation to optimize the Total Force for the longer term. As the Transition Team prepares the new administration to address budgetary and operational requirements on the Armed Forces, it should consider these recommendations essential toward addressing these challenges. Proper management and effective use of the reserve components would, as the title of our report indicates, “Improve the Total Force.”

Over the last fifteen years, the reserve components have become an indispensable operational force that is routinely employed to meet the Nation’s defense needs. Reserve Component (RC) members have risen to every challenge, and their performance has been consistently exceptional. The capabilities they bring are a bargain to the American taxpayer, coming at about one-third the cost per capita of their Active Component counterparts. But while RC advantages are significant, challenges remain that limit their use and hinder success for the Total Force.

In our report, the Board provides information to better understand the capabilities and advantages of the reserve components, and the actions necessary to realize maximum benefit from these advantages. These actions provide a roadmap to improved readiness, capabilities, and effectiveness of the reserve components and thus the Total Force, now and in the future. These improvements will help fulfill our national security requirements at home and abroad.

On behalf of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,

[Signature]

Arnold L. Punaro
Major General, USMCR (Ret)
Chairman
A Letter to the Secretary Designee:

Congratulations on your selection as leader of the most powerful military and defense department.

You enter office at a time of constrained fiscal resources, a divided body politic, and an extremely challenging security environment. These challenges require innovative solutions and any serious efforts at confronting them must recognize the National Guard and Reserves as integral parts of the solution. Over the last 15 years, the reserve components have become an indispensable operational force, routinely employed to meet the Nation’s defense needs. Reserve Component (RC) members have risen to every challenge, their performance has been consistently exceptional, and their proven capabilities are a bargain to the American taxpayer.

As you develop your strategic objectives and vision for the Department, consistent with the President’s priorities, ensuring your officials have a thorough understanding of the Reserve Component, its capabilities and benefits will assist to ensure the best use of this national asset. As one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department of Defense, the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s statutory requirement is to provide independent advice to you on RC matters. To this end, the Board has identified several recommendations that provide a roadmap to improved readiness, capabilities, and effectiveness of the reserve components and thus the Total Force, now and in the future. These improvements will help fulfill our national security requirements at home and abroad.

In our report, the Board provides information to better understand the capabilities and advantages of the reserve components, and the actions necessary to realize maximum benefit from these advantages. These actions include emphasis on a Total Force Policy to provide critical guidance, oversight and priorities for the Services; formalization of the Operational Reserve to ensure the Reserve Component remains a ready, relevant and responsive element of the Total Force; improved active/reserve integration to enhance operational effectiveness; and establishment of a Department standard in computing personnel costs to better inform man power decisions. The Department should also simplify the complex system of 32 distinct duty statuses used to manage the reserve components and eliminate the disparity in benefits between active and reserve service members. These and other recommendations aimed at optimizing the Total Force for the longer term, are detailed in this report.

We look forward to continuing to provide independent and objective advice to you in your role as Secretary of Defense.

On behalf of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,

Arnold L. Punaro
Major General, USMCR (Ret)
Chairman
Chairman Punaro introduces the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, during the June 9, 2015 Board Meeting.

“The presence, skill and readiness of Citizen Warriors across the country give us the agility and flexibility to handle unexpected demands, both at home and abroad. It is an essential component of our total force, and a linchpin of our readiness.”

- Secretary of Defense Ash Carter

1As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Pentagon Auditorium, Aug. 3, 2016
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Executive Summary** .......................................................................................................................... 11

**Introduction** ..................................................................................................................................... 15

**Chapter 1 - Current Security Environment and Status of the Reserve Components** .............................................................. 17
  1.1: The Global Security and National Fiscal Environments ..................................................................................... 17
  1.2: The Role of the U.S. Armed Forces .................................................................................................................... 18
  1.3: The Reserve Components ............................................................................................................................ 18
  1.4: Myths Surrounding the Reserve Components ................................................................................................. 20
  1.5: Opportunities for Immediate Improvement .................................................................................................... 22
  1.6: Role of the Reserve Components .................................................................................................................. 23
  1.7: Recent Contributions of the National Guard and Reserve ................................................................................ 25
  1.8: The Operational Reserve in the Total Force .................................................................................................... 25
  1.9: Obstacles limiting Long-Term Success ........................................................................................................... 27
  1.10: The Lack of a Total Force Policy and Definition for an Operational Reserve ................................................ 27
  1.11: Antiquated laws, policies, and information systems ........................................................................................ 28
  1.12: Summary ...................................................................................................................................................... 29

**Chapter 2 - Priorities for the Near Term** ......................................................................................... 31
  2.1: Emphasize a Total Force Policy .................................................................................................................... 31
  2.2: Formalize the Operational Reserve ................................................................................................................ 33
  2.3: Increase Active Component / Reserve Component Integration ....................................................................... 35
  2.4: Establish Department of Defense Policy for Computing Personnel Costs ....................................................... 38
  2.5: Enact Reserve Component Duty Status Reform ............................................................................................. 42
  2.6: Enact Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Parity .......................................................................................... 45
  2.7: Allow Reservists to Accrue Post-9/11 Benefits while on Medical Hold .......................................................... 47

**Chapter 3 - Optimizing the Total Force for the Long Term** ...................................................................... 49
  3.1: Integrate the Reserve Component into the Force of the Future ....................................................................... 49
  3.2: Maintain Reserve Component Readiness ....................................................................................................... 53
  3.3: Include the Reserve Component in Cyber Mission Force Requirements .......................................................... 55
  3.4: Implement Individual Ready Reserve Management Reforms .......................................................................... 58
  3.5: Transition Service Members at Home of Record Reserve Component Sites .................................................... 63
  3.6: Minimize Installation and Infrastructure Duplication ........................................................................................ 67
  3.7: Retain Adequate Reserve Component General Officer/Flag Officer Structure and Grade ............................ 70
Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Leon Panetta, greets the Honorable Jessica Wright, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and other members of the Board during their quarterly meeting on September 5, 2012.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Reserve Components have transformed from a seldom-used Cold War Strategic Reserve in the 1970s and 80s, to an indispensable operational force that is frequently and routinely employed to the meet the Nation’s defense needs. Constituting 38% of the Armed Forces, Reserve Component (RC) service members have repeatedly deployed and operated in Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and participated in numerous other contingency, humanitarian, and homeland support missions. They have performed at a level on par with their Active Component (AC) counterparts and their performance has been consistently exceptional while delivered at approximately one third the cost of AC service members and units.

Today, the Reserve Components enjoy greater support from DoD senior leaders than ever before. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is a true believer in the Total Force approach to the All-Volunteer Force. He has led the way in ensuring Guard and Reserve forces are viewed as critical pillars in the defense of the nation and in his words a “linchpin of our readiness.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Peter Levine, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Todd Weiler have also been staunch advocates.

Support has also never been stronger from senior leaders in the Military Departments. Since the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force published its historic report in 2014 recommending closer operating relationships between Air Force active and reserve components, those relationships have improved dramatically. Secretary Deborah Lee James, General Mark Welsh and now General David Goldfein have championed these efforts. A recent Congressional Budget Office Report notes that integration of personnel in their active and reserve components is so seamless that it is misleading to characterize the Air Force as composed of separate active and reserve components. The same transformation is now underway in the Army after the National Commission on the Future of the Army in 2016 made 63 recommendations to improve the Army and its Guard and Reserve components. Secretary of the Army Eric Fanning and Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark Milley have fully embraced the commission’s report and frequently state “There is only one Army, with 18 divisions, 60 brigades and 980,000 soldiers,” when referring to the active and reserve components. The Navy and Marine Civilian and Military Leaders are continuing their traditional strong support.

While senior leader support and the employment of the RC has changed dramatically for the better, numerous challenges remain that could hinder future success and improvements for the Total Force. To make informed decisions regarding the critical issues of national security and defense, it is essential for new leaders and policymakers to understand the composition of the reserve components, how they operate at a significant cost advantage, and the most pressing challenges they face while attempting to remain an operational component of the Total Force.

Priorities for the Near Term

While much has been done to ensure the RC remains viable to the Total Force moving forward, there is more to do. Several commissions, studies, and think tanks have recommended numerous reforms to ensure the RC remains ready, relevant,
accessible, and employed to meet the nation’s defense needs. Similarly, the Reserve Forces Policy Board has identified several policy initiatives aimed at immediately removing barriers that adversely impact the efficiency, readiness, and overall effectiveness of the RC. As active and reserve force structure is reduced, it is critical for the RC to remain an operationally viable element of the Total Force. To create the foundation necessary to address these barriers, the new Administration should immediately implement the following recommendations:

1. **Emphasize a Total Force policy.** The Department of Defense needs to strengthen and emphasize the Total Force policy to provide comprehensive guidance and oversight to the services. While improving, the Total Force perspective of some active component leaders is incomplete and adversely impacts optimal usage and resourcing decisions regarding the Reserve Components, as well as the determination of the correct balance between AC and RC forces (Chapter 2.1).

2. **Formalize the Operational Reserve.** The Department should plan, program, and budget for continued operational use of the Reserve Components. The Department should officially define the term “Operational Reserve” to ensure that the RC remains a ready, relevant, and responsive element of the Total Force. Moreover, the department should adjust the policies, rules, regulations, and resource allocations that restrict the use of the Operational Reserve (Chapter 2.2).

3. **Increase AC/RC integration.** The RC constitutes 38% of the Total Force and has provided critical capabilities and capacity in meeting security requirements at home and abroad. To ensure mission success in a period of constrained resources, the Department should take steps to further integrate AC and RC forces (Chapter 2.3).

4. **Establish a DoD policy for computing the fully-burdened and life-cycle cost for military personnel.** The Department should standardize the definition for Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost for use in calculating manpower costs, the Department’s largest account. A standard definition would enable policy official to make accurate cost comparisons when making force structure and other decisions (Chapter 2.4).

5. **Enact Duty Status reform.** The Department needs to simplify and streamline the complex model of 32 separate and distinct duty statuses used to manage the RC (Chapter 2.5).

6. **Eliminate the disparity in RC survivor benefits between AC/RC members.** Family members of RC service members killed in the line of duty while training should receive identical benefits as those of an AC service member (Chapter 2.6).

7. **Allow the accrual of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits for RC members in medical hold status.** Injured RC service members should receive the same benefits as AC counterparts rather than being penalized solely for belonging to the RC (Chapter 2.7).

Lack of current RC knowledge and experience by some Service and DoD leaders leads to common misperceptions which limits effective AC/RC integration and inhibits proper use of capabilities and experience. Because of this limited understanding, DoD should emphasize robust use of the Total Force policy as originally designed following the Vietnam War. This policy also needs to be updated and fully embraced by all stakeholders. A marginal Total Force perspective adversely impacts decisions regarding the use of the Reserve Components, the proper balance between AC and RC forces, and resourcing. The use of
outdated personnel management policies, statutes, and information systems (that are also difficult to navigate) creates inefficiencies that reduce the Services’ desire to use the RC and negatively impacts the overall effectiveness of the Total Force.

**Optimizing the Total Force for the Long Term**

The RFPB also recommends for continuation or initiation several ongoing or follow-on policy efforts to optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of the RC, and thus improve the Total Force as a whole. They include the following:

1. **Integrate the Reserve Component into the Force of the Future and enhance permeability.** To improve recruiting and retention of talent, the Department must improve the flexibility of active and reserve personnel management systems to ease transitions between the two components and the civilian workforce (Chapter 3.1).

2. **Prioritize and maintain RC readiness.** The Department should direct the Services to plan for and program funding for recurring and routine operational employment of the RC, and use OCO funding to the maximum extent possible (Chapter 3.2).

3. **Include the RC in the Cyber Mission Force.** The Department must ensure that critical cyber capabilities and skill sets developed by industry, at little to no cost to the government, are fully utilized (Chapter 3.3).

4. **Implement IRR management reforms.** The Department should better manage and utilize this pool of more than 265,000 personnel, many of whom are talented, previously trained and remain largely overlooked. (Chapter 3.4).

5. **Transition service members at Home of Record (HOR) RC sites.** Utilizing available infrastructure, this would enhance RC recruitment opportunities, enable a more holistic, coordinated transition, and promote the well-being of our members (Chapter 3.5).

6. **Minimize installation and infrastructure duplication.** Efforts to consolidate sites and build joint reserve centers must continue as the Department can no longer sustain separate sites for each individual unit or service (Chapter 3.6).

7. **Right-size the RC General/Flag Officer structures and rank.** The Department should make reductions to the number of Reserve G/FO positions only after a careful, deliberate, and recurring analysis of requirements, and retain adequate, commensurate grade structure for RC leadership (Chapter 3.7).

We have entered into a period of continuous conflict that we assume will last decades. This state of “perpetual war” places stress on the force. This, combined with constrained resources, the risks of sequestration, and the political establishment’s inability to-date to forge a long term budget agreement, requires adaptability and resourcefulness to meet the requirements of our National Defense Strategy. These factors require the United States to decide what is expected of its Operational Reserve force and endeavor to maximize its utility and effectiveness as part of the Total Force. This will, in turn, ensure the Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces are properly organized and funded to meet our long-term national security requirements.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Robert O. Work, answers a question from a Board member during the March 9, 2016 Board Meeting.
INTRODUCTION

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB or “the Board”) is a Federal Advisory Board codified in Title 10, Section 10301 to “serve as an independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components of our Armed Forces.” While one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department of Defense and operating for more than 60 years, the RFPB’s operating framework was revised in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, which extracted the Board from within the former Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and granted its independence and authority to report directly to SECDEF. This framework allows the Board to review and provide independent recommendations on policies impacting the reserve components (RC) as a whole, as well as their performance as a component of the Total Force, without the restrictive lens of the individual Services’ or the Department’s hierarchy. The independent nature of the Board enables it to make important recommendations focused on optimizing this critical national asset.

The Board is composed of 20 highly respected, proven leaders and subject matter experts from within the Department of Defense, the Government, and the Private Sector. Eighteen of the twenty are voting members, with a Military Executive (an RC general or flag officer) and a Senior Enlisted Advisor both serving as non-voting members (a list of board members and brief biographical summaries can be found in Appendix A).

Anticipating the 2017 change of presidential administrations, the Board identified (and incorporated in this report) numerous enterprise-level recommendations that provide opportunities for immediate improvement, means to optimize the Total Force for the longer term, and valuable reference material regarding RC operations and composition. RC service members comprise 38 percent of the Total Force and bring critical capabilities to the fight for about one-third the cost per capita of the Active Component (AC). In a time of constrained fiscal resources and new threats emerging on a seemingly daily basis, any serious discussion of national defense and security issues must include this vital national asset.

The Board hopes this report will stimulate solutions and actions for change, and believes enacting these recommendations will ensure the Reserve Component is effectively managed and utilized to deliver maximized service in defense of the Nation. Each of the recommendations and topics included in this report was deliberated and approved during open session meetings of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Copies of Board-approved slides, minutes, and reference materials used to draft this report are available at http://rfpb.defense.gov/.

Notes: For the purposes of this publication the abbreviation “RC” refers collectively to the forces that constitute the seven reserve components: i.e. the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve. DoD or simply, “The Department” refers to the Department of Defense. Thirty-eight percent of the Total Force includes only those service members attached to the Selected Reserve and excludes members of the Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard.
General John F. Kelly, USMC, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, discusses the Reserve Component’s contribution to U.S. Southern Command via video teleconference during the Board’s December 9, 2014 meeting.
CHAPTER 1

Current Security Environment and Status of the Reserve Components

1.1: The Global Security and National Fiscal Environments

The current security environment is complex and unstable with a myriad of state and non-state actors challenging American interests at home and abroad in ways never perceived just a few short years ago. Our domestic political and fiscal environment is equally challenging with its political division and unsustainable debt. Budget impacts created by the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) and sequestration have resulted in deep cuts to US military readiness and capabilities. Since passage of the BCA, security conditions have changed and are dramatically less stable than they were in 2011 when many in Congress assumed a reduction of the US military budget was feasible to address the national debt.

Since 2011, Russia’s actions have created regional instability in the areas of its western borders and Eastern Europe. Crimea was forcibly annexed and Russia remains militarily engaged in Eastern Ukraine. The Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, all NATO members since 2004, are especially vulnerable as Russia promotes unification with Russian minority populations in the satellite states of the former Soviet Union. In Syria, Russia’s military support for the regime has resulted in the targeting of anti-Assad militias and complicates solutions for the growing diaspora of Syrian refugees.

China seeks to grow its regional economic and military influence – and dominate its neighbors. In the South China Sea, disputed island reefs that are closer to Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia are being expanded by China, and new islands are being created by piling ocean sand onto live reefs. In addition to the disastrous ecological impacts, these artificial islands support new military grade runways and provide China with anti-ship missile sites in the middle of international shipping channels.

Iran and North Korea are significant potential adversaries who pursue nuclear weapons and jointly develop long-range missile technology. Both countries maintain large militaries with significant capabilities; North Korea closely positions forces to threaten Seoul and Iran has emerged as a regional hegemon in the Middle East and exporter of terrorism.

ISIS, after establishing a physical caliphate in Syria and Iraq, has surpassed Al-Qaeda in promoting worldwide terror attacks through propaganda spread by the internet and social media. A series of high-profile attacks in Europe and elsewhere in recent times demonstrates ISIS willingness and ability to destabilize the European Union and other countries it attacks.
1.2: The Role of the U.S. Armed Forces

To confront these dynamic security conditions while recognizing the domestic fiscal constraints, the United States military, as the bedrock of our national security, protects our citizens and interests, preserves regional stability, renders humanitarian assistance, and imparts stability to the world. The demands on the US military have never been greater but budget cuts from the 2011 BCA and other measures are deep, and severely curtail the ability for the United States to respond with what has become a smaller force that is less ready. In short, demand for military capabilities exceeds capacity and the Nation will continue to rely on National Guard and Reserve forces to augment and reinforce active duty forces as a front line of defense at home and abroad.

1.3: The Reserve Components

The Reserve Component consists of seven Service Components that include the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve. As an integral part of the Total Force, the RC provides:

- **Surge Capacity.** This surge capacity is provided by high quality, reliable, and affordable forces. The RC supplements the Active Component across the full spectrum of DoD missions abroad and in response to state and national emergencies at home. Today, over 29,700 members of the RC remain activated to meet the needs of the Department, with over 931,000 activated since 9/11.

- **AC/RC Integration.** RC forces are no longer used solely as a Strategic force. They are fully integrated into all peacetime and combat operations and have been increasingly relied upon as an integral part of the total Operational force.

- **Bargain Capability.** The RC provides highly experienced and combat-proven capability that is considerably less expensive to maintain in dwell when compared to the AC. The RC constitutes 38% of military personnel end strength, while only accounting for 16% of the total defense budget (including procurement and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation).

- **Lower Costs.** The fully-burdened, per-capita cost of the RC to the US Government is typically less than one-third the cost of the Active Component, 29.6% per the FY15 Base Budget request of $495.6 billion. The RC requires significantly less overhead and infrastructure costs as outlined in the Figure 1-1.

- **Continuum of Service.** The RCs contribute to the Continuum of Service concept by providing skilled and experienced personnel who enhance the effectiveness and sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force with flexible service options at a reduced cost to the government. Flexible service options make military service more attractive and increase the willingness of individuals to serve.
Figure 1-1: FY15 Fully-Burdened Per-Capita Cost Comparison

2 National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2015 (Green Book)
• **Community Engagement.** RC members serve in roughly 3,000 communities across the nation as citizen soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen, and have closer ties to a broader cross-section of the American population than their AC counterparts. These ties are essential in maintaining strong relationships and support for the military from the general U.S. population. The vast majority of RC members, families and employers (~75%) report a favorable opinion of reserve forces and a willingness to provide continuing support to the RC and the entire US Military.

The Reserve Components have evolved beyond a Strategic force to be relied on only in times of major war or national emergency as was the case during the Cold War. They are now used as an Operational Reserve for all peacetime and combat operations. With reduced resources and force structure in the Active Component, the RC will need to share an equal burden and equal risk with AC forces in future conflicts, as they have over the last 15 years.

### 1.4: Myths Surrounding the Reserve Components

While the Reserve Components have been integral to the success of the Total Force over the last 15 years, there exist barriers which will significantly hamper continued success in the future if not addressed. The source of these obstacles generally comes from a lack of understanding of the RC and its capabilities, and the antiquated laws, policies, and information technology used to manage them.

Lack of knowledge by senior Service and DoD leaders leads to common misperceptions about the RC which limits effective integration, and inhibits proper use of capabilities and experience. Because of this poor understanding, DoD also lacks an updated Total Force policy and has not fully embraced the Total Force concept as it was outlined by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and James Schlesinger in the 1970’s and validated by successive Secretaries of Defense. This adversely impacts decisions regarding the use of the Reserve Components and achieving a proper balance between AC and RC forces, as well as resourcing.

Also, the use of outdated personnel management statutes, policies, and information systems (that are also difficult to navigate) creates inefficiencies that reduce the Services’ desire to use the RC which in turn impacts the overall effectiveness of the Total Force.

Today’s RC consists of forces in dwell conducting routine training and a fully integrated Operational Reserve that is regularly employed. Although DoDI 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force provides a definition in the glossary for RCs as an operational force, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not contain a definition for the term Operational Reserve. Without a formally defined Operational Reserve, proper planning, prioritized funding for readiness, and predictability for effective RC employment limits the Total Force.³

Most notably, a general lack of knowledge regarding RC organization, capabilities, policies, access, cost, etc. has led some leaders to believe that the RC is not as capable or effective as their Active Component (AC) counterparts and that they cost

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³ DoDD 1200.17
too much. The continuing failure of DoD to calculate fully-burdened and life-cycle costs of it's Active, Guard, Reserve and other categories of personnel is the root cause of most of these problems. These assumptions have proven false after reviewing the actual fully burdened costs of maintaining Active and Reserve forces and the independent analysis of RC performance in combat.

**Myth 1**

*The Reserve Components are not as capable or effective as their AC counterparts.* In 2015, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) commissioned the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to study the operational effectiveness of the National Guard and Reserves during Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OND and OEF). This had never been done before (as of this writing, Phase II of the Study – analyses of RC performance in OEF – is ongoing). From IDA’s analysis of aggregated, measurable, tactical level and individual data, they found no sizable difference in performance between AC and RC during OIF/OND. Their research determined that RC forces that had adequate pre-deployment training performed their tasks with no significant differences from their AC counterparts and that both components shared comparable burden and risk. In addition, strategic and operational leaders were pleased with RC contributions and performance in support of OIF/OND. In fact, during numerous interviews conducted by IDA, many senior leaders were unable to distinguish between AC and RC personnel under their command.

**Myth 2**

*The Reserve Components cost more than their AC counterparts.* One of the primary reasons for this enduring perception is the lack of a standardized methodology when calculating personnel costs. In 2012, the RFPB began an in-depth cost methodology study to more accurately compare AC to RC costs by capturing all associated costing elements. In most comparisons used by DoD, direct personnel and unit operating costs are all that is compared. Indirect costs, such as those related to the DoD Defense Health Program, Dependent Education, Family Housing, Commissary, and others are not normally included. Results showed that the RC has significantly lower overhead costs when compared to the AC. While making up 38% of the Total Force, the per capita RC cost is approximately 29.6% of an AC service member (based on 2015 data - for specifics, see Section 4.2 Reserve Component Cost Comparison and Efficiencies). In July 2016, the Congressional Budget Office released their analyses of the structure and cost of the military from the perspective of major combat units. Their findings were nearly identical to the work done by the RFPB when considering direct, indirect and overhead costs for active, guard, and reserve units. The results are also similar to those of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, the Air Force Commission, and the National Commission for the Future of the Army. However, the myth persists due to an unwillingness of Active Leaders to acknowledge this significant cost advantage.
1.5: Opportunities for Immediate Improvement

The achievements of the RC highlight the need for review and reform to ensure the RC remains viable to the Total Force moving forward. Several commissions, to include the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, and the National Commission on the Future of the Army, and other studies and think tanks have recommended numerous reforms to ensure the RC remains ready, relevant, accessible, and employed to meet the nation’s defense needs. Despite recognizing the need for change and the adaption of some reforms, much work remains. The Reserve

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Figure 1-2: Cost Comparison AC v RC Units

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Forces Policy Board has identified several policy initiatives aimed at removing barriers that adversely impact the efficiency, readiness and overall effectiveness of the RC for the long term. As active and reserve force structure is adjusted, it is critical for the RC to remain an operationally viable element of the Total Force. To tackle these barriers, the new Administration should immediately implement the following recommendations:

1. Revalidate and emphasize the Total Force policy
2. Formalize the Operational Reserve
3. Improve AC/RC integration
4. Establish DoD policy for computing the fully-burdened and life-cycle cost for military personnel
5. Enact Duty Status reform and reduce the overall number of duty statuses
6. Eliminate disparity in RC survivor benefits between AC/RC members
7. Allow the accrual of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits or RC members in medical hold status

1.6: Role of the Reserve Components

As identified in Title 10, United States Code Section 10101, there are seven reserve components within the Armed Forces of the United States – the Army and Air National Guard, as well as the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard Reserve. As of May 2016, RC military strength totaled 821,518 service members, providing approximately 38% of the total DoD military force structure. Through such manpower, the RC supplies DoD with a broad array of combat and support capabilities for use at home and abroad. In addition to these personnel often referred to as “Drilling Reservist and Guard”, there are 264,185 Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) members which provide trained personnel when needed. Together they represent over 1,085,700 RC service members located in roughly 3,000 communities across America and the US territories.

The purpose of the RC is “to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components” (10 USC 10102). The National Guard is both a reserve component and a state militia. The statutory role of the National Guard is further articulated in Title 32 which states, “Whenever
Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed” (32 USC 102). As a state militia, The National Guard is available to state and territorial authorities for a wide range of domestic support operations. The Guard is unique in that it is the only military force, active or reserve, with civil law enforcement authorities while under the control of a state governor. (Additional information about each of the reserve components can be found in Chapter 5.)

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5 From Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Report Selected Reserve by Rank/Grade July 2016

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Figure 1-3: Total Reserve Force Makeup
1.7: Recent Contributions of the National Guard and Reserve

RC members have been involuntarily mobilized for six major operations in the last 25 years, including large-scale mobilizations for the first Persian Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn (Iraq). Following the Hurricane Katrina disaster in 2005, the Guard and Reserves activated members within affected communities and deployed an unprecedented RC force in excess of 50,000 personnel who, while working alongside a very small active military force, alleviated suffering and stabilized the Gulf States.

Since 9/11, nearly one million RC members have been activated across the seven reserve components. Over half the nation’s individual guardsmen and reservists have been mobilized for active duty more than once. Most mobilizations (89%) have resulted in deployments to combat zones. Since 1991, the National Guard has been called up nearly 7,000 times (an average of 311 events per year) to support Domestic Operations Missions such as Key Asset Protection, law enforcement, natural disasters, Search and Rescue, Border support and others. The RC has become a force of choice for Peacekeeping Operations, taking ongoing and lead roles in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Sinai.

1.8: The Operational Reserve in the Total Force

The US military was restructured after the Vietnam War and significant numbers of Army combat and support forces were placed in the RC. This created greater emphasis and interest in the reserve forces. Known as the Abrams Doctrine, the stated intent behind this restructure was to prevent the use of military force without reserve involvement and ultimately gain the collective support of the American people. At the same time, DoD adapted a Total Force Concept (i.e. consideration of all forces, active and reserve) that was to be applied in planning, programming, manning, equipping and employment of the force. Since this reorganization, inclusion of the Guard and Reserves in the Nation’s military efforts has been instrumental in sustaining the All-Volunteer Force and maintaining the public’s support for the nation’s military operations.

Since 1991, the seven reserve components are now used as an Operational Reserve, fully integrated into all peacetime and combat operations, as recognized in DoDI 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force. The Total Force approach requires the RC and Active Component to share equal risk.
Up to and including the Persian Gulf War in 1990/91, the RC operated primarily as a Strategic Reserve force and provided an annual average of 3,000 active duty man-years of operational support to DoD’s missions. Figure 1-4 shows how the RC has changed. Between the Gulf War and September 11, 2001 (9/11), RC contribution increased to an annual average of 35,000 active duty man-years of operational support. In the 15 years following 9/11, the RC fully transitioned from a Strategic Reserve into an Operational Reserve\(^7\) with contributions increasing to approximately 146,000 active duty man-years annually. DoD has relied extensively on Guard and Reserve forces with individual reserve mobilizations totaling more than 931,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines since 9/11 (as of June 2016). Since the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and the Afghanistan drawdown, RC requirements have declined, but even so, nearly 30,000 reserve service members are mobilized today, with a significant number of RC members expected to remain on active duty to support real world operations going forward. However, while increased reliance on the RC has occurred over the last 25 years, inclusion of the RC when planning and budgeting for the Total Force has fallen short of the original intent.

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\(^6\) Reserve Duty Days in Support of Contingency Operations 1986-2014, previously maintained by OSD Reserve Affairs

\(^7\) DoDD 1200.14
1.9: Obstacles limiting Long-Term Success

As discussed in Section 1.4 there exist barriers which, if left unaddressed, will inhibit continued success of the Reserve Component in the future. The source of these obstacles generally comes from a lack of understanding and the antiquated laws, policies, and information technology used to manage them. While RC forces have become increasingly operational over the last few decades, there remains a general lack of knowledge within DoD regarding their capabilities, access, cost, and other important areas. A number of our senior leaders remain unaware of the differences between the National Guard and the Reserves; the strengths and capabilities resident in each reserve component; the cost to maintain and use the RC; or the constraints affecting their use. This lack of knowledge leads to common misperceptions (or myths) about the RC which limits effective integration and inhibits its use. Also, use of outdated personnel management statutes, policies, and information systems (that are also difficult to navigate) creates inefficiencies that reduce the Services’ desire to use the RC which in turn impacts the overall effectiveness of the Total Force. During an era of diminished resources, reduced force structure and readiness, these barriers must be eliminated to enable optimized use of the RC as a component of the Total Force.

1.10: The Lack of a Total Force Policy and Definition for an Operational Reserve

As mentioned in section 1.4, today’s RC force consists forces in dwell conducting routine training and forces who are part of a fully integrated, Operational Reserve. Most Senior leaders recognize this and use these terms freely. However, neither of these terms is defined in joint doctrine or DoD policy. A formerly defined Operational Reserve by the Department is necessary to adequately prioritize funding to maintain readiness and predictability for effective RC contributions to the Total Force going forward.

DoD still struggles with the Total Force policy that was considered a priority after Vietnam, and the Department has not fully implemented the Total Force concept as was consistently directed over the years by the Secretary of Defense. The notion that reservists and guardsmen are somehow less capable, less committed, or less professional has continued to persist among some senior leaders in the Department. Each service has a Total Force policy but an overarching policy at the DoD level is lacking.
which is necessary to reduce biases and make real progress in uniformly managing and maintaining a ready Total Force. Better AC/RC integration is the key to a stronger and more effective military. Until this happens, the practice of prioritizing active forces as first in line for resources will continue and thus extend the cultural divisions leading to a loss of RC operational edge and risk a return to the period where the Guard and Reserves were used strictly in a strategic capacity, resulting in a force that is seriously undermanned and without necessary training, equipment or readiness. This absence of Total Force perspective adversely impacts decisions regarding the use of the Reserve Components, the proper balance between AC and RC forces, and resourcing. This culture needs to change within DoD to embrace Active and Reserve members as part of the same team – not separate teams competing for resources.

1.11: Antiquated laws, policies, and information systems

The last comprehensive changes in the Department’s personnel management laws and processes occurred in the 1970’s and much has changed since the current military personnel management system was first established at the outset of the Cold War. Defense personnel management statutes, policies and information systems have not kept pace with demographic or technological changes over the last 40 years. Two glaring examples of this are the current plethora of RC Duty Statuses and the disconnected and nearly obsolete information systems used to manage the force. Complex duty statuses and inefficient or difficult personnel management systems provide little incentive for the Services to make use of the RC during a contingency and often lead to wasted resources and increased operational tempo for an active force already stretched thin. In many cases, the expertise needed for an operation resides in RC units that are sidelined while AC units struggle to handle situations beyond their normal skillsets. It is long past time to modernize the Department of Defense and its system for assessing and recruiting, developing and utilizing, and sustaining and retaining its military manpower.
1.12: Summary

The nation can ill-afford to ignore the rich capabilities of the National Guard and Reserves or the lessons learned and experience gained over the last 15 years of combat and other operations. RC members bring unique capabilities and professional expertise to the Total Force gained through years of experience in the civilian sector. The Department must learn to better exploit this expertise going forward. Rich repositories of talent reside in the RC that is cost-prohibitive to develop in the Active Component (i.e. doctors, nurses, lawyers, computer analysts, cyber experts, engineers, etc.). During a period of significant force structure reductions and budget cuts, continued investment in a strong National Guard and Reserve Force provides numerous benefits to the Total Force and is essential in achieving US national security objectives going forward. It is equally vital that senior leaders understand the importance of, and define specific roles for reserve forces in future strategic and operational plans.
During the June 9, 2015 quarterly Board Meeting, Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, charges the Board with helping the Department collect lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan as viewed through a Reserve Component perspective and to think through Reserve Component considerations for the Force of the Future initiative.
CHAPTER 2
Priorities for the Near Term

This chapter’s purpose is to provide the Department’s leadership with a list of recommendations on issues that have been well known within DoD for many years but have not yet been resolved. These recommendations are intended, in accordance with the RFPB’s statutory basis, to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

2.1: Emphasize a Total Force Policy

While the Services each have individual Total Force policies in place, the Department of Defense lacks a comprehensive Total Force Policy capable of providing critical guidance and oversight to the services. This absence of Total Force perspective adversely impacts decisions regarding the use of the Reserve Components, the proper balance between AC and RC forces, resourcing.

![Figure 2-1: Force Makeup AC/RC](Image)

*DMDC Active Duty Military Strength by Service, August 2016 and Selected Reserves by Rank/Grade August 31, 2016*
Despite RCs being an integral part of the Total Force since 1970, the Department in large measure has failed to fully institutionalize the notion of a Total Force. The perception that reservists and guardsmen are somehow less capable, less committed, or less professional has proven to be incorrect yet continues to persist among some senior leaders in the Department. This culture needs to change. Active and reserve members, as well as civilian employees, need to be embraced as members of the same team, not separate competing entities. To that end, the Department should encourage and incentivize a continuum of service to preserve talent from the AC that would be otherwise lost with Total Force reductions or otherwise routine transitions from the active force.

The RFPB has a long history of Total Force advocacy. In September 2012, Secretary Panetta met with the RFPB and asked the Board to provide advice and recommendations on four strategic topics:

1. Best Ways to use the RC in the Future
2. AC/RC Mix
3. Cost of a Strong Reserve
4. How to Achieve Savings

To answer these questions, the RFPB established a Task Group to study these topics and develop recommendations for SECDEF. The report was completed in December 2013. In response to Secretary Panetta's question, “What are the best ways to use the reserve components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance?” the board made the following key observations:

- Employ the RCs operationally as integral elements of our National Defense Strategy maintain their training and avoid the tendency to “keep them on the shelf.”
- The RCs should be used to support all ten DoD priority missions and other missions required by the President and Governors.
- The RCs have a demonstrated record of sustained accessibility, readiness, and reliability.
- Many senior defense leaders are unaware of the differences between the National Guard and the Reserves; the strength of the RC; the capabilities resident in the RC; the costs to maintain and use the RC; or the limitations on their use.
- Retaining already lean RC force structure is the most significant efficiency possible when considering that the fully burdened costs of a Guardsman or Reservist is less than a third of an active duty service member.
- Some senior defense leaders still lack a Total Force perspective and thus focus on the Active Component as the only solution to the Nation's challenges.
One proposed RFPB recommendation was to improve and enforce a revised Total Force Policy that enumerates key principles necessary to encourage a Total Force culture. Throughout the Department, consideration should be given to the following principles by senior civilian and military leaders:

1. Take responsibility for, and ownership of the Total Force. The Department must view the Active and Reserve Components as co-equals and ensure the RC receives the same consideration in all matters.

2. Ensure military readiness in both the Active and Reserve Components. The RC plays a critical role in meeting national security requirements and must also be ready at all times.

3. Develop a clear and mutual understanding of the roles and missions of each component (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in each service and in joint/combined operations, during peacetime and war. The Department should provide a roadmap for long-term reserve integration, such as the previously published Joint Vision 2020.

4. Provide the necessary resources to accomplish assigned missions. In order to be fully utilized as an operational reserve, the Department should direct Services to adequately fund their reserve components for regular and routine participation in meeting Combatant Commander and other operational requirements.

### 2.2: Formalize the Operational Reserve

Utilization of and reliance upon the Reserve Components to meet operational requirements have increased dramatically since the first Gulf War, transforming the National Guard and Reserve from a strategic to an operational force with capabilities and capacity that are essential for the United States to meet global requirements. Over the previous two decades, reservists and guardsmen have been ready, accessible, and routinely utilized to meet mission requirements at home and abroad. As of August 2016, over 29,700 members of the RC remain activated to meet the needs of the Department, with nearly one million activated since 9/11.

Despite fifteen years of heavy RC operational involvement in support of global operations as part of the Total Force, the term “Operational Reserve” remains officially undefined within DoD, and many current RC policies and legal statutes remain tied to an outdated “strategic reserve” employment model that hinders access. This needs to change.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board found that many senior defense leaders lack a Total Force perspective, and thus, focus on the Active Component (AC) as the default solution to overall force management challenges. As seen over the last fifteen years, the AC alone cannot meet our overseas requirements or our Homeland Defense requirements without significant contributions from the RC. Resource constraints, reduced AC force structure, and increasing global threats dictate the need for the RC to be used on a routine basis as an Operational Reserve force. While the term Operational Reserve is well known and routinely utilized by senior defense official to describe the Reserve Components and how they are used, the lack of a formal
DoD definition that defines roles, responsibilities and funding requirements negatively impacts readiness and limits recognition of the critical role the RC plays in the Nation’s defense.

Many of our senior leaders remain unaware of the differences between the National Guard and the Reserves; the strengths and capabilities resident in each of the reserve components; the cost to maintain and use the RC; or the constraints affecting their use. As a result, the Department fails to fully consider the RC in key strategic reviews. For example, the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) completed in July 2013 did not address the size, shape, and use of the Guard and Reserve in support of DoD Strategy; and finally, although the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review mentioned the RC in its report, it missed the opportunity to deal with any of these questions in a meaningful way. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, and the National Commission on the Future of the Army all recognized the RC’s role as a major player in the Total Force, but strategies and policies still need to be implemented to institutionalize the Operational Reserve.

Proposals to formalize the Operational Reserve are not new and many have been voiced previously, to include the 2008 report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve and numerous RFPB reports and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Despite the need, not enough has been done to formalize the Operational Reserve. To address this, the Board recommends the following actions:

1. Officially define the term “Operational Reserve” to ensure that the RC remains a ready, relevant, and responsive element of the Total Force. This action will lay the groundwork for formalizing the concept of an Operational Reserve. The RFPB recommends the Department approve the following for inclusion in all relevant directives, instructions, and publications throughout the Department:

   
   Proposed Definition: “An Operational Reserve provides ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized on a predictable basis, and fully integrated for military missions that are planned, programmed, and budgeted in coordination with the Active Component.”

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Robert O. Work, discusses the Secretary’s agenda for the Department and the primary goals during his tenure during the March 9, 2016 Board Meeting.
2. The Department should plan, program and budget for the continued operational use of the Reserve Components.

3. Guidance on Reserve Component use should be included in a new Total Force Policy; the Quadrennial Defense Review Report; Defense Planning Guidance; and Guidance for Employment of the Force. It is noted the Congress has recommended significant changes in a number of DoD guidance documents including the QDR. The RC should be included in all defense planning documents.

4. Services should continue to include the Reserve Components in their force generation models.

5. The Department should adapt the Global Force Management process to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for RC support, to facilitate service planning, programming, and budgeting for the activation and employment of RC forces under Title 10, Section 12304b authority.

6. Wherever possible, use Overseas Contingency Operations funding to support RC activities in real-world operations and when the Declaration of National Emergency ends, utilize 12304b authority to support operational requirements (see Sections 3.2, Maintain RC Readiness, and 4.3, Myths Concerning Reserve Component Accessibility).

Acting on these recommendations recognizes the previous contributions of the reserve components and the necessity for continued access to meet the needs of the Services, the Department, and the Nation. Failure to act means the Nation remains tied to an outdated, Cold War Strategic Reserve model, governed by ad hoc policies and other temporary fixes that force the RC to function in a degraded and inefficient manner, and failing to meet the needs of the Nation. It is time to acknowledge the need for a formalized Operational Reserve that is planned, programmed and budgeted to provide continuous support to the Total Force and the Nation’s needs.

**2.3: Increase Active Component / Reserve Component Integration**

The RC is 38% of the Total Force and has provided critical capabilities and capacity in meeting security requirements at home and abroad. In a period of constrained resources, further integrating our AC and RC is essential to mission success. The benefits of integration include, but are not limited to:

1. **Enhanced Operational Effectiveness.** Forces that train together in peacetime perform at higher levels in wartime because they have worked together and met the same standards.

2. **Improved Cultural Integration.** Inter-service barriers are reduced as personal relationships build mutual trust and confidence.

3. **Increased Readiness.** Skill sets related to RC mobilization and employment are exercised by routine mobilizations and utilization of the RC, ensuring units are available on a regular basis and prepared for a major mobilization if necessary.
4. **Higher Retention.** RC service members join the reserve to serve their country and real world operational employment results in higher retention, as validated annually by The Status of Forces Survey of Reserve Component Members survey.

Despite these facts, some barriers to full integration continue to hinder efficient employment of the RC. In the RFPB report to the Secretary of Defense mentioned on the preceding page regarding his questions on RC use, force mix, and cost, the Board recommended the Services improve integration of their forces organizationally, both in training and during operational employment. Additionally, the Board recommended:

1. The Army should move toward stronger integration of its combat forces through test integration of RC maneuver battalions into Active Component (AC) Brigade Combat Teams. While the Army has made laudable efforts to integrate its enabler formations in operational settings, it has done less to integrate its formations when they are not deployed. The Board noted, with enthusiasm, that the Army has begun to reexamine the establishment of multi-component units in its enabler formations during peacetime. While the Board is encouraged by this step, it recommends the integration of Army Brigade Combat Teams as well.

2. The Department should reinvigorate the Title XI program, which commits AC manpower to the goal of enhancing RC combat readiness. After Operation Desert Storm, Congress mandated the establishment of a program to enhance the readiness of RC ground forces. As a result, the Army committed AC manpower to facilitate training and readiness. After 2001, global operational commitments impeded the ability of the Army to allocate personnel support to Title XI requirements. As operational augmentee commitments for mid-grade officers and Non-Commissioned Officers have declined, the Army should reinvest in this program. Such a re-investment would carry three important benefits. First, it would accomplish the statutory goals of Title XI to sustain hard-won RC readiness. Second, it would restore a valuable mechanism to break down cultural barriers and foster increased cooperation and integration between the components. Third, it would retain a sizable pool of mid-grade leaders on active duty, which is essential for rapidly reestablishing AC force structure when necessary.

3. Increase RC opportunities to attend Senior Enlisted Courses, Senior Service Colleges, and CAPSTONE. The Services should also ensure continued access, and where feasible, increased access to senior leader development courses, adding to those opportunities provided through shared experiences on the battlefield or during operational training.

On a promising note, the Army is moving forward with implementing an AC/RC teaming program that encourages integrated operational training. Beyond increasing the interaction between Active and Reserve Component members, the Army is pairing AC and RC units together to form lasting relationships at all levels that will sustain and improve training readiness in the reserve components through partnered training activities, improving opportunities for leader and staff development, sharing operational experiences, and promoting personal and professional relationships between AC and RC members. The Board
supports the Army’s recently proposed Total Force Partnership Program and looks forward to its successful implementation not only among the Army’s Brigade Combat Teams, but within and among its enablers as well.

Although not a recommendation in the February 11, 2014 report, the Board has consistently advocated for increasing the permeability between the AC and RC as another area where integration can be improved between the components. Not only should the Department encourage transitions between components, they should make them easier. They should promote a Total Force personnel system that allows for the seamless transition of members within DoD, between the Services and their components. It is encouraging that the Department has recently started a regular AC/RC Permeability Working Group as part of their Force of the Future reforms.

In many ways, the Air Force leads the way in Total Force (TF) integration with the initiatives they have instituted, which are unique among the American military services. Integration through the stand-up of various Air Staff-level task forces, Total Force Associations (TFAs), and multiple key initiatives ensure the Air Force continues its flight path toward becoming an even more effective and efficient integrated Total Force Service while meeting the nation’s National Military Objectives.

Prior to the January 2014 report published by the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF), the Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) directed the stand-up of a Total Force Task Force (TF2), consisting of one Major General from each component to develop strategic options on the appropriate TF mix, to meet current and future AF requirements, identify legal, policy, operational, and organizational changes that will enhance our ability to integrate future TF capabilities, assist the NCSAF as required, and build an engagement plan to inform and educate internal/ external customers. This later evolved into the Total Force-Continuum (TF-C), consisting of one Brigadier General from each component, which continues to serve as the focal point for answering the NCSAF as well as manage those tasks given to TF2.

The NCSAF provided 42 recommendations in their January 2014 report; 14 were implemented and closed by the Air Force relatively quickly. The disestablishment of the Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command was the only recommendation in which the Air Force disagreed with the commission. The remaining 27 recommendations are in various stages of implementation.

In addition to the implementation of NCSAF recommendations, the AF continues to identify and pursue a number of opportunities to more fully integrate and break down barriers to a robust “One AF.” The Total Force Integration Executive Committee (TFI ExCom), chaired by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, was formed in July 2014 and has evolved to better support TFI efforts across the Service. Charged with identifying parallel efforts and integrating HAF efforts on Total Force initiatives, the Committee tracked 78 efforts, including the 42 NCSAF recommendations. The TFI ExCom provides a forum in which AF senior leaders can assess TF progress, address barriers to success, provide strategic direction, improve accountability, and showcase interdependencies with other programs, and reprioritize integration efforts across the Service.
Perhaps the most visible evidence of the Air Force’s commitment to integration, Total Force Associations (TFAs) are another way the Air Force leverages the TF to efficiently and effectively meet mission requirements. The Air Force currently has 112 TFAs in most core mission areas, 25 of which are “active associations” sponsored by the Air Reserve Component.

There are three key AF TF initiatives that deserve additional attention – High Velocity Analysis (HVA), Integrated Wing (I-Wing), and staff integration. Using the HVA process, the Air Force continually analyzes mission areas to determine the best force mix options. As of July 2016, TF-C has completed 67 HVAs to optimize the three-components in all primary mission areas. These efforts will be ongoing and directly support several NCSAF recommendations. The I-Wing pilot program seeks to test a new construct where a TF commander leads a multi-component unit. Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, has an existing KC-135 aircraft association construct, is executing this program, and will declare initial operating capability on 1 October 2016. If this construct proves successful, integrated units may supplement unit associations in the future. Finally, by fully leveraging the diverse talent in the TF, Headquarters Air Force (HAF) staff integration will improve the efficiency and capability of the staff to seamlessly develop TF policies, plans, and programs. Coordination and collaboration between AF components at the institutional level will increase, which will help maximize TF operational capabilities as well as produce more capable, TF-informed leaders for all components.

The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) echoed many of the concepts suggested by the Board as well as the need for increased overall integration. Their 2016 report, which included a section, entitled “Developing One Army,” contained 25 recommendations specifically targeted at increasing integration. While the Army has made significant progress since both the RFPB and NCFA reports and is publicly exhibiting a “One Army” philosophy at the most senior levels, there is still a need for increased and improved integration.

The concept of integration is equally important to all the services, which are currently at various degrees of integration. A broad vision statement is needed to further integration and direct services to allocate adequate funding for RC utilization. The goal should be to continue to push integration in each service to the greatest extent possible, eliminating misperceptions and barriers that hinder the Total Force concept. Integration in peacetime is critical to achieving optimal performance in war, and will reduce the expenditure of blood and treasure in current and future conflicts.

2.4: Establish Department of Defense Policy for Computing Personnel Costs

The Department of Defense has standardized the definition for Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost as a method to properly cost traditional defense programs. DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, makes reference to life-cycle cost and total ownership cost for defense acquisition programs, consisting of research and development costs, investment costs, operating and support costs, and disposal costs over the entire life of the program.
However, these same principles of fiscal discipline and programming policy are not used when calculating manpower costs across both active and reserve components, the Department’s largest account. It has become increasingly apparent to senior Department of Defense (DoD) and Congressional leaders, outside think tanks and subject matter experts, that the cost growth trends associated with the All-Volunteer Force have reached unsustainable levels, yet the Department does not know, use, or track the fully-burdened and life-cycle costs of its most expensive resource. Thus, major military manpower decisions are uninformed.

Figure 2-2: Base & OCO Personnel Appropriation

*National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2015 (Green Book)*
due to inaccurate accounting for actual present and future costs. The RFPB has determined that the Department suffers from a gap in its costing data because it lacks proper policy to require a complete and consistent costing methodology that can identify the true fully-burdened and life-cycle costs. Consequently, the Board recommends the establishment of policies to develop standardized factors which accurately define a fully-burdened and life-cycle cost for personnel, and proposes specific cost elements that should be included in them. It should be noted that this approach has support in the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, and the Defense Business Board.

In an interim report to the Secretary of Defense in June 2012, the RFPB noted that senior leaders within DoD do not have complete or uniform data to calculate the total costs of Active and Reserve Component forces. This conclusion was based on several discussions with senior DoD military and civilian leaders, who erroneously believed RC service members to be more expensive than their AC counterparts. Those remarks and subsequent analysis indicated the existence of gaps in the data provided to DoD leadership. As a result, decisions about military personnel as well as the optimal mix of Active and Reserve Component forces are not fully informed. Accordingly, the RFPB also recommended the establishment of appropriate DoD policy guidance to accurately and consistently capture the costs of both components in order to fill this data gap. The Board feels that knowledge of the fully-burdened costs of each component (active, reserve, civilian and contractor) is foundational for senior DoD decision makers as they make assessments and decisions on future force mix options.

Prior to publication of the 2012 interim report, the RFPB project team conducted additional quantitative fiscal analysis and met with a wide range of subject matter experts, inside and outside of DoD, to inform the development of a more complete costing methodology. These discussions included personnel from each of the Services, the offices of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Comptroller, Defense Human Resources Activity Office of Actuary, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Government Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment as well as private sector companies.

During this cost methodology study, a bottom-up approach was used to accurately capture all costing elements. From January 29 to May 24, 2012, the Board’s project team convened 16 meetings with costing experts from the Department to examine and

The Honorable Peter Levine, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, shares his priorities for the year ahead and his thoughts on adapting the force to meet key security challenges during the June 8, 2016 Board Meeting.
compare current AC/RC costing practices across Services and Components. This “bottom-up” assessment of the current use of cost elements within the Department revealed the need for a new DoD policy. In subsequent months, the research team pursued a “top-down” quantitative analysis of the Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) federal budget request as detailed in DoD’s “Green Book” and related budget materials. In total, they held more than 100 meetings for substantive discussion and examination of the data. The meetings provided quantitative validation of the relative importance and fully-burdened value of the various cost elements. They also found that when all the costing elements associated with AC and RC manning were consistently applied, a more accurate picture of personnel costing was achieved (for specific findings, see Chapter 4, Reserve Component Cost Comparison and Efficiencies).

The RFPB’s final report of January 7, 2013 found DoD is neither complete nor consistent in applying some of the most important cost factors needed to accurately measure the relative costs of active and reserve forces. While the Services generally do consider basic costs associated with active and reserve personnel accounts (like the annual appropriations pay accounts), there are significant costs paid from other accounts (either at the DoD level or by other federal agencies) which are not included in AC/RC comparative cost analyses. Consequently, such analyses fail to reflect the fully-burdened cost to DoD and other Federal agencies, much less to the American taxpayer. Therefore, the RFPB recommended mandatory inclusion of specific cost factors in all future Departmental studies comparing the costs of active and reserve components to accurately capture the fully burdened and life-cycle costs of military manpower. To summarize, the RFPB made the following six recommendations:

2. Specify all the cost elements that must be included in cost studies. At a minimum, DoD Policy should require that any study conducted or contracted by the Services or other DoD component for the purpose of comparing the costs of active and reserve component personnel or forces include the following cost factors: Basic Pay, Retired Pay Accrual, Allowances, Incentives & Special Pay, PCS Costs, Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Fund Contribution, DoD Healthcare Costs, DoD & Department of Education Dependent Education Costs, DoD & Service Family Housing Costs, DoD Commissary Costs, Treasury Contribution for Concurrent Receipt, and Base Operations Support Costs.
3. Identify mission support, Treasury contributions, and all other external costs that must be considered.
4. Calculate and report cost element figures annually.
5. Clarify the use of composite rates in studies.
6. Develop a model to calculate and compare life-cycle costs.

The Board also stated that the Director of CAPE must take the lead for the Secretary of Defense in finalizing cost methodology ground rules for the military departments and other DoD entities. Subsequently, the Deputy Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) committed to addressing this gap and agreed to work on writing a policy to meet the need.
The result was DODI 7041.14, Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Active Duty Military Manpower and Contract Support, dated 3 July 2013. The RFPB applauds CAPE’s willingness to pursue this objective, but as of September, 2016 policy guidance has yet to be published that includes the Reserve Component. The Board believes senior leaders must receive accurate analyses based on more complete data and the establishment of a standard costing method for determining individual component costs is essential when exploring AC/RC component mix and mission alternatives in a budget constrained environment. Until such action is taken, the Department remains uninformed on the true cost of the Total Force.

2.5: Enact Reserve Component Duty Status Reform

Duty Status Reform will simplify and streamline the complex and confusing compensation and benefits system for RC service members who currently report for scheduled training or operational support in one of 32 separate and distinct duty statuses, each with varying degrees of benefits. Active Component service members, by contrast, serve under a single duty status with a uniform set of benefits. These myriad duty statuses for the reserve components were directed by law or policy in order to track the costs associated with the administration, training, and use of the reserve forces. Such a large number of duty statuses may have had a purpose at one time but many were developed in the Cold War Era of the last century and are outdated vestiges from this period. With the RC routinely called on for use as an operational force, the large number duty status’ can also add confusion when they are employed. This byzantine system can result in unequal benefits for reserve members serving alongside active members while participating in the same operations and facing the same dangers. The unequal benefits even extend to what a reserve service member and their survivors can receive after a service connected death, including interment arrangements. The time for reform is now and this complex system must be dismantled to enable the RC to meet future requirements.

Many of the duty statuses can be streamlined and reduced simply through changes in DoD internal policies. Others will require the Department to request congressional changes in legislative authority.

To address this, Congress directed the Department of Defense to recommend reforms to the duty status system in order to remove inequities affecting personnel serving in the reserve components and to improve efficiency. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Section 515) directs the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to assess the recommendation of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) to consolidate the 32 RC duty statuses currently authorized into six broader replacement categories and determine what impact consolidation will have on RC efficiency. Alternatively, the law allows SECDEF an alternate approach to consolidation of the statutory authorities if preferable. If selected, SECDEF must advise Congress of this alternate approach and include a draft of legislation that would amend U.S. Code titles 10, 14, 32, and 37 for implementation by October 1, 2018.

The need for Duty Status Reform has been recognized for some time, with the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve finding that reservists were serving in an array of statuses driven by a wide range of policies, laws, and types of duty
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Authority</th>
<th>Purpose of Duty</th>
<th>Applies To</th>
<th>Type of Duty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 10147</td>
<td>Annual Training (AT)/Drill Requirement</td>
<td>Reserve Only</td>
<td>AD/IDT</td>
</tr>
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<td>Annual Training</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(d)</td>
<td>Additional/Other Training Duty</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Annual Training (AT)/Drill Requirement</td>
<td>National Guard Only</td>
<td>FTNGD/IDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(f)(1)(A)</td>
<td>Additional Training Duty</td>
<td>National Guard Only</td>
<td>FTNGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(f)(1)(B)</td>
<td>Additional/Other Training Duty</td>
<td>National Guard Only</td>
<td>FTNGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(d)</td>
<td>AGR Duty/Operational Support/Additional Duty</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12304b</td>
<td>Preplanned/Preprogrammed CCDR Support</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
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<td>National Guard Only</td>
<td>FTNGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Other Duty</td>
<td>National Guard Only</td>
<td>FTNGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(a)</td>
<td>Full Mobilization</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
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<td>Partial Mobilization</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
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<td>PRC</td>
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<td>AD</td>
</tr>
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<td>10 USC 12304a</td>
<td>Emergencies and Natural Disasters</td>
<td>Reserve Only</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
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<td>Emergencies and Natural Disasters</td>
<td>USCGR Only</td>
<td>AD</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ID</td>
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<td>Muster Duty</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(h)</td>
<td>Medical Care</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12322</td>
<td>Medical Evaluation and Treatment</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12323</td>
<td>Pending LOD for Response to Sexual Assault</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Retiree Recall</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Disciplinary</td>
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<td>AD</td>
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<td>Insurrection</td>
<td>National Guard Only</td>
<td>FS</td>
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AD - Active Duty
ID - Inactive Duty
FTNGD - Full Time National Guard Duty
PRC - Presidential Reserve Call-up
CCDR - Combatant Command
IDT - Inactive duty Training
FS - Federal Service
and recommended significantly reducing the duty statuses to which DoD concurred. The 2011 report of the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) also stated “the reserve duty system consists of a plethora of authorities to order a reserve component member to duty and a variety of purposes of duty – all of which need to be tracked in order to justify the budget request, remain within authorized strength limits, and comply with utilization restrictions.” The QRMC found that “… without first addressing the convoluted and complex system of reserve duty, it would be difficult to bring meaningful change to compensation and benefits.” Of note, the 11th QRMC did develop draft legislation that reduces the number of authorities under which a RC member can be ordered to perform duty, while retaining the ability of the Services and Congress to track and account for the purpose and funding of the duty. The draft legislation was delivered to the Department as a separate package.

Recognizing that Duty Status reform directed in 2008 by Secretary Gates was stalled, the RFPB voted June 5, 2013 to recommend SECDEF direct USD (P&R) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to jointly develop a plan that revises and reduces the total number of duty statuses driven by policies and authorities which fall under their purview. The Board also recommended that Office of the Undersecretary of Defense USD, Personnel and Readiness OUSD (P&R) should propose necessary statutory modifications needed to implement duty status reduction to the Congress.

Efforts to address reform are currently underway with OUSD (P&R) and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Manpower and Reserve Affairs OASD (M&RA) leading the effort, and began with an RC duty status reform assessment and review in December 2015. The process was expected to last for six months but continues as of the publication date of this report. On 2 June 2016 the Acting USD (P&R) submitted a letter to the SASC stating that the Department desired to develop an alternate approach to MCRMC recommendations. Work is expected to be complete and a report with recommendations submitted by December 2016. To support the effort, the RAND Corporation was also commissioned to perform a duty status reform study to inform the Department’s report to Congress.

A Senior Leader Steering Committee (SLSC) chaired by the ASD (M&RA) is overseeing the Department’s review, and is composed of General/Flag officers and/or SES-level civilians from the Military Departments and their Components, the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau, DoD Chief Information Office, the Office of the DoD General Counsel, and representatives from other DoD organizations as needed. The SLSC oversees a DoD Reserve Component Duty Status Review Working Group (DSRWG) composed of action officer-level subject matter experts on RC issues from the Military Departments and their Components, the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau, DoD Chief Information Office, the Office of the DoD General Counsel, and representatives from other DoD organizations as needed. The DSRWG is chaired by the Director for Military Compensation Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy.

The RFPB fully supports ongoing reform efforts and believes pursuit of Duty Status reduction must remain a high priority and continue under the next Administration and the continuing bureaucratic impediments must be overcome.
2.6: Enact Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Parity

Reserve Component service members face the same dangers as active component service members while conducting readiness training in support of their military missions. However, significant disparity exists between the benefits granted to the survivors of Active Component personnel and RC personnel when members are killed during training in specific duty statuses. The family of a traditional (part-time) guardsman or reservist killed in the line of duty will receive differing annuity payments depending solely on the administrative duty status (active duty versus Inactive Duty Training) at the time of the incident.

To highlight differences in survivor benefits when service members are killed during training accidents, the June 2012 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) cited an example using two hypothetical officers, each with 18 years of service (10 years of service for retired pay computation purposes), one on active duty orders, the other on Inactive Duty Training (IDT) orders. The monthly Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) for the surviving spouse of the RC member on active duty orders would be $2,908, while the spouse of the RC member on IDT would be $969... even if both deaths occurred in the line of duty, during the same incident. Additionally:

1. The family of the RC member on active duty orders is eligible for full SBP benefits, which provides significantly more in survivor benefit payments than those for members in IDT status who are eligible only for RCSBP (RC Survivor Benefit Plan).
2. SBP is calculated based on total years of service, whereas RCSBP is calculated based solely on active service, or total points computed under Title 10 Sec 12733.
3. The family of the RC member on active duty orders is also eligible for other key survivor benefits not provided to the family of the member in IDT status. These include:
   a. Annuity calculations with a disability rating of “total.”
   b. Special Survivor Indemnity Allowance (Title 10, 1450).
   c. The choice to extend SBP eligibility directly to dependent children (Title 10, 1448).
The 11th QRMC recommended DoD, “Calculate Survivor Benefit Plan benefits for a reservist who dies while performing inactive duty training using the same criteria as for a member who dies while on active duty.” Thirty-two military, veteran, and uniformed service organizations (known as the Military Coalition) urged this change as well.

On April 3, 2013, the Reserve Forces Policy Board voted to recommend the Department ask Congress to change the law regarding the Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Plan (RCSBP). Specifically, the Board recommended:

1. The Secretary of Defense should direct the DOD staff to provide a Unified Legislation and Budgeting Process (ULB) proposal supporting ongoing legislative efforts by Congress to remove the distinctions between “Active Duty” and “Inactive Duty” as they apply to the current Survivor Benefit Plan and Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Plan.

2. Removal of the word “active” from “active service” to enable equitable treatment under provisions in Title 10, USC, Chapter 73, Subchapter II, Survivor Benefit Plan, section 1451(c)(1)(A)(iii).

3. The calculation of annuity payments awarded to qualifying survivors.

4. The choice to extend eligibility directly to dependent children.

5. Eligibility for the Special Survivor Indemnity Allowance.

6. Annuity calculations based on a disability rating of “total.”

Utah Congressman Jason Chaffetz introduced H.R. 1770 on April 26, 2013. According to a preliminary score by the Congressional Budget Office during the 112th Congress, changing the relevant sections of Title 10 to eliminate disparities would cost $12 million over a ten year period, including $1 million in retroactive payments for families dating back to 2001.

Although there has been progress since the Board’s action and submission of H.R.1770 (which was not adopted), the issue is not fully resolved. HASC language in H.R. 4909, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, includes language that would implement the recommendations of the RFPB and others in Section 624 - Equal Benefits under Survivor Benefit Plan for Survivors of Reserve Component Members who die in the Line of Duty during Inactive-Duty Training. Section 624 appears to address the RFPB concerns listed above and takes several steps to eliminate differences in treatment for the survivors of RC service members who die from an injury or illness incurred or aggravated in the line of duty while on IDT orders. Until this resolution becomes law or other corrective action is taken, we must continue to pursue resolution of this blatant disparity and call for equal benefits or all who serve our great nation.

In the absence of broader duty status reform, ensuring the language of Section 624 remains in the 2017 NDAA is imperative to ensuring RC members receive equal benefits under the Survivor Benefit Plan if they die in the Line of Duty, regardless of duty status.
2.7: Allow Reservists to Accrue Post-9/11 Benefits while on Medical Hold

Under the Veterans Educational Assistance Act Of 2008 (Post 9/11 GI Bill), a Reserve Component (RC) service member of the Armed Forces accrues active duty service time credit for the calculation of educational assistance benefits only while serving on active duty as defined in Title 38 USC Section 3301. In this section, active duty for reserve component members is defined as service under section 688, 12301(a), 12301(d), 12301(g), 12302, or 12304 of title 10 USC. Excluded from the current definition of active duty under Title 38, is Title 10 USC, is section 12301(h), which provides a category of active duty for reservists while receiving medical treatment (i.e. medical hold status).

The definition of active duty is important because the Post 9/11 GI Bill benefit is earned with active duty service time (as defined by Title 38) accrued since September 10, 2001 and the benefit is earned in tiers. To earn 100% of the benefit, a service member must accrue 36 cumulative months of active duty time or serve at least 30 continuous days on active duty and be discharged due to service connected disability.

Currently, when an RC service member is injured or wounded while in a duty status, that member may be transitioned on orders to a medical hold status under 10 USC 12301(h) for a potentially long recovery and rehabilitation. This stops the accrual of active duty time that would count toward the Post 9/11 GI Bill benefit. If the member is not discharged because of the injury and instead returns to service - either deployed or as a Selected Reservist - none of the time spent in recovery is considered qualifying time. The service member would earn less qualifying time than those who served the entire time without an injury, and would not receive an equal benefit. In effect, this service member is penalized for being wounded or injured in theater. Ironically, if that same member was discharged from service because of the injury, the member would earn 100% of the benefit (assuming 30 days of continuous active duty service).

Recognizing this inconsistency, the RFPB on September 10, 2014 voted to recommend the Department ask Congress to change the law regarding the definition of active duty as it relates to reservists under Title 38, United States Code – Veterans Benefits for the purpose of accruing benefits under the “Post-9/11 Veterans Assistance Act of 2008.” For its part, OUSD (Personnel and Readiness) approved a Unified Legislative Budget (ULB) Change Proposal and forwarded it to the Office of Legislation Council for review and inclusion into the 2016 NDAA. However, Congress did not adapt the provision in the FY 2016 NDAA, nor in the FY 2017 NDAA. This change was last projected for resubmission in the NDAA for 2018.

Until this proposal or other corrective action becomes law, the RFPB will continue to highlight the issue and the need for change. Our RC members face the same dangers as their active counterparts and should qualify for the same benefits when injured in the line of duty.
New Chief of the National Guard Bureau and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Lengyel, shares his views regarding readiness challenges facing our National Guard and his thoughts on the future of the “Operational Reserve” concept as part of the Total Force during the September 15, 2016 Annual Board Meeting.
CHAPTER 3
Optimizing the Total Force for the Long Term

3.1: Integrate the Reserve Component into the Force of the Future

On his first day in office, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced his goal to build the “Force of the Future” in order to maintain DoD’s competitive edge in bringing in top talent to serve the nation. Members of the Reserve Component (RC) play a unique role in this endeavor for two reasons. First, the RC is made up of citizens positioned in communities throughout the country who interact regularly with the civilian workforce. Second, in today’s era of constrained resources and increasing global threats, use of the RC is essential. It is imperative to create a personnel system that supports permeability between the AC and RC, improves career management, provides increased flexibility of service options, and makes better use of civilian and military skills found in the Reserve Force.

Context

Much has changed since the current military personnel management system was established at the outset of the Cold War, but defense personnel management statutes, policies and information systems have not kept pace. The last comprehensive review occurred in the late 1970s and current joint duty provisions are over 30 years old. It is long past time to modernize the Department of Defense and its system for recruiting, developing, and sustaining its military manpower. This is one of the major priorities of Secretary Carter’s Force of the Future initiative.

It is generally acknowledged that when considering the fully-burdened and life-cycle costs of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), projected cost growth under current policies is unsustainable. Simultaneously, demographic and social trends are reducing both the fitness and propensity to serve for service-eligible men and women. Those who do decide to serve rely more heavily on access to information, technology and the use of social media than ever before. Today, the force - increasingly made up of millennials – is managed within a personnel management system established by baby boomers and their predecessors. Young adults entering the work force today are less likely to remain with employers for the long term than their parents or grandparents. Private sector prospects, along with other non-defense public sector opportunities, represent serious competition for the best and the brightest within the military and for those considering military service. In short, the work force has changed and the system used to assess, manage, and sustain them must also change to make service appealing to current and future generations.

Different Active and Reserve Systems

While the fundamental statutory and policy frameworks governing the Active Component (AC) and RC are the same, the Services use and manage their respective reserve components differently. Their personnel systems are inherently different based on the fact that members of the National Guard and Reserves generally perform their duties on a part time basis while also maintaining employment in the private/public sector. The RC personnel system offers greater flexibility than the AC system.
to accommodate this difference. The AC personnel management system is dominated by the requirements of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and centralized accession, training, assignment and promotion from entry to separation; up or out advancement within a rigid time-in-service structure; pay based on time-in-grade; and cliff vesting for retirement. It is a system that former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates (head of the 1970 commission that recommended moving from conscription to the AVF) stated had to be changed for the AVF to be sustainable for the long term. That was 45 years ago and none of the changes the commission recommended have been made.

The RC personnel management system can be characterized as having greater decentralization and choice. The RC must comply with the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA), like DOPMA; with it’s up or out advancement system. But, unlike the active force, RC members receive pay for duty performed and have retirement deferred until age 60. More significantly, RC accessions, training, assignments, and promotions are much more decentralized than in the active force. A member can enter the reserves at mid-career (from another Service, component, or special branch); he or she can take a sabbatical when they want/need to (by transferring to their Service’s Individual Ready Reserve); they have assignment flexibility except for tenured jobs (they can move when they want to or need to and compete for the jobs they desire); and they have opportunities for accelerated, merit-based (vacancy position) promotions - although these are more limited than they could be.

**Thoughts for a New System**

The Secretary of Defense and others have advocated for a new system, and the RFPB agrees. This new system must be viewed by potential entrants as a desirable and competitive career option; attracting high quality recruits and maintaining the best and the brightest for advancement and leadership of the Nation’s military services. It must develop professionals, promote institutional values, embrace diversity, and maintain key elements of service culture. It must produce a force that both represents and is connected to the population it protects. The system must be fair with transparent policies, practices and processes. It should be cost effective, produce ready service members, and be seamlessly integrated across components. It must be much more flexible and incorporate world-class business practices in terms of assignments, advance schooling and training, family considerations and non-traditional opportunities. Ultimately, our Armed Forces must remain capable of deploying and sustaining military power rapidly in response to a variety of threats at home and abroad to win the Nation’s wars, support our allies, and defend our interests.

To create a personnel system that improves the career management, permeability and flexibility of service options, and makes better use of civilian and military skills found in the RC, the Department should consider the following:

1. Embracing the “Total Force.” The Department’s culture needs to change to embrace active and reserve members, as well as their civilian employees as members of the same team – not separate competing teams. To that end, the Department
should encourage and incentivize continued service in the reserves to preserve talent from the AC that would be otherwise lost with Total Force reductions or otherwise routine transitions from the active force.

2. Enhance Permeability by Easing Transitions. The Department should encourage transition between the service components and remove the barriers impeding it. A Total Force personnel system should be developed that allows for the seamless transition of service members within DoD (i.e. between the Services and their components). Greater permeability will allow service members to transition between the AC and RC, retaining valuable talent by providing service members flexibility that accommodates changing life circumstances. Reduction of statutory impediments and bureaucratic administrative requirements should be accomplished to ease these transitions.

3. Specifically, the Department should create an integrated Total Force pay and personnel management system that is modernized and accessed through mobile technology. This system will enable streamlined transitions between components and improve the ability of RC members to manage their careers by enabling seamless movement of all administrative and other records between components/services. As a service, the Army is currently working to field the Integrated Pay and Personnel System – Army (IPPS-A), which could serve as a model. Integral parts of any new DoD wide system would include:

a. A single “cradle to grave” personnel record from recruitment to retirement, accessible regardless of component.

b. Improved inter-connectivity of IT systems to reduce redundant information requirements and flow between components/agencies.

c. Improved access to these systems, especially for RC personnel, who have limited access to personnel management systems necessary to monitor, manage and advance their careers.

d. Elimination or mitigation of redundant “scrolling,” or appointment, requirements for AC personnel transferring to the RC as required by Title 10, Section 531 and Section 12203 respectively. Depending on the service, the process of appointing a member to the RC can take as long as six months due to the burdensome administrative process. Adopting a “Universal Appointment,” or a single service scroll, with no new nomination appointment requirement if a member moves within the same service would significantly streamline the process.

e. Elimination of redundant medical screening requirements.

f. Portability of qualifications between services and components. Qualifications achieved for like fields in one service or component should be recognized or otherwise streamlined for acceptance during transition. Time and money are wasted retraining experienced personnel who could otherwise add immediate value.
g. Streamlined processes to ‘cross-certify’ or provide constructive credit for civilian acquired knowledge, skills and abilities.

h. Establishment of “Reverse Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS)” transition centers within or collocated with RC facilities and partnered with government and non-government organizations to provide “one stop shops” across the United States to facilitate a smoother transition from military to civilian life. A more detailed concept paper on this topic is included later in this report.

4. Reduced Duty Statuses. As mentioned in Chapter two of this report, the Department should reduce the number of RC Duty Statuses to ease the transition between RC categories, and make administration of the RC easier to manage as a whole.

5. Assignment Flexibility and Choice. Employ best practices from the private sector to advertise, apply for, review and select best qualified candidates for assignment to positions across the reserve force.

6. Developmental Opportunities. Ensure RC members have opportunities to compete for special assignments or educational opportunities that provide access to the deepest talent pool possible. These opportunities are essential for effectively developing RC senior leaders.

7. “Downtime“ - Sabbaticals. The Services are experimenting, on a very small scale, with sabbatical programs to allow service members on active duty to “take a knee” for educational or other personal reasons. Reservists, like their active counterparts, should have increased opportunities for the same, in order to meet the changing demands in their personal lives, for fulltime educational opportunities, or family and employment obligations.

8. Increase ability for RC members to pause promotion clocks during periods where they would be less available for military service. During periods where personal needs or civilian professional requirements make military service difficult, pausing promotion clocks would prevent members from being forced out due to lack of competitiveness for promotion and allow them to continue service once these demands subside.

9. Modernize the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The Services maintain these pools of pre-trained talent for use in both peace and war. The Department should gather best practices and explore alternative management structures and methods to improve efficiently and optimize use of the IRR in support of the Total Force. This is a large pool of pre-trained manpower that is largely underutilized (see Chapter 3, Reform the Individual Ready Reserve for Optimized Management and Use in the Total Force for additional information).

10. Enable Use of Civilian Acquired Skills. Reservists and Guardsmen often possess unique civilian acquired skills which often complement their military specialties and missions. The Department should collect civilian skills data residing in the RC to
provide decision makers with awareness of critical civilian skills when needed. The creation of a civilian skills database has been a perennial recommendation for several decades but, to date, the Department has failed to produce a useful system.

At the June 9, 2015 meeting of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, SECDEF asked for input regarding the integration of the RC into the Department’s “Force of the Future” initiative. The RFPB Chairman answered the call with a memorandum dated August 11, 2015 which contained many of the recommendations included above. He also provided his thoughts on improvements to better meet the needs of an evolving defense workforce in a period of dramatic change. Implementing these recommendations would ensure the RC is better integrated into, while also optimizing, the Total Force.

3.2: Maintain Reserve Component Readiness

Why is readiness important in the Reserve Components?

The Board was asked in 2012 by the Secretary of Defense, “What does it take to maintain a Strong Reserve?” Answering the question requires a brief review of Reserve employment and the critical role the Reserve Component plays in the Total Force. Our Nation, through a decade of investment and war, has built a more capable, better equipped, battle-tested Guard and Reserve force than we have had at any time in our recent history. As of October 2016, more than 933,000 Reserve Component personnel have been activated since September 11, 2001, both at home and abroad. More than $399 billion in Base Budget funding and $13 billion in Overseas Contingency Funding has been invested in Reserve Component readiness and operational use since 2002.

Now, well into the severe fiscal constraints due to the 2011 Budget Control Act (Sequestration), the case has never been clearer for Active and Reserve Components to be made ready to preserve the Nation’s capacity to deter and defeat aggression, while simultaneously strengthening the Department’s capacity to defend the Homeland and provide Support to Civil Authorities. With steadily increasing costs for active duty military manpower exerting extreme pressure on the size of the Active Component Force, the Reserve Components offer an affordable option, retaining trained personnel that can be

11 Pay and Allowances and Operations and Maintenance Costs
used when needed. The Board strongly recommends the preservation of Reserve Component capabilities and the Department should actively consider the Reserve Components to mitigate the increased risk associated with further Active Component end strength reductions as a result of resource constraints.

**What will it cost going forward?**

For about $50 billion a year, the nation presently maintains a strong National Guard and Reserve force that comprises approximately 40% of DoD military end strength while costing only 16% of the budget. The Department should not squander the benefits gained and the hard won experience from those investments. Therefore, the nation must maintain a Reserve Component that is accessible, available, and flexible to provide operational forces (when needed) to satisfy the range of potential missions required by Governors and the Combatant Commanders. The Department should institute policies and practices necessary for the continued efficient and effective use of the Reserve Components. Besides the continued use of the Reserve Components operationally, the Department should: improve AC/RC integration; use available manpower more effectively; and invest in Reserve Component readiness. OCO funding should be utilized to the greatest extent possible in support of the operational employment of reserve forces.

**What is the best way to use the Reserves?**

In their role as an operational reserve, the best way to use the Reserve Components is to actually use them and avoid the inclination to place them “on the shelf” until the next major conflict. The Reserve Components have a demonstrated record of sustained accessibility, readiness, and reliability. Reserve Components should maintain capability and capacity to reduce the national military risk associated with prosecuting major theater wars, long-term stability operations, or other combinations of significant or protracted force requirements. Operationally, the Reserve Components should continue to provide forces to help meet both steady state peacetime engagement and contingency requirements of the Combatant Commanders; both at home and abroad. The Reserve Components should be employed operationally as an integral component of our National Defense Strategy, although at a level below their use over the past decade. Further, the Reserve Components should be used to support each of the ten primary missions of the Armed Forces of the United States described in the Defense Strategic Guidance, and in other capacities required by the President and Governors. An authority that will enhance readiness while increasing capacity for operational support resides in Title 10 USC section 12304b, which allows Service Secretaries to involuntary order to active duty selected reserve members to augment forces for preplanned missions in support of Combatant Commands. The statute limits the duration to no more than 365 days and with no more than 60,000 reservists serving under this authority at any one time, providing the way but not the means for the support. Funding for 12304b remains a challenge, and may require OSD to direct
the services to plan for and program 12304b funding to ensure it does not become an unfunded and underutilized authority. Accordingly, the RFPB recommends that:

1. Both units and individual service members are mobilized on a regular and routine basis using 12304b.
2. Services budget sufficient funding for significant 12304b use two years in advance of preplanned Combatant Command missions.
3. Services should aggressively pursue and utilize OCO funding to meet operational requirements.
4. If services do not fund for 12304b use, a potential solution could be the establishment of a National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) style account for operational support, or “National Guard and Reserve Operational Support Account“ (NGROSA).

To create the readiness required to do all the things already mentioned, DoD should reinvigorate the Title XI program for all Reserve Components, which commits Active Component manpower to enhance Reserve Component readiness. After Operation Desert Storm, the Congress mandated the establishment of a program to enhance the readiness of the Reserve Component Ground Forces. As a result, the Army committed Active Component manpower to facilitate training and readiness in the Reserve Components. After 2001, global operational commitments reduced the ability of the Army to allocate personnel to staff the Title XI requirements. With declining mid-grade officers and Non-Commissioned Officers in the Reserve Components, the Army should reinvest in this program. Such a re-investment would carry three important benefits. First, it would accomplish its statutory goal to sustain our hard-won Reserve Component readiness. Second, it would restore a valuable mechanism to breakdown cultural barriers and foster cooperation and integration between the components. Third, it would retain a sizable pool of mid-grade leaders on active duty, which is essential for rapidly reestablishing Active Component force structure should it become necessary.

### 3.3: Include the Reserve Component in Cyber Mission Force Requirements

The reserve components contain a wealth of skillsets honed on a daily basis by dedicated professionals working in high tech fields, and more specifically, the cyber arena. As the Department of Defense builds the cyber force, use of these valuable skills developed by industry, at little to no cost to the government, can provide immense benefits o the Department.

Recognizing this new mission area as a unique opportunity for DoD to capitalize on its reserve force, the RFPB formed a Task Group to examine the Department’s cyber approach and to provide an objective assessment of its current path in developing its organizations, policies, doctrine, and practices for defensive and offensive cyber operations. The Task Group was further directed to comment on the proper force mix (between active, reserve, and civilian personnel) required for an optimized
force to meet the DoD strategy. The Task Group also considered how RC components should be organized, manned, trained and equipped in order to meet the DoD strategy.

During the ten-month study, the Task Group met with senior cyber leaders at OSD, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Service Cyber Component Commands, and the Reserve Components. The group also attended a number of cyber conferences and exercises as part of its analysis. The Board concluded that USCYBERCOM, the Service cyber organizations and the Joint Staff were making exceptional progress in sourcing manpower, developing training programs, and enabling the employment guidance needed to field a fully operational Cyber Mission Force. Study recommendations included the following:

1. The RCs should be included in Cyber Mission Force (CMF) requirements. At the time of the study, the Services had just initiated planning efforts to determine their presentation of forces to USCYBERCOM, needed from each Service to meet the CMF 133-team requirement. The rapid timeline to Initial Operational Capability and Full Operational Capability, resulted in most Services approaching their team builds using only Active Component (AC) members. The RFPB Cyber Task Group believed the inclusion of RC personnel in CMF requirements would reduce long-term costs, while leveraging civilian-acquired skills, Service-invested training and experience, and enhancing continuity and longevity. The study recommended the Secretary of Defense direct a Total Force approach toward manning the CMF. The study also recommended USCYBERCOM and the Services review niche cyber needs outside the CMF construct to take advantage of the full range of civilian-acquired skills within the RC.

2. CMF requirements should be reassessed by FY 2017. As part of a Total Force solution leveraging RC advantages, the Services should reassess their CMF force presentation to determine proper inclusion of the RC to meet the full-time CMF requirement. As the cyber threat changes and more data is collected on team effectiveness, capability and capacity, changes to cyber team composition, number and distribution will be needed. A robust development of performance based metrics should be developed to quantify these types of future force decisions and provide a sound basis for return on investment and alternative resourcing decisions, including AC/RC force mix.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\) USCYBERCOM and the Services are gathering metrics as they build and employ the CMF teams. As of June 2016, USCYBERCOM is not making any changes to CMF composition in roles, team size, or number of teams until after the initial build of 133 teams.
3. Executive responsibility for cyber schools should be assigned. To achieve long-term cost efficiency, the Department should study and assign executive agent responsibilities for common cyber schools to a single service. By studying course content and re-aligning their structure, overlap with advanced courses can be reduced and Service redundancy eliminated.

4. Skilled personnel should be recruited through a professional accessions program. Adopting a professional accessions program, similar to those used for medical officers and other highly trained and specialized fields has high potential as a paradigm shifting approach towards acquiring exceptionally qualified recruits.

Subsequent to the study's completion, the RFPB has remained engaged with USCYBERCOM-sponsored, Joint Reserve Component Council efforts, and attended numerous meetings and conference calls to track DoD efforts as they relate to implementation of the Board's 2013 Study recommendations and maintained awareness of other Total Force cyberspace capacity and capability developments. The DoD continues to expand its understanding of the cyberspace domain, including the scope of cyberspace operations required to defend U.S. national interests and the need for capacity and capability beyond that of the CMF.

Since the 2013 Task Group Study, USCYBERCOM and the Services continue to evolve the cyber build and their efforts to operationalize cyberspace. There is recognition that the CMF contains elite cyberspace warfighters akin to Special Operations Forces. This elite CMF force will be composed of the Joint Staff-approved build of approximately 6,200 personnel organized in 133 teams. While this effort provides initial manpower to meet requirements, it is widely recognized that the cyber domain includes more than defense of networks, and also requires defense of critical DoD infrastructure and weapons systems. The CMF is insufficient to ensure our freedom of maneuver and the ability for our forces to deliver not only cyber effects, but also kinetic effects. Hence, the Services are increasingly investigating new roles for the RC in cyberspace operations and as cyberspace enablers (e.g. as trainers).

Each of the Services are taking a unique approach for including RC in their CMF force presentation model, with only the Air Force formally including its reserve component as part of their build. The Army plans to build an additional 21 RC Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) for potential presentation to USCYBERCOM and has requested USCYBERCOM include these 21 teams as part of the CMF. The Navy is using their reservists as manpower to augment CMF teams, while the Marine Corps has stated its desire to include reservists in CMF activities while adopting the Navy’s approach of augmenting Active Component teams. The Coast Guard is investigating how it might include reservists in cyberspace operations and will likely also follow the Navy model.

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13 Since 2013, there have been periodic community meetings to discuss the transition of CMF training from USCYBERCOM/NSA to the Services. Significant strides have been achieved in the Services building skills-awarding courses that meet the Joint Cyber Training and Certification Standards. Similar to the assignment of executive agency for Intelligence training, discussions have also included an executive agency approach for Cyber training.

14 The Services are using the USCYBERCOM-run Individual Training Evaluation Board or their own Service processes to recognize existing skills/experience to grant training equivalency for CMF pipeline courses. Services also have pilot programs to recruit civilian cyber experts to join at a higher rank.

15 There are a number of issues to be resolved before USCYBERCOM would be in a position to support this extension of the DMAG-approved size/composition of the CMF.
Beyond the CMF, the Services recognize the greater contributions the RC can make in cyberspace operations and are fully integrating the Guard and Reserve to leverage RC advantages. One critical area not initially accounted for, but one where the RC will make a significant contribution is the Joint Force Headquarters Cyber (JFHQ-C) and Combatant Commander cyber staffs (Joint Cyber Centers, JTFs, and JFACCs). Cyber planning and synchronization of cyber effects requires experienced staff with unique expertise (e.g. Industrial Control Systems (ICS)/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)). The lengthy planning process and required intelligence and targeting expertise are mission areas which the RC is well-suited while serving in a traditional drilling status.  

Cyberspace force development and employments are fluid and will continue to evolve. Additional changes to the CMF are likely after lessons are learned and metrics gathered following the initial 133-team build and employment, and the RC should be an integral component of all future efforts. Air Force RC teams’ performance as part of the CMF will inform the Services and USCYBERCOM, and provide valuable lessons on further integration opportunities for RC service members. The RC will have a role in critical Joint cyberspace operations, planning, and execution efforts, as well as non-CMF cyberspace operations as part of the Department’s effort to defend our National interests. Building the most effective cyber force necessitates using all available resources, and the RC provides critically needed skills and expertise at little to no additional cost. Inclusion of the RC in the Cyber Force serves as yet another example of RC’s contribution to the Total Force.

### 3.4: Implement Individual Ready Reserve Management Reforms

As we continue to navigate a period of constrained resources and reduced force structure while simultaneously dealing with increasing personnel costs and instability around the world, we must seek new approaches in personnel management that are necessary to maintain an effective fighting force. There are critical capabilities resident in the reserve components, some of which come at minimal cost to DoD that we should employ to assist in this effort. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), a part of the Ready Reserve with more than 265,000 members, contains a pool of previously trained and talented personnel that has suffered from years of neglect and inefficient management as an all but forgotten resource. While the active force gets smaller and defense requirements remain the same or increase, the optimized use of all available talent will be critical moving forward. The ability to draw from the IRR in an effective and efficient manner, during times of national emergency or when critical skills are urgently needed, must be improved.

The IRR contains previously trained personnel with and without remaining service obligations, generally related to an eight year military service obligation. Most service members complete four years of active duty and serve the remaining four years in the IRR. The IRR also includes individuals with highly technical skills (e.g. cyber experience) who have already been trained at great expense to the Department. Members of the IRR are mostly inactive, are not obligated to drill, and are generally not paid.  

16 USCYBERCOM and the Services are gathering metrics as they build and employ the CMF teams. As of June 2016, USCYBERCOM is not making any changes to CMF composition in roles, team size, or number of teams until after the initial build of 133 teams.
However, they can volunteer for training or active duty assignments or be involuntarily mobilized for full or partial mobilizations, as well as for disaster response and other contingencies. While there is no IRR in the Army National Guard, there is a similar category called the Inactive National Guard (ING).

IRR/ING manning has declined from 800,000 service members in 1993 to just over 265,000 today, comprising nearly 25 percent of the Ready Reserve. Reserve Component (RC) members not assigned to Selected Reserve units, Individual Mobilization Augmentee positions, Active Guard and Reserve duty, the Standby Reserve, the Retired Reserve, or on extended active duty are placed in the IRR or ING. This includes personnel in the following categories:

1. Members separating from Active Duty (AD) or leaving the Selected Reserve with a remaining Military Service Obligation or other commitment to serve in the Ready Reserve but not placed into or designated as a member of the Selected Reserve.
2. Members without prior service awaiting training before beginning service in a regular component or the Selected Reserve.
3. Members in the delayed entry program.

17 DMDC Report 21111, Total Activations by Component and Reserve Category Code, 1 August 2016
4. Members awaiting basic military training before beginning service in the Selected Reserve who are not authorized to attend Inactive Duty Training (IDT).

5. Certain personnel participating in officer training programs, such as chaplain candidates and participants in the Armed Forces Health Professions Financial Assistance Programs.

6. Members leaving Selected Reserve or AD status that are eligible for and desire to maintain or obtain status as a member of the Ready Reserve.

Figure 3-2: IRR and ING Population

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18 ARNG has ING vice IRR
Challenges with the IRR

The IRR is difficult to manage because each service uses a different strategy and few services view the IRR as a manpower source worthy of funding. This mindset exists for a variety of reasons:

1. Access is a cumbersome and lengthy process, and there is no central strategy for optimal utilization of the IRR’s skilled manpower.

2. Several components have significant difficulties screening and tracking IRR personnel.

3. Accurate databases are difficult to maintain due to outdated technology and lack of frequent contact with members.

4. Physical musters are often not mandatory and are costly, leading to increased use of “virtual” mustering or “snail mail” as the primary means of maintaining contact and updating member information.

5. IT systems are not interconnected with other agencies (such as the IRS), who could assist in locating members when services lose contact. These systems also contribute to delays in transitioning from other components into the IRR.

6. When IRR members were activated during OIF, there was political criticism of the practice as a “back door” draft.

Difficulty in assessing, screening, and tracking of personnel often leads to inefficiency in filling contingency requirements because of poor awareness of force readiness. Multiple individuals are normally required for call-up to source a single set of orders (sometimes as many as eight to ten notifications for every one billet filled) as many are unable to execute orders due to medical issues, poor physical fitness, inability to locate them, or other disqualifier. Members who are difficult to find are also hard to train and often lose their qualifications. Additionally, most IRR members who want to train are not issued the Common Access Cards (CAC) necessary to complete on-line training.

Difficulties in accessing IRR members create such an administrative burden that the services essentially will not bother to employ their IRR service members, often creating an increased workload or higher deployment tempo for their remaining personnel. Since 2001, neither the Air Force nor the Navy significantly accessed their IRR populations. While the IRR comprises half of the Navy’s Ready Reserve, fewer than 1,900 members were mobilized and nearly all filled administratively oriented billets. At the same time, the Navy uprooted thousands of AC personnel from their normal career fields to use as Individual Augmentees in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations, causing significant strain on the AC that could have been at least partially eliminated by using the IRR. The Air Force mobilized 1,133 IRR members for Desert Shield/Storm (with less than seven days’ notice) and mobilized roughly the same for all of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. The U.S. Coast Guard, while boasting a very small IRR of just under 1,500 personnel, has never involuntarily mobilized IRR members and has recently cut nearly 70 percent of their manpower pool for lack of participation. While the Army and Marines have done much better,
mobilizing about 35,000 members between them, the Army activated less than 4 percent while the Marines used just over 10 percent of their IRR members since 2001.19

As mentioned, there is no central strategy for best utilization of the IRR’s skilled manpower. While DoDD 1200.7, Screening the Ready Reserve, states that all members of the ready reserve will be screened annually, and DoDI 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Component, states that “the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) will be screened, maintained, and individually prepared for activation as a pre-trained manpower pool to ensure the total force is completely resourced in the event of a contingency operation, national emergency, or war,” neither document states how services will achieve these requirements. As we strive to meet our defense strategy and global force requirements, while also becoming more efficient, the Department and the Services must make consideration and integration of the IRR as part of the Total Force solution a top priority. The Nation has invested heavily in the capabilities and readiness of the Reserves over the last 15 years, but prioritization of reduced resources, cancellation of the OSD-sponsored IRR conference in 2011, and recent organizational changes in OSD reduce oversight and management of the Reserves as a whole during a time in which we must leverage every available resource.

**How to optimize the IRR for the Total Force**

The RFPB met on September 2, 2015 and voted to recommend the Department establish a Joint Working Group comprised of subject matter experts from each of the Services, the reserve components, and OSD to gather best practices, seek quick wins, and explore alternative management structures and methods to improve efficiency and enable more effective use of the IRR in support of the Total Force. As is often the case with the IRR, while deemed important, reform of this critical resource was tabled while addressing other priorities. The Board recommends the following initiatives be investigated for possible improvements leading to a more efficient and effective IRR:

1.  Re-establishing the OSD-sponsored, annual IRR Conference.
2.  Expanding use of the IRR as a Continuum of Service option for members of the Selected Reserve as well as AC members.
3.  Transferring service IRR management responsibilities and resources to their respective Reserve Components.
4.  Affiliating IRR personnel with Selected Reserve (SELRES) units.
5.  Providing TRICARE Reserve Select coverage to IRR members.
6.  Providing incentives to IRR members to maintain current screening and contact information, immunizations, physical fitness, etc.
7.  Improving member access to virtual muster and distance learning sites through development of a CAC substitute and mobile device compatibility for accomplishment of on-line training and member screening.

19 DMDC Report 21111, Total Activations by Component and Reserve Category Code, 1 August 2016.
8. Updating and improving IT systems and data sharing to improve information flow between components/agencies.

9. Mandating and maximizing the collection of civilian skills information to enable better decision making while sourcing current and future requirements, in and across services.

10. Reviewing mobilization laws and policies for potential changes that would improve access to IRR personnel in support of mission requirements in peacetime as well as contingencies.

11. Allowing IRR members increased ability to freeze promotion or high-year tenure (HYT) clocks for improved career flexibility without penalty.

On his first day in office, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced his goal to build the “Force of the Future” which would enable the Department to maintain our competitive edge in attracting and retaining top talent to serve the nation. He directed a comprehensive review of the Department’s military and civilian personnel systems to assist in this effort. He has since released numerous reform initiatives whose success will depend on effective use and management of the reserve components. The IRR has a critical role to play in this and OSD should develop policies and legislative proposals aimed at optimizing it for this purpose.

3.5: Transition Service Members at Home of Record Reserve Component Sites

Today’s military service members transitioning from the AC are experiencing high unemployment, medical and mental health issues, and other reintegration challenges. The Department of Defense (DoD) has an obligation to return service members to society ready to face new challenges as they enter a new phase in their lives and service to our nation. The Department needs a longer-term, more collaborative process for preparing service members for reintegration into civilian communities as they conclude periods of active duty service. Transition assistance support is available to aid service members and their families via several disparate programs. To partially address the issue, Syracuse University, in partnership with DoD, the Schultz Family Foundation and the private sector, is participating in a job placement and training pilot program at Joint Base Lewis-McChord and Camp Pendleton. They will launch similar initiatives at 16 additional military installations over the course of the next two years. The pilot program initiative is a step forward. However, a more comprehensive program needs to be developed that will provide a “one stop shop” for transition, ease military members and their families into civilian life, and help to retain hard-won combat experience and skills in the Total Force.

Military members are recruited and enter service from the communities in which they grew up and went to school. Members often return to these locations upon completing active service and some remain affiliated with the military by serving in a Guard or Reserve unit or by joining the Individual Ready Reserve. Others leave the military entirely and enter our Veteran ranks. The current transition process occurs at their last active duty location, which is very rarely in the community from where they
came or where they intend to live and work. While transition programs have been improved, they don’t really cover transitions beyond discharge and are primarily focused on pre-discharge preparations. As a result, separating service members end their service in one location and must abruptly begin new lives with little or no coordination between their separation points and their ultimate home communities.

Figure 3-3: AC Retirements v. Non-retirements

DMDC Active Duty Separations 2016
In fiscal year 2015, DoD separated 189,527 military members from active duty. Only 13% of those separating service members had secured a military retirement. Many of those who separated returned to their Homes of Record (HOR), settling in locations near reserve component units.

In order to provide a more holistic, coordinated transition and promote the well-being of our members, families, and communities, DoD should integrate and facilitate collaboration of all of the government resources that are geared toward the transition process. This recommendation was outlined in the April 2012 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on Avoiding Past Drawdown Mistakes to Enhance Future Total Force Capabilities. In this report, the RFPB recommended the development of long-term “one stop shop” reserve community transition centers, utilizing existing, well-established programs in community facilities throughout the country.

This recommendation could be executed as Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) “in reverse” that would serve as transition facilities where service members would complete the separation process while experiencing a positive hand-off from the military to their civilian communities. When service personnel leave their communities, they enter service at a MEPS. When they leave the military, they should out-process at a community-based location where all government agencies and community-based organizations are present. These stations would optimally be established in or collocated with existing Guard armories and Reserve centers throughout the United States, of which there are 4,542. In addition, the Guard and Reserve have more than 160,000 full-time people already supporting these centers. This whole of government, whole of society approach would provide direct links to employers, educational and technical training institutions, local medical resources, Veterans Service Organizations, local Chambers of Commerce, Departments of Labor and Education representatives, and the full range of community support agencies available to transitioning service members and their families. Embedding these facilities in Guard armories and Reserve centers would also offer immediate access to those service members who want to continue to wear the uniform by facilitating instant entry into one of the Reserve Components or at least having them leave acquainted with the range of options.

Recruiting for Talent retention will become increasingly important as RC mobilizations and deployments continue to plummet and sequestration budgets degrade readiness. In 2015, 165,686 non-retirement service members separated from the AC and only 56,583 joined the Guard and Reserves. The RC can capture even more valuable talent, save training dollars, and achieve a higher experience level across their forces if the Department would proceed with this proposal. The transition centers described represent a great additional opportunity to retain departing service members who frequently bypass In-Service Recruiters at their final active duty installations.

With appropriate changes to law and policy, transition centers could be funded by pooling the budget resources of established programs and agencies like the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, Hero 2 Hire, Joining Forces, Departments of Labor and Education, and Veterans Affairs. Additional funding would likely be available
through partnerships with community service organizations, private sector partners, and state and local governments. With enhancements to Total Force Integration, these transition centers could be managed wholly or partially by Reserve Component Full Time Support personnel. The Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have an average of 21.35% Full-Time Service support personnel who are responsible for administration and readiness of the force at 4,542 Guard and Reserve Drill Centers across the nation. Programs such as the Air Force 3 to 1 and combined customer service provided by the Air Reserve Personnel Center and Air Force Personnel Center as well as pilot programs validating all component Force Support Squadrons are rapidly nearing completion with significant positive results. Lessons learned via these Total Air Force programs could be applied to the creation of the separation transition centers.

Take for example, an Air Force enlisted aerospace propulsion mechanic who completes his/her service at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA and returns home to Atlanta, GA to be officially discharged. After completing initial base out-processing functions

![Guard and Reserve Drill Centers](image)

**Figure 3-4: Number of Guard & Reserve Drill Centers**

Data collected by OASD (Readiness)/Readiness Programming and Resources (RPR) Facilities
at Langley, he/she would report to Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Marietta, Georgia to receive his/her discharge after linking into the “total force and total community” resources already established there. At Dobbins today, a Developmental Training Flight (DTF) unit prepares delayed enlistment airmen for basic training and enhances their understanding of the Air Force mission and military culture. Their mission could be expanded to serve those airmen transitioning back to civilian life. Dobbins ARB is near the VA Atlanta Regional Benefit Office, Atlanta VA Medical Center, Decatur Clinic, and multiple community based outpatient clinics, Atlanta MEPS, and a significant number of large civilian employers. Private sector partnerships could be struck with companies like Delta Airlines, based out of Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta, to secure civilian employment for separating service members. With points of contact established by these community based entities in the Dobbins Center, transitioning service personnel would be able to access all of them. The service member separating at Dobbins would become acquainted with Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard opportunities in the local area and the benefits of RC service (TRICARE Reserve Select, Tuition Assistance, etc.). Whether the individual leaves at four years, one year, twelve years, or twenty years, this community-based transition program, vice a duty-based transition program underscores the commitment we make to the force.

3.6: Minimize Installation and Infrastructure Duplication

Opportunities for substantial cost savings and efficiencies exist in the Reserve Component’s physical infrastructure inventory and military construction programs, especially over the long term. Thousands of sites are spread across the country and located in every state, territory, and the District of Columbia, with many within a few miles of each other. While the RC relies heavily on demographics to determine where sites should be located for recruiting purposes, there are duplications in the basing of RC units. In addition, many sites, especially those established during the 1950s and 1960s, do not meet Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) requirements, placing personnel at greater risk. The old model of maintaining separate sites for each individual unit or service is no longer sustainable, and ongoing efforts to consolidate sites and build joint centers must continue.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) annually compiles a facility footprint by reserve component, and the numbers are striking (Table E-6). The 2016 Summary of RC Facility Data shows that the RC operates a total of 4,542 sites, consisting of 40,408 structures with a plant replacement value of $86.5 billion.

The 4,542 RC sites include: Camps, Forts, and Bases; Armories and Reserve Centers; Armed Forces Reserve Centers (with two or more reserve components); Ranges and Training Areas; military facilities on civilian airfields; and Geographically Separated Units (GSUs), including leased facilities.

Efforts to consolidate activities in joint facilities are not new as the statutory requirement to provide joint RC facilities to the greatest extent possible already exists in Title 10, Chapter 1803 (particularly Sections 18231(2) and 18234(2). In addition, recently issued DoDI 1225.08 (May 10, 2016), Reserve Component (RC) Facilities Programs and Unit Stationing addresses joint
construction and consolidation opportunities by requiring each state that has at least one unit from two different RCs to annually host a State Facilities Board (SFB) to discuss future RC military construction (MILCON) projects, available or underutilized facilities, and other potential cost saving initiatives. DoDI 1225.08 also established the Senior Engineer Steering Group (SESG), which meets twice a year and includes the senior engineer from each RC headquarters or the equivalent Service representative for each RC. The SESG explores joint construction opportunities, best business practices, excess or underutilized property held by each service, and provides a venue for the services to exchange information. Together, the SFB and SESG institutionalize routine communication among service components that should ensure Federal and State property and funds are used efficiently.

The most recent large scale consolidation effort was initiated by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations, which were approved by DoD, the BRAC Commission, and Congress. The Army recommended the closure of 211 Army National Guard Armories and 176 Army Reserve Centers (387 total facilities), while directing the consolidation of both ARNG and USAR units into 125 new joint Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs). A few of these AFRCs also included Navy Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve units. While the effort was successful, it was also very expensive. Any future BRAC is unlikely to have the amount of MILCON funding that was available in 2005, so future consolidations would likely occur on a much smaller scale and take place over decades. Despite these challenges, efforts to consolidate are worth pursuing and should be encouraged.

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Figure 3-5: Number of Guard and Reserve Facilities

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22 Data collected by OASD (Readiness)/Readiness Programming and Resources (RPR) Facilities
In 2012, OASD (Reserve Affairs) initiated a Joint Construction Efficiencies analysis in order to:

1. Analyze the value of joint military construction versus unilateral construction.
2. Verify a realistic range of MILCON savings.
3. Provide more incentive for the reserve components to identify, program, and fund more joint construction projects in the future.

The analysis focused on 34 Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) built in 5 regions of the country during the 2005 BRAC, and indicated an average cost savings of 27.9% from the estimated unilateral construction. While not all joint projects will garner this amount of savings, the study does provide tangible evidence that joint projects are more cost effective. Additionally, the study concluded that it costs approximately 47% more to operate unilateral facilities than an equivalent joint facility. The analysis also revealed the following Joint Construction Efficiencies best Practices:

1. Optimized Pairings: Pairing the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve was the most prevalent joint pairing, and provided the most efficient use of space for joint facilities in which those two components are aligned.
2. Operational Efficiencies Do not mandate concurrent drill periods for units in a joint facility (as was required in some congressional insert projects). Maximum facility size savings will occur when the co-located units do not have (or are not required to have) the same drill periods.
3. Joint Facility Type Restrictions: Consider joint construction for only similar facility types (e.g., Reserve Centers). Facility cost savings come from co-locating units with similar facility requirements.
4. Unilateral Facility Multiplier (UFM): Application of the UFM to scale facility costs for the estimated unilateral costs is an effective method of estimating a number of non-quantifiable and lump sum costs, including non-facility items such as ATFP, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) integration, and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs.
5. Joint Savings Factor Tool: Use of the BRAC Joint Savings Factor Tool to estimate the unilateral facility space requirements provide a quick and accurate method for assessing potential joint project savings during planning.
6. Design Standardization: The use of a small number of design companies and Design-Build construction contractors will, where appropriate, decrease overall project cost and time to project completion.

In light of the information presented here, the Board recommends that senior leadership within each reserve component continue to seek consolidation opportunities and pursue joint construction whenever practicable, and that Military Departments give higher priority to funding joint construction projects in the future. Without a massive influx of additional MILCON funding
in the annual DoD Budget or in another BRAC round, this effort will take decades to achieve meaningful consolidation results. Nonetheless, the reserve components have a statutory requirement in Title 10, Chapter 1803 to look for joint construction opportunities, and this effort must remain as a strategic goal for the Department.

The Board also recommends approval of another BRAC round, as the Department has proposed, to facilitate consolidation across the Total Force.

3.7: **Retain Adequate Reserve Component General Officer/Flag Officer Structure and Grade**

S.2943, the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Sections 501, 502, and 925 make significant changes to the number, authorizations, and authorities of Reserve Component (RC) General and Flag Officers (G/FOs). The RFPB met on 15 September 2016 and discussed recommendations pertaining to those sections of S.2943. After careful review and analysis, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) proposes two recommendations.

1. Retain the statutory requirement of O-9 (three star rank) for the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard, and the Chiefs of each Reserve Component.

2. The RFPB supports amending the language of the FY 2008 NDAA, which mandates the NORTHCOM deputy commander only be filled by a National Guard member. Place the best Reserve Component Officer, regardless of component, in the commander or deputy commander positions at NORTHCOM. Evaluate other key leadership positions to be filled by Reserve Component Officers.

**Background and Discussion**

The RFPB supports simplifying and improving command and control of the military. Sections 501 and 502 arbitrarily reduce the number of G/FOs at a time when each Service and Component is recovering from previously mandated cuts. Reductions should be made in a deliberate manner after a review and analysis of requirements and not tied only to end strength. Ideally,
each service and Component would conduct their review and analysis on a regular and recurring basis, providing continuous validation. This is especially true in the Reserve Component in light of an overall transition from a strategic to an operational Reserve. Arbitrary across-the-board cuts would have immediate detrimental effects on readiness and unit effectiveness.

10 USC, section 12004(a) sets “The authorized strengths of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps in Reserve general officers in an active status, and the authorized strength of the Navy in Reserve officers in the grades of rear admiral (lower half) and rear admiral in an active status.” The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) of 1994 established the limit at 422. Exceptions allow additional authorizations for those officers counted against active end strength (10 USC, Section 526); Joint requirements (10 USC, Chapter 38); or those serving as State Adjutants General, Assistant Adjutants General, or at the National Guard Bureau. Title 32, Section 314 authorizes an Adjutant General for each State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. There is no statutory limit on the number of Assistant State Adjutant Generals; however, they are limited by the National Guard Bureau.

As of 1 April, 2016 there are 397 RC G/FOs on active status filling the 422 positions authorized under ROPMA. There are 102 RC exemptions and 169 NGB TAGs and ATAGs. In total, there are 668 RC G/FOs. The table below shows a comparison for each service between current RC G/FOs on active status as dictated by ROPMA and S.2943 cuts. Exemptions are not included. As demonstrated, the resultant number of RC G/FOs after S.2943 cuts is 315, representing a 25% overall reduction, and a loss of 107 positions. The active component stands to lose 163 positions from its Title 10 baseline.

The 25% reduction of active duty G/FO positions will also affect RC members accounted for under active duty head space. There are approximately 75 RC G/FOs currently on active duty. Section 501 would also reduce the number of Chairman’s

<table>
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<th>ROPMA</th>
<th>FY17 NDAA</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>% Reduction</th>
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<td>207</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>-52</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>-107</td>
<td>26%</td>
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NDAA General Officer / Flag Officer Reductions

Figure 3 6: ROPMA / NDAA GO/FO Recommendations Comparison
Reserve GO positions in unified and specified combatant commands from 15 to 11, set an aggregate limit on the number of National Guard G/FOs serving on active duty, and cut the total number of Joint Duty Assignment positions from 310 to 232. Section 502 eliminates the Assistants to the CJCS for National Guard and Reserve Matters. If properly utilized, these G/FOs, as representatives of the seven RCs, can ensure integration of the RC into the Joint Force. Loss of these positions impacts RC advocacy with senior DoD official and inter-agency partners. Careful analysis is required prior to eliminating these positions. Several studies and recommendations support G/FO reductions based on analysis of the requirements. In February 2016, the RAND Corporation published a study entitled “Reserve Component General and Flag Officers: A Review of Requirements and Authorized Strength.” This study was accomplished in response to the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, which directed a review of requirements for Reserve Component G/FOs in an active status. OASD/RA tasked RAND to complete the assessment. Although RAND's report also covers areas not pertinent to this analysis, the authors did complete an analysis of G/FO requirements in the RC. Based on an assessment of current requirements, RAND asserts there are potential opportunities for eliminating or downgrading RC G/FO positions.

In its report entitled, “Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense,” the Reserve Forces Policy Board explored the topic of senior leadership positions within the RC to determine the required number and use of General and Flag Officers. The report states several examples of DoD and Congressional efforts to find efficiencies through the reduction of G/FOs. Most all of those efforts were completed without evaluating similar reductions in the RC. The Board recommended that the “Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary (Personnel and Readiness), in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Services, to conduct a thorough review of the number and use of RC General/Flag officers to ensure efficient use within the RC; support their respective parent Service, and meet Joint General/Flag Officer requirements. In the case of the Army and Air National Guard, these reviews should be conducted in conjunction with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.”

Blanket cuts stand to have a drastic effect on many areas within the RC. The area that most drastically affects the RC is the elimination of the statutory requirement of O-9 rank (three star) for the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard, and the Chiefs of each Reserve Component as dictated by Section 502. Changes in the rank structure for these positions should only be made after deliberate and careful analysis. Although the provision would not prohibit the position from being filled by an officer with the same, higher, or lower grade than the law currently requires, it would reverse the decision from the 2001 NDAA, which directed that the RC Chiefs and the Directors of Guard components be promoted to O-9.

Repeal of statutory grades for the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau and National Guard Directors will impact their ability to represent the National Guard within the DoD, before civilian leaders, and with inter-agency partners and it hinders
the ability to gain consensus from the State NG to effectively train, man, equip the non-federalized NG for their federal mission. Without the statutory requirement of O-9 for National Guard positions, specifically the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, achieving the rank of O-10 and Chief of the National Guard could become substantially more difficult. Further, the pool of prospective candidates for that position would be reduced. Although the National Guard Bureau could still compete to have the Service Secretaries designate one or more of these positions as O-9, the number of O-9 positions will be extremely limited due to corresponding reductions in GO grade positions. The RC Chiefs are dual-hatted as Component Chiefs and Commanders. The O-9 rank for RC Chiefs and directors is important within the DoD to provide parity with AC counterparts, and loss of that rank will result in a loss of influence in their respective service HQ staffs, undoing years of progress in obtaining parity. Additionally, reduction in rank reduces impact & influence of RC in the Joint Force. Finally, retaining statutory O-9 requirement would avoid the tensions of the 1990s, which eventually caused Congress to mandate O-9 rank in the 2001 NDAA.

Section 925 amends language from the FY 2008 NDAA, Section 1824, regarding the NORTHCOM deputy commander to allow any Reserve Component officer to be considered, not just National Guard officers. FY 2008 NDAA, Section 1824 dictated “At least one deputy commander (for) the combatant command the geographic area of responsibility of which includes the United States shall be a qualified officer of the National Guard who is eligible for promotion to the grade of O-9, unless a National Guard officer is serving as the commander of that combatant command.” Section 1824 specifically applies to NORTHCOM as the combatant command within the “geographic area of responsibility of which includes the United States.” The very specific language in the statute mandates the deputy commander (or commander) position be held by a National Guard officer and left no flexibility to fill the position with a qualified officer from another component.

S. 2943 changes the specific requirement that the position be held only by a National Guard officer and expands the eligibility to include officers from the other reserve components of the armed forces. The RFPB supports this change. The board believes the best Reserve Component officer, regardless of component, should be placed in the commander or deputy commander position at NORTHCOM. Further, the Department should evaluate other key leadership positions in other combatant commands to be filled by Reserve Component Officers.

The RFPB has a history of supporting efforts to simplify and improve command and control of the military. S.2943, though, makes significant changes to number, positions, and authorities of held by Reserve G/FOs. Any changes should be made only after a careful, deliberate, and recurring analysis of requirements. Reductions should not be made based on an arbitrary percentage of end strength alone. The Board also supports efforts to place the most qualified person in key leadership positions, regardless of component, as directed by Section 925.
Doctor John Nagl, Headmaster of The Haverford School and Board member, comments on remarks made by Army Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley at the December 8, 2015 Board Meeting.
CHAPTER 4

Additional Background and Information

4.1: Reserve Component Use and the Operational Reserve Concept

In Chapter 2 of this report, the Board has recommended formalizing the transformation of the RC into an Operational Reserve in order to preserve the capabilities and skill sets developed after 15 plus years of war. Understanding how and why this transformation occurred provides the rationale for why this recommendation must be enacted.

At the advent of the Cold War, the RC was designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the Armed Forces in the event of a major war with the Soviet Union. In this role, the RC was commonly referred to as the strategic reserve. As a strategic reserve, reserve forces were not routinely utilized to meet recurrent defense requirements but kept “on the shelf,” and would be employed only in the case of major war. With minimal RC involvement in Vietnam, the RC remained in this capacity until the first Gulf War when the RC was called up in record numbers. Playing a major role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the RC performed admirably as a key component of the Total Force.

Despite the optimism and spread of Western liberal Democracy at the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union failed to reduce worldwide conflict, and DoD’s operational tempo increased as global commitments continued to expand. As the AC drew down in the 1990s, employment of the RC began to rise and became an essential element of the military’s operational forces, with reservists supporting operations in Haiti, the Balkans, and other regional hot spots. When the nation was attacked on September 11, 2001, the RC rose to the occasion and contributions to our nation’s defense efforts rose to almost five times the level it was before September 11th, 2001. The number of RC service members supporting contingency operations increased from 12.7 million duty days in fiscal year 2001 to a peak of 68.3 million duty days in fiscal year 2005. More than 925,000 reservists and Guardsmen have been mobilized since September 11, 2001; and in addition to the mobilizations, thousands of RC members have volunteered for extended periods of active duty service. At their peak use in 2005, national guardsmen and reservists constituted nearly 40 percent of all U.S. military forces in Iraq. The RC fought in two wars, avoiding the need for a draft or a full mobilization.

In response to recurring requirements in support of operations in Iraq (OIF) and Afghanistan (OEF), the notion of an operational reserve developed almost by default as RC units were mobilized on a recurring and rotational basis. Using the RC in this manner eliminated the need for a draft or full mobilization and enabled DoD to meet operational requirements supporting OIF and OEF. This use of the RC displayed the attributes that constitute an operational reserve – providing ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for missions with the active component. DoDI 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force, recognized this change but focused on providing guidance and developing policies vice stating how an operational reserve would be employed. Despite much debate on the issue and recommendations from numerous Commissions and think tanks, the concept of the operational reserve has yet to be institutionalized.
While the RC was used operationally, this major change in the role and missions of the RC occurred without changes in legislation, the approval of Congress, and was generally accepted by the American public. The question on the proper role Reserve Component members should play in the nation’s defense is often posed as an either-or choice between two employment models – a strategic reserve or an operational reserve. This supposition that a choice must be made is false. The RC should be organized, manned, trained, and equipped as an operational reserve which would ensure the surge capability envisioned in the Cold War strategic reserve remains available, and the forces required in peacetime deployments at home and abroad are ready and available as well.

One of the most important ways to retain an “Operational Reserve” is to keep RC members “operationally trained”. Continue to assign them viable and important missions; fund them for proper training and equipment to accomplish that mission; and avoid the inclination to place them “on the shelf” while waiting for the next major conflict. RC members have a demonstrated record of sustained readiness, accessibility, and performance. They should continue to be employed operationally as an integral part of our National Defense Strategy.

Our nation faces the prospect of a decades-long engagement with enemies at home and abroad. Meeting increasing security threats with declining budgets presents an incredible challenge, and part of the answer clearly lies with the RC—uniquely capable of responding in the homeland, maintained at a dramatically reduced cost when not mobilized, and employed operationally at costs on a par with the active components. Utilizing the reserves in this manner has been necessary and effective from Operation Desert Storm onward, with reserve involvement in every major operation since then. This reliance will continue and likely grow as active force structure cuts and increased security threats leave no reasonable alternative. An Operational Reserve provides flexible capabilities that are ready, accessible, and routinely utilized to meet needs both at home and abroad. Institutionalizing this concept will ensure the United States has a 21st Century Force prepared and ready to meet the Defense Requirements of the 21st Century.

4.2: Reserve Component Cost Comparison and Efficiencies

A frequent discussion topic concerning Reserve Component (RC) forces has been the cost of RC service members as compared to Active Component (AC) service members. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) noted that senior leaders within DoD do not have complete or uniform data on the total costs of Active and Reserve Component forces which often leads them to the false assumption that RC members are more expensive than their AC counterparts. Consequently, the RFPB recommended the establishment of appropriate DoD policy guidance to accurately and consistently capture the costs of both components in order to fill this data gap.

In line with those efforts, the RFPB conducted an in-depth cost methodology study to more accurately compare RC to AC costs, utilizing a bottom-up approach to accurately capture all costing elements. From January 29, 2012 to May 24, 2012 the
**The RC has significantly lower overhead and infrastructure costs when compared to the AC. While making up 38% of the force, the per capita RC cost is approximately 29.6% of an AC service member.

*National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2015 (Green Book)*
Board’s project team convened 16 meetings with costing experts from across the Department in order to examine and compare current AC/RC costing practices across Services and Components. This “bottom-up” assessment of the current use of cost elements within the Department revealed the need for a new DoD policy and culminated in the Board’s Interim report delivered in June 2012. In subsequent months, the research team pursued a “top-down” quantitative analysis of the Fiscal Year 2013 federal budget request as detailed in DoD’s “Green Book” and related budget materials. In total, the RFPB project team held more than 100 meetings for substantive discussion and examination of the data. The meetings provided quantitative validation of the relative importance and fully-burdened value of the various cost elements and revealed the following findings:

1. The cost of an RC service member, when not activated, is less than one third that of their AC counterpart. According to RFPB analysis of the Fiscal Year 2013 budget request, the RC per capita cost ranges from 22% to 32% of their AC counterparts’ per capita costs, depending on which cost elements are included.

2. While Reserve Component forces account for 38% of military end strength, they consume only about 16% of the Defense budget.

3. Reserve component members receive a smaller retirement than their active component counterparts. The RC accounts for approximately 17% of DoD retiree payout. The FY 2013 average Retired Pay Accrual is $12,834 per AC service member, but only $3,419 per RC service member.

4. Reserve component members incur lower health care costs. For FY 2013, DoD requested $32.5 billion for the Defense Health Program (plus nearly $8 billion in military medical personnel funds and nearly $7 billion in Medicare-eligible Retiree Health Care accrual funds) to serve more than 9.5 million beneficiaries. Only about 21% of those beneficiaries are from the Reserve Components, and as a whole, the RC member uses the system less than AC members.

5. RC members typically serve in their home town and seldom incur military moving costs for “Permanent Change of Station”, for which DoD requested $3,260 per AC service member in FY 2013.

6. With few exceptions, Reserve families do not send dependent children to DoD schools, and only reservists serving on
active duty are counted for Impact Aid calculations. For FY 2013, the DoD Education Activity requested $2.7 billion and
the Department of Education’s “Impact Aid” program requested $505 million. The project team estimates that reservists
account for approximately 1% of the DoD’s and approximately 2% of the Department of Education’s funds to educate
military dependents.

7. Generally, reservists are ineligible to use the military family housing system, which required $1.3 billion to build and
operate in FY 2013. Only reservists on active duty orders qualify for on-base housing, and few use it.

8. Reservists do not drive the need for military commissaries, which in FY 2013 cost $1.37 billion over and above revenue
income in order to operate. Only 3% of commissary users are from the RC.

9. Since the RC does not require as much infrastructure as the AC, it incurs a far lower cost for base operations support, such
as maintenance, security, and utilities costs associated with the housing, childcare and recreation facilities found on major
bases. This is true whether the reservist is mobilized or in a drill status. Of the roughly $36 billion in DoD Base Operations
Support costs, about 12% is appropriated for RC.

Figure 4-2: O&M Appropriation

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24 National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2015 (Green Book)
10. Reservists account for a relatively small portion of the contributions made by the U.S. Treasury over and above the DoD budget for defense-related costs.

a. The U.S. Treasury’s direct contribution for “Concurrent Receipt” of both military retired pay and Veterans disability compensation was estimated at $6.95 billion for FY 2013, but only 9% is attributable to RC recipients.

b. The U.S. Treasury direct contribution for Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF) over and above the DoD contribution was estimated at $6.44 billion in FY 2013, but only 29% of the liability for that cost is attributable to the Reserve Components.

c. The U.S. Treasury direct contribution to the Military Retirement Fund over and above the DoD contribution was estimated at $67.18 billion in FY 2013, but only 17% of the payout from that fund is made to RC retirees.

During a period of economic uncertainty and declining budgets, the RC provides incredible value for a reduced investment when compared to the AC. Using the RC as operational reserve will allow the Nation to meet Defense requirements at a reduced cost and provides the additional benefit of ensuring gains in RC readiness and capability are retained. RC performance at home and abroad has proven the RCs value as an integral component of the Total Force and our Nation’s National Security, and formalizing the operational reserve preserves this vital asset.

**4.3: Myths Concerning Reserve Component Accessibility**

While specific authorities govern RC employment, a less than complete understanding of these authorities with both policy and statute-mandated advance notice requirements can create the false impression of an overly complex process. Difficulty in accessing the RC is often lamented by active component leaders as a barrier to their effective employment, and a general argument against RC use. In reality, however, barriers to access are sometimes perceived based on a misunderstanding of multiple authorities allowing for RC employment. It is therefore critical that senior DoD civilian and military leaders have at least a basic comprehension of authorities and policy relating to mobilization of RC personnel and organizations. DODI 1235.12, dated June 7, 2016, addresses authorities, procedures, and timelines for Access to the RC. Some key points of this instruction, relevant to common anecdotal myths concerning RC access, are included in the following paragraphs.

**Primary Involuntary Mobilization Authorities**

Since 2001, Title 10 US Code 12302, Partial Mobilization of the Reserve Component, has been used extensively for involuntary RC employment. This authority allows for the involuntary mobilization of up to one million members of the Ready Reserve at any one time, for a period not to exceed twenty-four months and requires a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency (DNE) in accordance with Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1622(d). President Bush signed the DNE

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25 Title 10 United States Code Armed Forces, Volume III Subtitle E Reserve Components, as amended 7 January 2011, Sections 12302, 2286.
on September 14, 2001, and it has been extended on an annual basis each year since by both Presidents Bush and Obama. A recent letter from OSD tasked the services with devising plans for a transition to 12304b authority, anticipating no additional extension of the NDE beyond FY 2017.

Title 10 USC Section 12304b provides authority to Service Secretaries to involuntary order to active duty selected reserve members to augment forces for pre-planned and pre-budgeted missions in support of Combatant Commands. This statute limits the duration to no more than 365 consecutive days for a maximum of 60,000 reservists at any given time.26 As of July 5, 2016, according to the Defense Manpower Data Center, 25,107 RC members were serving in an involuntary activation status,

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26 Title 10 USC Section 12304b
27 Title 10 US Code
so current requirements could potentially be met under the 12304b maximum if pre-planned and budgeted for by Services. While RC activation under 12304b allows flexibility by not requiring a DNE, it does mandate operations be pre-planned and pre-budgeted, thus driving services to commit to RC activations two years in advance due to budget cycle input requirements. The 365 consecutive day limit also will likely drive changes to some of the services’ deployment schedules, as the limit applies to pre-mobilization time, mobilization, post-mobilization time, and leave accrued while mobilized.

**Advanced Notification Requirements**

Much of the perceived difficulty in accessing the RC is rooted in notification requirements. As addressed elsewhere in this document, as well as in the findings of other bodies tasked with improving AC/RC integration, predictability is a key factor in efficient use of the RC, and predictability requires sufficient advance notice. DoD policy directs “Military Services will issue orders to RC members ordered to active duty in the most expeditious manner possible to facilitate members’ notification to employer and family, and other planning considerations.”

Furthermore, both policy and statute dictate specific minimum notice for RC activations, demobilizations, and extensions, with provisions for emergent requirements.

The DoD standard for advanced notice of an involuntary activation is 180 days for pre-planned requirements, and 120 days for emergent requirements, and while service secretaries may approve activations in advance of 120 days, anything less than 120 days prior to the activation date requires SECDEF approval. For time-critical emergencies and some short term (less than 30 day) activations, service secretaries retain approval authority until 30 days prior to activation, at which time approval authority reverts to SECDEF. If the operational situation requires immediate activation of RC forces, SECDEF may approve activation as soon as the orders are issued, though congressional notification may be required.

In addition to predictability, stability is also critical in effective management of RC forces. DODI 1235.12 addresses this, stating “the period of activation will remain constant once approved and issued. This permits the RC member, their family, and their employer to plan accordingly for their departure and return.” While conditions may arise requiring the extension of activation, combatant commanders may not unilaterally extend RC members. Service secretaries may authorize an extension if the extension is for less than 30 days, and the approval occurs 30 or more days prior to the originally scheduled end date. If either of these conditions cannot be met, approval authority resides only with SECDEF. Similarly, authority to modify the activation start date can only be accomplished by a service secretary 45 or more days prior to activation and for changes of 30 days or less. If either of these limits is exceeded, approval can only be authorized by SECDEF.

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28 DODI 1235.12, June 7, 2016, Accessing the Reserve Component, Section 3(e).
29 DODI 1235.12, June 7, 2016, Accessing the Reserve Component, Section 13(a).
**Mobilization-To-Dwell Ratio**

In addition to notification requirements, mobilization-to-dwell ratio requirements are another frequent source of RC accessibility-related confusion. The mobilization period starts on the date of involuntary activation and ends on the date of demobilization. The ratio of this period compared to the period between activations is the mobilization-to-dwell (mob-todwell) ratio. Generally, SECDEF approval is required for individuals or units with a mob-to-dwell ratio of less than 1:4. Service secretaries may approve activations for units and individuals who agree to waive a lower than 1:4 dwell ratio.

Though real potential for confusion exists in the process of accessing the RC, advanced planning will allow for the predictability, stability, and good communication required for effective RC employment, and mechanisms do exist to provide the flexibility needed to operate in today’s often dynamic conditions. While additional requirements and prior notification may seem at times inconvenient to AC planners, it is important to note that these apply to partial, involuntary mobilization authorities, and that emergent or critical requirements, such as Presidential Emergency Call-Up would be met through specific authorities designed for those purposes. Voluntary mobilizations under separate authorities can also fill these mobilization requirements, often with fewer restrictions than detailed above.

**4.4: Reserve Component Performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom**

An exhaustive study conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) to assess RC performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) found no discernible difference between the AC and RC. The finding is even more impressive when considering the fact that the cost for a reserve unit is roughly one third that of an active unit.

The study resulted from an RFPB meeting held on June 9th, 2015, when Secretary of Defense Ash Carter requested that the Board conduct an assessment to help him understand the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan relative to the Reserve Component.

The RFPB contracted with IDA to complete a study to assess the performance and operational effectiveness of RC forces during OIF from 2003 – 2011. The RFPB also contracted for a follow-on study for Operation Enduring Freedom which is ongoing as of the publishing date of this report.

IDA assembled a team of experts and set about completing the work in two phases, consisting of the following:

**Phase 1: Investigation of Performance Data, Proof of Concept, and Plan Development**

1. Obtain sufficient data associated with OIF and OEF operations that can be used to objectively analyze operational effectiveness.
a. Solicit input from the Services, Reserve Components, Joint Staff, OSD offices, specific combatant commands, DIA, etc.

b. Identify which data are most viable for quantitative assessment and where qualitative assessments might be justifiable.

2. Conduct a quantitative proof of concept via comparative analysis of the operational significant activities (SIGACTs) database.

3. Develop a plan for the performance assessment of RC forces employed in OIF.

4. Present both the proof of concept and plan for performance assessment to the sponsor in the form of a briefing.

**Phase 2: Performance Assessment**

1. Review and assess the deployment and performance of RC forces during three phases of major military operations.
   a. The initial deployment of RC forces to OIF.
   b. The ‘OIF Surge’ of forces in 2007.
   c. The troop reduction, transition to Operation New Dawn and withdrawal of US forces.

2. Conduct comparative analyses when possible.

IDA prepared both classified and unclassified versions of the report, reviewing thousands of documents and synthesizing numerous sources of data to include manpower data, safety and casualty data, archived interview transcripts, histories, testimonies, surveys, after action reports, aviation strike data, mobility databases, significant activities (SIGACTs) reports from operations, and other studies by research organizations. IDA also conducted about one hundred focused interviews with senior leaders involved in the critical activities and decision making associated with OIF. These leaders represented the DoD, the Joint Staff, the Combatant and warfighting commands, and the Services. Research participants included Service Chiefs, Reserve Component Chiefs, Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau, the last two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and warfighting commanders from the battalion or squadron level to the four star flag officer level.

The following observations highlight key takeaways from the Study:

1. Strategic leaders were overall pleased with RC contributions and performance in OIF.
   a. Met their intent and when asked, RC forces and individuals stepped up and served.
   b. The Nation could not have conducted the long campaigns and preserved the all-volunteer force.
2. The decision to disaggregate the Time-Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD) from the execution of the OIF war plan had major impacts on how the Services utilized the RCs.
   a. The doctrine of the DoD and all of the supporting decision making and synchronizing mechanisms and systems relied on the TPFDD; ad hoc processes had to suddenly be created, but could not be synchronized.
   b. Less ready units were forced to be moved ahead of others for deployment, alert to mobilization times were extremely short, and units arrived in theater without supporting organizations or without their equipment.

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Data collected and provided by Institute for Defense Analysis 2016
3. Relationships between the AC and RC mattered.
   a. There was purposeful employment of RC individuals and organizations in OIF based upon relationships with the AC of all Services.
   b. These relationships, over time, helped build a foundation of trust.
4. Readiness levels mattered (individual and collective).
   a. Limited exposure to the equipment and systems of AC counterparts created a cycle of frustration and expectation mismatch between the AC and RC.
   b. Operational communities and organizational staffs that had periodic operational/deployment, warfighter, and training center experience with their AC counterparts and with joint entities, seemed to integrate easier.
   c. Many institutions were not prepared for large scale mobilizations at the onset.
   d. Over time, increased resourcing levels and investments, equipment purchases, and institutional experience, mitigated some of these impacts.
5. From transcripts and interviews, in functions and missions where RC organizations and individuals brought to bear their vast, professional, and sometime unique experiences, minimal performance friction with the AC seemed to exist.
6. The greatest friction appeared in ground combat discussions at division level and below between AC Army and ARNG Infantry Brigades, and between AC Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve Infantry Battalions.
7. Performance data was not readily captured and made available for analyses; there was no single plan, systematic process, or system to capture such data.
8. Joint Doctrine states that operational assessments will take place with an emphasis on transparency and credibility.
9. Aggregated tactical level data (SIGACTs, casualties, mishaps, strike) depict a shared burden, a shared risk, and no sizable differences in measurable metrics.

The key takeaway IDA found after their exhaustive review was that there was no measurable difference between the active and reserve components for RC units that had adequate pre-deployment training. This finding, combined with the fact that RC units’ costs approximately a third of the cost of an AC unit when not mobilized, highlight the incredible value the RC contributes to the Total Force. Senior leaders, both military and civilian, need to understand the significant capabilities that the RC can provide in support of the Nation’s Defense requirements, and to ensure that improvements in RC readiness and experience are retained by continued employment as an operational reserve.
4.5: **Role of the Reserve Component in Homeland Defense**

The Reserve Component is part of the synchronized Federal emergency response system providing assistance in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for shared state and federal accountability for the security of the homeland. Federal reserve units and service members can provide limited conditional support, while the National Guard, as an organization with shared state and federal mission objectives, is a routinely utilized fusion agent that synchronizes state, federal, and homeland defense and security efforts.

![Spectrum of Operations](image-url)

*Figure 4-5: Spectrum of Operations*
At the national level, the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security still draw distinct lines between “defense” and “security” activities, with neither wanting to encroach upon the mission of the other.

At the state level, the National Guard straddles the operational, fiscal and mission lanes of these federal agencies and has mission responsibilities under both overarching national strategies. In more than half of the states and territories, the Military Department is also responsible for the emergency management functions and for administering Department of Homeland Security grants in addition to Department of Defense funding.

When a major disaster or emergency occurs in an area subject to the laws of any State, Territory, or District of Columbia, the Governor of the State affected normally should be the principal civil authority supported by the primary Federal agency and its supporting Federal entities. The Adjutant General of the State, or his or her subordinate designee, normally should be the principal military authority. As the Governor’s designated homeland security advisor in many states, the Adjutant General also deals routinely with the Secretary of Homeland Security in addition to civilian and uniformed officials of the Department of Defense. As a state agency, the military department can place National Guard members on state active duty (to the extent permitted by state law) and assign them duties that qualify for reimbursement under Department of Homeland Security (ODP) grants.

The legal framework that governs federal and state roles and responsibilities dictates which component can respond and in what capacity.

Stafford Act (42 USC, Section 5121). The Stafford Act was designed to bring an orderly and systemic means of federal natural disaster assistance for state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to aid citizens. Congress’ intention was to encourage states and localities to develop comprehensive disaster preparedness plans, prepare for better intergovernmental coordination in the face of a disaster, encourage the use of insurance coverage, and provide Federal assistance programs for losses due to a disaster.

Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (18 USC, Section 1385) Section 1385 of Title 18, United States Code (USC). The PCA states: “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”

The PCA does not apply to the U.S. Coast Guard in peacetime or to the National Guard in Title 32 or State Active Duty status. The substantive prohibitions of the PCA were extended to all the services with the enactment of 10 USC, Section 375. As required by 10 USC, Section 375 the Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defense Directive 5525.5, which precludes members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps from direct participation in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.
The PCA generally prohibits U.S. military personnel from direct participation in law enforcement activities. Some of those law enforcement activities would include interdicting vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military’s role in domestic affairs.

The United States Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws of the U.S. The most common example is counterdrug assistance (10 USC, Sections 371-381). Military support to civilian law enforcement is carried out in strict compliance with the Constitution and U.S. laws and under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense.

Other relevant statutes and policies include:

The Insurrection Act (10 USC, Sections 331-335). This act allows the President to use U.S. military personnel at the request of a state legislature or governor to suppress insurrections. It also allows the President to use federal troops to enforce federal laws when rebellion against the authority of the U.S. makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the U.S. Assistance in the case of crimes involving nuclear materials (18 USC, Section 831). This statute permits DoD personnel to assist the Justice Department in enforcing prohibitions regarding nuclear materials, when the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an “emergency situation” exists posing a serious threat to U.S. interests and is beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies.

Emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (10 USC, Section 382). When the attorney general and the secretary of defense jointly determine that an “emergency situation” exists that poses a serious threat to U.S. interests and is beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies, DoD personnel may assist the Justice Department in enforcing prohibitions regarding biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members; order to active duty other than during war or national emergency (10 USC, Section 12304). While a federal response using RC Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines units must comply with the legal framework listed above, the RC of these services does include significant capabilities vital for supporting lead agencies during responses to domestic emergencies and disaster relief efforts. 10 USC, Section 12304a, amended by the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, provides new authority for the Active and Reserve Components (Title 10) to assist citizens and communities in the United States during domestic emergencies to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage.

Title 10 USC, Section 12304a authorizes Reservists to provide disaster assistance to a major natural disaster or emergency in the United States at the request of the governor of a state. 10 USC, Section 12304b authorizes Federal Reserve units to respond to certain emergencies and humanitarian assistance in other nations. This includes the authority to order up to 200,000
members to active duty for a continuous period of up to 365 days to provide assistance to either the federal government or an individual state in time of a serious man-made disaster, accident or natural catastrophe.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DoD Directive 3025.18). Immediate Response is conducted by Reserve units and Soldiers under the Immediate Response Authority (IRA) outlined in this directive, which authorizes commanders, upon the request of local officials, to take action to save lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great property damage in a situation of urgency when there is insufficient time to get approval from higher headquarters.

Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) is a US military reserve training opportunity that provides real world training opportunities for service members and units to prepare them for their wartime mission while supporting the needs of America’s underserved communities. Medical care including dentistry and optometry, civil engineering, construction, and public works projects are provided to these communities at no additional cost by Military Reserve components.

**National Guard Specific Capabilities**

32 USC, Section 112(D), authorizes the National Guard, as a component of the Department of Defense, to conduct counterdrug operations. The counterdrug mission supports the detection, interdiction, disruption and curtailment of drug trafficking activities through the use and application of the military’s unique skills and resources. This provides a bridge between civilian law enforcement and the military by bringing core DOD capabilities and resources to bear against drug related threats while leveraging the Guard’s unique legal ability to operate on U.S. soil and abroad.

The Emergency Management Assistant Compact (EMAC) is a national mutual aid partnership agreement that allows state to state assistance during governor or federally declared emergencies. The EMAC concept was approved in Congress in 1996 (Public Law 104-321) and provides governors a means to quickly request assistance for any type of emergency, from earthquakes to acts of terrorism. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita showcased the largest deployment of state-to-state aid in history and included the deployment of 46,488 National Guard members.

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) and high-yield explosive enhanced Response Force Package provides immediate CBRN incident response capabilities to the governor such as incident site research of collapsed building and structures, conducting rescue tasks to extract trapped casualties, providing mass decontamination, performing medical triage and initial treatment to stabilize patients for transport to medical facilities. There is at least one National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and high-yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (NG CERFP) in each of the ten FEMA regions.

Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) are National Guard units designed to provide a specialized capability to respond to CBRN incidents primarily in a Title 32 operational status within the United States, the District of Columbia,
its territories and possessions, as established by 10 USC Section 12310. Congress, the President, and DoD recognized that the WMD-CSTs, responding under the authority of the Governor, provide significant capabilities to assist local and state agencies that may be overwhelmed by a large-scale terrorist attack or where specific technical capabilities to identify CBRN materials are required. The mission of the WMD-CST is to support civil authorities at the direction of the Governor at domestic CBRN incident sites by identifying CBRN agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional support. The WMD-CST consists of 22 ARNG and ANG personnel serving in a Title 32, Full-Time National Guard (FTNG) duty status; also known as Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) status. The unit consists of six sections: command, operations, administration/logistics, medical/analytical, communications, and survey. The WMD-CST is required to maintain a level of readiness that will allow for a rapid response within established timelines. The unit is specially trained and equipped to assist local, tribal, state, and Federal emergency response organizations with state of the art equipment. They also have a technical and analytical reach back capability to other experts who may assist the local response. There are 57 WMD-CSTs spread out among the States and territories.

The Air National Guards’ C-130s equipped with Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS) provide the U.S. Forest Service additional aerial fire-fighting assets to assist after the capabilities of commercial and contract air tankers have been exhausted. Congress established the MAFFS to assist in the wildfire suppression program lessoning the risk to firefighters and civilians while protecting critical infrastructure and personal property.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) currently fields and provides program management oversight for three Critical Infrastructure Protection – Mission Assurance Assessment (CIP-MAA) teams. Each CIP-MAA team conducts all-hazard risk assessments on critical Defense Industrial Based (DIB) assets for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Conducting risk assessments on critical DIB assets is a key component to OASD’s overall responsibility set forth in Department of Defense Directive 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure. In addition to the CIP-MAA teams, the National Guard also fields nineteen DHS Vulnerability Assessment Teams (VATs) that conduct assessments of prioritized critical infrastructure and key resource assets. Teams are situated in thirteen states and provide coverage for all ten FEMA regions.

The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) builds international relationships that enhance global security, understanding, and cooperation. The SPP is a Department of Defense program managed by the National Guard Bureau but executed by the individual states. The SPP links a state’s National Guard with a partner nation’s military/security forces in a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship that supports Combatant Command and Embassy security cooperation objectives. Built on enduring relationships that enhance influence and promote access, the SPP is currently comprised of 76 unique partnerships. These National Guard missions and responsibilities add immeasurably to the state’s overall domestic security preparedness. They also make the adjutant general a crucial “go to” official in time of crisis. The Governor expects the adjutant general to exercise control over all military forces operating within his or her state. This expectation is satisfied when
National Guard forces employed within the state are in State Active Duty or Title 32 status. Title 32 allows the Governor, with the approval of the President or the Secretary of Defense, to order a member to duty for operational Homeland Defense activities in accordance with the provisions of Title 32. The expectations and requirements are also met when National Guard forces from supporting states are operating within a supported state. Title 10 means full-time duty in the active military service of the U.S. and allows the President to “federalize” the National Guard forces by ordering them to active duty in their reserve component status or by calling them into Federal service in their militia status in accordance with provisions of Title 10. Thus, Guardsmen can serve on active duty in either Title 32 or Title 10, depending upon requirements which are discussed further in this paper.

Critical to the first line of defense in counter-terrorism, the National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) is a specially trained force comprised of Soldiers and Airman from existing National Guard units that provide each state, territory, and the District of Columbia with a rapid response capability focused on incidents requiring law enforcement and security support. The NGRF is designed to respond to an incident ahead of federal assets and capable of delivering an initial force of 75-125 personnel within eight hours and a follow-on force of up to 375 personnel within 24 hours. The NGRFs are organized as temporary task forces and perform their mission primarily under the command and control of their home state, territory, or the District of Columbia.

The Army and Air National Guard are often the face of the military in the case of domestic disasters. Living and working in nearly 2,600 communities, they connect the U.S. military to the American people. The National Guard forces were called upon 286 times and logged more than 547,100 man-days responding to emergencies, performing steady state operations, or supporting National Special Security Events (NSSEs) in the homeland in FY15. The National Guard elements responded to 80 natural disaster, wildfire and severe weather homeland events in FY15. On any given day, up to 4,000 National Guardsmen are on duty providing support to civil authorities. These soldiers and airman live and serve in nearly every zip code in the U.S. In a domestic emergency response, the equation is simple: less time and distance equals more lives saved.

**4.6: Impact of National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendations**

The Report of the National Commission for the Future of the Army (NCFA) was directed by the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to accomplish the following:

“Not later than February 1, 2016, the Commission shall submit to the President and the Congressional defense committees a report setting forth a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission…with its recommendations for such legislative and administrative actions as the Commission considers appropriate in light of the results of the studies.” - 2015 NDAA, Section 1703(c)

The Budget Control Act of 2011 and the ensuing fiscal constraints within the Department of Defense prompted the Army to make difficult decisions regarding its future size and composition and triggered resourcing decisions that were increasingly
at odds with the leadership of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. The transfer of Apache helicopters from the Army National Guard to replace combat loss aircraft in the regular Army was arguably the most contentious issue and resulted in the establishment by Congress and the President of the National Commission for the Future of the Army to make specific recommendations regarding future needs balanced against projected funding. The resulting report, published January 28, 2016, described the issues driven by increasing Army requirements and declining resources and provided sixty-three separate recommendations.

The regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve, at the direction of the acting Secretary of the Army, methodically reviewed each of the commission’s sixty-three recommendations. This initial assessment of the National Commission’s recommendations was driven by a set of criterion which served to sharpen the Army’s focus on the value, cost, and risk associated with each individual recommendation, as well as the interactions between recommendations. For example, deciding to pursue a costly recommendation within current resource levels would necessarily limit the Army’s ability to implement other recommendations, and might even create inconsistency with other recommendations and priorities. Difficult trade-offs are required to balance Army investments in people, readiness, and modernization.

The National Commission initially focused on Army aviation structure and modernization in all components, and expanded its focus to assess the readiness and capacity of other Army critical capabilities, including armored maneuver forces, short range air defense, missile defense, and tactical mobility, among others. The Army gave priority to the aviation-related recommendations from the outset, based on their operational value, cost, and congressional interest. It grouped several of the aviation recommendations for assessment and consideration due to shared intent and interrelated subjects. If funded, the aviation recommendations will enhance deterrence, readiness, and capacity for both surge and steady-state missions.

None of the recommendations of the National Commission will include additional financial resources. The Army estimates that implementation of the National Commission’s recommendations would require an additional $20-40 billion over the Future Years Defense Plan. The Army is working through the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the recommendations of the National Commission compete for resources with other high priority requirements within the Defense topline during the regular budget process. In order to move forward with any certainty, however, the threat of sequestration must be eliminated.
Sequestration is an impediment to good planning and represents a threat not only to the ability of the Army and DoD to carry out recommendations of the National Commission, but to maintaining the Armed Forces needed to support the broader national security strategy.

The National Commission proposed paying for some of its recommendations by eliminating up to two Regular Army infantry brigade combat teams (BCTs), but the Army does not support reducing this core capability to pay for gaps and shortfalls elsewhere. The combat forces – including infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation – are the military tools that win wars and impose the Nation’s will on potential adversaries. The Army needs the full suite of combat and support capabilities to be successful on distant battlefields and at home. Combat forces, however, are the most difficult and most costly to regenerate, and they typically bear the brunt of war. The Army has already reduced Regular Army BCTs by nearly one-third and opposes further reductions to core combat forces, given increasingly complex and dynamic international conditions.

The National Commission recommended that the President revise strategic and budgetary guidance based on changes in the security environment. The Secretary of Defense would then revise planning guidance, and the Army would in turn revise plans associated with force structure, readiness, and modernization. The Army is currently downsizing based on assumptions and analysis linked to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army agrees with the National Commission that since then, the strategic environment has changed and warrants a reassessment of previous assumptions upon which the Budget Control Act of 2011 was based.

The RFPB reviewed the NCFA report and identified thirteen recommendations that specifically applied to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve and endorsed each in order to strengthen the total force. The RFPB agrees with the need to maintain an All-Volunteer Force, ensuring it is sufficiently funded to meet and sustain Army Total Force Policy goals in the areas of Manning, training, equipping, and management through an integrated personnel and pay management system. The RFPB recommends that Reserve Component end strength and force structure be preserved to mitigate risk from Active component force reductions and to hedge against fiscal and geostrategic uncertainty. Reserve forces should further be an integrated part of the operational force and fully programmed by the Services.
Further recommended actions in support of AC/RC integration include the following:

1. The Army should move toward stronger integration of combat forces through a test integrating reserve component units in active component units.

2. The DoD should restore and increase the Title XI program which integrates active force manpower into reserve component units.

3. Services should increase opportunities for reserve personnel attendance at Senior Enlisted Courses, Senior Service Colleges, and CAPSTONE.

4. Services should implement an AC/RC teaming or pairing program to encourage operational training.

5. Services should increase 12304b funding in order to utilize Reserve Forces for missions for which they are ideally suited.

6. Finally, as stated in Chapter 2 of this report, DoD should develop and enforce a Total Force Policy that ensures readiness and provides necessary resources to meet reserve component obligations as part of the Total Force.
Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve, answers a question from a Board member during a panel discussion at the September 10, 2014 Board Meeting.
5.1: Army National Guard

Mission

The Army National Guard has a dual mission—supporting the states under the command of their governors when not mobilized for federal service, and supporting the President when activated for federal missions. Governors have broad authority to use their ARNG assets, from saving lives and protecting property during natural disasters to maintaining peace during civil emergencies.

During FY15, ARNG Soldiers continued service in combat operations in Afghanistan and in support of other missions globally. From September 11, 2001 through September 2015, more than 544,066 individual Soldiers mobilized for deployments to federal missions around the world.

As an integral part of the Army team, the Reserve Component is more than 50 percent of the Total Army. The ARNG makes up approximately 38 percent of the Army Operational Force.

- FY15 End Strength 350,200
- 14.6 billion budget for FY15
- 2579 Communities
- 70 State Partnerships with 76 Nations

Vision

The Director of the ARNG (DARNG) established five key priorities: Leader Development, Resourcing, Modernization, Full-Time Support and Ready Soldiers and Families, the execution of which will ensure the ARNG remains effective, agile, and adaptive. The ARNG will continue to be an indispensable component of the Total Force and the primary military response force for the Nation’s governors.

The NGB is defined in law as a joint activity of the DoD. The NGB is the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the ARNG between the Department of the Army and the individual states, administering policies and overseeing federal funding for the National Guards of the states, territories and the District of Columbia.
The NGB is led by the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). The DARNG and Director, Air National Guard (DANG) assist the CNGB in his duties and communicate directly with the Adjutants General (TAGs) of the states on behalf of the CNGB. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2012 also elevated the CNGB to a full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The CNGB may communicate his advice directly to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), though these communications typically are channeled through the Chairman of the JCS.

The ARNG is a Reserve Component (RC) of the Army, as well as the militia of the states, territories and the District of Columbia when not in federal service. The governor of each state serves as the commander in chief of that state’s ARNG and ANG when those components are not in federal service. Each state or territory also has a TAG, typically a two-star general, who in most cases is appointed by the governor and is responsible for the training and readiness of Soldiers and Airmen within his or her state or territory (Note: The District of Columbia National Guard is a federal militia, with a commanding general appointed by the President who serves the same function as the TAGs in the states and territories). The President serves as commander in chief of ARNG units activated for federal service, as well as the District of Columbia National Guard.

Command Structure: National Guard Leadership
OPERATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE (39% of the Army Operational Force)

14 Command & Control Headquarters
   - 8 Division, 2 Expeditionary Sustainment, 1 Army Air & Missile Defense, 1 Military Police, 1 Theater Aviation, 1 Theater Sustainment

2 Special Forces Groups

28 Brigade Combat Teams
   - 20 Infantry, 7 Armor, 1 Stryker

49 Multifunctional Support Brigades
   - 16 Maneuver Enhancement, 10 Sustainment, 8 Combat Aviation, 8 Field Artillery, 7 Battlefield Surveillance

50 Functional Support Brigades & Groups
   - 7 Engineer Brigades, 4 Theater Aviation Brigades, 3 Military Police Brigades, 3 Air Defense Artillery, 1 Army Field Support Brigade, 1 Chemical Brigade, 1 Missile Defense Brigade, 19 Regional Support Groups, 5 Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Groups, 2 Theater Information Operations Groups, 1 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group, 1 Theater Airfield Operations Group, 2 Signal Brigades

514 Modified Tables of Organization & Equipment (MTOE) Battalions
5.2: Army Reserve

Mission

The Army Reserve provides trained, equipped and ready Soldiers and cohesive units to meet the nation's requirements, at home and abroad.

Vision

America's Army Reserve -- the most capable, combat-ready, and lethal federal reserve force in the history of the Nation. 202,000 strong, the Army Reserve enables the Force by providing:

- Theater bulk petroleum to the Joint Force (92% of total force capability)
- Civil Affairs (82% of total force capability)
- Chaplains (80% of total force capability)
- Sustainment Brigades and Battalions (69% of total force capability)
- Transportation units (56% of total force capability)
- Medical units (51% of total force capability)

Designated Army Reserve commands further provide 25 percent of the Army's generating force and base expansion capabilities, Soldier Initial Entry Basic and Advanced Individual training, ROTC Cadet Command support, Medical and mobilization expansion.

The United States Army Reserve is the Army's Federal Reserve force, providing operational capability and strategic depth to the Total Army in support of the National Defense Strategy and Joint Force commitments worldwide. The US Army Reserve Command accounts for 20 percent of the Army's organized units, provides nearly half the Army's total maneuver support. Manned, trained and equipped to enable operational forces, the Army Reserve provides quick access to trained and ready Soldiers, leaders and cohesive units and critical enabling capabilities found nowhere else in the Army or the Joint Force.

Since 2001, Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized more than 335,000 times and deployed across the globe, to include every major combat zone.
**Unified And Accessible**

Command authority of the Army Reserve rests under a single individual who is both the Chief of Army Reserve and the Commanding General of United States Army Reserve Command. This streamlined command structure ensures unity of command and unity of effort in the resourcing, training, and accessing of the Army Reserve and enables support to every Army Service Component Command and Combatant Command with a footprint in all 50 States, five territories, and more than 30 countries. The Army Reserve is uniquely designed from the ground up to meet the needs of the Joint Force under this single unified command authority.

**Critical Enabling Capabilities**

When Unified Land Operations are required, the nation integrates and synchronizes all of America’s military services, but it can do so only with the support of the Army Reserve, which provides critical early entry and sets the theater capabilities. These include Petroleum Pipeline and Terminal Operations, Civil Affairs, Theater Engineer Commands, Hospitals and Medical Logistics as well as others crucial to opening and sustaining major operations. Meeting ongoing defense and security demands requires continued access to, and reliance upon, the skills, capabilities, and experience of a ready Army Reserve. Most importantly, a ready and operational Army Reserve provides the critical enabling capabilities that combat forces rely upon to win America’s wars.

**Support In The Homeland**

The Army Reserve further stands ready to provide emergency federal support during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations with capabilities such as aviation lift, search and rescue or extraction, expeditionary logistics (medical, food, shelter, potable water, and heated tents), civil affairs and public information as well as full-spectrum engineer capability. Army Reserve aircraft can rapidly transport patients to critical-care facilities and deliver critical capabilities into affected areas. In the Homeland, The Army Reserve is fully integrated into the standing Department of Defense task force postured for response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) events.

**Always Ready**

Today’s Army Reserve is the most battle-tested and experienced in our Nation’s history. As the dedicated Federal reserve of the Army, the Army Reserve exists to serve the Army and the Nation, and has never failed to accomplish its mission. The Army Reserve is ready now and in the future for whatever threats and challenges lie ahead.
5.3: Marine Corps Reserve

Mission

Augment and reinforce the Active Component (AC) with trained units and individual Marines as a sustainable and ready operational reserve for employment across the full spectrum of crisis and global engagement.

Vision

Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) units, including the Individual Ready Reserve, will serve as a strategic hedge able to respond to OPLAN/CONPLAN sourcing as required and as an operational force supporting a variety of missions across the globe. MARFORRES will satisfy Combatant Commander requirements that might otherwise go unsourced with an AC only force, assist with readiness recovery of AC capabilities, and maintain and institutional readiness for large-scale mobilization. Keeping the Reserve Component (RC) in a ready status via continued operational employment will enable the Marine Corps to respond to contingencies and crises upon a moment’s notice.

Marine Corps Reserve Resourcing Value

The Marine Corps Reserve consists of over 38,180 Marines who constitute 17% of the Marines Total Force, however only consumes 4% of the total Marine Corps budget.
**Marine Corps Total Force**

The Marine Corps AC and RC are integrated as a Total Force. Through a concept of “mirror-imaging,” AC and RC forces are similarly manned, trained, and equipped; thereby enabling RC forces to be seamlessly employed as an integral part of the Marine Corps operating forces. The RC serves to augment and reinforce AC Marine Air Ground Task Forces, but also maintains the capability to task-organize entirely with Reserve units. Maintaining the same fundamental individual and unit training standards enables the RC to conduct assigned missions in a manner commensurate to their AC counterparts. Although substantially mirrored with the AC in order to facilitate integration, MARFORRES also provides Civil Affairs, Personnel Recovery and Aviation Adversary capabilities that are non-existent in the AC.

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**MARFORRES Task Organization**

- **COMMARFORRES**
  - 4th Marine Division
  - 4th Marine Aircraft Wing
  - 4th Marine Logistics Group
  - Force HQ Group

  *MARFORRES has units in 160 sites spread throughout 47 states and Puerto Rico (No USMCR in South Dakota, Vermont, or Wyoming).*
5.4: Navy Reserve

Mission

Deliver strategic depth and operational capability to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Joint Force.

Vision

A ready and agile Force, whose military and civilian skills are deliberately leveraged to support mission accomplishment.

- 57,359 Reserve Personnel (Full Time Support and Drilling Reservists)
- $3.03 billion budget for FY15
- Provides 149 aircraft to the Navy’s overall force structure

As the Navy transforms to meet future demands, so too will the Navy Reserve, as it remains fully integrated with the Navy of tomorrow. In alignment with Navy’s guidance, including A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, it will build on the operational proficiency gained and will remain ready to respond to emerging missions.
The Navy Reserve is navigating forward guided by five Strategic Imperatives which set our course to future mission success. To achieve this Vision, the Navy Reserve will:

- Keep pace with the Navy’s future capabilities
- Maintain a ready Force for tomorrow
- Actively employ each Sailor’s unique capabilities
- Deliver technologically advanced solutions
- Develop transformational leaders

**Fy15 Mobilizations**

- 2,537 mobilizations
- Filled 75% of Navy Individual Augmentation requirements
- 84% volunteers
Command Structure

123 Navy Operational Support Centers (NOSC) are spread throughout the 50 states, Guam and Puerto Rico. 52 NOSC’s are on military installations, 71 are stand alone installations.

Hardware

One hundred forty-nine aircraft (14 C-40A, 23 C-130, 4 C-20, 4 C-37, 12 P-3C, 32 F/A-18, 5 E/A-18G, 32 F-5, 10 HH-60H, 6 MH-60R, 7 MH-53E) are assigned across 23 squadrons under three Air Wings. The Navy Reserve provides 100 percent of the Navy’s organic, global intra-theater medium airlift capability for Fleet and Combatant Commands; strategic reserve for carrier air wings, expeditionary electronic attack, adversary training, and homeland defense operations; and maritime patrol supporting anti-submarine warfare, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, exercise and training support and combating transnational organized crime.

For additional information, visit the Navy Reserve website at www.navyreserve.navy.mil.
5.5: Air Force Reserve

**Mission**
To provide combat-ready forces to Fly, Fight and Win.

**Vision**
The Air Force Reserve will remain an integrated, flexible and combat-ready force providing accessible and sustainable capabilities as an Air Force component supporting our National Security.

**Guiding Principles**
The Air Force Reserve is a Combat-Ready, Cost-Effective and Experienced Force; a Force with Operational Capability, Strategic Depth and Surge Capacity; a Viable and Relevant Force; and a Sustainable Professional Military Force.

- 69,200 Drilling/Participating Reservists
- $4.89 billion budget in FY 16
- Provides 35 wings, 10 independent groups and various mission support units and approximately 342 aircraft to the Air Force force structure

The Air Force Reserve is the federal reserve component of the US Air Force. As part of the Total Air Force, Air Force Reservists often work side by side with their active duty and Air National Guard counterparts to meet the mission requirements of our National Military Strategy. Air Force Reserve units and individuals are trained, equipped and evaluated to the same standards as the active Air Force and can deploy to anywhere in the world in less than 72 hours with no need for additional training.

Although the Air Force Reserve has more than 300 aircraft assigned, a number of Reserve units share aircraft assigned to an active duty unit. Called Total Force Associations, 112 of these units augment active duty units in most core mission areas. In addition, there are 25 Total Force Associations with the Air Force Reserve in the lead.

The Air Force Reserve operates in 66 locations throughout the world, consisting of 5 Air Reserve Bases, 4 Air Reserve Stations, 3 Navy Tenant Locations, 4 Army Tenant Locations, 1 ANG Tenant Location, 42 AF Tenant Locations, 3 Miscellaneous Locations, and 4 Ranges.
Current Mobilization (May 2016)

There are currently 3,985 Air Force Reservists mobilized or operationally supporting following Combatant Commands: CENTCOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, PACOM, and NORTHCOM.

Command Relationships
Hardware

The Air Force Reserve has a total active inventory of 342 aircraft and it provides support to each of the Air Force Core Functions. Air Force Reservists operate the following aircraft: F-35, F-22; B-52, A-10, F-16, WC-130J, MQ-1, MQ-9, RQ-4, C-130H MAFFS, C-130H MASS, KC-10, KC-135R, KC-46 (programmed), C-40C, C-5, C-17A, C-130H, C-130J, C-145A, C-146, U-28, HC-130N/P, HH-60G, E-3, T-1, T-6, T-38, AT-38. The Air Force Reserve participates in every Air Force Mission area and operates each mission system except the U-2 and strategic nuclear missiles. It provides 100% of DoD’s hurricane hunter and aerial spray capability.

More information can be found by visiting: http://www.afrc.af.mil/AboutUs.aspx.
5.6: Air National Guard

Mission

As provided for in the Constitution, the Air National Guard (ANG) has both state and federal missions. The state mission of the ANG is to protect life and property, and to preserve peace, order, and public safety. The federal mission is to support national security objectives by providing properly trained and equipped units when mobilized for war, national emergency, or when otherwise needed. During peacetime, the combat-ready units and support units are assigned to most Air Force major commands to carry out missions compatible with training, mobilization readiness, humanitarian, and contingency operations.

Vision

The Air National Guard will meet 21st century challenges by proactively shaping our future with combat-ready, adaptable Airmen at our core. Together with our partners we will provide the capabilities necessary to guard America at home and defend freedom worldwide.

Overview

As an agile and inclusive component of the USAF, the ANG is integral to the overall success of USAF strategy and the defense of the nation. The ANG will continue to thrive in all five AF core missions as a unit-equipped community based steady state, engaged operational force that provides strategic depth for the Air Force. The cost effectiveness of the ANG will continue to provide return on investment for the nation and USAF by preserving capability and capacity for the Joint Force during a fiscally constrained era. Additionally, this cost effectiveness and increased capability and capacity benefits the USAF writ large while it recapitalizes and modernizes USAF capabilities. The dual-use value of the ANG will continue to deliver homeland forces to the nation, states, territories, and district in times of need, and strengthen enduring relationships at home and abroad. 93% of ANG equipment is dual-use, and 100% of ANG Airmen are dual-use. An experienced multi-faceted force is the heritage that the ANG provides. As a nation, an increased reliance on the ANG is as viable now as it ever has been.
• 105,700 Drilling/Participating members
• $8.97 billion budget in FY 16
• 90 Wings in 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia, providing 250 geographically separated units and approximately 1,084 aircraft to the Air Force force structure

Current Mobilization (August 2016)

There are currently 5,375 Air National Guard members mobilized or supporting combat operations, contingencies, humanitarian response, or other requirements worldwide.

Command Structure

The ANG is a Reserve Component (RC) of the Air Force, as well as the militia of the states, territories and the District of Columbia when not in federal service. The governor of each state serves as the commander in chief of that state's ARNG and ANG when those components are not in federal service. Each state or territory also has an Adjutant General, typically a two-star general who in most cases is appointed by the governor and is responsible for the training and readiness of Soldiers and Airmen within his or her state or territory (Note: The District of Columbia National Guard is a federal militia, with a commanding general appointed by the President who serves the same function as the TAGs in the states and territories). The President serves as commander in chief of ANG units activated for federal service, as well as the District of Columbia National Guard. Air National Guard units and individuals are trained, equipped and evaluated to the same standards as the active Air Force and can deploy to anywhere in the world in less than 72 hours with no need for additional training.
5.7: Coast Guard Reserve

Mission

The Coast Guard Reserve serves as the Coast Guard’s “Force-in-Garrison” and is a flexible, responsive operational force that exists to support the Coast Guard roles of maritime homeland security, national defense (domestic and expeditionary), and domestic disaster operations.

Vision

The Coast Guard depends on the Reserve force to be always ready to mobilize with critical capacity needed for surge operations. The Reserve Component is defined as a contingency-based workforce to meet the Coast Guard’s mobilization requirements within the prioritized mission areas of Defense Operations; Port, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Incident Management and Response; and Mission Support.

Reservists obtain and maintain proficiency and readiness through a combination of training and augmentation. Commanders, commanding officers and officers-in-charge ensure Reservists under their authority receive appropriate training, augmentation opportunities, and administrative support. By doing so, Reserve forces achieve mobilization readiness, while providing increased capacity to the local command. Individual Reservists obtain and maintain the skills and personal readiness required to mobilize.
Current Mobilizations

- 464 mobilizations
- Fulfilled 100% of Coast Guard Individual Augmentation requirements
- 93% volunteers

Command Structure

The Coast Guard Reserve is embedded at all levels of the Coast Guard organization. Unit commanders and commanding officers hold ultimate responsibility and are directly accountable for their total force, which includes the readiness of assigned reservists. The Reserve Force Readiness System (RFRS) helps commands manage their reserve workforce. RFRS is a dedicated and specialized service-wide readiness infrastructure that matches resources with requirements, and attains and maintains readiness to facilitate rapid activation and deployment of the Coast Guard Reserve when surge operations require additional personnel for the active component. The primary function of RFRS is to facilitate and promote individual reservist’s mobilization readiness and administration preparation to execute assigned contingency roles through augmentation and training. RFRS staffs provide commanders, commanding officers and officers-in-charge resources and expertise to train and employ reservists operationally while maintaining readiness for surge and contingency operations within the normal confines of Inactive Duty Training (IDT) drills and Active Duty Training (ADT) each fiscal year.

Additionally, the Coast Guard Reserve is specifically assigned contingency-based missions and the requisite competencies that go along with those missions. The Coast Guard uses tailored training and augmentation to build and maintain the skills necessary to achieve a high state of readiness for contingencies requiring a surge force.

To assist the unit commander or commanding officer in maximizing the Reserve force capability, Senior Reserve Officer (SRO) positions have been created at most major Coast Guard units. The SRO fills a substantial leadership role in supporting the unit commander’s goals and objectives in the training, readiness and overall administrative support of assigned reserve members. Units at the Sector level and below in addition to Coast Guard Bases have Senior Enlisted Reserve Advisor (SERA) billets. SERAs coordinate with their commands to address leadership, training, and administrative processes required to support mobilization requirements, and mentoring of assigned members.
The Coast Guard Reserve also employs 5 COCOM Reserve Units (NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, and TRANSCOM) AND 8 SELRES commanded Port Security Units (PSUs) for expeditionary warfare. The COCOM units provide unique support to the DoD staffs and are available for mobilization. PSUs provide port and waterway security, port entry control, and land/water force protection domestically and abroad and have been recently used to support operations in Iraq, Kuwait, and Guantanamo Bay.

“Semper Paratus – Always Ready”

For additional information you may visit our website at https://reserve.uscg.mil.
(From Left) Chairman Punaro, Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Gen Frank Grass, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and Major General William Wofford, The Adjutant General of Arkansas and Board member discuss cyber policy at the September 10, 2014 Board Meeting.
APPENDIX A
Board Member Biographies

Major General (Ret) Arnold Punaro
Chairman

Arnold L. Punaro took the oath of office as Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on September 12, 2011. Appointed by Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, he is the first person to hold the chair under the revised structure established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011. He was reappointed by Secretary Hagel and Secretary Carter for a second and third term.

The RFPB now serves as an independent advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all reserve and guard matters to include advice and recommendations on strategies, policies and practices to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency and effectiveness of the reserve components.

Mr. Punaro is chief executive officer of The Punaro Group, LLC, a Washington-based firm he founded in 2010 specializing in federal budget and market analysis, business strategy and capture, acquisition due diligence, government relations, communications, sensitive operations, business risk analysis and compliance, and crisis management. He consults for a broad array of Fortune 100 companies and has been recognized by Defense News as one of the 100 most influential individuals in U.S. Defense.

He served as Chairman of the National Defense Industrial Association, the country’s largest defense industry association with over 1,600 corporate and 91,000 individual members. He chaired the statutory independent Commission on the Guard and Reserve from 2005 to 2008. A member of the Pentagon’s Defense Business Board, he previously served as executive vice president at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and as Senator Sam Nunn’s Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee for 14 years. A retired U.S. Marine Corps Major General, he served as the Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division. He served on active duty as an Infantry Platoon Commander in Vietnam where he was awarded the Bronze Star for valor and the Purple Heart. He has Masters of Arts degrees from both the University of Georgia and Georgetown University and serves on the boards of the University of Georgia’s School of Public and International Affairs, Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Government, and Georgia Tech’s School of International Affairs. He is a member of the Advisory Board at the Center for New American Security, a visiting scholar at the Bipartisan Policy Center, and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

He is the author of the recent book, On War and Politics: The Battlefield Inside Washington’s Beltway that was published by the Naval Institute Press in October 2016.
LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at American University’s School of International Service and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

General Barno was senior American commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. In 2003, he was selected to establish a new three-star operational headquarters in Kabul and take command of the 20,000 U.S. and coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. For nineteen months as the senior American commander, he was responsible for overall coalition military leadership of the war in Afghanistan, implementing a new counterinsurgency strategy in close partnership with the U.S. embassy and coalition allies. For much of his thirty-year active duty career, he served in infantry and special operations units, and fought in combat operations with Army Ranger battalions during the invasions of Panama and Grenada.

Following his retirement from active duty, Barno served as the Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. from 2006 to 2010. Concurrently, he was the chairman of the Advisory Committee on Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Veterans and Families from 2007-2009. In 2010, Barno joined the Center for a New American Security as a Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow where he was Co-Director of the Responsible Defense Program until 2015.

Barno is an authority on military operations, the changing character of conflict, civil-military issues, and leader development. He has testified numerous times before Congress on counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, counterterrorism and Joint Professional Military Education, and lectures and writes often on related topics. He co-authors the biweekly Strategic Outpost column at the defense blog War on the Rocks, and his articles and opinion pieces have appeared in Foreign Policy, the Washington Post and The Atlantic. He is a member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and of the Board of Visitors at the U.S. Army War College. Barno earned his BS from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and MA in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.
Dr. Nora J. Bensahel
Board Member

Dr. Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the School of International Service at American University. She was most recently senior fellow and co-director of the Responsible Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where she previously served as deputy director of studies. Since September 2016, she has been a Board Member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which serves as an independent advisor to Secretary of Defense on Reserve and National Guard matters.

Dr. Bensahel is a widely published expert on U.S. defense policy, U.S. military operations and force structure, coalition and alliance operations, and leader development. Her recent publications include Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity, Battlefields and Boardrooms: Women’s Leadership in the Military and the Private Sector, The Seven Deadly Sins of Defense Spending, Building Better Generals, and “Charting the Course: Directions for the New NATO Secretary General.”

Prior to CNAS, Dr. Bensahel served as a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where she authored numerous reports including After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, and “The Experiences of Foreign Militaries,” in Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy. Dr. Bensahel has also written several book chapters and has published articles in Survival, Journal of Strategic Studies, Joint Force Quarterly, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Defence Studies, and European Security.

Dr. Bensahel spent more than a decade as an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, where she taught M.A.-level classes and received the Alumni Leadership Council Teaching Award. Dr. Bensahel is also a frequent commentator in well-known media publications and programs.

Dr. Bensahel received her Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University and her B.A., magna cum laude, from Cornell University. While at Stanford, she worked as a research assistant for former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry. She held fellowships at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford.
Major General Daryl L. Bohac
Board Member

Major General Daryl L. Bohac serves as the Adjutant General for the State of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska. As the Adjutant General, he is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing, and coordinating policies, programs and plans affecting more than 4,800 Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the Governor, General Bohac serves as a principal on the Governor’s Staff and is the Director of the Nebraska Military Department and the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, respectively. As the Adjutant General, he commands the Nebraska Army and Air National Guard and serves as the state’s official channel of communication with the National Guard Bureau to the Departments of the Army and Air Force. Prior to his current assignment, General Bohac served as the Assistant Adjutant General of the Nebraska Air National Guard and the Deputy Adjutant General of the Nebraska Military Department. Also, since September 2016, he has been a Board Member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which serves as an independent advisor to Secretary of Defense on Reserve and National Guard matters.

General Bohac was commissioned in 1988 at the Air National Guard Academy of Military Science, McGhee-Tyson Air National Guard Base, Tennessee. Prior to receiving his commission, General Bohac served as an enlisted member of the United States Marine Corps Reserve and of the Nebraska Air National Guard. General Bohac deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom as the Senior Air Reserve Component Advisor for Air Force Central Command, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar from December 2008 to May 2009. He has also deployed in support of Operations Noble Eagle, Decisive Endeavor and Deliberate Guard.
Phillip E. Carter was appointed by Secretary of Defense as Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on November 12, 2015. He is also a member of the RFPB subcommittee of the Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel, to assess whether the current Service member, families, and employers personnel programs and policies are meeting the needs of an operational reserve. A native of Southern California, Mr. Carter attended college and law school at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).

Mr. Carter is Senior Fellow, Counsel and Director of the Military, Veterans, and Society Program at the Center for a New American Security. His research focuses on issues facing veterans and military personnel, force structure and readiness issues, and civil-military relations.

Mr. Carter began his career as an Army officer, serving for several years in the active and reserve components as a military police and civil affairs officer. He deployed to Iraq in 2005-06, where he served as an embedded adviser with the Iraqi police in the Diyala province, and worked closely with the State Department’s Provincial Reconstruction Team. After coming home, Mr. Carter became increasingly involved in veterans and national security policy issues and in 2007, helped stand up the Obama campaign’s veterans policy committee. In 2008, he joined the campaign as its national veterans director, responsible for policy and political engagement with the veterans and military community. In 2009, Mr. Carter served as a political appointee in the Obama administration, responsible for detainee policy issues.

In addition to his military and government experience, Mr. Carter has worked in the private sector as an attorney and business leader. He authored briefs in the landmark national security cases Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (relating to military commissions at Guantanamo Bay), FAIR vs. Rumsfeld (relating to military recruiting on university campuses) and Al-Aulaqi v. Obama (a challenge to U.S. targeting of al Qaeda personnel in Yemen). Following his law practice, from 2011 to 2013, Mr. Carter served as chief operating officer for Caerus Associates, a private-sector strategy and design firm.

Mr. Carter currently teaches as an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University. He serves on the editorial board of the Journal for National Security Law & Policy, and the veterans advisory council for the Jericho Project, a non-profit organization in New York devoted to ending homelessness through innovative supportive housing programs. He continues to write extensively on legal and national security issues, with recent work appearing in the Washington Post, Slate, and Foreign Policy, and other publications, also comments on national security issues as @Carter_PE on Twitter.
Vice Admiral (Ret) John G. Cotton
Board Member

Vice Admiral (Ret.) John G. Cotton was appointed by Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, as Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on October 13, 2011. He also was appointed as Chairman to the RFPB subcommittee for Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available, and Sustainable Operational Reserve, focusing on retaining the operational capability and experience within the reserve components to meet future threats.

John Cotton graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in June 1973 with a degree in Aerospace Engineering, earned his wings in October 1974 and became a third generation pilot. His father was also a Naval Aviator and his grandfather flew with the Lafayette Flying Corps in World War I.

Accumulating over 15,000 flight hours as a Navy and commercial pilot, his global joint experience includes assignments as a light attack, reconnaissance, strike fighter and adversary pilot, and command leadership positions of an FA-18 squadron, Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland, and the Pentagon Navy Command Center. He most recently served in the Pentagon from 2003-2008 as Chief of Navy Reserve and Commander Navy Reserve Force, and from 2008-2013, he worked for DRS Technologies as a Corporate Senior Vice President.

Previous Flag Officer assignments include Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia; Deputy Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Warfare Requirements and Programs; and member of the Secretary of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board. He is a graduate of many military and civilian senior executive leadership and business programs, and personal awards include the Navy Distinguished Service, Legion of Merit and Defense Meritorious Service Medals.

He is currently a defense and security consultant, and serves as a civilian member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, a Senior Fellow at the Joint Forces Staff College, and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Navy Marine Coast Guard Residence Foundation.
Captain (Ret) Frances Dawn Halfaker
Board Member

Dawn Halfaker founded and is Chief Executive Officer of Halfaker and Associates in Arlington, Virginia, an award-winning professional services and technology solutions firm established in 2006. Halfaker and Associates operates worldwide providing leading-edge, innovative solutions in information technology for government organizations on issues of national and global significance. Under Dawn’s leadership, the Company has achieved extraordinary success which is fueled by the Company’s vision of “Continuing to Serve.”

Dawn has consulted with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Defense Sciences Office, focusing on medical technology to save lives on the battlefield. She was also a military liaison and intern to the House Armed Services Committee advising the committee Chair on key legislation affecting the Department of Defense. As a Military Police Officer in the United States Army, Dawn was a highly respected combat leader, peacekeeper, and military trainer. During her combat deployment to Iraq, Dawn commanded a military police platoon within the 3rd Infantry Division and held other leadership positions. While leading a combat patrol near Baghdad in 2004, she was subsequently wounded and awarded the Purple Heart and Bronze Star for her wartime service.

Dawn actively supports numerous civic, cultural and business organizations and advocates tirelessly for Veterans and Wounded Warriors having served on the Wounded Warrior Project Board of Directors for eight years. She has also served on the Secretary of Veterans Affairs Committee for OIF/OEF Soldiers and Families to improve care for veterans. She currently serves on the Secretary of Labor’s Advisory Committee for Veterans Employer Training and Employer Outreach and also the Department of Veteran Affairs Readjustment Committee. She is also a member of the USO Board of Governors, the Advisory Board for Humana Military Health Systems, and ThanksUSA. In addition, she is also on the NDIA Board of Trustees, and the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

Dawn is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and earned a Master of Arts in Security Studies from Georgetown University. In 2012, she was honored as the Ernst & Young Greater Washington Entrepreneur of the Year. Other significant accomplishments include: 2012 Fairfax County Chamber of Commerce Outstanding Corporate Citizenship Award Winner; 2012 Aspen Institute Scholar Award; 2012 Civilian Job’s Most Valuable Employer for Military; 2012 Women in Technology Leadership Award Finalist; 2012 Heroine in Technology Finalist; 2011 Fortune Most Powerful Women Entrepreneurs; 2011 Worth Magazine Top Entrepreneurs to Watch (#18); and 2011 Washington Business Journal Women Who Mean Business Award. Dawn was also prominently featured on several media outlets including HBO, CNN, MSNBC, CBS, Huffin on Post and The New York Times.
Major General Lewis G. Irwin was appointed by Secretary of Defense as Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on September 18, 2015. He also was appointed as member to the RFPB subcommittee of the Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available, and Sustainable Operational Reserve, focusing on retaining the operational capability and experience within the reserve components to meet future threats.

Major General Irwin is from Claysville, Pennsylvania and is a 1986 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. In 2008, he led an inter-agency effort in Afghanistan to reform and modernize the Afghan National Police. Major General Irwin presently commands the 416th Theater Engineer Command, headquartered in Darien, Illinois with approximately 12,500 Soldiers and 175 units stationed in 26 different states and the District of Columbia. He is also the Army Reserve Adjunct Professor for Research at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.

In his civilian career, Major General Irwin is a professor of public policy and government at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. He holds masters degrees and a doctorate in political science from Yale University, and a masters in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. He has authored three books on American politics and public policy and numerous journal articles on national security and American government. His most recent book analyzes the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the U.S. government’s strategic and inter-agency challenges there.

Major General Irwin has commanded and served in wartime operational assignments in the Regular Army and the Army Reserve including tours in the 101st Airborne Division; combat with the 3rd Armored Division during Operation Desert Storm; a Sapper company command in the 1st Armored Division in Germany; command of the 926th Engineer Battalion; faculty of West Point’s Department of Social Sciences. Major General Irwin was also the officer-in-charge of a Joint Deployable Team in the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) in the U.S. Joint Forces Command at Norfolk, Virginia.

Major General Irwin’s military awards include the Legion of Merit, two Bronze Star Medals, as well as the normal decorations expected of an officer of his experience. He is Airborne, Air Assault, Sapper, Jungle Warfare, and “3H” Joint Planner qualified.

Lew and his wife Marcia make their home in McMurray, Pennsylvania. Their eldest daughter Mary, West Point Class of 2012, is an Army Captain assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Their other daughter Eva, graduated from Washington & Jefferson College and is a Third Grade teacher and volleyball coach in North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Their son Andrew, is an Army Infantry officer, West Point Class of 2016, and is assigned to Fort Benning, GA.
Brett B. Lambert was appointed by Northrop Grumman Corporation as Vice President, Corporate Strategy in January 26, 2015 and leads development and implementation of Northrop Grumman’s corporate and business focus area strategies and serves as the chair of the strategic development council. His previous positions include Executive-in-Residence, Renaissance Strategic Advisors; Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Senior Fellow at the National Defense Industrial Association; and membership on several public and private boards involved in national security. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Board Member of the Henry L. Stimson Center.

Mr. Lambert was also the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy from 2009-2013 where he managed policy for all matters relating to the defense industrial base, including industrial capabilities and assessments; defense industry mergers, acquisitions and consolidation; preservation of essential industries and technologies.

In 2011, Mr. Lambert led President Obama’s effort at the Department of Defense to establish the first National Network for Manufacturing Innovation site, which culminated in the selection of additive manufacturing (3D printing) as the focal point for the Administration’s pursuit of a manufacturing renaissance. He was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service and the Secretary of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the highest award from the secretary available to a non-career civilian. Mr. Lambert was also awarded the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Gold Medal, for his efforts in support of the defense industrial base while in office.

Beginning in 1989, Mr. Lambert held positions at DFI International, a national security consultancy he built with the founder and assisted in selling in 2007. Positions at DFI included Executive Vice President of DFI International, Managing Director of DFI Investment Partners, DFI Ethics Officer, and member of the Board of Directors. Mr. Lambert specialized in technology assessments, strategic planning, and market analyses for defense, intelligence, and space companies and worked closely with leading venture funds, merchant banks, and private equity firms in support of their national security portfolio companies.

Before DFI, Mr. Lambert worked for the Department of State (USAID) at the American Embassy in New Delhi, India. He attended graduate school at Jawaharlal Nehru University and was an independent journalist in India, Pakistan and Burma.

Mr. Lambert is an avid mountaineer with high altitude experience on four continents. He lives in Chevy Chase, MD with his wife and two daughters. He also maintains the small family farm in Densmore Kansas where he was raised by his mother and grandparents.
Designated by the Secretary of Defense, Sergeant Major Michael J. Lewis assumed his position as Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman and Board member at the Reserve Forces Policy Board on September 15, 2016. SGM Lewis serves as the subject matter expert for personnel, mobilization and readiness issues impacting personnel from all seven reserve components. In this capacity he works and interacts with the senior military and civilian leadership throughout the Department of Defense. SGM Lewis also serves as a liaison with senior NCO policy boards within the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of each of the uniformed services. Prior to this assignment, Sergeant Major Lewis was the 6th State Command Sergeant Major for the Rhode Island National Guard.

SGM Lewis entered active duty in June 1982, completed One Station Unit Training at Ft. Benning, Georgia as an infantryman and was assigned as an Airborne Ranger to C Company, 1st Ranger Battalion, Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah, Georgia.

Upon completion of his initial enlistment as an Airborne Ranger, Sergeant Major Lewis joined the Rhode Island Army National Guard where he was assigned to A Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne). There, SGM Lewis served as Junior and Senior Weapons Sergeant, Operations / Intelligence Sergeant, Special Forces Team Sergeant and Company Sergeant Major. In August 2006, SGM Lewis was assigned as the first Command Sergeant Major of the newly formed Special Operations Detachment – Global.

SGM Lewis’s military education includes all levels of noncommissioned officer schools including the Army Sergeants Major Academy, Basic Airborne School, Jungle Operations Training Center, Ranger School, Special Forces Qualification Course, Jump Master, USASOC Mountain Master Course (Distinguished Honor Graduate) and Level 1 Mountaineer, ARNG Mountain Warfare School Winter, Summer, and Lead Climber Courses, Marine Corps Scout Sniper School, and Northern Warfare Training Center. SGM Lewis holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration.

SGM Lewis has deployed in support of many named operations to include Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Iraq). His awards include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal (1st OLC), Meritorious Service Medal (4th OLC), Army Commendation Medal (3rd OLC), Army Achievement Medal (2nd OLC), Kosovo Campaign Medal, Iraqi Campaign Medal (2 stars), Afghanistan Campaign Medal, Special Forces Tab, Ranger Tab, Combat Infantryman Badge (2nd Award), Expert Infantryman Badge, the Master Parachutist Badge, and numerous other personal, unit and campaign awards.
Major General Walt Lord is Military Executive to the Reserve Forces Policy Board. He serves as both military advisor to the chair and as military executive officer for the Board, supervising the Board’s operations and full-time staff.

General Lord enlisted in the 2nd Battalion, 111th Infantry Regiment in 1982 at the age of 17. In 1984, he was commissioned into the Pennsylvania Army National Guard at Valley Forge Military College and served his initial assignments with 1st Squadron, 104th Cavalry Regiment, and 28th Infantry Division. He began his full-time service in 1990 through the Active Guard & Reserve (AGR) program.

He has led at platoon, company, squadron, and coalition headquarters levels, culminating in command of NATO Headquarters Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina from June 2012 through June 2013. He has held critical army and joint staff positions at every level from unit to coalition in the Continental United States, Germany, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Afghanistan. He has also participated in domestic operations as a member of two dual-status Joint Task Forces with United States Northern Command, serving as Chief of Staff, JTF-G20 in support of the G20 World Economic Summit in Pittsburgh, and Deputy Commander, JTF-NSJ in support of the 100th Anniversary National Scout Jamboree at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia.

General Lord is married to the former Grace Power of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Lords have two sons. Ryan is an Army First Lieutenant at Fort Hood, Texas; and Drew is an Army Second Lieutenant and will begin training as a Military Intelligence officer in November, 2016. They currently make their home at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Major General Timothy E. Orr was appointed by Secretary of Defense as Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on September 18, 2015. He also was appointed as Chairman to the RFPB subcommittee for Enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland, focusing on improving the capability and capacity of the reserve component to address the increasing threats to the homeland.

General Orr assumed duties as The Adjutant General, Iowa on 26 March 2009 and also serves as Director, Iowa Department of Public Defense. He provides command and control of more than 100 Army and Air National Guard units with approximately 9,400 assigned Soldiers and Airmen. His primary mission is to ensure the Iowa National Guard trains, mobilizes, deploys, sustains and reconstitutes units ensuring the state provides ready forces in support of community, state and national requirements.

General Orr began his military career by enlisting into the Iowa Army National Guard in December 1978. He received his officer’s commission through the United States Army Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning on 20 August 1985. He has commanded at the company, battalion and brigade level. His most recent command assignment was Commander, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division, Iowa Army National Guard, from October 2004 to September 2007. Following that assignment, General Orr served as Chief of Staff, Iowa Army National Guard, from October 2007 to December 2008.
Rear Admiral Francis “Stash” Pelkowski
Board Member

Rear Admiral Lower Half Francis S. “Stash” Pelkowski was appointed by Secretary of Homeland Security Johnson as Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on July 20, 2015. He also was appointed as member to the RFPB subcommittee for Enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland, focusing on improving the capability and capacity of the reserve component to address the increasing threats to the homeland.

Rear Admiral Stash Pelkowski is the Senior Reserve Officer, Coast Guard Atlantic Area since June 2014. He facilitates the training and mobilization readiness of over 4,400 reservists from as far West as Colorado to as far East as Afghanistan. Prior to his assignment to Atlantic Area, he was Senior Reserve Officer for the Deputy Commandant of Operations (DCO) and the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Coordinator at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters.

Rear Admiral Pelkowski enlisted in the Coast Guard as a coxswain operating the 44’ Motor Life Boat and the 41’ Utility Boat performing Law Enforcement and Search & Rescue missions. After commissioning, he served aboard several USCG Cutters as a Deck Watch Officer. Later he became Group Operations Center Controller and the Operations Officer for the U.S. Navy’s Naval Coastal Warfare Harbor Defense Command. Rear Admiral Pelkowski also served as the Chief of Prevention and the Senior Reserve Officer at Sector NY, one of the largest field Commands in the Coast Guard. In 2010 he assumed command of the Coast Guard Joint Staff Unit in Suffolk, Virginia and simultaneously commanded NATO’s first Joint Reserve Unit, the first Coast Guard reservist to do so.

In his civilian career, Rear Admiral Pelkowski is a licensed “Master Mariner” and 3rd Assistant Engineer and sailed extensively in the U.S. Merchant Marine. He was Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel for several commercial vessel operators and President of a small Towing Vessel company which grew significantly under his leadership. He is now a Professor at New York Maritime College and utilizes his expertise to develop the next generation of marine operators and industry leaders. Rear Admiral Pelkowski earned a Juris Doctor Degree from N.Y. Law School and holds New York & New Jersey state law licenses; an MBA from the N.Y. Institute of Technology; and a Bachelor of Engineering degree from N.Y. Maritime College at Fort Schuyler. He is a military graduate of National Defense University, Naval War College, Army War College, and the Joint Forces Staff College. His military decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (3 awards). He is qualified as a U.S. Navy Expeditionary Battle Watch Commander, USCG Coxswain, Permanent Cutterman, & Advanced Boat Force Operations Insignias and Joint Chiefs Staff Identification Badge.
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles E. Stenner, Jr.
Board Member

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles E. Stenner, Jr was appointed by Secretary of Defense as Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on December 24, 2015. He also was appointed Chairman of the RFPB subcommittee for Supporting & Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel, to assess whether the current Service member, families, and employers personnel programs and policies are meeting the needs of an operational reserve.

General Stenner most recently served as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the 21st Century Partnership in Warner Robins, Georgia from August 2014 to December 2015. He was ultimately responsible for implementation of the vision, mission and strategies of the Partnership. A Georgia nonprofit corporation, the 21ST Century Partnership is the only community enterprise dedicated solely to preserving the military presence of Robins Air Force Base, while helping Middle Georgia communities prepare to avert potential efforts to marginalize the missions of the base. The Partnership accomplishes these goals principally by working closely with national, regional and local leadership along with community organizations to positively influence those primary factors that will likely be considered under a future Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. For more than 20 years, the Partnership has been a key participant in all large-scale Department of Defense decision-making affecting Robins Air Force Base.

Prior to joining the Partnership, General Stenner served as the Chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Ga. As the Chief of Air Force Reserve, he served as principal adviser on Reserve matters to the Air Force Chief of Staff. As Commander of Air Force Reserve Command, he had full responsibility for the supervision of all U.S. Air Force Reserve units around the world.

General Stenner was commissioned a second lieutenant upon completing Officer Training School in 1973. He has served in various operational and staff assignments, including duty as an F-4C/D pilot, an F-16C pilot and an A-10 instructor pilot and operations officer. He has commanded four operations groups and two fighter wings. The general is a command pilot with more than 3,500 flying hours in the F-4, A-10 and F-16.

General Stenner is a lifetime member of the Air Force Association (AFA), Retired Officers Association (ROA), Airlift and Tanker Association (AfTA), and Military Officers Association of America (MOAA)

He is married to Diedra “Dee” Stenner. They have four children and ten grandchildren
MaryAnn E. Tierney was appointed Regional Administrator for FEMA Region III in August 2010. She served concurrently as Acting Regional Administrator in FEMA Region II for ten months following the devastating effects of Hurricane Sandy on New York and New Jersey. As Regional Administrator, Ms. Tierney is responsible for leading FEMA’s efforts in the mid-Atlantic to ensure communities are resilient against, ready for, can respond to, and quickly recover from disasters of all kinds. As a FEMA Regional Administrator, she promotes dialogue and builds partnerships with a diverse group of local, state and federal stakeholders, to include the Military Service’s Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Programs, the National Guard and Reserves, and USNORTHCOM to further FEMA’s mission to support our citizens and first responder civil support missions.

From November 2006 to August 2010, Ms. Tierney served as Director of Emergency Management in Philadelphia where she oversaw a transformation of the emergency management program by developing operational emergency plans, conducting multiagency training and exercises, building partnerships with the private sector and community organizations, and providing the public many avenues to stay informed during emergencies.

Ms. Tierney spent over 7 years with the New York City Office of Emergency Management rising to Assistant Commissioner for Planning and Preparedness. In New York City, Mrs. Tierney developed and revised emergency plans and oversaw the City’s recovery and mitigation activities. During the City’s response to the attacks of September 11th, she held a key position coordinating debris management activities at the World Trade Center site and the Fresh Kills Landfill as well as the City’s application for Federal funding to reimburse costs associated with response and recovery operations, which totaled over $4.75B.

She has extensive experience coordinating large and complex emergency response operations. She has managed over 60 EOC activations in New York City and Philadelphia and regularly responded to large emergencies to coordinate on-scene response activities. At FEMA, Mrs. Tierney is responsible for leading the Federal government’s response to all presidentially declared emergencies and disasters in the mid-Atlantic. In October and November 2012, she served as a Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for FEMA in New York City in response to Hurricane Sandy.

Ms. Tierney was formerly a principal member of the NFPA Technical Committee on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA 1600) and has taught graduate-level courses on emergency management. She holds a BA in political science from American University, a MPA from New York University, and a certificate from the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security. She also recently completed the National Defense University Capstone Course. Maryann, her husband Ed, son Aiden, and dog Molly reside in South Philadelphia.
Rear Admiral Linda R. Wackerman grew up in Key Biscayne, Florida. She is a graduate from Metropolitan State College in Denver, Colorado, and was commissioned from Aviation Officer Candidate School in September 1986. She was designated a Naval Aviator in October 1987.

Her active duty tours include Helicopter Combat Support Squadron THREE (HC-3), the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS); and first fleet our assignment with HC-11, Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island, California where she flew and instructed in the H-46D helicopter and deployed to the Western Pacific. Admiral Wackerman was further assigned to shore duty with VT-6 and the Instructor Training Unit, NAS Whiting Field, Florida, where she instructed flight training in the T-34C Mentor.

Her Full Time Support (FTS) officer duty in the Navy Reserve includes Assistant Reserve Program director for 2,300 reservists where she flew and instructed in the UC-12B; and Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (VR-52), where she flew and instructed in the C-9B/DC-9 at NAS JRB Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. Rear Admiral Wackerman transitioned from full time status to Selected Reservist remaining with VR-52 in June 1999. She became commanding officer of VR-52 after which the squadron was awarded the Operational and Maintenance awards for performance. Admiral Wackerman mobilized for eleven months in support of Operation Noble Eagle after 9-11.

Rear Admiral Wackerman’s Subsequent tours include training officer of Navy Reserve Capabilities Assessment Unit (OPNAV N8) in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. She served as Commanding Officer for Navy Reserve, Commander, Navy Region Mid Atlantic, Region Operations Center (ROC) in Norfolk, Virginia; and Navy Reserve, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Operations and Planning N3/N5 unit in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. She was assigned as Navy Emergency Preparedness liaison officer (NEPLO) for the state of Pennsylvania and Deputy Lead for the NEPLO Program at Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC). She served as the Commander, NR CNIC NEPLO leading the NEPLO Program. She is currently assigned as Reserve Deputy Director, Assessment Division, OPNAV N81R. Also, since September 2016, she has been a Board Member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which serves as an independent advisor to Secretary of Defense on Reserve and National Guard matters.

In her civilian capacity, Rear Admiral Wackerman is an American Airlines 757/767 First Officer flying international routes where she has accumulated over 7,000 civilian flight hours in addition to her 5,400 military hours. Her military decorations include the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal (3rd Award), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2nd award), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (3rd award), the Military Volunteer Service Medal, Sharpshooter Pistol Ribbon, and various unit/campaign awards.
Dr. Charlotte J. Warren, Ph.D., is the first woman President of Lincoln Land Community College (LLCC) and is a Colonel (Retired) of the Georgia Army National Guard. She holds a Ph.D. in counseling psychology from the University of Virginia; a master’s degree in psychiatric/mental health nursing; and a bachelor’s in nursing, both from Virginia Commonwealth University.

Prior to LLCC, Dr. Warren was President of the Community College Alliance and Vice President of the Virtual Campus at Franklin University in Columbus, Ohio. From 2002-2005 she served as Provost of the Lawrenceville campus of Georgia Perimeter College. From 2000-2002, she was Assistant Academic VP for Continuing and Corporate Education at Georgia Perimeter College in Clarkston. From 1997-2000, she was chair of the Department of Nursing at Georgia Perimeter, Clarkston. She was a psychotherapist in private practice from 1992-98 and taught in research universities and community college settings for 30 years.

In her military career, Dr. Warren retired in 2012 as a Colonel and a Honorary Brigadier General, serving 21 years in the Georgia Army National Guard. She began her career in the National Guard as an Army Nurse and assumed positions of increasing importance including Battalion Operations, Inspector General, Intelligence Officer, Executive Officer and Deputy Commander of the GAARNG Medical Command. Her military service saw her active in numerous major training exercises with NATO partners and providing medical service following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Colonel Warren entered the Guard in 1990 having already attained a Ph.D. while working as the Dean of School of Nursing and President of the Georgia's Nurse's Association. As a captain, she was a clinical nurse for the 117th MASH and planned and implemented the “Atlanta Kids Immunization Project” for school age children and also developed nutritional counseling programs and training videos enabling greater National Guard outreach.

Colonel Warren served in both civilian and military capacities on the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games Medical Committee. The Committee was responsible for medical planning, recruitment, and care during the games where Colonel Warren personally provided direct medical support at several Olympic venues.

From 2002 to 2011, Colonel Warren was assigned to the State Medical Command and served as Head Nurse, Executive Officer and Deputy Commander. In those roles, she oversaw development and implementation of new SRP/PHA procedures and she worked closely with the DSS to build a contract program which allowed the Georgia Guard to be ranked number one in the nation in military medical readiness.

Colonel (Retired) Warren is a Command and General Staff College graduate and her awards include the Army Achievement, Army Commendation and Meritorious Service medals.
Major General Burke W. Whitman has served as a military and corporate leader.

As an officer of United States Marines, he has commanded infantry and reconnaissance units at every level from platoon to regiment; served as operations officer at every level from battalion to geographic combatant command; conducted combat operations in Bosnia, Iraq (twice), and Afghanistan (twice); developed policy and strategy while assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and earned a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the Army War College. As a general, he has served on active duty as Assistant Division Commander, 2d Marine Division; Director, Military Advisor Group, Afghanistan; Deputy Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force; and Director of Marine & Family Division, responsible for holistic fitness and readiness of all Marines and their families – body, mind, spirit, and social.

As a civilian, he has served as CEO, CFO, President, and Board Member of multiple corporations, two traded on the New York Stock Exchange and listed among the Fortune 500 companies. He was named a Best CEO and Best CFO in his Industry by Institutional Investor Magazine. He has served on the boards of the Federation of American Hospitals, Lovett School, Marine Corps University, and Toys for Tots Foundation; on the Founders Group of the National Museum of the Marine Corps; and on the Reserve Forces Policy Board, an independent advisor to the Secretary of Defense.

Reared in Atlanta, he graduated with honors from Lovett High School, earned a BA with honors from Dartmouth College and an MBA from Harvard University, and received a commission as an officer of Marines after graduate school.
Major General Cornell A. Wilson, Jr.
Board Member

Major General Cornell A. Wilson was appointed by Governor Pat McCrory of North Carolina on October 2015 to his cabinet as the Secretary for the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs. Formerly the Governor’s Military Advisor since 2013, his responsibilities include protecting the state's military installations, working with the military communities around the installations, assisting military families and veterans to get the support and services they need, and helping connect veterans with jobs.

A graduate of the University of South Carolina with a B.S. in Chemistry, he received his commission in the United States Marine Corps through the Navy ROTC program in 1972. He has a long and distinguished record of service to our country in both active and reserve duty assignments. He has commanded Combat Arms and Combat Service Support units from the Company, Battalion, Group and Brigade levels. His staff assignments included service in manpower, operations and logistics positions. Selected as a General Officer in 1999, he served as a Deputy Commanding General for Marine Forces Central Command and the Deputy J3 for Central Command in Tampa, Fl; Commanding General for 4th Force Service Support Group in New Orleans, La; Commanding General for II MACE, 2nd Brigade Commanding General and the Deputy Commanding General II MEF at Camp Lejeune, NC; Director, Manpower and Reserve Affairs at Headquarters Marine Corps in Quantico, Va.; Commanding General Marine Forces Europe and Africa in Stuttgart, Germany; Deputy Commanding General Marine Forces Command in Norfolk, Va and Commanding General Marine Forces Southern Command in Miami, Fl. In 2003, he commanded a Joint Task Force of Coalition Partners in combat in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom based in Kuwait.

His professional military education includes the Harvard University Program for Senior Executives for National and International Security, Marshall Center Senior Executive Seminar in Garmisch, Germany; NATO Defense College General and Flag Officer Course, Rome, Italy; National Defense University’s Capstone Course and the Logtech Executive Course. He has served as a board member of Charlotte Bridge Home and currently serves as a board member of the Toys4Tots Foundation, St. Augustine’s University, US Veterans Administration Advisory Council for Minority Veterans and the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

He and his wife of 35 years have 3 adult children and one grandson.
Major General Sheila Zuehlke
Board Member

Maj. Gen. Sheila Zuehlke is the Mobilization Assistant (MA) to the Commander, 24th Air Force, headquartered at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas. The 24th Air Force’s mission is to operate, extend and defend the Air Force Information Network, defend key mission systems, and provide full spectrum cyberspace capabilities for the joint warfighter in, through and from cyberspace. Twenty-Fourth Air Force comprises two wings, the 67th Cyber Wing and 688th Cyber Wing, and the 5th Combat Communications Group, as well as the 624th Operations Center.

General Zuehlke was commissioned through the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1983. After completing an East-West fellowship, she served as the Air Force Chief of Staff’s Northeast Asia Analyst. She has held a variety of leadership positions including Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) to the Director of Intelligence, 13th Air Force; IMA to the Commander Pacific Air Intelligence Squadron; IMA to the Deputy Director of Intelligence, Air Combat Command and most recently as the MA to the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Director, National Security Agency, Chief Central Security Service. As a civilian, Maj. Gen. Zuehlke owns a software engineering firm.
APPENDIX B

List of Recommendations

2.1: Emphasize the Total Force Policy .................................................................31
2.2: Formalize the Operational Reserve ................................................................33
2.3: Increase Active Component / Reserve Component Integration ..................35
2.4: Establish Department of Defense Policy for Computing Personnel Costs ....38
2.5: Enact Reserve Component Duty Status Reform ..............................................42
2.6: Enact Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Parity ........................................45
2.7: Allow Reservists to Accrue Post-9/11 Benefits while on Medical Hold .......47
3.1: Integrate the Reserve Component into the Force of the Future and Enhance Permeability .................................................................49
3.2: Maintain Reserve Component Readiness .......................................................53
3.3: Include the Reserve Component in Cyber Mission Force Requirements ....55
3.4: Implement Individual Ready Reserve Management Reforms .......................58
3.5: Transition Service Members at Home of Record Reserve Component Sites ...63
3.6: Minimize Installation and Infrastructure Duplication .....................................67
3.7: Retain Adequate Reserve Component General Officer/Flag Officer Structure and Grade ...............................................................70
APPENDIX C
List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1-1: FY15 Fully-Burdened Per-Capita Cost Comparison .................................................................19
Figure 1-2: Cost Comparison AC v RC Units .................................................................................................22
Figure 1-3: Total Reserve Force Makeup ......................................................................................................24
Figure 1-4: Reserve Duty Days (Historical) ..................................................................................................26
Figure 2-1: Force Makeup AC/RC ..............................................................................................................31
Figure 2-2: Base & OCO Personnel Appropriation ......................................................................................39
Figure 2-3: Duty Statuses ...........................................................................................................................43
Figure 3-1: Number of IRR and SELRES Accessed Since 2001 .................................................................59
Figure 3-2: IRR and ING Population ...........................................................................................................60
Figure 3-3: AC Retirements v. Non-retirements .........................................................................................64
Figure 3-4: Number of Guard & Reserve Drill Centers ............................................................................66
Figure 3-5: Number of Guard and Reserve Facilities ..............................................................................68
Figure 3-6: ROPMA/NDAA GO/FO Recommendations Comparison ....................................................71
Figure 4-1: “Why It Matters” .......................................................................................................................77
Figure 4-2: O&M Appropriation ..................................................................................................................79
Figure 4-3: A Wide Variety of Authorities Available to Use RC ..............................................................81
Figure 4-4: OIF Personnel Strength ...........................................................................................................85
Figure 4-5: Spectrum of Operations ...........................................................................................................87
## APPENDIX D
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC/RC</td>
<td>Active Component/Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Reserve Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Air Force Reserve Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>Air Reserve Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARPC</td>
<td>Air Reserve Personnel Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Annual Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATAG</td>
<td>Assistant Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATFP</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Force Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVF</td>
<td>All-Volunteer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Budget Control Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Common Access Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFR</td>
<td>Commander, Air Force Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE</td>
<td>Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERFP</td>
<td>CBRN Enhanced Force Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>Cyber Mission Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNGB</td>
<td>Chief, National Guard Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Cyber Protection Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAF</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td>Civil Support Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DANG</td>
<td>Director, Air National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>DARRNG</td>
<td>Director, Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Defense Industrial Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNE</td>
<td>Declaration of National Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOPMA</td>
<td>Defense Officer Personnel Management Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSR WG</td>
<td>Duty Status Review Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTF</td>
<td>Development Training Flight</td>
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<td>EMAC</td>
<td>Emergency Management Assistance Compact</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Association</td>
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<td>FGC</td>
<td>Force Generation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Flag Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>Federal Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTNGD</td>
<td>Full Time National Guard Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>General Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSU</td>
<td>Geographically Separated Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASC</td>
<td>House Armed Services Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOR</td>
<td>Home of Record</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>House Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYT</td>
<td>High-Year Tenure</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Industrial Control Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Inactive Duty</td>
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IDA Institute for Defense Analysis
IDT Inactive Duty Training
ING Inactive National Guard
IPPS-A Integrated Personnel and Pay System - Army
IRA Immediate Response Authority
IRR Individual Ready Reserve
IRS Internal Revenue Service
IRT Innovative Readiness Training
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IT Information Technology
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JFHQ-C Joint Force Headquarter Cyber
JTF Joint Task Force
LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
M&RA Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MAA Mission Assurance Assessment
MAFFS Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems
MARFORRES Marine Forces Reserve
MCRMC Military Compensation and Retirement Commission
MEPS Military Entrance Processing Station
MERHCF Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund
MILCON Military Construction
MTOE Modified Table of organization and Equipment
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCFA National Commission on the Future of the Army
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NGB National Guard Bureau
NGREA National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation
NGRF National Guard Reaction Force
NORTHCOM Northern Command
NOSC Navy Operation Support Center
NSA National Security Agency
NSSE National Special Security Event
O&M Operations and Maintenance
OASD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OCO Overseas Contingency Operation
ODP Office of Defense Planning
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OND Operation New Dawn
ONE Operation Noble Eagle
OPLAN Operation Plan
OPS Operations
OUSD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
P&R Personnel and readiness
PCA Posse Comitatus Act
PRC Presidential Reserve Call-up
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
QRMC Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
RC Reserve Component
RCSPB Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Plan
RET Retired
RFPB Reserve Forces Policy Board
RFRS Reserve Force Readiness System
ROPMA Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act
SASC Senate Armed Services Committee
SBP Survivor Benefit Plan
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCMR Strategic Choices and Management Review
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SELRES</td>
<td>Selective Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERA</td>
<td>Senior Enlisted Reserve Advisor</td>
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<td>SESG</td>
<td>Senior Engineer Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFB</td>
<td>State Facilities Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGACTs</td>
<td>Significant Activities</td>
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<td>SLSC</td>
<td>Senior Leader Steering Committee</td>
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<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>State Partnership Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Senior Reserve Officer</td>
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<td>STBY</td>
<td>Standby</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>The Adjutant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Transition Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
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<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force Deployment Document</td>
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<td>UFM</td>
<td>Unilateral Facility Multiplier</td>
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<td>Unified Legislative and Budgeting Process</td>
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<td>USD</td>
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<td>VAT</td>
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