THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2014
RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
ANNUAL REPORT

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14 June 1951

The first Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,
Mr. Charles H. Buford (center) is sworn in by Mr. Ralph N. Stohl,
Director of Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (left),
during a special ceremony in the office of the Secretary of Defense
George C. Marshall (right) at the Pentagon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: 2014 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

The Reserve Forces Policy Board met on September 10, 2014 to determine which reserve component matters the Board considered appropriate for inclusion in a separate report to the President and Congress that fulfills the requirement of Section 113(c)(2) of Title 10, United States Code. The attached Annual Report covering Fiscal Year 2014 is respectfully submitted for that purpose.

This Annual Report summarizes three separate Board reports, covering seventeen recommendations made to you over the course of Fiscal Year 2014. Thus, we have complied with our statutory mandate to serve as an independent source of advice to you and the Department.

In fulfilling our mission in Fiscal Year 2014, the RFPB operated in an open and collaborative fashion with officials throughout the Department of Defense and elsewhere, assuring that diverse perspectives were considered in the process of formulating and approving the Board's recommendations to you.

ARNOLD L. PUNARO
Chairman

Board discussion 4 June, 2014 with The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), The Honorable Jessica L. Wright, and Chairman Arnold Punaro. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

"... the Secretary shall transmit to the President and Congress a separate report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on any reserve component matter that the Reserve Forces Policy Board considers appropriate to include in the report."

10 USC § 113(c) (2)

For additional information:

http://rfpb.defense.gov

Preparation of this report/study cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $16,000 in FY 2014. Generated on 07/20/2014—RefID: D-6B90CA6

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Executive Summary

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) provides the Secretary of Defense with advice and recommendations designed to strengthen the Reserve Components. During fiscal year 2014, the Board held four (4) quarterly meetings and delivered to the Secretary of Defense three (3) reports containing seventeen (17) recommendations. A summary of each of these reports is included in the body of this Annual Report.

Starting in November, 2013, the Board delivered three (3) reports. The first report, entitled "Opposition to Sectin 511 of H.R. 1960 (Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act). The RFPB found that recommendations concerning provisions in the House and Senate versions of the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act would hinder Department of Defense access to the Reserve Components. The Board found that these provisions, while well-meaning, will exert a chilling effect on DoD decisionmaking to employ the National Guard and Reserve, and thus, effectively hinder future access to the Reserve Components. The second report entitled "Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense." On September 5, 2012, then Secretary Leon Panetta met with the RFPB and tasked the Board with providing its advice and recommendations regarding four questions: the best ways to use the Reserve Components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance; the right balance or mix of Active and Reserve Component forces; the cost to maintain a Strong Reserve; and how the Department can achieve cost savings in relation to the Reserve Components. The RFPB met on September 5, 2013 and December 12, 2013 and voted to make twelve (12) recommendations. In August of 2014 the third report was delivered entitled "The Department of Defense Cyber Approach: Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force" with four(4) recommendations.

The Board's first report dealt with provisions in the House and Senate versions of the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act which hinder Department of Defense access to the Reserve Components. That report made one recommendation for the secretary to consider:

The Board recommended that the Secretary of Defense publicly and privately emphasize the Department's opposition to new legislative limitations requiring the Department of Defense to provide advanced notice of Reserve Component "off-ramping" because it hinders future access to the Reserve Components.

The following twelve (12) recommendations were provided to the Secretary in the Board's second report titled Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings.

1. Plan and Use the Reserve Component Operationally.
2. Develop and Enforce a Revised DoD Total Force Policy.
3. Study the Effectiveness of the Reserve Component.
4. Preserve Reserve Component to Mitigate Risk from Active Component Cuts.
5. Expand Reserve Component in Key Skill Areas.

6. Improve Active Component/Reserve Component Integration.
7. Effectively Use Available Manpower.
8. Invest in Reserve Component Readiness.
9. Conduct a Broad Reserve Component Programmatic Review.
10. Review Reserve Component General and Flag Officer Usage.
11. Review Reserve Component Infrastructure.
12. Study Cross-Component Equipment Sharing.

The Board's third report was entitled Department of Defense Cyber Approach: Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force. The following four (4)recommendations were provided to the Secretary:

1. Include Reserve Components in Cyber Mission Force requirements in order to leverage Reserve Component reduced cost, civilian/AC acquired skill/experience, continuity and longevity.
2. As part of a Total Force solution, re-evaluate the composition, size and force mix of the planned Cyber Mission Force by FY 2017, and refine as needed based on changing threats, team effectiveness, capability, required capacity and cost.
3. The Department of Defense should study, and then assign executive responsibility to a single Service for the full range of joint cyber training.
4. Recruit highly skilled members via a professional accessions and retention program to fill both AC and Reserve Component requirements within the Cyber Mission Force.

INTRODUCTION

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) established by statute, is a federal advisory committee within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Its purpose is to "serve as an independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components." By law, the Secretary of Defense transmits to the President and Congress a separate annual report from the RFPB that includes reserve component matters the Board considers appropriate.

During fiscal year 2014, the RFPB successfully fulfilled its statutory role by delivering to the Secretary of Defense three (3) reports containing a total of eighteen (17) recommendations.

As required under Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 113(c)(2), this Annual Report contains those reserve component matters the Reserve Forces Policy Board considers appropriate to include in the report for transmission from the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress. The report includes a compilation of the three (3) reports and seventeen (17) recommendations provided to the Secretary of Defense over the past year. The text of statutes governing Board operations is included as an appendix to this report.

MG Stephen M. Twitty, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army Forces Command addresses the Board 4 June 2014. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW

The 20-member Reserve Forces Policy Board is led by a civilian chair and includes a non-voting Military Executive and Senior Enlisted Advisor, a member (serving or retired) of each of the seven reserve components of the armed forces, and ten U.S. citizens with significant knowledge and experience in national security and reserve component matters. Board members represent a wide range of military, industry, business, professional, and civic experience, which combined provide the Secretary of Defense with a unique and independent body of senior officials to provide advice and recommendations on Reserve Component strategies, policies, and practices.

The Board is supported by a full-time staff consisting of a Colonel or Navy Captain from each of the six DoD reserve components, plus a part-time detailed member of the Coast Guard Reserve. These officers also serve as liaisons between their respective components and the Board. The law requires them "to perform their staff and liaison duties under the supervision of the military executive officer of the board in an independent manner reflecting the independent nature of the board."

The RFPB is one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department of Defense. In September 1949, in response to inadequate recruitment and strength in the reserve program of the armed services, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson established a Civilian Components Policy Board. On June 13, 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall re-designated the Civilian Components Policy Board as the Reserve Forces Policy Board. In July 1952, Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. This act established the

Board member Hon. Grier Martin discusses a policy issue on 5 March 2014. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

Reserve Forces Policy Board as "the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve Components." Passage of the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 and the Reserve Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act of 1967 underscored the Board's role and expanded its authority, responsibility, and membership. In 1995, a member of the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was added to the Board's membership.

In 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommended that the RFPB's governing statute (10 USC 10301) be amended, because the Board was not structured to obtain and provide independent advice directly to the Secretary of Defense on a wide range of National Guard and Reserve matters due to the nature of its membership and its subordination to other offices within DoD. Other than the Chairman, the Board's membership included only DoD officials who made recommendations through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The current statute establishes the Board as an "independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense."

In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, after receiving input from the Department of Defense and a wide range of outside experts, Congress significantly changed the operating framework and membership of the RFPB to its present structure. The revised law became effective July 1, 2011. On September 12, 2011, Arnold L. Punaro succeeded William S. Greenberg as Chairman of the RFPB.

Fiscal year 2014 was the third full year of Board operations under the revised statute and produced three (3) reports totaling seventeen (17) recommendations. The 17 recommendations were deliberated, debated, and approved during four meetings over the course of the year.

Chairman Punaro and MG John Davis, DASD for Cyber Policy, providing an update to the board on 4 June 2014. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

Summary of Meetings

Quarterly Meeting
December 12, 2013

The 1ˢᵗ quarter meeting was held on December 12, 2013. Presentations were made by: former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Retired); former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald Fogleman (Retired); former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michèle Flournoy; Director General, UK Army Reform, Major General Kevin Abraham and Deputy Commander, Land Forces, Major General RTI Munro - Remarks by VTC; and the board's Subcommittee Chairs.

Admiral Roughead opened by stating that it is an important time for the Department of Defense and National Security, but noted that he did not subscribe to the hyperbole that it's the most dangerous time for our nation. He stated that it's the internal drivers that we need to get our arms around, adding that budget levels that we're seeing today are the budget levels we are going to be living with in the future. He also noted the importance of knowing where the American people stand on security, citing survey data showing that a majority believe we need to focus on the home front. He suggested that we are at another Gates Commission moment with respect to our all-volunteer force. He added that the current compensation/benefits package is unsustainable under current budget levels, if we still expect to have enough resources to provide the necessary equipment and training for the men and women we expect to go into harm's way. ADM Roughead stated that the Uniformed Civilian Force force has gotten too large. He noted that ground force numbers (when combining Active, Reserve and Guard Components) exceed a million people and added that the current number needs to be adjusted. He recognized our Reserve Components for their contributions during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and noted the value of having Reserve members flawlessly integrate into active duty organizations like Navy Headquarters. He added that in this tough budgetary period, it's time for the Guard and Reserve (noting current experience levels) to fill in to bring down costs and shape the force of the future. Admiral Roughead gave his thoughts on the right mix of AC and Reserve Component forces, given recent cost comparisons. The Admiral cited work he and a colleague conducted February 2013 which showed billions in savings through a more elegant use of AC and Reserve Component forces. He suggested that many of the missions that will benefit the country in the future need not be AC, but could be filled best by RC personnel with savings in the tens of billions of dollars. He added that we need to consider the issue in its totality - to include compensation along with force structure and to consider establishing an independent commission that provides recommendations on the appropriate roles and missions for Guard and Reserve forces to fill in the future. He suggested that it is time to take another look at the requirements put forward in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. He submitted that the growth in Joint Headquarters staffs is not necessarily driven by the work that needs to be done, but rather the Joint qualification requirement in Goldwater-Nichols, which leads to chasing careers instead of focusing on the mission. With regard to pay, he suggested the approach to compensation by using more incentives, specialty pay and assignment pay. With regard to health care, ADM Roughead

stated that reform is urgently needed and that it is unfair that a retired Admiral pays the same for healthcare as an E-7 in retirement. The Chairman asked for his thoughts on what can be done from outside DoD in regards to the budget. ADM Roughead said that with the recent budget deal and more defined spending levels, he believes that now is the time to act. ADM Roughead believes that Congress is starting to ask the tough questions about future DoD capabilities. He also stated that current funding levels will require different training and readiness models than those currently utilized. He suggested that in the O&M world, equipment costs should be looked at in two different categories - cost to own and cost to operate. In addition, he believes that as DoD looks at a lean future, they consider cross budget line decisions for smarter business outcomes. When asked by Chairman Punaro about his thoughts on contractor costs, Admiral Roughead commented on his inability to capture contractor costs during his tenure as CNO. The Admiral believes that there needs to be a separate pay account for contractors, adding that we do not have the same covenant with contractors that we have with military and government employees.

General Fogleman opened by describing his topic as: a "missed opportunity" in terms of a 21st century total force construct. In addition, he stated that the needs of the nation fall into two categories: domestic and international. Domestically, the country needs a healthy economy, balanced budget, improved infrastructure, homeland defense, and an ability to respond to national emergencies. In the international arena, the country needs free and open access to the Global Commons (sea, space and cyber) and to protect our interests and citizens abroad. It is with these priorities in mind that we build our 21st century military. Next, he commented on the all-volunteer force and stated that we cannot support the force as it is currently structured. He added that post-WWII and the Cold War were aberrations in our history in terms of force structure, and stated the need to look at a reallocation of resources. He further noted that the bottom-up review in 1993 simply sliced the budget 3 ways and left us with a large standing military force that ended up as the wrong force when we were finally challenged. He expressed that a strong Reserve Component is necessary for the new force structure. He stated that as the national defense strategy has shifted to "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region, future forces will need to be structured to provide universal applicability around the world with a relatively rapid response time. Gen Fogleman warned against cutting forces proportionally and suggested the need to look at a large reduction in our land forces. He noted that we have not recapitalized or modernized our equipment, and that if we don't change our current practices, it will erode the asymmetric advantage that we have today. He stated that the Air and Naval Forces don't get a bye with respect to cuts. Referencing a briefing he recently attended which stated that 30% of the defense budget is being spent on stealth, General Fogleman urged DoD to take a look at how much money is spent on modernization, particularly when multiple nations have developed anti-stealth technology. He commented that DoD and the Services need a decision support tool that looks at the capacity and capability of various force structures, and added that standard costing data is needed as well. Gen Fogleman stressed the importance of continued operational use of the Guard and Reserve, and the need to follow through with developing a well-crafted definition of "Operational Reserve." GEN Fogleman stated that one needs to personally understand what it takes to be a Guardsman and Reservist, and that Service

Chiefs need to believe in the necessary changes, know the facts about accessibility of the Guard and Reserve, and be prepared to stand up to commanders in the Active Component.

The Honorable Michèle Flournoy opened with a discussion of the current strategic environment, noting fundamental shifts in the balance of power in international security dynamics in Asia; a diminished threat in Al Qaeda, but a morphing of that organization where it is now taking root in a number of countries from Yemen, Mali and Syria; and the continued pursuit of nuclear weapons by many terrorist organizations and countries, including Iran. She also discussed the increasingly congested and contested Global Commons. She suggested that while we are in a period of relative calm, we need to avoid becoming isolationist, and while she understands the war-weariness of the country and desire to focus on internal issues exclusively, there will be things that threaten our interests and require our attention internationally. She noted that the recent political stalemate has raised questions abroad about the U.S.'s staying power; ability to follow through on our commitment to allies; and ability to follow through on deterrence. She added that we have to remake the case to the American people that we cannot lose our international posture; need to maintain the leadership role we play; and end the political stalemate that has crippled us as a nation. Noting the downward pressures on defense spending, she posed the following question: How do we maintain the best military in the world (ready and equipped for the future) and keep faith with the all-volunteer force? She noted the historical tendencies during drawdowns to gut readiness and modernization as opposed to rethinking our operating model. She advised against repeating those mistakes again, and urged leadership to maintain a force that is truly agile and ready; maintain the ability to respond to a broad range of contingencies; and reassure our friends and allies that we will be there for them. With respect to what this means for the Guard and Reserve, Ms. Flournoy posed 3 questions: (1) What are the roles and missions we need the Guard and Reserve to perform, and what are the areas of comparative advantage? (2) What should be the operating model for the Guard and Reserve (3) How much should the Guard and Reserve be asked to contribute to the defense reform agenda and how do we manage the politics?

Ms. Flournoy discussed her ideas on the roles and missions where the Guard and Reserve have a comparative advantage: (1) Recognize the role played by the Guard and Reserve in keeping the military connected with the local community versus the Active Component; (2) Provide a strategic reserve of manpower and capability; (3) Provide support to domestic authorities, ranging from homeland defense scenarios, natural disasters, and other emergencies; and (4) Use the Guard Partnership program and the comparative advantage that Guard and Reserve members have in other areas by drawing on their civilian skills, as well as their military skills, in the shaping and engagement piece of foreign policy. She further suggested some other areas where the Guard and Reserve can contribute disproportionately either due to their civilian skill sets or geographic distribution: (1) Cyber Security - Noting that we are never going to recruit enough IT talent into the active component, Ms. Flournoy suggested creative ways to leverage the IT community for public service, including units designed to recruit from Silicon valley. (2) Counter CBRN – This mission is already covered and is a priority for many Reserve Component units that leverage first responder skills

Board discussion 5 March, 2014 with Dr. Scott A. Comes, Acting Director of CAPE and Chairman Punaro. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

and the tight connection to state and local communities. (3) Expanding investment in true experimentation, innovation and concept development, as well as looking at changes in staffing and structure to create meaningful and rewarding positions for those experienced members coming out of the active force over the next several years.

Ms. Flournoy then asked if we should keep the Operational Reserve model that we've inherited from the last decade and noted the historical aberration of fighting two ground wars simultaneously. She offered alternatives to consider; expressed disappointment that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has not addressed this question. The first suggestion she offered was a mixed model with some forces that are critical to enabling active forces and other forces that are more strategic (example given was keeping a significant portion of the heavy ground forces in the Guard), noting that the model would be based on COCOM Ops plans; partnering needs of the Active Component; and mission needs with longer lead time. Recommending against the old tiered readiness model, she suggested that the Board look at the Continuum of Service model in more detail, to include developing a suite of variable service contracts and models. Finally, she addressed the question of how much should the Guard and Reserve be asked to contribute to the defense reform agenda. Stating that we are at a point where our personnel costs are unsustainable, she noted that there are some who would try to exempt the Guard and Reserve from efforts to squeeze more money out of Defense. She feels that such an approach is incorrect and not politically viable. She added that we must find the right balance on compensation, benefits, readiness and modernization to keep faith with those that have served and those who are serving or will serve, and that no part of the Department should get a pass when looking at cost savings.

She commented that overhead reductions should begin with the civilian force, noting that the force has grown by 15% over the past decade. Ms. Flournoy felt that DoD needs to look at headquarters and infrastructure that is no longer mission related or central to our strategy. In addition, compensation and benefits must be examined. She acknowledged that there are very challenging analytic tasks required to understand what the ideal model needs to look like in the future, what is truly cost effective, and what is going to put us in good standing to maintain the best military in the world. Ms. Flournoy closed by emphasizing the need to manage the politics of defense funding reductions. She stressed that the role of the Service Chiefs is key, but that leadership has to come from the Secretary of Defense and even the President by engaging key congressional leaders, governors, adjutants general, and others as partners and stakeholders for the health and security of our nation. She stressed the need for cooperation and mutual trust in order to develop the best strategy and approach to obtain an affordable and viable force for the future.

Major General KD Abraham, Director General, Army Reform and Major General RTI Munro, Deputy Commander, UK Land Forces briefed several slides on the UK Army's "Army 2020" plan via VTC, and provided insight on the history and specific details of why and how the British Army is dramatically increasing the size of its Reserve force to counter-balance budget driven reductions in its full-time Regular force. The stated goal of Britain's "Army 2020" initiative is to provide a force capable in three major spheres: contingent capability for defense and deterrence; overseas engagement and capacity building as a means of conflict prevention; and both homeland resilience and engagement with British civilian society at large. In essence, the Reserves are being transitioned from a strategic supplement and source of individual replacements to an operational force. The Army Reserve will make a collective contribution, provide structural resilience to the UK military via a regime of graduated readiness, and serve as a pool of specialists and experts in fields like cybersecurity. The expectation is that the Reserve forces will provide a portion of the total force at every stage of overseas deployments from start to finish. The early stages will see more individual Reservists deployed and the latter stages will see more Reserve units deployed. In the near term, the UK will grow its Reserve from 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers with emphasis placed on recruiting and engagement with employers.

The Deputy Chief of Land Forces for the British Army, Major General Munro, is a senior Reserve officer in the Army. He sees additional recruitment and investment in Reserve capability and availability on the horizon. Major General Munro stated, "No one can afford to have a Reserve force used only in extremis." Thus, that is why the British Army has set a goal of having 10% of all future Army deployments staffed by Reserve forces. The Active and Reserve Component leaders are all espousing a "share the load" mentality with regard to AC/Reserve Component integration.

The RFPB subcommittees provided updates and recommendations. The Board members deliberated and approved several recommendations made from the Strategic Questions Task Group. The Board then moved to "Closed" session. Mr. Sergio Pecori, the subcommittee chairman Cyber Policy Task Group provided a brief on USCYBERCOM's Cyber mission force construct, along with Air Force, Navy, Army Reserve and National Guard Cyber

programs. A summary of findings and observations from the effort was presented along with a discussion on the relevance of Cyber Guard 13 participants and exercise results.

Quarterly Meeting
March 5, 2014

The 2nd quarter meeting was held on March 5, 2014. Presentations were made by: The Honorable Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force; The Honorable Whitten Peters, National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force; Dr. Scott Comes, Acting Director, CAPE; Mr. John Hastings, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Resources); Major General RTI Munro, British Army, Deputy Commander Land Forces; and the board's Subcommittee Chairs.

Dr. Scott Comes, Acting Director, OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) commented on the impact of current and future fiscal challenges. The Fiscal Year 2015 budget was characterized as a budget that plans for a leaner, but more technologically advanced force that focuses on capability over capacity. He stated that future budgets will continue to seek efficiencies. Dr. Comes also discussed the implications of future budgets that require compliance with sequestration levels.

Mr. John T. Hastings, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Resources)

Ms. Michelle Lowesolis, Director, Plans and Integration, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services, HQ US Air Force provides informational brief to the board on AFIPPS (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

commented on the President's Fiscal Year 2015 Budget submission and its impact on the Reserve Components, including end strength and funding data. His discussion began by talking the strategic view, noting the FY-15 Budget funding levels were slightly higher than those outlined in the Budget Control Act because of the recent Bipartisan Budget Agreement. The FY-15 budget is $496B, similar to FY-14 levels and a reduction of $75B below the FY-14 President's Budget. He further stated that the Budget plan projects $115B more in spending than sequestration levels for FY-15 through FY-19. He noted that all components, except the Navy active duty, would reduce end strength between FY-14 and FY-15. Next, he outlined Reserve Component funding in the FY-15 Budget. He explained that the ARNG continues to reduce their overall end strength, including 4,000 fewer full-time support positions. He also briefed that ARNG military personnel funding decreased by $135M from the previous year. In addition, cuts to O&M funding have driven the ARNG to train their members at only the individual, crew and squad levels. There are no funds available for Guard units to train at Combat Training Centers. He also briefed the following: Army Reserve funding for Ground OPSTEMPO, Base Operations and Support (BOS), and facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) decreased; Navy Reserve reductions occurred in Navy Expeditionary Combat Command structure and manpower; Marine Corps Reserve funding decreased in Active Duty for Training (ADT) mandays, while sustaining school training; and the ANG and Air Force Reserve C-130H, KC-135 and F-16 fleets are recapitalizing or modernizing concurrent with the divesture of the A-10 fleet. In conclusion, he suggested that there will be a continuous downward pressure on all service budgets, and that increased manpower costs will continue to drive end strength reductions.

The Honarble Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force, comments dealt with the Total Air Force and her view of the future. She concentrated on three priorities: 1) Taking care of people; 2) Balancing today's readiness with tomorrow's readiness requirements; and 3) Ensuring the Air Force is using its limited budget wisely- making every dollar count. She also described how the Total Force Continuum (TFC) group is working to identify restrictive policies and processes that are counterproductive to the Total Force, and providing her viable solutions to consider to improve Total Force continuum of service. She also addressed the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force's (NCSAF) recommendations and how the Air Force will proceed in the future. Finally, Secretary James described how although the Air Force of the future will be smaller, it will remain highly capable in our current and future budget constrained environment.

Lieutenant General Joseph L. Lengyel, Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau, offered new thoughts on the mission of the National Guard and described future force structure, modernization, and compensation. He discussed the National Guard's missions and future reductions in troop strength and force structure. Gen Lengyel explained that under the current Army future plan, Army National Guard (ARNG) end strength and force structure would decline, but emphasized that under sequestration budget levels ARNG reductions could be even larger. In response to questions about National Guard helicopter capability in the future, he noted that the National Guard Bureau's leadership is working with Army leaders to determine the future aviation force structure. Details concerning implementation of the announced proposal to transfer AH-64 Apache/UH-60 Blackhawk between components and

elimination of the OH-58 Kiowa fleet were not solidified yet. In addition, Lt Gen Lengyel outlined his concerns with compensation reform stating that slowing the growth of military compensation costs requires Congress to support and implement the DoD's compensation recommendations. He completed his remarks by stating that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is committed to maintaining a ready and capable National Guard.

Mr. Sergio Pecori, Cyber Policy Task Group Leader, presented a current summary of the Findings and Observations from the Cyber Policy Task Group and described Group visits with experts and final report development.

The RFPB concluded business in "Closed" Session then commenced to business in "Open" Session with a presentation given by Major General Ranald Munro (UK), Deputy Commander Land Forces (Reserves), British Army. Maj Gen Munro opened by stating that the British Army is transforming both the Reserve and Regular Components and moving to an integrated Army - Army 2020 and beyond. He described his background as a civilian General Counsel and pointed out that when he deployed to Iraq in 2005, he was deployed in his civilian skill as a lawyer, leading a team of operational law attorneys. Maj Gen Munro provided information on his government's 2011 independent commission report entitled "Future Reserves 2020" and the reports key findings. Maj Gen Munro discussed the recommendations and delivery of the Future Reserves 2020 report, which included such topics as financial investment; growing to a trained force of 30,000 by 2018; betterment packages; recruiting and partnership programs; and oversight. The end state

Board members SGM Michael Biere and RADM Russell Penniman discuss policy issues 5 March 2014. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

Board member VADM (Ret) John Cotton provides subcommittee update to the Board 5 March 2014. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

is to transform the Territorial Army and build capability to provide a credible, usable and relevant Army Reservist as an integrated and enduring element of the whole force. Maj Gen Munro talked about the expectation that Army Reservists will deliver force elements with predictability and assurance. He also envisioned reservists having access to modem equipment and the planning requirement for Reserve Component members to be prepared to mobilize 1 year in every 5 to encompass a full spectrum of military tasks. He said that the British Army leadership has made an explicit commitment to the future operational employment of Reserves by mandating that at least 10 percent of all future deployments will consist of Reserve forces. Maj Gen Munro closed by describing the steps required to achieve full Reserve integration, which includes attracting the talent, then manning, equipping, training, and sustaining the force. He also expressed some concern about the need to overcome Regular Army prejudice toward the reservist to ensure success, and reiterated that this integrated change to the British Army must succeed because the driver now is lack of money and there is no alternative (no plan B).

Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Commissioner, National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, began his presentation by addressing the Commission's charter and the force structure issues they were directed to consider including: AC/Reserve Component balance; areas where Reserve Component draws on civilian strengths, including cyber warfare; capacity required for Homeland Defense; and maintaining a rotation that meets a deployment/dwell goal of 1:2 for the AC and 1:5 for the Reserve Component. In addition, he addressed the commission's implied tasks of accounting for the operational nature of

Air Force Reserve Components determining present and future mission requirements and the resources likely to be available to them. He also pointed out that if we are going to have an operational reserve in the future, current law needs to change (especially in the Title 32 arena) to fully support and enhance an integrated force. He pointed out that the DoD interpretation of FACA laws was an impediment to the commission's deliberation process. He noted that 180 day rotations for the Reserve Component is not ideal, and pointed out that there must be flexibility for Reserve Component personnel rotations with consideration for issues with civilian employers, education requirements, and airline currency. He related that 45 to 90 day Reserve Component rotations for Northern and Southern watch during his tenure as SECAF were initially viewed by Air Force leadership with some skepticism, but ultimately the practice proved very successfull, and highlighted that there was no difference between AC and Reserve Component units supporting those missions. Mr. Peters provided the Board with a key finding of the study which is: the Air Force has funded a very capable and ready Reserve Component that trains and tests to the same standard as their Active Component counterparts, which means that any unit (AC or Reserve Component) is capable of deploying at any time. He stated that the Reserve Components have demonstrated their capacity and capability for increased contributions, but questions remain as to whether a 1:5 dwell ratio is supportable in the long term. One of the conclusions of the study was the Air Force is now positioned to leverage the Reserve Component's high level of readiness into cost savings that can offset some of the cuts to readiness, modernization and manpower. The report recommended moving manpower into the Reserve Components rather than a 'peanut butter spread' into all three components, and cited significant cost savings by moving force structure into the Reserve Components or integrated wings. However, Mr. Peters mentioned that the

Major General RTI Munro, British Army, addresses the Board 5 March 2014.
(Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

Reserve Components cost a lot less when in training status, but cost about the same when supporting operational missions. Chairman Punaro challenged this claim referencing the RFPB's costing report that identifies other considerations like base operating support costs for AC, and that the Department needs to start looking more closely at the fully burdened and life-cycle costs of the components. Mr. Peters agreed and said that their summary of recommendations included recognition of the need to plan and budget for costs using a fully-burdened approach. In addition, Mr. Peters stated that the commission pressed CAPE to take a position on the RFPB's cost model and noted that there are multiple (cost) models, all with different assumptions. He explained that CAPE concluded that a traditional non-pilot Air Force reservist costs one sixth that of an Active Duty member when in a training status and that CAPE also agreed that the cost of a Reserve Component combat squadron is about two thirds the cost of an AC squadron. The commission's report also recommended reducing overall infrastructure by looking at another BRAC round to capture additional savings. According to Mr. Peters, the main take away from the report is there are highly trained Reserve Component forces (cheaper than the AC) and the Air Force needs to find ways to use Reserve Component forces more to preserve/reconstitute for surge, to support peacetime missions, and develop flexible options to serve, which includes more ways for personnel to move between the components.

VADM (Retired) John Cotton -Subcommittee Chair, Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available, and Sustainable Operational Reserve, briefed on observations made during a review of Defense Manpower Data Center's Status of Forces Survey of the Reserve Components. He opened with general observations about the data which showed that: More than half of Reserve Component Members have been activated one or more times since 9/11, with most activations greater than 30 days resulting in deployments to a combat zone; most Reserve Component members are satisfied with the Military Way of Life and their families and employers support their participation in the military; given the opportunity, most Reserve Component members choose to stay in; and Reserve Component Service Members, many of whom have served through multiple deployments, continue to support recurring use of the Reserve Components and are willing to serve in support of a wide variety of missions at home and abroad. VADM Cotton offered the following specific data points to support his observations: 75% of serving Reserve Component Service Members are satisfied with the Military way of Life; the vast Majority of Families, Coworkers, Spouses and Supervisors have favorable views of RC Service (62-82%); and 75% of serving Reserve Component Service Members choose to stay in. He closed with the following points: for more than a decade, Reservists and National Guardsmen have shown themselves to be ready, accessible, and available to support the needs of our Nation while at war; some have suggested Reservists and National Guardsmen, their families, and employers are weary of repeated activations and deployments; and the data suggests quite to the contrary - That Reservists and National Guardsmen intend to continue their service; their families and employers support their participation; and they are willing to serve in support of a wide variety of missions at home and abroad.

Maj Gen Michael Edwards, Subcommittee Chair, Enhancing the DoD's Role in the Homeland, stated that work continues on the Presidential Nominating Conventions

funding issue. He also discussed several key points from the subcommittee's February 14th update meeting. Several action items were identified to include: scheduling a future subcommittee update meeting where the NGB J3 (Operations) and NORTHCOM would provide information related to DoD's guidance regarding the use of Title 32, 502(f) authorities and NORTHCOM's plans to utilize 12304(b) in future exercises during Fiscal Year 2015; and researching FEMA's rationale for not reimbursing the DoD for use of National Guard personnel in a Title 32 502(f) status.

MG Marcia Anderson, Subcommittee Chair, Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel, provided an update on the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP). She gave a brief synopsis of the program along with member and family attendance data since program inception. She also discussed the program's plan for future support of an Operational Reserve. She brought up the fact that the services currently fund the Yellow Ribbon Program with OCO dollars and discussed the need for the services to have a plan to fund YRRP in the services base budget to ensure continued support for an Operational Reserve. MG Anderson also provided an update on the Reserve Component Survivor Benefit disparity. The Under Secretary of Defense responded to the RFPB's recommendation to eliminate the disparity by stating that the Air Force has submitted a FY 2016 Unified Legislative and Budget (ULB) request, which would achieve parity between Reserve and Active Duty Survivor Benefit plans.

Quarterly Meeting
June 4, 2014

The 3rd quarter meeting was held on June 4, 2014. The first portion of the meeting was held in "Open" session with presentations made by: The Subcommittee Chairs; Ms. Lowesolis the Director of Plans and Integration for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services, U.S. Air Force; SGM Michael Biere, Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman, RFPB; and Colonel Robert Preiss, RFPB Chief of Staff; Mr. Dave Gillespie, from the Air Force Reserve A9 staff. The remainder of the presentations were conducted in "Closed" session which were given by: Major General John A Davis, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy; Mr. Sergio A. Pecori, Cyber Task Group, RFPB; The Honorable Jessica L. Wright, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Major General Stephen M. Twitty, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army Forces Command.

Major General Anderson updated the Board on the progress of its review of Transition Assistance services provided to Reserve Component personnel and the requirements associated with the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011 (VOW Act). MG Anderson noted that the VOW Act is fairly new in terms of implementation and that adjustments are being made by OSD and the Services as more experience is gained working the program. The subcommittee will continue to monitor program progress.

Ms. Lowesolis, the Director of Plans and Integration for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services, U.S. Air Force, presented the timeline for implementation; a brief definition of the capability; the key reasons the Air Force needs the Air Force Integrated

Personnel and Pay System (AFIPPS); and the expected high level outcomes. AFIPPS, once fielded, is intended to support the personnel needs of over 500K Total Force Airmen from accession to separation, including their compensation. She outlined AFIPPS evolution since the termination of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS) in 2009.

She expressed her opinion that AFIPPS is the foundation for Total Force Integration. Reserve Component member changes in duty status, increases in pay problems as a result of increased RC use, requirements to reconcile personnel system actions to pay system transactions, and other problems have resulted in a recent decision to accelerate delivery of the system.

Vice Admiral (Retired) Cotton, Subcommittee Chair, Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available, and Sustainable Operational Reserve, provided an update. At the request of the Chairman, VADM Cotton presented a follow-up briefing on selected metrics from the Defense Manpower Data Center's Status of Forces Survey of the Reserve Components. VADM Cotton highlighted the following general observations: 1) Most Reserve Component members are satisfied with the Military Way of Life, and their families and employers support their participation in the military; 2) Given the opportunity, most Reserve Component members choose to stay in; and 3) Reserve Component Service Members, many of whom have served through multiple deployments, continue to support recurring use of the Reserve Components and are willing to serve in support of a wide variety of missions at home and abroad. VADM Cotton concluded that after an extensive review of available DMDC data, the Subcommittee confirmed its previous observations regarding RC attitudes: 1) Reservists and National Guardsmen intend to continue their service; 2) Families and employers support RC member participation; and 3) RC members are willing to serve in support of a wide variety of missions both at home and abroad. VADM Cotton concluded his presentation by stating that attitudes are dynamic and continued monitoring of DMDC's data is important to inform future policy decisions regarding RC policies and employment. Chairman Punaro stated that he did not believe there was any data to back up assertions by many individuals within and outside of DoD that the Guard and Reserve were worn out, but that if these assertions surfaced, they should be challenged.

SGM Michael Biere, Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman, provided an informative briefing on his observations from the field. The Chairman tasked the RFPB Senior Enlisted Advisor to provide the Board with a presentation on current discussions and surveys with Reserve Component enlisted members from units in the field, and to compare these observations to those in the recent DMDC Status of Forces Survey of Reserve Component Personnel. SGM Biere surveyed 150 Reserve Component enlisted service members from many different units, services, and geographical areas across the nation. He found that his results support the observations made by VADM Cotton with regard to Reserve Component Service Member attitudes. While generally positive, SGM Biere identified the following issues confronting Reserve Component Service Members that have the potential to negatively impact satisfaction levels: perceived lowering of service standards; perceived requirement to use personal time for duty related matters (including non-readiness related required training); and adding an excessive amount of ancillary training requirements. Finally, SGM Biere reported that Tricare was an important benefit mentioned numerous

times by Service Members and their families as having a significant impact on their level of satisfaction with the military.

Colonel Robert Preiss, RFPB Chief of Staff, provided an update on the RFPB Active/Reserve Component Cost Comparison Methodology, followed by a presentation on the Air Force Reserve's Individual Cost Assessment Model (ICAM). The Chairman asked the RFPB staff to update and recalculate the fully-burdened Active/Reserve Component costs using the FY 2015 DoD Green Book data to update the previous FY 13 comparison presented in last year's (Jan 2013) cost report to the Secretary of Defense. Colonel Preiss presented the update and indicated that from the FY 2013 to FY 2015 DoD Base Budget request, per capita Reserve Component costs dropped from 30.4% to 29.6% of an Active Component member's fully-burdened cost. He added that costs for both Active and Reserve Component personnel were down, but the cost of Reserve Component personnel was reduced more, making the Reserve Component an even better bargain for the American taxpayer. More specifically, the cost of Reserve Component personnel declined 8% from $100,380 in FY13 to $92,815 based on FY 2015 DoD Budget Data, while the cost of Active Component personnel declined 5% from $330,343 in FY 2013 to $313,272 in FY15. The Chairman offered that some of the expected savings submitted in the FY 2015 DoD Budget request (the Military Personnel Base Pay proposal and Commissary and Tricare savings) have been rejected by Congress and could change the outcome of our analysis. Defense Authorization Act requires a Commission to Review the Force Structure of the Army and the Commission will be required to use "Fully-Burdened" and "Life-Cycle" Costs to assess the total cost of Army personnel.

Mr. Dave Gillespie, from the Air Force Reserve A9 staff, presented an information briefing on the Air Force Reserve's Individual Cost Assessment Model (ICAM), which is a life-cycle costing model used as a decision-support tool. The model uses the fully-burdened cost elements described by the RFPB's costing work to determine the cost of an airman from the time they swear in as a new accession until the day they die. This model is being used and is fully endorsed by Air Force leadership. Mr. Gillespie noted that ICAM shows huge cost advantages for Reserve Components over the life-cycle, as well as in annual comparisons where Reserve Component costs are roughly 30% of their Active Component counterpart costs. He explained that the model has been garnering some attention at the OSD level. The Air Force Reserve A9 staff was asked recently to provide a briefing to both the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.

Major General Stewart provided the subcommittee update on Enhancing the DoD's Role in the Homeland on the Presidential Nominating Conventions funding issue. He updated members on recent engagements with the National Guard Bureau staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and with representatives from the Department of Justice. The Subcommittee presented two recommendations for consideration. The Subcommittee also recommended further research to determine whether the establishment of predictable National Special Security Event National Guard funding was needed. The RFPB concluded business in "Open" Session and commenced business in Closed Session.

Presentations were given by Major General John A. Davis Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy; Mr. Sergio A. Pecori, Cyber Task Group; and The Honorable

Jessica L. Wright, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and MG Stephen M. Twitty, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, U.S. Army Forces Command.

Annual Meeting
September 10, 2014

The annual meeting was held on September 10, 2014. The meeting was held in "Open" session with presentations made by: Major General (Retired) Kenneth Bouldin, President, Reserve Forces Policy Board Fellows Society; Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command; General Frank J. Grass, U.S.A, Chief, National Guard Bureau; a panel of the Reserve Component Chiefs; a "Think Tank" panel; Subcommittee update and recommendations. Major General (Retired) Graham, Vets4Warriors program. The Citizen Patriot Unit and Individual award were also presented to recipients.

Major General (Retired) Kenneth Bouldin, President, Reserve Forces Policy Board Fellows Society, noted that his term was ending and offered his belief that the Fellows Society has fallen short in being a relevant resource for the Board and could be better utilized. MG (Retired) Bouldin invited departing Board members to join the Fellows Society. The Chairman thanked MG (Retired) Bouldin for his service and underscored his comments, noting that many of the issues we are dealing with today were dealt with in the past.

Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, opened by thanking the Board for their service and the opportunity to address the important topic of RC integration into the Cyber Mission Force. He emphasized that he is the joint operational commander, while the services man, train and equip. He highlighted the four touchstones he provided to the services to guide their force development efforts: (1) Consider a full spectrum capability that does not start by assuming the force must be active component. (2) One training standard for all. (3) One set of team compositions that applies across components to enable plug and play. (4) One command and control structure for employment of the force. He then highlighted his three mission sets (protect the nation's critical infrastructure; provide Combatant Commanders a full spectrum of capabilities; and defend the Department of Defense network infrastructure) and stated that each service arrived at a slightly different solution in developing their forces. ADM Rogers agreed with the conclusions in the RFPB's Cyber Report, but stated that the organizations and structure should be tested and stabilized, rather than continually reorganizing. Mr. Sergio Pecori, a member of the Board, commented that some of the Board's recommendations followed his comments and asked about standardized training requirements. Admiral Rogers responded that he recognized that some service members are already doing the mission so Cyber Command has established a board to assess equivalency and provide the services flexibility in qualifying their cyber warriors. He expressed concern regarding reductions in Reserve Component funding and closed by emphasizing he will not accept an "us versus them" mentality and that we all must work together, as one enterprise and one team.

General Frank J. Grass, U.S.A, Chief, National Guard Bureau, thanked Chairman Punaro and the Board for providing him an opportunity to participate in the Board's annual meeting. He expressed his belief that we are on a fiscal glide path to destroy our military and become a

second rate military power as we need billions of dollars for investment in key capabilities beyond 2023. GEN Grass spoke of today's National Guard and highlighted that it transitioned from a strategic reserve to an operational force because resources were made available. He also provided examples demonstrating that the National Guard is accessible, capable, ready, and affordable. GEN Grass identified fiscal realities under the Budget Control Act as our most significant challenge and provided examples of budget impacts. He also identified numerous opportunities to include cyber forces, multi-component units, partnerships, and integrated homeland planning in which the National Guard would participate.

The Reserve Component (RC) Chiefs Panel provided the individual RC Chiefs' points of view on top challenges and opportunities for the Reserve Components and the implications of diminishing resources on RC force structure, readiness, and Active-Reserve Component relations. VADM Braun, Chief, Navy Reserve, stated that the Navy Reserve is making a global impact and highlighted an initiative to get sailors back to sea and mentioned that they have proposed an expansion to their Reserve Component skills database to achieve greater awareness of civilian acquired skills. LTG Talley, Chief, Army Reserve, suggested that since we cannot afford to maintain the size of the regular Active Component force, that the operational reserve is here to stay. He noted the intent to move away from available year utilization to utilization throughout a unit's readiness life-cycle. He suggested that the Reserve Components could be more innovative in their approaches to training and operational use, offering the thought that his units might, in the near future, partner with private companies to conduct training overseas that could provide training value to reservists, benefit local nationals, and support U.S. diplomatic and development objectives. Lt Gen Mills, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, stated that the USMCR mirrors the active force and hopes to harvest a lot of the talent leaving active duty. He highlighted the fact that reserve Marines are integrated into operations and exercises around the world. LtGen Mills also voiced his concerns about readiness, contract maintenance, and modernization. BG Fountain, Special Assistant to the Director, Army National Guard, provided his thoughts on mobilization policies like those in the "Utilization of the Force Memo" and the fact that they are being used to establish the AC/RC force mix and potentially skew information used in senior leader decisions. He quoted a passage from General Grass to the Chief of Staff of the Army and Air Force stating "Two-year notice, nine-months boots on the ground, 30-day individual notice, not more than 50 percent of a state's force structure deployed at once and other policies were helpful over the last decade, but they should not govern force planning assumptions for future contingencies" and offered that the Board should consider the topic. Lt Gen Jackson, Chief, Air Force Reserve, recommended the Board look at the British re-organization and migration of personnel and resources into their reserves and the new U.S. Air Force strategy. He also gave examples of how the Air Force Reserve provides operational capabilities and strategic depth on a daily basis. Brig Gen Witham, Deputy Director, Air National Guard, noted that modernization account diversions hit the Air Guard harder as their aircraft are generally older. For example, older tactical lift aircraft need navigation upgrades or they will be unable to operate in international airspace in the very near future. Similarly, the Air National Guard will equip its first F-35 unit in about four years, but the second unit will not receive aircraft for another five to six years. RADM

Heinz, Director, USCG Reserve and Military Personnel, noted that, as it is for all of his colleagues, funding is his most significant challenge. Additionally, they have enough money to pay for drill duty, but very little funding for anything else. That is, in turn, challenging their ability to generate readiness.

The Think Tank Panel consisted of LTG (Retired) David W. Barno, U.S.A., Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Responsible Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS); Mr. Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow for Defense Budget Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA); and Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies. LTG Barno commented on readiness, force structure, and relationships, largely focusing on the Army. He noted that the strong Active and Reserve Component relationships built over 13 years of war have eroded over the last year and a half. He highlighted force structure changes like the Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative as an issue that strained relationships, but stated that there were others. He also noted that readiness is a product of how much money and time is provided for training, equipment, etc. Mr. Harrison continued the readiness theme and believes the way we measure readiness is wrong as the current system measures inputs instead of performance. Ms. Eaglen also discussed relationships and stated that Air Force component tensions started around 2005, even before BRAC. She also touched on compensation and expressed her belief that we have prioritized retirees over current forces. The Chairman commented that budgets have doubled but the size of the force has been halved.

Maj Gen H. Michael Edwards, Subcommittee Chair, provided an update from the Subcommittee on Enhancing DoD's Role in the Homeland. Maj Gen Edwards

The Commander US Cyber Command, ADM Michael S. Rodgers addresses the Board 10 September 2014. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

updated the Board on the history and status of policies and funding for Presidential Nominating Conventions and other National Special Security Events. He previewed draft recommendations and noted that earlier integration of National Guard and other Department of Defense stakeholder requirements would aid the process. He noted the Subcommittee plans to examine a new topic to determine if strategies, policies, and practices related to the RC and civil support are consistent.

MG Marcia Anderson, Subcommittee Chair, provided an update from the Subcommittee on Creating a Continuum of Service. Her update included subcommittee recommendations associated with the Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Plan and the revision and reduction of the total number of duty statuses. MG Anderson also discussed a new issue regarding medical hold duty status for RC members. Under current law, medical hold does not qualify for the accrual of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. The services and OSD are pressing to include a legislative change to address the issue in the 2016 NDAA. The subcommittee recommended the The Secretary of Defense should approve a pending Unified Legislation and Budgeting proposal which would add Title 10 12301(h) (i.e. medical hold) as a period of "active duty" under Title 38, Section 3301 (1)(B) for the purpose of accruing Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits.

MG (Retired) Graham briefed the Board and attendees on the Vets4Warriors program that provides immediate, one-on-one peer counseling and follow-up support for Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve service members and their families through a network of Veterans who understand the challenges of military life. The program uses a Peer-to-Peer format unlike many others and employs 38 Veterans providing confidential counseling and other services on a 24/7 basis.

VADM (Retired) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair, provided an update from the Subcommittee on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve. VADM (Retired) Cotton provided a brief update on Reserve Component medical readiness and a follow-up to the March 2014 "RC Attitudes" presentation. RC medical readiness has improved since the subcommittee first started tracking the statistics in 2010-2011 but ground components continue to lag behind other components. A recent change to the frequency of certain labs like HIV is the driver of a recent down turn. In a follow-up to his March 2014 presentation on RC Attitudes, VADM (Retired) Cotton reported that follow-up analysis of employers reinforced our earlier assertions about employer support for reserve component participation. He noted that the vast majority of employers (86%) are satisfied with the Reserve Component employees in their businesses.

The board discussed the Annual Report layout and supcommitte structure. The board concluded business in "Open Session and the meeting was adjourned.

RFPB Reports of Advice & Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense

During Fiscal Year 2014, the RFPB delivered to the Secretary a total of three (3) reports containing seventeen (17) separate recommendations. This section of the annual report includes summaries of those recommendations.

> *"Opposition to Section 511 ofH.R 1960 (Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act)"*

REPORT

delivered to the Secretary of Defense on November 1, 2013

The RFPB met on Thursday, September 5, 2013 and voted to make one recommendation to you concerning provisions in the House and Senate versions of the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act which hinder Department of Defense access to the Reserve Components. The Board found that the United States Congress has drafted provisions in recent legislation to address the "off-ramping" of Reserve Component units from assigned missions. Section 511 of H.R 1960 requires the Department of Defense to provide 120 days advanced notice of Reserve Component mobilization and demobilization. A similarly worded Senate provision (Section 508 of S.R. 1197) requires the Secretary of Defense to personally approve, in writing, cancellation of Reserve Component deployments within 180 days when those Reserve Component units will be replaced by Active Component units intended to perform the same mission. The Board finds that these provisions, while well-meaning, will exert a chilling effect on DoD decision-making to employ the National Guard and Reserve, and thus, effectively hinder future access to the Reserve Components.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense publicly and privately emphasize the Department's opposition to new legislative limitations requiring the Department of Defense to provide advanced notice of Reserve Component "off-ramping" because it hinders future access to the Reserve Components.

"Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings a response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense"

REPORT

delivered to the Secretary of Defense on February 11, 2014

On September 5, 2012, then Secretary Leon Panetta met with the RFPB and tasked the Board with providing its advice and recommendations regarding four questions: (1) the best ways to use the Reserve Components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance; (2) the right balance or mix of Active and Reserve Component forces; (3) the cost to maintain a Strong Reserve; (4) how the Department can achieve cost savings in relation to the Reserve Components. The RFPB met on September 5, 2013 and December 12, 2013 and voted to make twelve recommendations to you concerning these questions.

The Board recommends the following. Each recommendation is expanded upon in the attached report:

Recommendation 1   Plan and Use the RC Operationally.

Recommendation 2   Develop and Enforce a Revised DoD Total Force Policy.

Recommendation 3   Study the Effectiveness of the RC.

Recommendation 4   Preserve RC to Mitigate Risk from AC Cuts.

Recommendation 5   Expand RC in Key Skill Areas.

Recommendation 6   Improve AC/RC Integration.

Recommendation 7   Effectively Use Available Manpower.

Recommendation 8   Invest in Reserve Component Readiness.

Recommendation 9   Conduct a Broad RC Programmatic Review.

Recommendation 10   Review Reserve Component General and Flag Officer Usage.

Recommendation 11   Review Reserve Component Infrastructure.

Recommendation 12   Study Cross-Component Equipment Sharing.

The Honorable Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force sharing her perspective with the Board 5 March 2014.

"Department of Defense Cyber Approach: Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force"

REPORT

delivered to the Secretary of Defense on August 19, 2014

On June 5, 2013, in response to the growing national dependence on computer network technologies and increasing threats to our national security emanating from the cyber domain, the Reserve Forces Policy Board established a Task Group to examine the Department's current path in developing its organizations, policies, doctrine and practices for conducting defensive and offensive cyber operations. The Task Group was further directed to comment on force mix between active, reserve, and civilian personnel and Reserve Component organizations needed to meet the DoD strategy. The RFPB met on June 4, 2014 and voted to make four recommendations.

Recommendation 1	Include Reserve Components in Cyber Mission Force requirements in order to leverage RC reduced cost, civilian/AC acquired skill/experience, continuity and longevity.
Recommendation 2	As part of a Total Force solution, re-evaluate the composition, size and force mix of the planned Cyber Mission Force by FY 2017, and refine as needed based on changing threats, team effectiveness, capability, required capacity and cost.
Recommendation 3	The Department of Defense should study, and then assign executive responsibility to a single service for the full range of joint cyber training.
Recommendation 4	Recruit highly skilled members via a professional accessions and retention program to fill both AC and RC requirements within the Cyber Mission Force.

IMPACTS OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE

The RFPB is not required by statute or policy to track or assess the degree to which its recommendations and advice are agreed to or actually implemented by the Department of Defense. However, in an era of increasing fiscal constraint, the Board feels that good governance drives all governmental organizations to be accountable and effective in the use of limited resources devoted to its work.

As of September 31, 2014 (the end of the fiscal year), all three RFPB reports remained out for comment by various DoD components within the Department's automated staffing system. None of the reports have received a final, definitive acceptance or rejection; however, the Board believes that policy recommendations generated under its revised statutory structure are receiving an appropriate degree of review and consideration within the department.

In order to gauge its effectiveness continually, the RFPB intends to have its staff actively monitor the responses to and implementation of RFPB recommendations by the Department.

LTG Jeffrey Talley addresses the Board from the Reserve Components Chiefs panel 10 September 2014. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

Appendix 1 – Members of the RFPB

Arnold L. Punaro, Major General (Retired) U.S. Marine Corps Reserve – Chairman

Reserve Component members

Major General William D. Wofford - Army National Guard Member
Major General Marcia M. Anderson - Army Reserve Member
Rear Admiral Russell S. Penniman - Navy Reserve Member
Major General Darrel L. Moore - Marine Corps Reserve Member
Major General H. Michael Edwards - Air National Guard Member
James E. Sherrard III, Lieutenant General (Retired) - Air Force Reserve Member
Rear Admiral John S. Welch – Coast Guard Reserve Member

Citizens having significant knowledge of and experience in policy matters relevant to National Security and Reserve Component matters

John G. Cotton, Vice Admiral (Retired), U.S. Navy
John W. Handy, General (Retired), U.S. Air Force
Hon. Grier Martin, North Carolina House of Representatives
Paulette M. Mason, Delaware Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
Dr. John Nagl, Fellow, Center for New American Security
Sergio A. Pecori, President & CEO, Hanson Professional Services, Inc.
Honorable Gene Taylor, Former Member, U.S. House of Representatives
Maria Vorel, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Leo V. Williams, III, Major General (Retired), U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Non-voting members

Major General James N. Stewart, USAFR - Military Executive Officer
Sergeant Major Michael E. Biere, USAR - Senior Enlisted Military Adviser to the Chair

Chairman
Arnold L. Punaro

Major General
Marcia M. Anderson

Sergeant Major
Michael E. Biere

John G. Cotton
Vice Admiral (Retired)

Major General
H. Michael Edwards

John W. Handy
General (Retired)

Honorable Grier Martin

Paulette M. Mason

Major General
Darrel L. Moore

Dr. John Nagl

Sergio A. Pecori

Rear Admiral
Russell S. Penniman

James E. Sherrard III
Lieutenant General (Retired)

Major General
James N. Stewart

Honorable Gene Taylor

Maria Vorel

Rear Admiral
John S. Welch

Leo V. Williams, III
Major General (Retired)

Major General
William D. Wofford

Dawn Halfaker
Captain (Retired)

Appendix 2 – Staff of the RFPB

Military Executive Officer - Maj Gen James N. Stewart
Enlisted Military Advisor - Sergeant Major Michael E. Biere
Chief of Staff - COL Robert A. Preiss
Designated Federal Officer (DFO) – Mr. Alex Sabol
Senior Policy Advisor for Army National Guard - COL Robert A. Preiss
Senior Policy Advisor for Army Reserve - COL Timothy J. Lynch
Senior Policy Advisor for Navy Reserve - CAPT Steven P. Knight
Senior Policy Advisor for Marine Corps Reserve - Col Reidar F. Larsen
Senior Policy Advisor for Air National Guard - Col Donald R. Bevis
Senior Policy Advisor for Air Force Reserve – Col Jay D. Jensen
Senior Policy Advisor for Coast Guard Reserve – LT Alisa G. Harkins
Administrative Assistant/Executive Secretary – Mrs. Cindy Tyrie

Appendix 3 – Governing Statutes

Title 10, United States Code, Section 175. Reserve Forces Policy Board

There is in the Office of the Secretary of Defense a Reserve Forces Policy Board. The functions, membership, and organization of that board are set forth in section 10301 of this title.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 10301. Reserve Forces Policy Board

(a) In General.— As provided in section 175 of this title, there is in the Office of the Secretary of Defense a board known as the "Reserve Forces Policy Board" (in this section referred to as the "Board").

(b) Functions.— The Board shall serve as an independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components.

(c) Membership.— The Board consists of 20 members, appointed or designated as follows:

(1) A civilian appointed by the Secretary of Defense from among persons determined by the Secretary to have the knowledge of, and experience in, policy matters relevant to national security and reserve component matters necessary to carry out the duties of chair of the Board, who shall serve as chair of the Board.

(2) Two active or retired reserve officers or enlisted members designated by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Army—

(A) one of whom shall be a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or a former member of the Army National Guard of the United States in the Retired Reserve; and

(B) one of whom shall be a member or retired member of the Army Reserve.

(3) Two active or retired reserve officers or enlisted members designated by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy—

(A) one of whom shall be an active or retired officer of the Navy Reserve; and

(B) one of whom shall be an active or retired officer of the Marine Corps Reserve.

(4) Two active or retired reserve officers or enlisted members designated by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Air Force—

(A) one of whom shall be a member of the Air National Guard of the United States or a former member of the Air National Guard of the United States in the Retired Reserve; and

(B) one of whom shall be a member or retired member of the Air Force Reserve.

(5) One active or retired reserve officer or enlisted member of the Coast Guard designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(6) Ten persons appointed or designated by the Secretary of Defense, each of whom shall be a United States citizen having significant knowledge of and experience in policy matters relevant to national security and reserve component matters and shall be one of the following:

(A) An individual not employed in any Federal or State department or agency.

The Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Commissioner, National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, addresses the commission's charter with the Board 5 March 2014. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)

      (B) An individual employed by a Federal or State department or agency.

      (C) An officer of a regular component of the armed forces on active duty, or an officer of a reserve component of the armed forces in an active status, who—

          (i) is serving or has served in a senior position on the Joint Staff, the headquarters staff of a combatant command, or the headquarters staff of an armed force; and

          (ii) has experience in joint professional military education, joint qualification, and joint operations matters.

    (7) A reserve officer of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who is a general or flag officer recommended by the chair and designated by the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve without vote—

      (A) as military adviser to the chair;

      (B) as military executive officer of the Board; and

      (C) as supervisor of the operations and staff of the Board.

    (8) A senior enlisted member of a reserve component recommended by the chair and designated by the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve without vote as enlisted military adviser to the chair.

(d) Matters To Be Acted on.— The Board may act on those matters referred to it by the chair and on any matter raised by a member of the Board or the Secretary of Defense.

(e) Staff.— The Board shall be supported by a staff consisting of one full-time officer from each of the reserve components listed in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 10101 of this title who holds the grade of colonel (or in the case of the Navy, the grade of captain) or who has been selected for promotion to that grade. These officers shall also serve as

liaisons between their respective components and the Board. They shall perform their staff and liaison duties under the supervision of the military executive officer of the Board in an independent manner reflecting the independent nature of the Board.

(f) Relationship to Service Reserve Policy Committees and Boards.— This section does not affect the committees and boards prescribed within the military departments by sections 10302 through 10305 of this title, and a member of such a committee or board may, if otherwise eligible, be a member of the Board.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 113. Secretary of Defense [EXCERPT]

(a) There is a Secretary of Defense, who is the head of the Department of Defense, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within seven years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.

(b) The Secretary is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President and to this title and section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC. 401), he has authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.

(c) …(1), the Secretary shall transmit to the President and Congress a separate report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on any reserve component matter that the Reserve Forces Policy Board considers appropriate to include in the report.

APPENDIX 4

RFPB Reports

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
5113 Leesburg Pike, Suite 601
FALLS CHURCH, VA 22041

AUG 19 2014

CHAIRMAN

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE   DepSec Action_____

FROM: MajGen Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (Ret), Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

SUBJECT: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on Department of Defense Cyber
Approach: Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force

- The RFPB is a federal advisory committee established to provide you with independent advice and recommendations on strategies, policies and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

- On June 5, 2013, in response to the growing national dependence on computer network technologies and increasing threats to our national security emanating from the cyber domain, the Reserve Forces Policy Board established a Task Group to examine the Department's current path in developing its organizations, policies, doctrine and practices for conducting defensive and offensive cyber operations. The Task Group was further directed to comment on force mix between active, reserve, and civilian personnel and Reserve Component organizations needed to meet the DoD strategy. The RFPB met on June 4, 2014 and voted to make four recommendations.

- The recommendations are listed below with each expanded upon in the attached report:

  Recommendation #1 – Include Reserve Components in Cyber Mission Force requirements in order to leverage RC reduced cost, civilian/AC acquired skill/experience, continuity and longevity.

  Recommendation #2 – As part of a Total Force solution, re-evaluate the composition, size and force mix of the planned Cyber Mission Force by FY 2017, and refine as needed based on changing threats, team effectiveness, capability, required capacity and cost.

  Recommendation #3 - The Department of Defense should study, and then assign executive responsibility to a single Service for the full range of joint cyber training.

  Recommendation #4 - Recruit highly skilled members via a professional accessions and retention program to fill both AC and RC requirements within the Cyber Mission Force.

- As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, these recommendations were deliberated and approved in an open, public session. The Report, including briefing slides

presented to and approved by the Board, is at TAB A and has been posted to the RFPB public website. The basic overview of the RFPB is submitted as TAB B.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments(s):
As stated

Prepared by: Maj Gen James N. Stewart, 703-681-0060

RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

Department of Defense Cyber Approach: Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force

Report to the Secretary of Defense

August 18, 2014

RFPB Report FY14-03

...US Cyber Command, with the Services and other partners, are doing something that our military has never done before. We are putting in place foundational systems and processes... for organizing, training, equipping, and operating our military cyber capabilities to meet cyber threats...Our legacy forces lack the training and the readiness to confront advanced threats in cyberspace.[1]

- Gen Keith B. Alexander

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[1] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, *Statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander United States Cyber Command: Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services.* 113th Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 2014

Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force   REPORT FY 14-03

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Department of Defense Cyber Approach:
Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the 5 June 2013 Reserve Forces Policy Board quarterly meeting, a Task Group led by Sergio Pecori was formalized to examine Department of Defense's cyber approach and to provide an objective assessment of the Department's current path in developing its organizations, policies, doctrine and practices for conducting defensive and offensive cyber operations. The Task Group was further directed to comment on force mix between active, reserve, and civilian personnel and Reserve Component organization needed to meet the DoD strategy. The purpose of this report is to provide the Secretary of Defense with analysis and observations, in accordance with the Board's Charter under Title 10, United States Code, Section 10301, to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components. The Board's recommendations are made in what we recognize is a dynamic and changing operational and planning environment. It should be noted that the Board concluded in its first finding that USCYBERCOM, Service cyber organizations and the Joint Staff are making exceptional progress in sourcing manpower, developing training programs and enabling employment guidance needed to field a fully operational Cyber Mission Force.

The Reserve Components Should Be Included in Cyber Mission Force Requirements

Initial plans to field the Cyber Mission Force did not embrace Reserve Component integration. Including Reserve Components in Cyber Mission Force requirements would take advantage of reduced cost, civilian acquired skills, experience, continuity and longevity. Several Reserve Components have since proposed allocating manpower and training to create Cyber Mission Force teams; however, most are not allocated to USCYBERCOM, Combatant Commanders, or Service Cyber organizations. The Secretary of Defense should direct a fully integrated Total Force. Optimally, Active Component and Reserve Component cyber units should be co-located whenever possible to leverage reduced cost efficiencies of shared equipment and infrastructure and to provide operational synergies. In addition, USCYBERCOM and the Services should also review the need for cyber expertise outside of the Cyber Mission Force construct that meets niche capabilities that take advantage of the full range of civilian acquired skills within the Reserve Components.

Cyber Mission Force Requirements Should Be Reassessed by FY 2017

As part of a Total Force solution leveraging Reserve Component reduced cost, civilian acquired skills, experience and continuity, the Cyber Mission Force should include the Reserve Components, which is not currently the plan. As the cyber threat changes and more data is collected on team effectiveness, capability and capacity, changes to cyber team composition, number and distribution will be needed. A robust development of performance based metrics

should be developed to quantify these types of future force decisions and provide a sound basis for return on investment and alternative resourcing decisions, including AC/RC force mix.

Executive Responsibility for Cyber Schools Should Be Assigned

In order to achieve long term cost efficiencies, the Department should study and assign executive responsibilities for common cyber schools to a single service. By studying course content and re-aligning their structure, overlap with advanced courses can be reduced and Service redundancy eliminated.

Skilled Personnel Should be Recruited through a Professional Accessions Program

Adopting a professional accessions program, similar to those used for medical profession officers and other highly trained and specialized skills has high potential as a paradigm shifting approach towards acquiring exceptionally qualified recruits. Utilizing USCYBERCOM's Individual Training Evaluation Board process to recognize existing skills would also provide resource savings, reduce training pipeline stress, and enhance growth of the Cyber Mission Force.

TASK

On April 29, 2013 Major General (Ret) Arnold Punaro, the Reserve Forces Policy Board Chairman, in light of the Secretary of Defense prioritizing cyber as a critical capability, directed the establishment of an RFPB Cyber Policy Task Group. The purpose of the Task Group was to address the policy question of to what extent capabilities in the Department's cyber approach should be established in the reserve component. As described in 10 USC 10301, this task group was chartered to examine cyber issues in order to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components. Additionally, it complied with the requirements under Title 5, Appendix 2 (Federal Advisory Committee Act); the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, Part 102-3 (Federal Advisory Committee Management); and DoD Directive 5104.04 (Department of Defense Federal Advisory Committee Management Program). To address this issue, the Task Group, over a period of nine months, conducted interviews and received briefings from service cyber organizations, Department of Defense policy makers, Cyber subject matter experts, and reviewed existing doctrine, directives and publicly available information. This detailed analysis allowed the group to obtain sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for findings and recommendations needed to answer the following questions:

1. What is DoD's current path in developing its organizations, policies, doctrine and practices for the conduct of both defensive and offensive cyber operations?

2. Is the Department staffing this new mission with the proper mix of active, reserve, and civilian personnel?

3. How should the Reserve Component be organized, manned, equipped, and used to meet the expectations outlined in the July 2011 DoD *Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*?

Since the tasking letter and terms of reference for this study specifically identify assessing offensive and defensive cyber operations, the Task Group focused on assessing the building of Cyber Mission Forces (CMFs), with only a limited look at established legacy cyber missions, such as Information Assurance, Network Operations, Signal Intelligence, Combat Communications and Electronic Warfare. The Task Group was not able to quantify an optimal mix of active, reserve and civilian personnel or fully address organizational integration of RC Cyber Mission Forces due to its early phase of development. When the recommendations of this group were approved, only 1.5% of Cyber Mission Force teams had reached Full Operational Capability (FOC), with an additional 20% at Initial Operational Capability (IOC). These were all Active component (AC) teams. For the purpose of this report, the Reserve Component (RC) includes both National Guard and Reserve forces. Specifically, the Reserve Component

encompasses the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and Coast Guard Reserve.

APPROACH

This report's primary purpose is to provide the Secretary of Defense with thoughtful analysis, observations, and recommendations in response to questions posed by the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) following the Board's statutory mandate. These responses are intended, in accordance with the RFPB's Charter, to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

A temporary five member Task Group, reflecting the balanced representation of the Board, was formalized on 5 June 2013. The Task Group was chaired by Sergio Pecori. The mission of the Task Group was to study the questions raised by the Chairman, gather information, conduct research, analyze relevant facts, and develop for Board consideration a report or reports of advice and recommendations for the Secretary of Defense. A Work Plan was approved by the Board on September 5, 2013. The Task Group conducted eight meetings, met, interviewed or contacted more than 71 officials from the Department of Defense and relevant agencies, Department of Homeland Security and representatives from think tanks and private industry. Updates were presented on observations for deliberation by the full Board in two public sessions on December 12, 2013 and March 5, 2014, with final recommendations approved by the full board June 5, 2014. The completion of the report was aided by the ability to review the Board's public findings and recommendations with appropriate stakeholders.

To address the Task Group's objectives, the Group and staff collected an abundance of research information derived from briefings and papers provided by each of the Services and their Reserve components, interviews with functional area experts within and outside of the Department, reviews from reports and previous studies, as well as organizational documents and Congressional testimony. The Task Group sought inputs from a diverse array of experts and interested parties to inform its analysis. In addition, members attended CYBER GUARD 13 to observe RC members participating in a cyber-exercise along with elements of the AC's Cyber Protection Team #1. The Group was very mindful throughout of the need for cybersecurity. While this report primarily focuses on the Reserve Components, many of the findings, observations, and recommendations apply to Active and Reserve Components as well as the enterprise effort to build cyber capabilities within the Department of Defense.

A parallel effort in reviewing this topic is being accomplished by USCYBERCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Cyber Policy in compliance with requirements levied by Congress through Defense Appropriation language and Section 933 of the 2014

NDAA.[2] The Cyber Policy Task Group has collaborated with both organizations, sharing information collected from the Services, as well as the Task Group's findings and observations. A key difference between this report and DoD mandated reports is the level of reported detail on RC cyber units, skill sets required to meet cyber mission team requirements and a cost-benefit analysis of meeting cyber manpower requirements with teams sourced from the AC only, compared to a mix of AC/RC or fully filled by the RC. The National Guard has also been tasked to provide an independent assessment.

FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS

> **Finding #1: USCYBERCOM, Service cyber organizations and the Joint Staff are making exceptional progress in sourcing manpower, developing training programs and enabling employment guidance needed to field a fully operational Cyber Mission Force.**

This assessment of the Department of Defense's current path in developing its cyber organization, policies and doctrine is a snapshot of a moving train. Some of the Board's Findings and Observations as well as our Recommendations are subject to being outdated as fielding the Cyber Mission Force rapidly evolves. Overall, the Department should be commended for its significant efforts in developing an organizational framework, building training capacity and capability, and enabling plans to employ offensive and defensive forces in the cyber domain.

Stepping back to review the history behind these developments begins with the Department recognizing in the 2006 National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations that cyber is a domain in which the military operates. This places cyber on par with sea, land, air and space domains.[3] Since this recognition, the Department has created the Sub-Unified Command called USCYBERCOM under USSTRATCOM. They achieved IOC on May 21, 2010. This new organization combined the Joint Functional Component Command-Network Warfare and Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations, effectively joining offensive and defensive cyber operations under a single command.[4] In support of USCYBERCOM, each service has stood up individual service cyber organizations, the last being the 2013 IOC for Coast Guard Cyber. Senior military leadership realized that this force was not sufficient to meet the rising cyber

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[2] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong., 1st sess., (December 2013), 163-166.
[3] Peter Pace, *The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations* (Washington DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), 3.
[4] Rivers J. Johnson, "About Us," United States Cyber Command, http://www.cybercom.mil/default.aspx# (accessed May 1, 2014).

threat risks or satisfy Department needs. This realization led to the 2012 authorization of a new conceptual framework for adding depth to cyber defense, capability to cyber offense, and enhanced support for our Combatant Commanders, through the fielding of the Cyber Mission Force.[5] The challenges of bringing disparate service capabilities and divergent cyber solutions into a joint enterprise requires a tremendous amount of effort and collaboration and it appears that the Department of Defense is on a positive vector towards achieving this goal.

> **Finding #2: The Cyber Mission Force, as authorized in the December 2012 Secretary of Defense Memo, consists of 133 teams.**

The Cyber Mission Force is a standardized force presentation construct with three primary mission sets; Defending the nation against cyber-attack with National Mission Forces, Operating and Defending DoD Information Networks (DODIN) with Cyber Protection Forces and Combatant Command Support from Cyber Combat Mission Forces.[6] The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) "Tank" and Deputy's Management Action Group (DMAG) determined size and composition of 133 teams and approximately 6,000 personnel based on the capabilities needed for a sustained operational requirement.[7] The CMF is an all Service effort with 30% of the teams resourced each from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the remaining 10% from the Marine Corps. The force mix initially pursued an 80% Active Component and 20% Civilian manpower composition; although each Service is pursuing a slightly different model. As an example, the Marine Corps is targeting a force mix of approximately 64% Active Component military, with just under 30% civilian and the remainder from contractor sourcing.[8]

The CMF framework of teams, missions, functional distribution, size and numbers was developed by USCYBERCOM. OSD Capabilities and Program Evaluation (CAPE) were not involved in any analysis on resourcing the force. As of this time, the Task Group is unaware of CAPE conducting a program evaluation of this construct.[9] Anecdotally, there are


Figure 1: Cyber Mission Force Team Distribution

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[5] DOD, *Fiscal Years 2011-2015 Capability Gap Assessment Results and Recommendations for Mitigating Capability Gaps,* JROCM 113-09 (Washington DC, June 2009).
[6] Cheryl Pellerin, "DOD Officials Cite Advances in Cyber Operations, Security," *American Forces Press Service,* March 14, 2013. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119532 (accessed June 24, 2014).
[7] Charles T. Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2014), p. 41.
[8] Mark A. Butler, interview with Marine Forces Cyber Chief of Staff, Columbia, MD, February 25, 2014.
[9] Lisa A. Dixon, e-mail message from OSD CAPE to author, December 2, 2013.

various levels of analytical rigor applied to determine team numbers and size, with National Mission Teams having the most.[10] Reserve Component plans and pre-decisional proposals to field an additional 33 Cyber Protection Teams will result in providing a 27% increase in teams and 31% increase in CMF manpower, most of which is above known requirements. This increase in teams and manpower investment, if fully resourced, could cover CMF surge operations, backfill requirements for AC teams or steady state use of an Operational Reserve. However, there is no documentation of RC CMF missions and roles or established requirements. The lack of a defined requirement could result in creating excess Department of Defense force structure. Reserve Component CMF structure would benefit from a mission analysis and formal validation process. There are some indications that this is being accomplished at the Service level, but it lacks consistency. The Air Force, as part of their Total Force integration strategy, has developed a plan that reduces AC manpower in three Cyber Protection Teams and one National Mission Team through RC augmentation.

FIGURE 2: Service Allocation of Cyber Mission Teams/Pre-Decisional and Proposed RC Force Structure

Cyber Msn Force	National Mission Team	National Support Team	Combat Mission Team	Combat Support Team	Cyber Protection Team
Army	4	3	8	6	20
Army Natl Guard	-	-	-	-	11
Army Reserve	-	-	-	-	10
Navy	4	3	8	5	20
Navy Reserve	-	Augment	-	Augment	Augment
Marine Corps	1	-	3	1	8
Air Force	4	2	8	5	17
Air Natl Guard	Augment	-	-	-	12
Air Force Reserve	-	-	-	-	3
Coast Guard	Augment	-	Augment	-	Augment

AC figures provided by USCYBERCOM/RC figures from Task Group interviews and subject to programmatic action

[10] Interview with Navy, Air Force, Army Reserve, Army National Guard Service Cyber Panel, Pentagon, Washington DC, November 18, 2013.

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It has been noted that the previous Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management, before his retirement, directed a study on CMF manpower requirements by the Institute for Defense Analysis which will consider a different mix than 80% active component military and whether a more appropriate mix of contractors, National Guard and Reserve would be more efficient and effective.[16]

> **Finding #4: Without a continuum of Service mind set, it is impossible to retain valuable Cyber Mission Force skills, experience and capabilities for individuals leaving the Active Component.**

Currently, the Marine Corps has a reasonably robust reserve augmentation to the Marine Forces Cyber Headquarters.[17] At the time of the Task Group's review, nearly 35 of 53 Individual Mobility Augmentee Reservists assigned to MARFORCYBER have accomplished "long term" full time support duty, with several reaching the 1,095 active duty day waiver limitations. However, these individuals are not assigned to operational cyber defense or offense operations, despite some having relevant skills in these areas. Creating individual augmentee positions within the Cyber Mission Force would provide an outlet for "a continuum of service" from these highly trained individuals. It would also provide a useful way to capture a greater continuum of service from members leaving the Active Component for private industry within the Service's respective Reserve Components. An existing study by the Institute for Defense Analysis highlights that more than 50 percent of existing legacy cyber organizations' manpower had relevant skills for Cyber Network Defense and Cyber Network Exploitation from civilian occupations. The same survey showed that 88 percent of subject matter experts who observed reserve participation felt they added value to AC units several times or more per year, while none felt there was no value added. In addition, the survey indicates that experienced reserve cyber augmentation can provide operational synergies, when paired and employed in an integrated AC/RC workforce setting.[18]

The Coast Guard Cyber organization is extremely small, with only 23 billets assigned to CG Cyber Command and an additional six to the Department of Homeland Security's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. Size constraints make zero-sum manpower resource decisions even more difficult to achieve as other mission areas are

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[16] R.E. Vollrath to Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Deputy Chief of Staff Army G1, Chief of Naval Personnel N1, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force A1, Deputy Commandant, Manpower & Reserve Affairs, "Requesting Support for Study on Staffing Cyberspace Operations", November 22, 2013, Pentagon, Washington DC.

[17] Andrew (BA) Seay, interview with Marine Forces Cyber, Reserve Detachment OIC, Columbia, MD, March 4, 2014.

[18] Drew Miller, Daniel B Levine and Stanley A Horowitz, *A New Approach to Force-Mix Analysis: A Case Study Comparing Air Force Active and Reserve Forces Conducting Cyber* (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2013), 14-A2.

decremented to make way for new mission growth without increases to authorized end-strength.[19] However, case-by-case consideration for creating augmentee positions for departing members with Cyber Mission Force experience might prove beneficial especially for individuals experienced in their unique mission to protect Maritime Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (MCIKR) from cyber threats and vulnerabilities or those with interagency expertise from liaison position within the Department of Justice's National Cyber Investigations-Joint Task Force (NCI-JTF).

Finding 5: Existing Reserve Component cyber units are not designed or organized to present 'plug and play' forces under today's Cyber Mission Force construct.

Only a minority of individuals who complete baseline courses resulting in the award of a legacy Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), Rating or Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) initially considered as qualifying for retraining into the CMF will become cyber warriors under this construct. In short, not all cyber will be part of the Cyber Mission Force. There are well established requirements for individuals in Information Technology, Information Assurance, Cryptologic Technicians, Signals Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Client Systems, Cyber Transport, and other related specialties. The need to man Network Operations Centers (NOCs) and build and maintain networks remain as validated requirements. Some Services are building new specialties that support the CMF construct, including the Army's newest occupational specialty, 25D, cyber network defender.[20] The Air Force significantly restructured their cyber AFSCs in 2010, with 11 new enlisted occupations and consolidation of their communications and information officers into the 17D Cyberspace Operations career field. Consolidating officer career fields has received some criticism, since the majority of these officers still perform functions outside of 'keyboard' network operations in legacy duties, yet are not identified as force support or visibly differentiated from those working directly in the cyber domain.[21]

The existing RC legacy cyber units, such as the Army National Guard's Virginia Data Processing Unit, Army Reserve Information Operations Center, and Air National Guard and Reserve Network Warfare Squadrons/Flights or Information Aggressor Squadrons (IOS) have some complementary skill sets, but do not contain all of the training needed to fill out a full range of capabilities used by Cyber Mission Teams. Some Service RCs augment AC units in lieu of a unit construct. Another compatibility issues is the widely varying size of RC units,

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[19] Kyle J. Smith, interview with CG Cyber Command and FY2016-FY2020 Cybersecurity PG Initiative Overview, Alexandria, VA, December 17, 2013.
[20] Wilson A. Rivera, "Cyberspace warriors graduate with Army's newest military occupational specialty," *WWW.ARMY.MIL: The Official Homepage of the United States Army*, December 6, 2013, http://www.army.mil/article/116564/ (accessed December 16, 2013).
[21] Katrina A. Terry, *Overcoming the Support Focus of the 17D Cyberspace Operations Career Field* (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Institute of Technology, 2011), 58.

typically 65 to 166, which would require some force shaping reductions or additive missions. CMF teams range in size from 24 for support teams to 64 for National Mission Teams, with the Cyber Protection Teams standardized at 39 personnel.

> **Finding 6: Department of Defense Service Cyber Doctrine is not fully matured and is in various stages of re-write and development.**

The Cyber Task Group found doctrine development, especially Service doctrine in its early state of maturity. The overarching core document is Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, Cyberspace Operations; classified SECRET. This JP was published in 2013 and includes Presidential Policy Directive 20 in Appendix A. JP 3-12 mostly fulfills the executive recommendation for a previous doctrine deficiency gap discovered by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and recorded in report 11-75. However, with the development of the Cyber Mission Force construct, this product will require revisions along with lagging Service Doctrine.[22]

The Air Force has the oldest Service Doctrine, with the latest change to Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-12 Cyberspace Operations made in 2011. The US Army just released their Field Manual 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities in February of this year. Neither of these documents discusses the Cyber Mission Force or its organization, roles, missions and responsibilities. The Navy's Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-12, Cyberspace Operations is rescinded pending re-write (draft expected in October 2014). The Marine Corps interim cyber operations doctrine (MCIP) 3-40.02 is currently in edit and should be available in September 2014.[23] The Coast Guard has identified the need to develop Service doctrinal guidance, but currently cyber rates a single paragraph in Coast Guard Publication 3-0.

In the Navy's published strategy guidance, called *Navy Cyber Power 2020*; they bring up a valid point that will steer future doctrine efforts, when they discuss IT infrastructure efficiencies and cybersecurity improvements from the implementation of the Joint Information Environment (JIE). Common JIE architecture and enterprise solutions will eventually drive Services towards common doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures across the Department of Defense.[24] Services are making headway in this effort with the closing of data centers and network gateway consolidations, which effectively reduce the internet facing attack vectors as

[22] Davi M. D'Agostino and Gregory C. Wilshusen, *Defense Department Cyber Efforts: DOD Faces Challenges In Its Cyber Activities* (Washington DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2011), 43.
[23] Tony Mattaliano, email from Marine Corps HQ C2/Cyber EW Integration Division, Quantico, VA, July 3, 2014.
[24] Kendall L. Card and Michael S. Rogers, *Navy Cyber Power 2020* (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 2012), 2-3.

the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) refines plans for a single security architecture.[25]

> **Finding 6a: Strategic Cyber guidance is spread across multiple documents without established links.**

Current Strategic Guidance is spread across multiple documents; consisting of Presidential Policy Directives, Initiatives, Policy Reviews, and Executive Orders, as well as Department of Defense Strategy, International Strategy, and National Military Strategy. A comprehensive overarching document that provides linkages to these documents is needed. This core strategy should include roles and responsibilities, milestones, costs, resources, and performance measures beneficial to holding the DoD and other Agencies and Departments accountable. This is a continuing problem that has been noted by the GAO in testimony and reports to Congress as recently as 2013.[26]

The Department of Defense could also benefit from strategy improvements similar to those needed in National Plans, as identified in GAO report 13-187. The 2006 *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations* was replaced or complemented by the 2011 *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace* even though DOD goals are not as clear and content in some ways is less complete and relevant to the Services.[27] As an example, vulnerabilities that are discussed mention theft of intellectual property as the most pervasive threat. However, there is no discussion or guidance on DoD's responsibilities in this regard. Future iterations should include a foreword or preface that highlights a summary of revisions and changes as well as linkages to other relevant documents. It should also include goals, implying a definitive end state instead of initiatives or steps to achieve, as well as an expanded description of a plan of action. Although it may not be palatable to the Intelligence Community to which USCYBERCOM is attached, delving into different strategies for different actors, an attribution strategy and a goal for cybersecurity metrics would also be useful.[28] The current lack of transparency on issues like this and the classified Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) reduce the deterrence value of this document. In fact, the DoD strategy makes no mention of deterrence or what would spark an offensive cyber response, leaving this to the *International Strategy for*

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[25] Brian T. Dravis, interview with DISA Director JIE Synchronization Office, Fort Meade, MD, May 20, 2014.

[26] Gregory C. Wilshusen, *Cybersecurity: A Better Defined and Implemented National Strategy Is Needed to Address Persistent Challenges* (Washington DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2013), 18-23.

[27] Sean Lawson, "DOD's "First" Cyber Strategy is Neither First, Nor a Strategy," *Forbes*, August 1, 2011. http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2011/08/01/DoDs-first-cyber-strategy-is-neither-first-nor-a-strategy/

[28] Thomas M. Chen, *An Assessment of the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 35-37.

Cyberspace, which alludes to implications that a cyber-attack against the U.S. could be met with a kinetic response.[29]

The Cyber Policy Task Group did not make any of these a recommendation since the majority of these documents fall under the purview of the Cybersecurity Coordinator Special Assistant to the President and the Executive Office of the President. Most of these deficiencies have also been brought to light in other reports and assessments, similar to the Letort Papers.

Finding 7: Reserve Component Cyber Organization
Some Reserve Components are planning or propose to build Cyber capable Mission Forces without Department or Service identified requirements.

The terms of reference for this study required the Task Group to examine how RC cyber organizations are manned, equipped and used to meet DOD cyber strategies. Many of these existing RC cyber organizations will continue to meet valuable needs in Cyber Command and Control, Internet Control, Combat Communications, Analysis and Communications Security and other missions. A few will restructure into defensive and offensive cyber functions performed by the CMF. In addition to RC cyber units, USCYBERCOM currently has 90 Reserve Component personnel authorizations directly assigned, which are 78% filled. The Service distribution is 41% AF Reserve, 32% Army Reserve, 24% Navy Reserve, and 3% Marine Reserve. This type of Reserve individual augmentation will continue to grow. The Joint Manpower Validation Board (JMVD) has validated an additional 132 positions that are currently listed as an unfunded requirement and have yet to be Service sourced through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Process. These Reservists perform duties as CYBERCOM Headquarters staff support, exercise support, crisis surge support, and plan to extend capability into Geographic Centers of Excellence. They perform duties in intelligence analysis and production, strategy, doctrine and policy, exercise and training, and cyber support. The areas of defensive cyber operations and combat targeting are under development, with cyber analytics and cyber law currently unsupported.[30]

Even though Active Components are all striving to achieve a standardized Cyber Mission Force team construct, Reserve Component organization and fielding is following a diverse range of concepts based on perceived needs and planned operations. While training is expected to produce the same standardized individual output, the ability to employ as a team or an operational reserve will be significantly different. At this stage of development, it is difficult to assess which is the preferred solution, or whether these constructs will meet the overall needs of

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[29] Barack Obama, *International Strategy for Cyberspace* (Washington DC: Executive Office of the President, 2011), 14.
[30] Sheila Zuehlke, email of briefing provided to Joint Reserve Component Council, Fort Meade, MD, January 15, 2014.

their respective Services or the Department. It would be expected to see cyber teams performing at a higher level that those drawn from a pool, similar to aircrew or surgical teams; however, theoretically, individuals with standardized training should meet requirements in a satisfactory manner. The planning information presented in the following bullets are meant to highlight the component differences, but the Task Group cautions that most of these are "pre-decisional" and either lack approved Concepts for Operation or Program Objective Memorandum (POM) action as well as requirements validation. The planning is so dynamic that the Navy Reserve changed their plans during the writing of this report from a team organization towards an augmentation pool concept.

- Army National Guard proposes 10 regional and possibly FEMA aligned Cyber Protection Teams, and one Title 10 full time operational Cyber Protection Team
- Army Reserve proposes 10 Cyber Protection Teams with no full time manpower at team level, managed from staff above team level
- Navy Reserve proposes Cyber Mission Force Active Component team augmentation
- Air National Guard proposes 12 Cyber Operations Squadrons manned with 30% full time and yielding two quickly deployable teams in addition to National Mission Team rotational augmentation
- Air Force Reserve proposes one unit with manning for a full time CPT (39), employed as RC integrated augmentation to three AC teams and surge capacity with two additional traditional reserve CPTs
- Marine Corps Reserve and Coast Guard Reserve are not planning to participate in the CMF

Each Service Reserve Component is seeking unique organizational solutions.

> **Recommendation 1: Include Reserve Components in Cyber Mission Force requirements in order to leverage RC reduced cost, civilian/AC acquired skill/experience, continuity and longevity.**

> **Recommendation 1a: Ensure RC surge and Operational Reserve requirements are identified and filled before considering force structure reductions.**

The Secretary should direct USCYBERCOM and the Service Secretaries to validate the requirement for RC inclusion in the Cyber Mission Force prior to Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 POM deliberation activities. The Defense Advisory Council recommended that cyber offense and

defense resources in mostly personnel should be increased by an additional 25% above FY 2014 levels.[31] Although CMF AC manpower was partially sourced as early as 2013 with plans to complete by 2016, the Task Group contends that increased RC participation at that percentage above the planned CMF size could be reasonably validated. DOD leadership was able to determine an estimated steady state requirement for the AC. This would be complete if they were to determine operational reserve, surge or backfill requirements and document as a validated need. While this requirement may eventually be refined as employment experience is gained and further analysis completed, delaying implementation of a true Total Force Solution causes unnecessary thrash as each RC struggles to come up with their own plan amidst sequestration driven reductions. The USCYBERCOM Commander and Director of NSA made a good step in the right direction to begin this process by the hosting the RC Mission Alignment Conference in July of 2014. The purpose of this conference was to quantify the RC's potential roles, responsibilities, and authorities for support of the CMF so the Services can build a more holistic approach to leveraging RC strengths and providing a unified joint approach, as well as inform an appropriate answer to Congressional Defense Committees.[32] This recognizes that there should only be one Cyber Mission Force, an all-encompassing view, not several independent RC solutions to complementing this Force.

We hope this conference forum considered funding and participation of an Operational Reserve. One potential discussion topic could be the UK RC participation model. The UK Ministry of Defense set a policy that a minimum of 10% of Army expeditionary requirements would be met by the Reserves.[33] While this goal is clearly unrealistically high for National Mission Teams, it may turn out to be a reasonable model for Cyber Protection Teams.

Recommendation 1b: Create AC/RC cyber associate units that share infrastructure and equipment to the maximum extent possible.

Sharing cyber equipment, infrastructure and mission focus between collocated Active and Reserve Component units could best be served by associations. In addition to reduced cost, leveraging shared equipment and facilities improves AC/RC integration, with the benefit of increased RC efficiency. One study indicates that Cyber Network Defense (CND) and Cyber Network Attack (CNA) integrated units spend between 60-65% of their duty time on operational mission tasks instead of the majority of time normally spent on education, training, and

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[31] Barry M. Blechman et al., *Strategic Agility: Strong National Defense for Today's Global and Fiscal Realities* (Washington DC: Stimson, 2013), 26.

[32] Andrew J. Adams, email from Combined Action Group (CAG) staff to author, June 18, 2014.

[33] Ranald Munro, "Army 2020 and beyond" (presentation by the Deputy Commander Land Forces Reserve, British Army presented to the Reserve Forces Policy Board quarterly meeting, Washington DC, March 5, 2014).

administration.[34] The 2014 *National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force* believes the next step to improving integration should include integrating the leadership chain of AC/RC associated units and reducing redundant overhead by alternating leadership positions between components.[35] A previous RFPB report on RC Use, Balance, Cost and Savings also recommended that the Secretary of Defense should direct Secretaries of the Military Departments to review options and explore creative opportunities to co-locate and share Active and Reserve Component equipment for training and operational use with a view toward improving Active and Reserve Component integration and reducing overall equipment procurement requirements.[36] We believe this concept builds on that recommendation.

Recommendation 1c: Validate proficiency and ongoing certification requirements that would justify additional Reserve Inactive Duty Training Periods.

USCYBERCOM asked the RFPB for assistance in addressing funding for an additional 72 Inactive Duty Training periods, similar to those used by the aviation community. Expertise for validating additional training period requirements resides within the Services. CYBERCOM will need to assist the Services in validating proficiency and currency training needed by Cyber Mission Team operators or continuation training requirements needed for recurring certifications. A robust justification will ensure that operational requirements are not being "off-ramped" towards shrinking Reserve Component budgets, when it would be more appropriate to fund through Military Personnel Appropriations (MPA) orders. Performing operational missions in a reserve status is not by itself restricted by U.S. Code if the primary purpose is to provide required training. Certain operational activities that may require Title 10 or Title 50 could potentially restrict a limited number of National Guard training missions. Defensive cyber missions should not be an issue.

Recommendation 1d: Identify cyber specialties needed in the Guard and Reserve outside of the Cyber Mission Force construct.

The Cyber Mission Force is well thought out in providing enhanced defensive and offensive cyber operations. However, to capture a wider range of civilian acquired skills,

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[34] Drew Miller, Daniel B. Levine and Stanley A. Horowitz, *A New Approach to Force-Mix Analysis: A Case Study Comparing Air Force Active and Reserve Forces Conducting Cyber Missions* (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analysis), 23.

[35] Dennis McCarthy et al., National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (Arlington: NCSAF, 2014), 61.

[36] Arnold L. Punaro, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense* (Falls Church: RFPB, 2013), 34.

additional missions outside of these teams should be explored. As an example, the Air National Guard has proposed utilizing Industrial Control System (ICS) expertise from their Washington Air National Guard units to form a capability to train CMF teams on these types of systems. They could also perform ICS and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) vulnerability assessments on national critical infrastructure as well as DOD owned systems.[37] Another example of small team or individual expertise could include reservists from computer or software manufacturers familiar with vendor sourcing and certification that could assist in addressing supply chain vulnerability assessments and enterprise acquisitions.

USCYBERCOM Guard and Reserve Directorate leadership have taken an innovative approach to seeking RC cyber talent with their proposal to enhance some existing Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers with a Joint Cyber Reserve Element near U.S. geographic cyber and technology centers of gravity in the Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, Seattle, New York City, Austin and the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina among others. Creating distributed operations near major cyber research, industry, and academic centers is an attractive way to leverage an exceptional RC cyber workforce on the leading edge of cyber innovations.[38]


Lower job counts   Higher job counts   Unavailable   Selected Locations

Figure 3 Source: WANTED Analytics Cybersecurity professional hiring

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[37] Robert Burris, interview with Air National Guard Advisor to 24th Air Force, San Antonio, TX, May 15, 2014.
[38] Sheila Zuehlke, email of briefing provided to Joint Reserve Component Council, Fort Meade, MD, January 15, 2014.

19

Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force   REPORT FY 14-03

Although federal missions dictate requirements for building force capability, the Council of Governors has met with the Secretary of Defense and expressed support for increasing National Guard cyber capabilities as one of their top priorities.[39] The Task Group recommends that the Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC) should be considered as a model for maximizing access and information sharing cyber expertise and intelligence between federal, state, and private sector partners. Nearly 80% of critical infrastructure resides in the private sector. Industry and privacy advocates have expressed reservations with militarized cyber responses and have opposed additional regulations, which have contributed to the lack of any major cybersecurity legislation passing since 2002.[40] To illustrate this point, in a recent round table hosted by the Center for Strategic & International Studies on the use of the National Guard in cyber security response, one major financial service provider estimated that a uniformed presence responding to an incident within his company would cause the value of his firm's stock to drop 5%.[41] Despite whether this is true or not, privacy and confidentiality concerns exist. The state or regional fusion center provides a means to put a civilian face on military cybersecurity assistance. The KIFC is directed by the Kansas Attorney General, with oversight over privacy rights and civil liberties. The Kansas National Guard Adjutant General as the designated state Homeland Security Advisor is a key member of this mutually beneficial partnership that provides foreign threat analysis and receives force protection assistance in return. Intelligence members from the National Guard are assigned to a compartmentalized collocated fusion center that separates homeland security intelligence analysis from their Military Analysis Center. They focus on national level Standing Intelligence Needs (SINS), but work collaborative issues with DHS analysts and private security representatives. This brings greater resources to the issues of several different functional Information Sharing and Analysis Center sectors representing; energy, financial services, telecommunications and other critical infrastructure. They are also assisted by the 177th Information Aggressor Squadron from the Kansas Air National Guard on cyber intrusion pattern analysis and threats to critical infrastructure components and networks.[42] The National Guard brings security clearances and access to classified federal capabilities to the state and local level, similar to the information sharing environment established at the national level by the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center or NCCIC. The distributed

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[39] Ashton B. Carter and Jane Holl Lute, letter from DoD/DHS to Governors' Branstead and O'Malley Washington DC, May 3, 3013.

[40] Rita Tehan, *Cybersecurity: Authoritative Reports and Resources, by Topic* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1.

[41] Stephanie Sanok Kostro, "The Future of the Army National Guard in Cybersecurity" (roundtable discussion hosted by CSIS, Washington DC, December 19, 2013).

[42] Jeremy Jackson, interview by author, Topeka, KS, February 2014.

network approach ties them into critical infrastructure and analysis subject matter experts making this model an effective information sharing environment within an existing legal framework.

Not all states have resident National Guard unit cyber capabilities, but they do have Army National Guard authorizations for eight cybersecurity professionals and an additional cyber intelligence 35F/N position to assist with National Guard and state network security. These individuals could liaise with joint partners in respective fusion centers on cyber issues. One limitation is the current capability of the fusion centers, of which only 50% of the existing 77 nationwide have a cyber-sector team.[43] The other limitation is that not all states have filled their nine authorizations. Some of the states have been blocked on filling their authorizations due to funding shortfalls. The Task Group's last update indicated that only 64% of computer network defense positions have been filled. Seven states have two or less, and only fifteen states have six or more positions filled.

> **Recommendation 2: As part of a Total Force solution, re-evaluate the composition, size and force mix of the planned Cyber Mission Force by FY 2017, and refine as needed based on changing threats, team effectiveness, capability, required capacity and cost.**

The full sourcing of Cyber Mission Force manpower should be complete in FY 2016, with up to two years of training needed for some teams to reach FOC certification. By the end of 2017 enough teams should be in place to re-evaluate effectiveness and capacity based on the performance and operations tempo of existing FOC teams. Considering the dynamic nature of the cyber threat and complexity of the CMF construct, an ongoing reassessment should be accomplished. As more countries gain offensive cyber capabilities, it is likely that the number of National Mission Teams may need to increase. Concurrently, JIE architecture improvements might drive down the requirements for Cyber Protection teams. These types of decisions, as well as RC integration, will require analytic data from well-developed metrics.

There has been debate on quantifying what type and amount of RC cyber capabilities that are applicable to the CMF from civilian acquired skills.[44] Some AC Service planners are skeptical and without a formal tracking mechanism for certified skills, there will continue to be doubts. CYBER GUARD 13 participant interviews with the Task Group left an impression that RC teams were up to the task and brought civilian acquired capabilities to the exercise that were not yet available from the AC team in training. Air National Guard participants supplied the RFPB with a list of civilian companies that employ their members. The list of companies was

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[43] DHS, *2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report* (Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 4.
[44] Stephanie S. Kostro et al., *Citizen-Soldiers in a Time of Transition: The Future of the U.S. Army National Guard* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2014), 58-59.

well represented by major cyber and technology industries as well as government agencies and is included in Appendix B. The DOD *Cyberspace Workforce Strategy* has two relevant focus area elements that address this topic. The first is identifying and tracking personnel and qualifications within the cyberspace workforce and the second is analyzing RC support for cyberspace missions that offer DOD access to private sector cyber expertise in addition to requirement analysis for crisis and surge capabilities necessary to conduct cyberspace missions.[45] The Task Group believes that following through with the implementation plan for this strategy should be a priority for the Department of Defense.

Recommendation 2a: Direct the development of performance based metrics to evaluate Cyber Mission Force teams.

The Task Group, like the Defense Science Board, found a similar lack of success in discovering cyber metrics useful for the Department to make investment decisions or shape its cyber structure.[46] GAO's 12-275 report addresses outcome-based measures assisting DHS in assessing cybersecurity effectiveness.[47] This is equally applicable to the Department of Defense. USCYBERCOM and Service cyber organizations' current priorities, with a minority of the Cyber Mission Force teams now reaching IOC, are training and fielding teams. However, they have assigned a project within USCYBERCOM towards developing metrics. This effort needs to be elevated in importance. This could be aided by reinvigorating the OSD Chief Information Office cyber metrics working group. The Task Group believes that this project will require a significantly larger collaborative effort and should include DHS, academic/private sector partners, Defense Labs and key DOD Service and Agency stakeholders.[48] Cyber metrics are "difficult to identify, delimit and quantify," yet they are vitally important in risk determinations and return on investment and alternative decisions.[49] Currently the Department is unable to either rate their own cybersecurity effectiveness in personnel performance or fully quantify effectiveness of cyber tools and IT architecture.

Re-validating the initial framework is essential to determining the most efficient and effective force size and mix investment given declining budget resources. As an example, current plans allow for Cyber Protection Teams to be assigned to Combatant Commanders,

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[45] Ashton Carter, *Department of Defense Cyberspace Workforce Strategy* (Washington DC: DOD, 2013), 5-15.
[46] Paul Kaminski, James R. Gosler, and Lewis Von Thaer, *Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat* (Washington DC: Defense Science Board, 2013), 12.
[47] Gregory C. Wilshusen, *Communications Networks: Outcomes-Based Measures Would Assist DHS in Assessing Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Efforts* (Washington DC: Government Accountability Office, 2013), 21.
[48] Stuart H. Starr, "The Challenges Associated with Assessing Cyber Issues," in *Cyber Infrastructure Protection*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 2:238-242.
[49] Mark Mateski et al., *Cyber Threat Metrics* (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2012), 31.

Service cyber organizations, and USCYBERCOM. Understanding both the capability and capacity of these teams as well as the workload and operational tempo will be pivotal to determining whether this initial allocation is correct or needs rebalancing. Internal CMF team refinement may also need to be made, within numbers of tool developers, color teams and HUNT functions. As of now, the Services metric tends to focus on implementation progress. Tied to recommendation #1 is the need to close a feedback loop back to the service Programming, Planning and Budgeting guidance for future fiscal years to address this reassessment.

> **Recommendation 3: The Department of Defense should study, and then assign executive responsibility to a single Service for the full range of joint cyber training.**

Each of the services, with the exception of the Coast Guard, maintains at least some of their own baseline cyber technician/information technology schools. However, with the implementation of the Joint Information Enterprise standardized network architecture and desire for joint "plug and play" of different service cyber teams, it may be prudent to examine whether resource consolidation efficiencies could be found within the Department of Defense by appointing a single service as the cyber school executive agent.

The Task Group recognizes that this is not as simple as it appears, since each service retains the majority of their cyber trained personnel in legacy missions that fill unique requirements. However, the Task Group believes that re-aligning these types of courses could potentially reduce overlapping coverage in joint advanced courses through a common syllabus and assist in USCYBERCOM's end objective to produce a standardized Cyber Mission Team member. This recommendation is a long range goal. For the short term, further disrupting training pipelines could adversely impact capacity and delay cyber mission teams reaching Full Operational Capability. Any additional delays would be undesirable, despite fiscal savings that might result from consolidations.

The Cyberspace Training Advisory Council is chaired by USCYBERCOM J7, OSD Personnel and Readiness and OSD CIO representatives. This group is suitably positioned to pursue this recommendation, since it is included in their draft charter that is expected to be approved in the summer of 2014. The Council is preparing a catalog of service cyber schools and evaluating content for equivalency between courses. The assessment of graduated students and equivalency evaluation should combine to identify gaps in training capabilities and determine ways to reduce duplication by aligning existing training solutions.[50]

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[50] Stephanie Keith, email attachment of draft Department of Defense Cyberspace Training Advisory Council Charter, June 13, 2014.

Recommendation 4: Recruit highly skilled members via a professional accessions and retention program to fill both AC and RC requirements within the Cyber Mission Force.

To meet Strategic Initiative #5 of the 2011, *Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*, consideration should be given towards recruiting highly skilled members via a professional accessions program, similar to the UK Land Information Assurance Group (LIAG) Army Reserve model. Paradigm-shifting approaches, mentioned as a strategy initiative, require out-of-the-box proposals to tap into exceptionally talented industry pools. A 2014 RAND report also mentioned a similar proposal based on the UK select reserve, as a way to attract higher paid individuals that might otherwise not be interested in Active Component service or the lower pay provided by the GS civilian pay schedule.[51] The specific cyber model the Task Group advocates differs in that it proposes targeted recruitment into the officer grades of Captain and Major for exceptionally qualified individuals through professional accessions, similar to how existing JAG or medical officers are brought into uniformed service. Services could leverage USCYBERCOM's Individual Training and Evaluation Board process to grant credit for existing skills, and reduce both the training bill (Class billets/Human Capital costs) for the Services, as well as the amount of time spent in Officer Training/Candidate Schools, compared to Commissioned Officer Orientation Programs (12-14 weeks versus 5 weeks). For the RC, this serves the additional benefit of limiting the candidates' time away from work and their potential personal financial cost from the lower military pay they would receive.

The Services' ability to recruit civilians using the standard General Service Pay tables and also retain individuals through traditional bonus programs may not be sufficient to compete with high industry demands. The UK Army Reserve notes that their organization has been successful in enticing higher paid individuals to participate in lower paying military operations through flexible scheduling and an overall modest tax rebate bonus based on the amount of service given in that year.[52] The UK model also contains more flexibility in meeting physical standards. The more flexible standards could be adopted to help retain Wounded Warriors in uniformed service. The need to foster non-traditional hiring for niche mission needs is also a focus element from the DOD's Cyberspace Workforce Strategy.

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[51] Albert A. Robbert et al., *Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve Components* (Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2014), 42-46.
[52] Christopher Barrington Brown, interview with Commander LIAG, 2 Signals Corps, Royal Corps of Signals, UK Army Reserve, Washington DC, November 17, 2013.

CONCLUSION

The cyber domain is increasing in its criticality and importance to the Department's network centric warfight. Threats and attempted intrusions into government networks are rapidly increasing as more of the world's population goes online. Cybersecurity incidents increased 680% between 2006 and 2011 alone.[53] Despite the extensive training lead times needed to bring CMF teams to full certification, it is evident to the Task Group that significant progress is being made in as short of time as possible to improve the Department's cybersecurity posture and provide a wider range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders. Once fully fielded, the Department of Defense will dwarf the Department of Homeland Security's cyber incident response capabilities. Their Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) and US-CERT resources used to respond to .gov and critical infrastructure incidents will equate to approximately 13% of the personnel the Department is committing to Cyber Protection Teams for defense of .mil networks.[54]

There are areas in which the Department should improve and issues that still need further effort. The Department has put together integration/implementation teams, working groups and convened councils to address several of the issues the Task Group mentions in this report. There are a few items which remain unclear as to whether they will be addressed in a timely and collaborative manner. These include updating and maturing Service Cyberspace Operations Doctrine and developing Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) across the Services. Another significant issue is the determination of an appropriate AC/RC mix in cyber missions. Other than AF component integration into six of their 39 CMF teams, there appears to be no Service appetite for operational reserve forces performing steady state operations, nor validated surge requirements for proposed and planned RC cyber growth. This is the impetus behind the Task Group's Human Capital Management intensive four recommendations and five sub-recommendations.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board makes these recommendations to the Secretary of Defense under our statutory charter. The RFPB stands ready to make its members and staff available for further consultation or discussion on these matters as the Department shall require.

Respectfully submitted

Major General (Ret) Arnold L. Punaro
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

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[53] Gregory C. Wilshusen, *Cybersecurity: Threats Impacting the Nation* (Washington DC: GAO, 2012), 9.
[54] Eric Schneider, interview with DHS NCCIC Operations Chief, Arlington VA, April 15, 2014.

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Cyber Policy Task Group

RFPB Recommendation Brief
4 June 2014

Mr. Sergio "Satch" Pecori
Task Group Chair

1

Overview

- Cyber Policy Task Group Charter
- Individuals/Offices Contacted for Data
- Findings and Observations
- Reserve Component Cyber Mission Force Organization Finding
- Recommendations
- Questions

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Cyber Policy
Task Group Members

Mr. Sergio "Satch" Pecori
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• *Navy Reserve Member*

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• *At-Large Member*

Col Jay Jensen
• *Staff Policy Advisor*

3

Chairman Charge
to Task Group

On 29 April 2013, the RFPB Chairman
directed the establishment of a task group to:

- Assess DoD's current path in developing its cyber organization, policies, doctrine
- Examine adequacy of staffing mix of active, reserve and civilian personnel
- Consider how RC components should be organized, manned and equipped in order to meet stated DoD strategy
- Consult with Senior Defense officials and other persons and organizations
- Develop a preliminary work plan to submit to RFPB at September 5th meeting

4

Cyber Policy
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- Mobility Asst to DIRNSA
- Asst to Chairman, JCS Natl Guard
- Natl Guard Assistant to DIRNSA/Commander USCYBERCOM
- AG Wisconsin/ New Hampshire
- Asst Commandant for C4IT/CIO USCG
- Dep Dir Trans Regional Policy
- Director of Operations ARCyber, G-3
- Director, DISA Joint Information Environment Technical Synchronization
- Dep Director of Operations, USCYBERCOM, J-3
- Director Strategic Initiatives Group, ARCyber
- CMF Lead, ARCyber
- Director, Strategic initiative, USCYBERCOM
- Director Plans, Policy, Exercises, Training, Readiness 2nd Army, G-5/7
- Institute for Defense Analysis
- Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies

- Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution
- Director National Cyber and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)
- Professional Staff, House Armed Services Com
- Senior Advisor to Dep Asst Sec of Cybersecurity, DHS
- OSD Cyber Policy staff
- NGUAS Legislative Affairs Manager, Air Programs & Cyber Security
- NGB Director C4I/CIO, J-6
- Chief, Force Development AF Information Dominance/ SAF/CIO, A6
- Director of Communications/CIO AFRC A6
- Chief USAR Cyber and Information Operations Division, G39
- Marine Corps Combat Development Command
- Branch Head Information Operations, USMC
- Chief of USCG Reserve Forces
- Deputy Commander CG Cyber
- Chief of Strategic Planning, CG Cyber Command
- MarForCyber, Chief of Staff
- MarForCyber, Reserve Det OIC
- Commander, UK LIAG, Royal Signals
- AFSPACE Cyber Programs Integrator

Cyber Policy
Task Group Contacts

- Chairman, National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force
- Dep Dir for Intel, IO, Cyber & Space, OSD-RA
- Branch Head for Cyber and EW Strategy, Plans & Policy CNO OPNAV Staff
- N2N6 C12 Information Dominance Corp, Reserve Manpower, Training & Education Advisor
- FORCM (AW), USN
- Director Deloitte Consulting LLP – Cyber Guard 13 RC Participant
- Senior Cyber Vulnerability Analyst, ManTech Group – Cyber Guard 13 RC Participant
- OSD CAPE C4I and Cyber Programs
- OSD P-R, Dep Director Cyber Readiness
- OSD AT&L Dep Director C3 & Cyber
- DHS NCCIC Director of Operations

Findings/Observations Summary

- **#1:** DoD is making exceptional progress towards fielding a fully operational Cyber Mission Force (CMF)

- **#2:** The DoD stated requirement for the CMF consists of 133 teams sourced from Active Components

- **#3:** Initial direction to establish Cyber Mission Forces does not take advantage of Total Force solutions

- **#4:** Marine Corps and Coast Guard have no plans for RC participation in Cyber Mission Force teams

- **#5:** Existing RC cyber units are not designed/organized to "plug and play" under the Cyber Mission Force construct

- **#6:** DoD Service Cyber Doctrine is not fully updated
  - Strategic cyber guidance is spread across multiple documents without established links

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Findings and Observations

- **Finding #1:** USCYBERCOM, service cyber organizations and the Joint Staff are making exceptional progress in sourcing manpower, developing training programs and enabling employment guidance needed to field a fully operational Cyber Mission Force

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Findings and Observations (Cont.)

- **Finding #2:** The Cyber Mission Force, as authorized in the 2012 Secretary of Defense Memo, consists of 133 teams
    - Three primary cyber missions and force of approx 6,000 people
    - Service split of 30% each for Army, Navy, Air Force; 10% Marine Corps
    - Force mix of 80% Active Component, 20% Civilian; however, each service is pursuing a slightly different force mix; some include contractor personnel
    - No Reserve Components were included

- **Finding #3:** Initial direction to establish Cyber Mission Forces from Service Active Components does not take advantage of the skill sets resident in the Reserve Components enhanced by civilian jobs and available at reduced cost

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Findings and Observations (Cont.)

- **Finding #4:** Without a continuum of Service mind set, it is impossible to retain valuable Cyber Mission Force skills, experience and capabilities for individuals leaving the Active Component
    - Coast Guard and Marine Corps have no plans in place

- **Finding #5:** Existing Reserve Component cyber units are not designed/ organized to present "plug and play" forces under today's Cyber Mission Force construct
    - The majority of cyber trained forces will remain in legacy missions that have established enduring requirements

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Findings and Observations *(Cont.)*

- **Finding #6:** DoD Service Component Cyber Doctrine is not fully matured and is in various stages of re-write and development
  - Strategic Cyber guidance is spread across multiple documents, without established links

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RC CMF Organization Finding

- Some Reserve Components are building Cyber capable Mission Forces without DoD or Service identified requirements
  - Army National Guard proposes 10 FEMA region aligned Cyber Protection Teams, and 1 Title 10 Full Time Cyber Protection Team
  - Army Reserve proposes 10 Cyber Protection Teams with no full time manpower at team level
  - Navy Reserve proposes Cyber Mission Force Active Component team augmentation
  - Air National Guard proposes 12 Cyber Operations Squadrons manned with 30% full time yielding two quickly deployable teams
  - Air Force Reserve proposes one unit with manning for a full time CPT (39) and surge with 2 additional traditional reserve CPTs
  - USMCR and USCGR are not planning to participate in the CMF

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Recommendations Summary

- **#1:** Due to their reduced cost, civilian/AC acquired skill/experience, continuity and longevity, the RC should be included in Cyber Mission Force requirements
- **#2:** As part of a Total Force solution, re-evaluate the size, composition and force mix of the planned Cyber Mission Force by FY17, and refine as needed based on changing threats, team effectiveness, capability, capacity and cost
- **#3:** Assign executive responsibility to a single Service for common cyber schools to reduce duplicative courses
- **#4:** Recruit highly skilled members via a professional accessions and retention program to fill requirements for the CMF

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Recommendations

- **Recommendation #1:** Include Reserve Components in Cyber Mission Force requirements in order to leverage RC reduced cost, civilian/AC acquired skill/experience, continuity and longevity

  (OSD CIO/Policy, USCYBERCOM, Joint Staff, Services)
  - Ensure RC surge and Operational Reserve requirements are identified and filled before considering force structure reductions
  - Create AC/RC cyber associate units that share infrastructure/equipment to the maximum extent possible
  - Validate proficiency and ongoing certification requirements that would justify additional reserve Inactive Duty Training periods
  - Identify cyber specialties needed in the Guard and Reserve outside of the Cyber Mission Force construct

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Recommendations*(Cont.)*

- **Recommendation #2:** As part of a Total Force solution, re-evaluate the composition, size and force mix of the planned Cyber Mission Force by FY17, and refine as needed based on changing threats, team effectiveness, capability, required capacity and cost

  (OSD CIO/P-R/CAPE/Policy, USCYBERCOM, Joint Staff, Services)
    - Direct the development of performance based metrics to evaluate Cyber Mission Force teams

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Recommendations*(Cont.)*

- **Recommendation #3:** The Department of Defense should study, then assign executive responsibility to a single Service for the full range of joint cyber training

  (OSD CIO, OSD P-R, USCYBERCOM)
    - Align and consolidate content; similar courses gain efficiencies and feed advanced joint schools
    - Supports Joint Information Enterprise standard service network architecture and enterprise services
    - Assist USCYBERCOM in producing interchangeable and fully joint Cyber Mission Force capability

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Recommendations*(Cont.)*

- **Recommendation #4:** Recruit highly skilled members via a professional accessions and retention program to fill both AC and RC requirements within the CMF

  (OSD P-R, OSD Cyber Policy, OSD RA, USCYBERCOM)
    - Paradigm–shifting approach to expanding the aperture on accessions for both AC/RC in growing CMF, similar to UK Reserve model
    - Training efficiencies gained through USCYBERCOM Individual Training Evaluation Board recognition of civilian acquired education and skills
    - Excellent opportunity to retain Wounded Warriors (skilled or qualified for cyber training)
    - Cost savings from Officer Orientation courses versus Line Officer Training Schools

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Questions?

Mr. Sergio "Satch" Pecori
Task Group Chair

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ACRONYMS

- AC – Active Component
- AFSPACE – Air Force Space Command
- ARE – Army Reserve Element
- ARCOG – Army Reserve Cyber Operations Group
- ARIOC – Army Reserve Information Operations Cmd
- BCA – Budget Control Act
- BDE – Brigade
- C2 – Command and Control
- CMF – Cyber Mission Force
- CMT – Combat Mission Team
- COCOM – Combatant Command
- CONOPS – Concept of Operations
- CPT – Cyber Protection Team
- CST – Combat Support Team
- DHS – Department of Homeland Security
- DISA – Defense Information Service Agency
- DCO – Defensive Cyber Operations
- DPU – Data Processing Unit
- EW – Electronic Warfare
- FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency
- FYDP – Future Years Defense Plan
- GOSC – General Officer Steering Committee
- HAF – Headquarters Air Force
- IDC – Information Dominance Corp

- IO – Information Operations
- IOSC – Information Operations Support Center
- JFHQ/C – Joint Force Headquarters/Cyber
- JMETL – Joint Mission Essential Task List
- MI – Military Intelligence
- MILCON – Military Construction
- NCCIC – National Cyber security and Communications Integration Center
- NMT – National Mission Team
- NR – Navy Reserve
- NSA – National Security Agency
- NST – National Support Team
- NTC – National Training Center
- OCO – Offensive Cyber Operations
- OPFOR – Opposition Forces
- OPM – Office of Personnel Management
- OSD CAPE – Office of Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
- PAD – Program Activity Directive
- POM – Program Objective Memorandum
- RC – Reserve Component
- RMD – Resource Management Decision
- SIGINT – Signals Intelligence
- VA ARNG – Virginia Army National Guard

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
5113 Leesburg Pike, Suite 601
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NOV – 1 2013

CHAIRMAN

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE   DepSec Action _____

FROM: MajGen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret), Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

SUBJECT: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on Opposition to Section 511 of H.R 1960 (Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act).

- The RFPB is a federal advisory committee established to provide you with independent advice and recommendations on strategies, policies and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components.

- The RFPB met on Thursday, September 5, 2013 and voted to make one recommendation to you concerning provisions in the House and Senate versions of the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act which hinder Department of Defense access to the Reserve Components.

- The Board found that the United States Congress has drafted provisions in recent legislation to address the "off-ramping" of Reserve Component units from assigned missions. Section 511 of H.R 1960 requires the Department of Defense to provide 120 days advanced notice of Reserve Component mobilization and demobilization. A similarly worded Senate provision (Section 508 of S.R. 1197) requires the Secretary of Defense to personally approve, in writing, cancellation of Reserve Component deployments within 180 days when those Reserve Component units will be replaced by Active Component units intended to perform the same mission. The Board finds that these provisions, while well-meaning, will exert a chilling effect on DoD decision-making to employ the National Guard and Reserve, and thus, effectively hinder future access to the Reserve Components.

- A background information paper on "off-ramping" is at TAB A. The specific language of Section 511 of H.R 1960 (Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act) and Section 508 of S.R 1197 (Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act) are at TAB B.

- At present, the Board understands that a staff recommendation that opposes the legislation is with the Office of General Counsel.

- Therefore, The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense publicly and privately emphasize the Department's opposition to new legislative limitations requiring the

Department of Defense to provide advanced notice of Reserve Component "off-ramping" because it hinders future access to the Reserve Components.

- As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, this recommendation was deliberated and approved in an open, public session. A basic overview of the RFPB is submitted as TAB C.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments(s):
As stated

Prepared by: Maj Gen James N. Stewart, 703-681-0060

SUBJECT: RFPB Review of Reserve Component "Off-Ramping"

PURPOSE: Provide context for proposed recommendation

1. "Off-Ramping" is the cancellation of an operational requirement that typically occurs when Combatant Command force requirements change. "Off-Ramping" is not new and is not a Reserve-specific issue. It occurred during the Iraq drawdown and it is now occurring as a part of the drawdown of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan.

2. Sequestration added a new challenge to the "off-ramping" phenomena – the cancellation of operational requirements due to budget constraints, and in the case of the Army, the replacement of Reserve Component units with Active Component units to save money.

3. The Army's new "off-ramping" practice was brought to the Board's attention at its September 2012 meeting by MG David Baldwin, The Adjutant General of California, who warned that the Active Army was beginning to assume missions traditionally performed by Reserve Component organizations.

4. In March 2013, the Army officially announced the "off-ramping" of Indiana National Guard units from the United Nations Multinational Force Observer mission in the Sinai Peninsula.

5. Army Reserve Component leaders, both formally and informally, expressed their concern that the use of "off-ramping" raised doubts about the Army's commitment to the Total Force, undermined predictability of deployments for Reserve Component service members, and posed potential hardships for soldiers, families, and their employers.

6. Since February 2013, the Department has "off-ramped" over 16,000 Army Reservists and Guardsmen from assigned missions in FY13 and FY14 – some because of the drawdown in Afghanistan and others due to budget shortfalls.

7. Despite the large number of Reserve Component personnel "off-ramped", the actual number of cases where "off-ramping" caused a bona fide hardship remains low.

8. In response to the "off-ramping" of Indiana National Guard units in March 2013, the United States Congress is considering legislation to restrict the Department's flexibility on mobilization and demobilization of Reserve Component forces.

Prepared by: COL Timothy J. Lynch, 703-681-1129
Approved by: Maj Gen James Stewart, 703-681-0600

House Resolution 1960

SEC. 511. MINIMUM NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERS OF RESERVE COMPONENTS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT OR CANCELLATION OF DEPLOYMENT RELATED TO A CONTINGENCY OPERATION.

Section 12301 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (e), by striking ''The period'' and inserting
(2) by adding at the end the following new sub section:

''(i)(1) The Secretary concerned shall provide not less than 120 days advance notice to a unit of the reserve components that—

''(A) will be ordered to active duty for deployment in connection with a contingency operation; or

''(B) having been notified of such a deployment, has such deployment canceled, postponed, or otherwise altered.

''(2) If a member of the reserve components is not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit or is to be ordered to active duty apart from the member's unit, the required notice under paragraph (1) shall be provided directly to the member.

''(3) If the Secretary concerned fails to provide timely notification as required by paragraph (1) or (2), the Secretary concerned shall submit, within 30 days after the date of the failure, written notification to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate explaining the reason for the failure and the units and members of the reserve components affected.''

Senate Resolution 1197

SEC. 508. LIMITATION ON CERTAIN CANCELLATIONS OF DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS WITHIN 180 DAYS OF SCHEDULED DATE OF DEPLOYMENT.

(a) LIMITATION.—The deployment of a unit of a reserve component of the Armed Forces described in subsection (b) may not be cancelled during the 180-day period ending on the date on which the unit is otherwise scheduled for deployment without the approval, in writing, of the Secretary of Defense.

(b) COVERED DEPLOYMENTS.—A deployment of a unit of a reserve component described in this subsection is a deployment whose cancellation as described in sub section (a) is due to the deployment of a unit of a regular component of the Armed Forces to carry out the mission for which the unit of the reserve component was otherwise to be deployed.

(c) NONDELEGATION OF APPROVAL.—The Secretary may not delegate the approval of cancellations of deployments under subsection (a).

(d) NOTICE TO CONGRESS AND GOVERNORS.—On approving the cancellation of deployment of a unit under subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Governor concerned a notice on the approval of cancellation of deployment of the unit.

TAB C

The Reserve Forces Policy Board – Basic Overview

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is a federal advisory committee mandated by law in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to "serve as an independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components." As required by statute, the board also produces an annual report which the Secretary of Defense transmits to the President and Congress on reserve component matters the board considers appropriate to include in the report.

The board consists of 20 members; a civilian chairman, a general/flag officer from each of the seven reserve components, a two-star military executive, a senior enlisted advisor, plus ten other U.S. citizens, who may or may not be government employees, with significant knowledge of and experience in policy matters relevant to national security and reserve component matters.

The board is supported by a staff consisting of a Colonel or Navy Captain from each of the six DoD reserve components. There is also a Coast Guard staff officer. These officers also serve as liaisons between their respective components and the board. The law requires them "to perform their staff and liaison duties under the supervision of the military executive officer of the board in an independent manner reflecting the independent nature of the board."

Established in 1951, the board is one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department of Defense.

In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, Congress significantly revised the operating framework and membership of the RFPB. Previously, other than the chairman, the board included only DoD officials and made recommendations through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. In 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommended that the RFPB's governing statute (10 USC 10301) be amended because the board was not structured to obtain and provide directly to the Secretary of Defense a wide range of independent advice on National Guard and Reserve matters due to the nature of its membership and its subordination to other offices within DoD. The revised law was effective 1 July 2011.

On 12 September 2011, retired Marine Corps Major General Arnold Punaro was sworn in as the first chairman of the board under the revised structure. Other new members were sworn in at an organizational meeting on 13 October.

The board is organized into three subcommittees: Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve; Enhancing DoD's Role in the Homeland; and Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel. Subcommittees meet as required. The full board meets quarterly. The RFPB website is at http://ra.defense.gov/rfpb/.

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CHAIRMAN

FEB 11 2014

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: MajGen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret), Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

SUBJECT: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense

- The RFPB is a federal advisory committee established to provide you with independent advice and recommendations on strategies, policies and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

- On September 5, 2012, then Secretary Leon Panetta met with the RFPB and tasked the Board with providing its advice and recommendations regarding four questions: the best ways to use the Reserve Components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance; the right balance or mix of Active and Reserve Component forces; the cost to maintain a Strong Reserve; and how the Department can achieve cost savings in relation to the Reserve Components. The RFPB met on September 5, 2013 and December 12, 2013 and voted to make twelve recommendations to you concerning these questions.

- In summary, the Board recommends the following. Each recommendation is expanded upon in the attached report:

  Recommendation #1 - Plan and Use the RC Operationally.

  Recommendation #2 - Develop and Enforce a Revised DoD Total Force Policy.

  Recommendation #3 - Study the Effectiveness of the RC.

  Recommendation #4 - Preserve RC to Mitigate Risk from AC Cuts.

  Recommendation #5 - Expand RC in Key Skill Areas.

  Recommendation #6 - Improve AC/RC Integration.

  Recommendation #7 - Effectively Use Available Manpower.

  Recommendation #8 - Invest in Reserve Component Readiness.

  Recommendation #9 - Conduct a Broad RC Programmatic Review.

  Recommendation #10 - Review Reserve Component General and Flag Officer Usage.

  Recommendation #11 - Review Reserve Component Infrastructure.

  Recommendation #12 - Study Cross-Component Equipment Sharing.

- As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, these recommendations were deliberated and approved in an open, public session. The Report, including briefing slides presented to and approved by the Board, is at TAB A and has been posted to the RFPB public website. The basic overview of the RFPB is submitted as TAB B.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments(s):
As stated

Prepared by: Maj Gen James N. Stewart, 703-681-0600

RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense

Final Report to the Secretary of Defense

February 11, 2014

RFPB Report FY14-02

Reserve Forces Policy Board
Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the September 5, 2012 meeting of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta met with members of the Board and asked them (in accordance with Title 10, Section 10301) to provide him with advice and recommendations on several Reserve Component topics. Specifically, he was interested in determining: the best ways to use the Reserve Components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance; the right balance or mix of Active and Reserve Component forces; the cost to maintain a Strong Reserve; and how the Department can achieve cost savings in relation to the Reserve Components. The purpose of this report is to provide the Secretary of Defense with thoughtful analysis, observations and recommendations in response to each of these questions, and constitutes the Board's complete and final report. The responses are intended (in accordance with the Board's Charter) to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

Best Ways to Use the Reserve Components

It is the Board's view that the best way to use the Reserve Components is to, in fact, use them, and avoid the inclination to place them "on the shelf" while waiting for the next major conflict. The Reserve Components have a demonstrated record of sustained accessibility, readiness, and reliability. They should be used simultaneously in both strategic and operational roles. In the strategic role, Reserve Components should maintain capability and capacity to help reduce the national military risk associated with prosecuting major theater wars, long-term stability operations, or other combinations of significant or protracted force requirements. In the operational role, the Reserve Components should continue to provide forces to help meet both steady state peacetime engagement and contingency requirements of the Combatant Commanders; both at home and abroad. The Reserve Components should be employed operationally as an integral component of our National Defense Strategy, although at a level below their use over the past decade. Further, the Reserve Components should be used to support each of the ten primary missions of the Armed Forces of the United States described in the Defense Strategic Guidance, and in other capacities required by the President and Governors.

Right Balance of Active and Reserve Forces

In an era of limited fiscal resources, it is the Board's strong belief that the Reserve Components be used to preserve the Nation's capability and overall capacity to deter and defeat aggression, while simultaneously strengthening the Department's capacity to Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. It is the opinion of the Board that, to date, the Department has not seriously considered the question of how much force structure it truly needs, and what mix it can afford. The Department should be deliberate in their approach to force reductions and avoid simplistic "fair-share" cuts across all components for the sake of "being equitable." With reduced fiscal resources available to provide the necessary forces to

Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense   *REPORT FY14-02*

implement the nation's defense strategy, it is essential to strike the right balance between risk and cost when determining Active and Reserve Component force structure. However, numerous costing studies suggest that the Department can maintain more of our defense capability and capacity for less cost in the Reserve Components. Therefore, the Department should consider preserving Reserve Component end strength and force structure to mitigate the risk associated with increased Active Component force structure reductions, to hedge against fiscal and geostrategic uncertainty, and to do so in an even more cost–effective way. The Board is not advocating reduced active duty end strength but should the Department make that decision then the Board believes that preserving capabilities in the National Guard and Reserve is both sound strategy and cost-effective.

Cost of a Strong Reserve

The Department has built (through a decade of investment and war) a stronger, more capable, better equipped, battle tested Guard and Reserve force than we have had at any time in our recent history. Therefore, the Department should not squander the benefits derived from those investments and hard won experience gained in combat. For about $50 billion a year, the Nation maintains a strong, operationally engaged National Guard and Reserve force that comprises about 39% of the Department's military end strength for approximately 9% of the Department's Budget. The Nation must maintain a Reserve Component that is accessible, available, and flexible to provide operational forces, when needed, to satisfy the full range of potential missions called for by our civilian and military leadership. In order to achieve this goal, The Department should institute policies and practices necessary for the continued efficient and effective use of the Reserve Components. Besides continuing the operational use of the Reserve Components, the Department should: improve AC/RC integration; use available manpower more effectively; invest in Reserve Component readiness; and improve Reserve Component cost advantages.

Potential Efficiencies

The Board believes that the Reserve Components are already a cost-effective solution, providing the nation with trained manpower that delivers skilled, seasoned capacity and capability at a reduced cost. However, there are opportunities for additional savings. Therefore, the Board consulted with DoD officials and outside experts, and then conducted its own examination of the budget submissions of the Reserve Components to identify potential efficiencies. As a result, the Board concentrated its efforts on the following areas: Headquarters structure; Operations and Maintenance budget overhead costs; Full-Time Support; General/Flag Officer numbers; Infrastructure; and Equipment. Although not significant, there are some savings to be found in these areas.

TASK

At the September 5, 2012 meeting of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta met with members of the RFPB and charged them, in accordance with Title 10 Section 10301, to provide him with advice and recommendations in response to four specific questions. In that session, Secretary Panetta asked:

1. What are the best ways to use the Reserve Components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance?

2. What is the right balance of Active and Reserve Component forces?

3. What does it cost to maintain a Strong Reserve?

4. How can the department achieve cost savings?

The Reserve Components include both National Guard and Reserve forces. Specifically, these encompass the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve.

Figure 1: Former Secretary Panetta addressing the Reserve Forces Policy Board (September 5, 2012).

Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense   *REPORT FY14-02*

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On May 6, 2013, RFPB Chairman Arnold Punaro submitted an interim report to Secretary Hagel on "Strategic Choices and the Reserve Components." It provided initial observations on the first two questions. In short, it recommended: the continued operational use of the Reserve Components; preservation of Reserve Component capabilities; active consideration of the Reserve Components to mitigate increased risk reductions in Active Component force structure; and the inclusion of the Reserve Components in strategic reviews. This report expands on the observations provided in the interim report, provides the Board's advice and recommendations for each of the questions posed by Former Secretary Panetta, and constitutes the Board's complete and final report.

APPROACH

This report's primary purpose is to provide the Secretary of Defense with thoughtful analysis, observations and recommendation in response to questions posed to the Board by Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. These responses are intended, in accordance with our Charter, to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

A temporary Task Group of five Board members was established on October 31, 2012 with the mission of studying the questions posed by the Secretary of Defense, gathering information, conducting research, analyzing relevant facts, and developing for Board consideration a report or reports of advice and recommendations for the Secretary of Defense. The Task Group conducted 20 meetings, met with 26 officials from the Department and representatives of 13 outside organizations, and presented observations and recommendations for deliberation by the full Board in three public sessions.

Recognizing that there are many different voices within the defense community advocating for a number of varied solutions that address the size and shape of the force along with efficiencies that can be found within the Department, the Board sought inputs from a diverse array of experts and interested parties to inform its analysis. The Board's goal was to remain objective and avoid any appearance of parochialism or advocacy in favor of the Reserve Components over the Active Component. Since the Secretary's questions specifically addressed the Reserve Components, this report will focus its primary attention on the Reserve Components. However, the report will also make a number of recommendations that apply to both Active and Reserve Components in areas that require continued or improved integration between them.

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

> **SECDEF Question:** What are the best ways to use the Reserve Components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance?

One of the most important ways to utilize Reserve Component members is to keep them "operationally trained". In other words, give them a viable mission; provide them with the proper training and equipment to accomplish that mission; and avoid the inclination to place them "on the shelf" while waiting for the next major conflict. Reserve Component members have a demonstrated record of sustained accessibility, readiness, and reliability. They should be employed operationally as an integral part of our National Defense Strategy. Going forward, the Reserve Components should be used to support all ten DoD "Primary Missions" that were identified in the Defense Strategic Guidance, as well as other missions required by the President and Governors. This section outlines the general organization and purpose of the Reserve Components; describes their traditional use in the past; and provides more specific advice and recommendations for their future use.

The Board conducted its review mindful of the key tenets of the current Defense Strategic Guidance released on January 5, 2012 titled, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." The guidance identifies our policy priorities: transitioning from today's wars to prepare for future challenges, and rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region while remaining vigilant in the Middle East. It also requires that the Department maintain commitments to NATO and strengthen alliances and partnerships across all regions. In addition, the guidance stipulates that the Department maintain a ready and capable force able to perform the Department's ten primary missions (Figure 2), even as it reduces overall capacity, and retains the ability to surge and regenerate forces for unanticipated challenges. Finally, it requires the Department to keep the promises it made to the troops, families, and veterans.

Primary Missions of the US Armed Forces

Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
Deter and Defeat Aggression
Maintain a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
Project Power despite Anti-Access / Area Denial Challenges
Provide a Stabilizing Presence
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, & Other Operations.

Figure 2: Primary Missions of the Armed Forces (2012 Defense Strategic Guidance)

Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense   *REPORT FY14-02*

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Reserve Forces Policy Board

As identified in Title 10, United States Code Section 10101, there are seven Reserve Components within the Armed Forces of the United States – the Army and Air National Guard, as well as the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard Reserve. For Fiscal Year 2014, the National Defense Authorization Act provided a total end strength number of 833,700 Reserve Component service members, which is approximately 40% of the total DoD military force structure. With that manpower pool, the Reserve Components provide the Department of Defense with a broad array of combat and support forces for use at home and abroad.

The purpose of the Reserve Components is "to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components."[1] The National Guard is both a Reserve Component and state militia. The statutory role of the National Guard is further articulated in Title 32 which states, "Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other Reserve Components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed."[2] The National Guard, in its militia role, exists to "execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."[3]

Prior to Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the Reserve Components were primarily used as a Strategic Reserve force – maintained for use in major contingencies, while remaining largely unused in peacetime. The Board reviewed the pattern of use of the Reserve Components, both before and after the First Gulf War. In the five years prior to 1991, the Reserve Components provided an average of about 3,000 man-years of support to operational missions. After OPERATION Desert Shield/Storm, the Reserve Components were used more regularly as a part of the "Operational" force. In fact, Reserve Component use grew to a point that, during the six years prior to 9/11, Reserve Component forces provided an average of approximately 35,000 man-years of support to operational missions – a greater than tenfold increase in operational use over the level prior to Desert Shield/Storm.

During Operations Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and Enduring Freedom, the Reserve Components became a fully integrated partner, providing a significant number of forces for operational use. During the nine years of war from 2002 until 2010, National Guard and Reserve forces averaged about 146,000 man-years of support for operations at home and abroad. Since

[1] Title 10, United States Code Section 10102
[2] Title 32, United States Code Section 102
[3] U.S. Constitution (Article 1, Section 8) and Title 10 United States Code Sections 311 and 12406

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9/11, approximately 890,000[4] Guardsmen and Reservists have been mobilized to serve on active duty. That service has, at times, demanded grave sacrifice. From September 11, 2011 through the end of Fiscal Year 2012, nearly 900 National Guard and Reserve service members were killed in action. Currently, there are 42,372[5] Reserve Component members activated in support of operations around the world. They clearly and repeatedly have demonstrated their value to the Nation and Department during the conduct of both campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the operational use of Reserve Component forces should be considered when planning for the use of American forces in the future.

Figure 3: Use of the National Guard and Reserve since 1986

Frequently, the question regarding the proper role Reserve Component members should play in the nation's defense is posed as an either-or choice between competing ideas – strategic reserve versus operational reserve. It is not an either-or proposition. They can, have, and should continue to perform both roles simultaneously. The Reserve Components should be organized, manned, trained, and equipped to provide both strategic and operational capability and capacity to the nation when required.

In their strategic role, Reserve Components should maintain capability and capacity to help reduce the national military risk associated with prosecuting major theater wars, long-term stability operations, or other combinations of significant or protracted force requirements. A strategic reserve, while not officially defined, is that portion of the force kept at lower levels of readiness and availability than those forces ready for operational use. All or portions of the

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[4] National Guard (In Federal Status) and Reserve Activated as of February 4, 2014 Available from http://www.defense.gov/documents/Mobilization-Weekly-Report-02-04-2014.pdf
[5] National Guard (In Federal Status) and Reserve Activated as of February 4, 2014 Available from http://www.defense.gov/documents/Mobilization-Weekly-Report-02-04-2014.pdf

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strategic reserve can be made ready in times of crisis should the nation require their skills. Keeping a strategic reserve capability and capacity serves to reduce the national military risk associated with unforeseen needs and is significantly cheaper to maintain. Both Active and Reserve Components have forces at lower readiness levels that could be considered a part of the strategic reserve. While there is a long standing stigma associated with keeping a portion of the force in reserve in some services, there is value in maintaining a strategic reserve.

In their operational role, Reserve Components should continue to provide forces to help meet the steady state peacetime engagement and contingency requirements of the Combatant Commanders – both at home and abroad. Continued operational use of the Reserve Components offers at least three clear benefits. First, it helps maintain the experience, skills, and readiness gained through twelve years of war for the hundreds of thousands of National Guard and Reserve personnel who have been mobilized. Second, it frees up Active Component forces to ensure their availability to respond immediately to no-notice contingency warfighting requirements. Third, it reduces Active Component deployment tempo and aids in the preservation of the All-Volunteer Force.

The Reserve Components have demonstrated since Operation Desert Storm that they can do much more than simply maintain forces in strategic reserve. That is why many of the services plan to, or have expressed their intent to continue using their Reserve Components to meet operational demands, albeit on a smaller scale than their use today. Under Title 10, Section 12304B, the Department may involuntarily mobilize Reserve Component units to augment active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command, but only if "the manpower and associated costs of such active duty are specifically included and identified in the defense budget materials for the fiscal year or years in which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty."[6] The Department should ensure that adequate attention is given to reviewing and validating opportunities for the operational use of Reserve Components, and that the necessary resources are included in the Department's annual budget submission to pay for their use.

First and foremost, Reserve Component members should be used to support all of the missions described in the Defense Strategic Guidance. At home, the Reserve Components should provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities because their members live in communities across the nation, and to members of the public, they are the face of the Department of Defense. When these communities require assistance due to natural or manmade disasters, state and community leaders, emergency managers, and first responders turn to their Reserve Component neighbors for help. For the same reasons, Defense of the Homeland is another mission area

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[6] Title 10, United States Code Section 12304B. This section also imposes the following additional limitation – "the budget information on such costs includes a description of the mission for which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty and the anticipated length of time of the order of such units to active duty on an involuntary basis."

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perfectly suited for Reserve Component forces. Reserve Component units have been used to control and defend American airspace both prior to and since 9/11.

Abroad, the Reserve Components should be employed to meet predictable operational requirements including: enduring missions, forward presence requirements, and missions aimed at reinforcing alliances and building partner capacity. The Reserve Components have provided sustained support to operations in the Sinai Peninsula and in Kosovo, and should be used in the future to support similar predictable and enduring requirements that call for U.S. presence abroad. The Reserve Components have also helped to sustain alliances and build partner capacity. The National Guard State Partnership Program has been a particularly effective program in this regard.

In addition, the Defense Strategic Guidance requires the Department to maintain a surge capacity. The National Guard and Reserve provide much of that capability should the Nation require it for the conduct of a protracted war or long-term stability operations, and can provide the Department with time to generate additional active forces to prosecute these conflicts if needed. The Reserve Components should also be used as a source of individual manpower to augment major service, joint, and combined headquarters units – manpower that provides crucial skills enhanced by their civilian employment. Finally, the Reserve Components should be used to meet new and emerging capability requirements, particularly when those requirements are technology-based, or when civilian acquired skills would facilitate rapid establishment of such capabilities. The cyber domain is an area where the Reserve Components are particularly well-suited to support increasing demand.

The Reserve Components played an essential role during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan while effectively supporting efforts to build partner capacity, filling enduring operational mission requirements, and providing homeland defense and support to civil authorities here at home. They can be counted on to perform their assigned missions effectively and professionally. The Board strongly urges the inclusion of specific guidance directing continued use of the Reserve Components in appropriate departmental planning documents and offers the following recommendations to answer the Secretary's question on the best ways to use the Reserve Components.

Recommendation #1 - Plan and Use the RC Operationally: DoD should continue to use the Reserve Components operationally and should include requirements for such use in service force generation models, and DOD planning, programming, and budget documents.

a) The Department should plan, program and budget for the continued operational use of the Reserve Components.

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b) Guidance on Reserve Component use should be included in: a new Total Force Policy; the Quadrennial Defense Review Report; Defense Planning Guidance; and Guidance for Employment of the Force.

c) Services should continue to include the Reserve Components in their force generation models.

d) The Department should adapt the Global Force Management process to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for Reserve Component use to facilitate service planning, programming, and budgeting for the activation and employment of Reserve Component forces under Title 10, Section 12304b authority.

During the conduct of our review, the Board found that senior defense leaders lack a total force perspective, and thus, focus on the Active Component as the default solution to overall force management challenges. Many senior defense leaders are unaware of the differences between the National Guard and the Reserves; the strengths of each Reserve Component; the capabilities resident in each of the Reserve Components; the cost to maintain and use the Reserve Components; or the limitations on their use. As a result, the Department fails to fully consider the Reserve Components in key strategic reviews. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review did not address the roles and missions of the Reserve Components as required by Title 10, Section 118. The Secretary of Defense's Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) completed in July 2013 did not address the size, shape, and use of the Guard and Reserve in support of DoD Strategy. Finally, it appears that the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review has missed the opportunity to deal with these questions in a meaningful way as well. At some point, the discussion must take place.

Recommendation #2 - Develop and Enforce a Revised DoD Total Force Policy: DoD should develop and enforce a revised Total Force Policy to encourage a Total Force culture and improve Active and Reserve Component integration. While the services have Total Force policies in place, the Department of Defense does not. This lack of Total Force perspective affects decision-making regarding the use of the Reserve Components, AC-RC Mix, and resourcing. The Department of Defense should develop and enforce a revised Total Force Policy that enumerates key principles necessary to encourage a Total Force culture. Throughout the Department, consideration should be given to the following principles by senior civilian and military leaders:

- Take responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force.
- Ensure military readiness.

- Develop a clear and mutual understanding of the roles and missions of each component (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in each service and in joint/combined operations, during peacetime and war.
- Provide the necessary resources to accomplish assigned missions.

The Reserve Components have demonstrated their availability and reliability in providing forces for operational use through a decade of sustained combat operations. Commanders and senior Department of Defense officials have lauded the contributions and performance of the Reserve Components. Some have even stated that the Reserve Components are as effective as their active counterparts. However, the Department does not have thorough, deliberate analysis on the demonstrated operational effectiveness of Reserve Component units upon their arrival in a theater of operations.

Recommendation #3 - Study the Effectiveness of the RC: DoD should charter an independent and impartial study to assess the operational effectiveness of the Reserve Components. The Department should conduct an assessment of Reserve Component operational performance to better understand how well, or how poorly, operational missions were performed in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11, and to determine necessary changes to strategies, policies, and practices to maintain or improve their performance.

SECDEF Question: What is the right balance of Active and Reserve Component forces?

In an era of fiscal constraint, the Reserve Components should be used to preserve the Nation's capability and overall capacity to deter and defeat aggression, while simultaneously strengthening the Department's capacity to Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. The steadily increasing costs of active duty military manpower will continue to exert downward pressure on Active Component Force structure, particularly in the ground forces. The Reserve Components offer an affordable option, retaining capability and capacity that can be used when needed. The Board strongly recommends the preservation of Reserve Component capabilities and that the Department should actively consider the Reserve Components to mitigate the increased risk associated with further Active Component end strength reductions, either intentional or unavoidable, as a result of declining resources.

The Department of Defense, Joint Staff, and the Services have had little success in predicting future force structure to meet the operational

AC/RC Mix
Army
52% 48%

Navy
15% 85%

Marines
17% 83%

Air Force
35% 65%

■ Active ■ Reserve

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needs of Combatant Commanders with any degree of certainty in the past. However, there are a few assumptions that can be made about the demand signal for the future: 1) Military forces in Afghanistan are expected to decline; 2) The mission of deterring potential adversaries and defeating terrorists will likely continue; and 3) Force requirements in the homeland and in the cyber domain will almost certainly increase. These demands, along with judgments about roles and missions, should form the basis for decisions about Service end strengths, and inform decisions about the relative mix of AC and RC forces within each Service.

The AC-RC Mix for each Service differs greatly, as does their operational reliance on the Reserve Components. The Army is by far the largest service and the Service with the greatest proportion of Reserve Component end strength. The Army relied heavily on Reserve Component enablers (necessary combat support and service support units), and to a lesser extent on combat capabilities, to conduct operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Air Force depends more heavily on its Reserve Components for both structural and operational support. Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Component structure is proportionally much smaller and has, in fact, shrunk over the past decade. While there has been disagreement over proper force mix decisions in the past that have led to Congressional Commissions (Commission on the Structure of the Air Force), the Board hopes this practice is the exception rather than the rule when making force structure decisions in the future.


Figure 4: Authorized End Strength of the Reserve Components

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The Board did not assess or make specific recommendations on AC-RC force mix at the tactical level. It is up to the Department and the Services to determine roles and missions, requirements, and what force structure is needed (to include AC-RC force mix) to meet current and future national defense needs. It is the opinion of the Board that the Department has not yet tackled this task in a serious way; however, the Department has acknowledged the need. In fact, the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance notes that "the Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy." The Department is also required under Title 10, Section 118 to "define sufficient force structure… that would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy" during the conduct of its Quadrennial Defense Review. As stated earlier, neither the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review nor the 2013 Strategic Choices and Management Review took on the challenge of addressing AC-RC Mix. Whether the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review will consider the question in a meaningful way remains to be seen, but preliminary indications are that it does not.

The Department must grapple with the question of how much force structure it truly needs, and what what mix it can afford. Reducing force structure results in increased risk in the Department's ability to implement Defense Strategy. Therefore, the Department should take some time to deliberate on its approach to force reductions and avoid simplistic, "fair-share" cuts across all of the components for the sake of "being equitable." Limited fiscal resources drive leaders to look at new and innovative ways to provide the proper force structure necessary for the strategy, but at reduced cost. Numerous costing studies suggest that the Department can maintain more capability and capacity in the strategic reserve, at a lower cost, by investing in the Reserve Components. DoD should consider preserving Reserve Component end strength and force structure to mitigate the risk associated with increased Active Component force structure reductions, to hedge against fiscal and geostrategic uncertainty, and to do so in an even more cost–effective way. The Board is not advocating reducing active duty end strength but should the Department make that decision then the Board believes that preserving capabilities in the National Guard and Reserve is both sound strategy and cost-effective. The Board believes that the resultant outcome of decisions on DoD force structure and mix should be a more capable force that is better integrated and smartly employed; an approach similar to that being employed by the United Kingdom.

As a result of their 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review, the British military initiated a significant reform of its Reserve Component force. The reforms include increasing the size of their Reserve Components (doubling the size of their Army Reserve), increasing investment in Reserve Component readiness, and regularly using their Reserve Components to complement their active forces.[7] While there are significant differences between the Reserve

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[7] Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation's Security Together, November 2012, available at: www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8475/8475.pdf

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Components of our two nations – including the significantly greater size and much higher level of operational use of the Reserve Components in the United States – some consideration should be given to the approach taken by the United Kingdom.

Recommendation #4 - Preserve RC to Mitigate Risk from AC Cuts: DoD should preserve Reserve Component end strength and force structure to mitigate risk associated with increased Active Component force structure reductions and to hedge against fiscal and geostrategic uncertainty.

Recommendation #5 - Expand RC in Key Skill Areas: DoD should examine those mission capabilities where the Reserve Components have a distinct advantage due to their civilian acquired skills and exposure to new technologies in the workplace (i.e. Cyber, ISR and UAV/RPA). The 2011 "Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components" prepared by the Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs remains a valid document that serves as the basis for such an examination.

SECDEF Question: What does it cost to maintain a Strong Reserve?

The Secretary's question suggests that the Department already has a strong National Guard and Reserve. The Board agrees with this view! The reason – our Nation, through a decade of investment and war, has built a more capable, better equipped, battle-tested Guard and Reserve force than we have had at any time in our recent history. More than 889,000 Reserve Component personnel have been activated in support of DoD requirements since September 11, 2001, both at home and abroad.[8] More than $399 billion in Base Budget funding and $13 billion in Overseas Contingency Funding has been invested in Reserve Component readiness and operational use since 2002.[9]

The Department should not squander the benefits gained and hard won experience derived from those investments. Therefore, the Nation must maintain a Reserve Component that is accessible, available, and flexible to provide operational forces (when needed) to satisfy the range of potential missions required by Governors and the Combatant Commanders. For about $50 billion a year, the Nation maintains a strong National Guard and Reserve force that comprises approximately 40% of DoD military end strength. The Department should institute policies and practices necessary for the continued efficient and effective use of the Reserve

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[8] National Guard (In Federal Status) and Reserve Activated as of February 4, 2014 Available from http://www.defense.gov/documents/Mobilization-Weekly-Report-02-04-2014.pdf
[9] Pay and Allowances and Operations and Maintenance Costs

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Components. Besides the continued use of the Reserve Components operationally, the Department should: improve AC/RC integration; use available manpower more effectively; and invest in Reserve Component readiness.

The Board noted that while the force is fully integrated on the battlefield, fiscal pressures are undermining Total Force integration here in Washington. The Commission on the Structure of the Air Force and the recent Army discussions on Reserve Component missions and force size are two recent examples that show that the Total Force is not fully integrated yet. However, there are examples of "best practices" that reside within each of the Services. Among those practices are: the Marine Corps' Inspector-Instructor (I&I) program; the Air Force's Associate Unit construct; Navy Reserve Component personnel integration; and the Army's modular force construct and Combat Support and Service Support integration in operational environments. While the Services have each made individual efforts to integrate their Components, more can be done. Better integration between the components will improve overall Total Force readiness and help to reduce institutional friction. As previously discussed, it is the Board's view that a lack of a DoD-level Total Force Policy contributes to this problem.

Recommendation #6 - Improve AC/RC Integration: The Services should better integrate its forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment.

a) The Army should move toward stronger integration of its combat forces through a test integrating Reserve Component maneuver battalions into Active Component Brigade Combat Teams. While the Army has made laudable efforts to integrate its enabler formations in operational settings, it has done less to integrate its formations in peacetime. The Board notes, with approval, that the Army has recently begun to reexamine the establishment of multi-component units in its enabler formations in peacetime. While the Board is encouraged by this step, it recommends the integration of Army Brigade Combat Teams as well.

b) The Department should reinvigorate the Title XI program, which commits Active Component manpower to enhance Reserve Component Combat Readiness. After Operation Desert Storm, the Congress mandated the establishment of a program to enhance the readiness of the Reserve Component Ground Forces. As a result, the Army committed Active Component manpower to facilitate training and readiness. After 2001, global operational commitments reduced the ability of the Army to allocate personnel to staff the Title XI requirements. As operational augmentee commitments for mid-grade officers and Non-Commissioned Officers decline, the Army should reinvest in this program. Such a re-investment would carry three important benefits. First, it would accomplish its statutory goal to sustain our hard-won Reserve Component readiness. Second, it would restore a valuable mechanism to breakdown cultural barriers and foster cooperation and integration between the components. Third, it would retain a sizeable pool of mid-grade leaders on active duty, which is essential for rapidly reestablishing Active Component force structure should it become necessary.

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c) Increase Reserve Component opportunities for attendance at Senior Enlisted Courses, Senior Service Colleges, and CAPSTONE. The Services should also ensure continued access, and where feasible, increased access to senior leader development courses, in addition to those opportunities provided through shared experiences on the battlefield or during operational training.

d) Consider implementing an AC-RC teaming or pairing program to encourage integrated operational training. Beyond increasing the interaction between Active and Reserve Component members, the Army should consider implementing a program to pair/partner Active and Reserve Component units together to sustain or improve training readiness in the Reserve Components by: enabling partnered training activities; improving opportunities for leader and staff development; sharing operational experiences; and promoting personal and professional relationships between Active and Reserve Component members. The Board supports the Army's recently proposed Total Force Partnership Program and looks forward to its successful implementation not only among the Army's Brigade Combat Teams, but within and among its enablers as well.

Recommendation #7 - Effectively Use Available Manpower: As Active Component end strength and force structure declines, the Department of Defense should make better use of its available Total Force manpower.

a) Reduce the number of Reserve Component Duty Statuses. A number of Boards and Commissions, including the RFPB[10], have recommended that the Department work with Congress to reduce the number of Reserve Component Duty Statuses, but little has been done to implement these recommendations. There are currently 32 Reserve Component Duty Statuses that are derived from a convoluted array of duty authorities, purposes, funding mechanisms, and restrictions. The Department should take immediate action to reduce the number of duty statuses from 32 to as few as 6, while retaining the ability to track and report on the duty purpose.

b) Ease Personnel Transitions between components. Yet again, there are a number of Boards, Commissions, and studies that have recommended increasing the flexibility of the manpower models and management systems of the Services to allow for a more seamless ability to transition between components – a real Continuum of Service. Service members, whether in the Active or Reserve Components, have different personal and professional needs and priorities as they progress through their careers, and a more flexible manpower model that allowed for the seamless transition between components could benefit both the Department and the service member.

c) Encourage Active to Reserve Component transfers to retain talent and combat experience. The Department should make every effort to retain as much talent as possible as it draws down the Active force, particularly the ground forces whose directed end strength

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[10] Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on Reserve Component (RC) Duty Status Reform, 16 July 2013, available on the RFPB website at http://ra.defense.gov/rfpb/reports/

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Allocated Reserve Component Forces: Those Reserve Component units allocated to Geographic Combatant Commanders in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) for use during a specified period.

Reserve Component Homeland Response Forces: Those Reserve Component units necessary to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive (CBRNE)/Disaster Response) requirements of the Governors and Standing Homeland Defense Requirements of the Department (Ballistic Missile Defense/Air Sovereignty Alert).

Reserve Component Contingency Forces: Those Reserve Component units requiring enhanced readiness for early mobilization and deployment in support of existing Geographic Combatant Command Operation Plans.

SECDEF Question: How can the Department achieve cost savings (with a Reserve Component nexus)?

The Board believes that the Reserve Components are already a cost-effective solution in meeting the Defense needs of the nation with trained manpower that provides skilled, seasoned capacity and capability. Relative to the rest of the Department of Defense, the Reserve Components provide an extremely high level of military capability for a comparatively small portion of the DoD budget. Retaining already-lean Reserve Component force structure and using it operationally is the most significant efficiency. The Department maintains about 39% of its end strength in the Reserve Components for approximately 9% of the Department's Budget. As the RFPB has previously reported, the fully-burdened and life-cycle cost of a Reservist or Guardsman is less than a third of their Active Component counterpart. Therefore, the Reserve Components are an effective solution for maintaining future force structure at a reduced cost.

Even though the Reserve Components have proven to be cost effective, there are opportunities for additional savings. Within all organizations there are areas where savings can be found if you look hard enough. Thus, the Board consulted with DoD officials and outside experts, and then conducted its own examination of the budget submissions of the Reserve Components to identify potential efficiencies. As a result, the Board found several areas where DoD review could result in some Reserve Component cost-savings.

Reserve Component Headquarters Structure/Staffing

The Board examined the headquarters structure of the Reserve Components and found 85 Reserve Component, flag-level, non-deployable headquarters that administer to approximately 840,000 Reserve Component personnel[14]. The Board examined the headquarters structure of the Reserve Components and found 85 Reserve Component, flag-level, non-deployable headquarters that administer to approximately 840,000 Reserve Component personnel[15]. The ratio of administrative headquarters to personnel is about one headquarters per 10,000 personnel.

TABLE E-1

Non-Deployable Headquarters	
Component	Headquarters
National Guard	57
Army Reserve	17
Navy Reserve	4
Marine Corps Reserve	1
Air Force Reserve	6
Totals	85

Ten of the 85 headquarters are derived from statutes directing the establishment of the Reserve Component Chiefs and Reserve Component Commands. A majority (64%) of the 85 headquarters are National Guard State Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). Established in accordance with DoD Directive 5105.83, these 54 National Guard State Joint Force Headquarters provide support for both National Guard Federal and State missions, when appropriate. One of the Federal mission requirements of the SJFHQ is operational versus administrative. In addition to maintaining trained and equipped National Guard forces and providing command and control for those forces, the SJFHQ, in accordance with policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, is prepared to provide one or more JTF command elements (or to serve as component elements of (larger) JTFs that might be established by proper authority) that are able to exercise command and control of military forces to execute assigned missions.[16]

There are approximately 36,000 billets in the Reserve Component administrative headquarters. About 75% of the 36,000 billets belong to the National Guard. A review of the ratio of administrative headquarters to personnel suggests that the National Guard has the greatest administrative overhead (1 per 8,139 troops); followed by the Air Force Reserve (1 per 11,813) and Army Reserve (1 per 12,059). SJFHQ manpower is managed using joint manpower documents in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01. Each Service has a process to review and validate manpower requirements associated with Reserve Component headquarters.

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[14] The numbers do not include Reserve Component deployable operational headquarters or non-deployable administrative headquarters below Flag-level command.

[15] The numbers do not include Reserve Component deployable operational headquarters or non-deployable administrative headquarters below Flag-level command.

[16] DoD Directive 5105.83, January 5, 2011, Subject: National Guard Joint Force Headquarters – State (NG JFHQs-State).

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The Government Accountability Office recently completed a review of Army and Air Force Reserve Component Headquarters and their staffing levels in GAO Report 14-71, *Actions Needed to Ensure National Guard and Reserve Headquarters Are Sized to be Efficient*. In the report, GAO found that staffing at Reserve Component Administrative Headquarters has grown over the last four years by 6%. GAO also noted that while the Joint Staff and the Services have processes for reviewing and validating Reserve Component headquarters manning structure, they have not been consistently applied. Thus, GAO concluded that DoD lacks proper assurance that Army and Air Force Reserve Component headquarters are staffed with the minimum personnel needed to efficiently perform required functions. GAO's review did not recommend eliminating or reducing the size of Reserve Component headquarters. Instead, they stated that the Services should regularly review their Reserve Component headquarters manning requirements.

Other GAO recommendations worthy of note include the following:
1. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to implement the Joint Chief of Staff's Joint Manpower and Personnel Process, and have its personnel requirements periodically validated by a DOD organization external to the National Guard Bureau.
2. The Secretary of Defense should include the National Guard Bureau among its list of Major DOD Headquarters Activities, and report personnel associated with the National Guard Bureau in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report. In addition, The Secretary of Defense should direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to develop a process for the Army and Air National Guard to collaborate when determining personnel requirements for joint functions at their headquarters, and assess and validate all personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters, to include the Army and Air staff elements.
3. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to ensure that these headquarters are reassessed and have their personnel requirements validated within required time frames by including them in the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency's schedule for reassessment and validation.
4. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to modify the Air Force's guidance to require that Reserve Component headquarters have their personnel requirements reassessed on a recurring basis, and establish and implement a schedule for reassessing their personnel requirements.

The Board recommends that the Department conduct a thorough review of Reserve Component programs to identify potential efficiencies, and that such a review should include a detailed examination of Reserve Component headquarters management structures to streamline management layers and eliminate unnecessary headquarters.

Reserve Component Overhead Costs

Next, the Board examined Reserve Component overhead costs found within the Operations and Maintenance budgets of each of the components. It found that the Department's combined FY14 Base Budget Request for the Reserve Component totaled $48B.[17] The budget included approximately $21.9B in personnel-related funding and $21.3B in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. A majority of the O&M funds (96%) are associated with Budget Activity 1 (BA1) - Operating Forces that include Operations, Force Readiness and Training, Weapons Maintenance, and Facility Operations and Maintenance. A small portion of the O&M funding is associated with Budget Activity 4 (BA4) - Administration and Service wide Support (approximately $754.4M). BA4 funding includes costs for Recruiting and Advertising, Personnel and Financial Administration, Communications, Transportation, and other General Administrative program costs. Table E-2 depicts planned Reserve Component BA4 funding for Fiscal Year 2014 by subcategory.

TABLE E-2

Component	Total O&M ($K)	BA4 Admin & Svcwide Spt ($K)	BA4 % of O&M	BA4 SAGs ($K)				
				Admin	Comms	Per/Fin Admin	Recruiting & Advertising	Other
Navy	1,197,800.00	22,944	2%	2,905	2,485	14,425		3,129
Marines	263,300.00	21,795	8%	11,743			9,158	894
Army	3,095,000.00	93,412	3%	24,197	10,304	10,319	37,857	10,735
ARNG	7,054,200.00	441,100	6%	78,284	46,995	6,390	297,150	12,363
Air Force	3,164,600.00	110,472	3%	64,362		23,617	15,056	7,437
ANG	6,566,000.00	64,700	1%	32,117			32,585	
Total	21,340,900.00	754,423	4%	213,608	59,784	54,751	391,806	34,558

Overall Reserve Component funding for Budget Activity 4 has declined by 25% from FY12 to the current FY14 budget. BA4 funding is down in the Air and Army Reserve Components (ARNG - 27%; USAR - 40%; USAFR - 15%; and ANG - 21%); flat for the USNR; and up for the USMCR (12%).[18] The largest BA4 activity that is driving the current downward trend is Recruiting and Advertising, which constitutes more than 50% of FY14 BA4 funding. Recruiting and Advertising funding has declined by 25% since FY12. This account provides funding for:

– Reserve Component recruiting operations; recruiter-specific costs; recruiter related training; recruit military entrance processing; travel and transportation costs; commercial facilities; vehicle and communications leasing; equipment procurement; and civilian pay associated with recruiting program operations and management.

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[17] Reserve Component Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Submission documents are available from the following Service websites:
  Army: http://asafm.army.mil/offices/BU/BudgetMat.aspx?OfficeCode=1200
  Air Force: http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/
  Navy and Marine Corps: http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/14pres/books.htm
[18] The Marine increase is primarily associated with a programmatic increase for administrative support.

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– National, regional and local advertising presence through television, on-line, and printed publication media to maintain Reserve Component specific brand awareness; generate recruiting leads; and support recruiting operations.
– Support of a Total Reserve Component accessions goal of 110,338 Soldiers, Airmen and Marines (Officer and Enlisted).[19]
– Support of 3,635 Full-time military, civilian and contractor personnel (2,960/59/616) associated with Reserve Component recruiting, advertising and related activities.

The Board noted that the Army National Guard spends significantly more of its resources on Recruiting and Advertising than the other Reserve Components (roughly $5,830 per recruit); followed by the Air National Guard (roughly $2,880 per recruit); the Air Force Reserve (roughly $1,770 per recruit); and the Army Reserve (roughly $950 per recruit). Of the 110,338 planned Fiscal Year 2014 Reserve Component accessions, the Army National Guard constitutes about half of the total requirement.

The Board recommends that the Department conduct a thorough review of Reserve Component overhead costs to identify potential efficiencies, and that the review should include a detailed examination of Recruiting and Advertising costs to ensure efficient performance of assigned functions.

Reserve Component Full-Time Support

The Board examined the Reserve Component Full-Time Support program. Our review considered overall numbers and not grade distribution and use; however, future reviews should consider these questions. Today, the common view of Reserve Component Full-Time Support is that it includes only Reserve Personnel on Active Duty in Support of the Reserves and Dual Status/Non-Dual Status Military Technicians. The actual Full-time Support program also includes Active Component personnel provided by the parent Service and non-technician Civilian employees. Average Full-Time Support distribution across the Reserve Components is about 20% of end strength. Full-Time Support personnel assist in the organization, administration, recruitment, instruction, training, maintenance, and supply support of the Reserve Components, and are absolutely essential for Reserve Component unit readiness.

Authorizations for Reserve Personnel on Active Duty in Support of the Reserves and Dual Status/Non-Dual Status Military Technicians are established annually in the National Defense Authorization Act.[20] Reserve Personnel on Active Duty in Support of the Reserves include Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel in the Army and Air Force Reserve and

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[19] USNR receives no direct funding for recruiting and advertising.

[20] The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizes Reserve Component Full Time Support. Section 412 identifies Authorizations for Reserve Component personnel on Active Duty; Section 413 identifies Dual Status Technician Authorizations and Section 414 identifies Non-Dual Status Technician Authorizations.

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Guard force, as well as Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel in the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve. Fiscal Year 2013 authorizations for Reserve Personnel on Active Duty in Support of the Reserves (AGR) and Dual Status/Non-Dual Status Military Technicians totaled 150,960. Fiscal Year 2013 Full-Time Support authorizations to the Reserve Components, from all sources of manpower, totaled 165,681 Personnel (See Table E-3).

TABLE E-3

FY13 Authorizations							
Component	End Strength	AGR	DS MILTECH	NDS MILTECH	AC	Civilian	Total FTS	FTS% of ES
Army National Guard	358,200	32,060	28,380	1,600	184	1,116	63,340	18%
Army Reserve	205,000	16,277	8,445	595	72	1,394	26,783	13%
Navy Reserve	62,500	10,114			2,242	854	13,210	21%
Marine Corps Reserve	39,600	2,261			3,778	257	6,296	16%
Air National Guard	105,700	14,871	22,313	350	208	208	37,950	36%
Air Force Reserve	70,880	2,888	10,716	90	511	3,897	18,102	26%
Totals	841,880	78,471	69,854	2,635	6,995	7,726	165,681	20%

Note: AGR and Technician authorizations are from NDAA 2013. AC and civilian numbers from the Congressional Research Service report (Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers, dated 12 July 2013) with data as of 30 September 2012.

Authorizations for Reserve Personnel on Active Duty in Support of the Reserves and Dual Status/Non-Dual Status Military Technicians have grown by 24,373 since 2001. Most of the growth in FTS (approximately 22,000 personnel) is associated with the Army. Over the same period, Air Force grew by about 6,000; Marine authorizations remained the same; and Navy Reserve authorizations declined by about 4,500. Over the same time period, Reserve Component end strength authorizations declined by 3%. The Army deliberately grew AGR and Technician authorizations to meet critical requirements and facilitate operational use of the Reserve Components. Despite the significant growth of Army FTS authorizations, the Army Reserve has the lowest percentage of Full-Time Support when compared to end strength. The Air National Guard, on the other hand, has the highest level. However, there are reasons for these differences

Each Reserve Component is unique in the way they are organizationally structured, and how they choose to use their Full-Time Support force. Both Air Force Reserve Components are authorized a greater percentage of Full-Time Support resources to enable them to maintain a high state of readiness. Both Guard Components and the Air Force Reserve rely heavily on Dual Status Technicians, while the Army and Navy Reserve rely more heavily on AGR personnel versus Technicians. The Marine Corps Reserve, on the other hand, is heavily weighted toward Active Component Full-Time Inspector-Instructors to maintain operational experience in its Reserve formations.

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The Board recommends that the Department conduct a thorough review of Reserve Component Full-Time Support requirements, authorizations, and distributions to ensure these programs are manned to efficiently meet critical unit administrative, operational, and combat readiness requirements.

Recommendation #9 - Reserve Component Programmatic Review: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Director, Cost Assessment Program Evaluation (CAPE), in conjunction with the Under Secretary (Personnel and Readiness), the Under Secretary (Comptroller), and the Services to conduct a thorough review of Reserve Component programs to identify potential efficiencies. That review should include a detailed examination of:

a) Reserve Component headquarters management structures to streamline management layers and eliminate unnecessary headquarters.
b) Reserve Component Overhead Costs to ensure efficient performance of assigned functions.
c) Reserve Component Full-Time Support requirements, authorizations, and distributions to ensure these programs are manned to efficiently meet critical unit administrative, operational, and combat readiness requirements.

In the case of the Army and Air National Guard, these reviews should be conducted in conjunction with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Reserve Component General/Flag Officers

The Board explored the topic of senior leadership positions within the Reserve Components to determine the required number and use of General and Flag Officers. As of October 1, 2013, there were 664 Genera/Flag Officers currently serving in the Reserve Components. There are, by contrast, 943 General/Flag Officers in the Active Component. The distribution of Reserve and Active General/Flag Officers is roughly equivalent to the distribution of end strength between the components; roughly 40% Reserve and 60% Active.

The Services are authorized 422 Reserve Component General/Flag Officers under Title 10, Section 12004. Exceptions allow additional authorizations for those officers counted against Active End strength (Title 10, Section 526); Joint requirements (Title 10, Chapter 38); or those serving as State Adjutants General, Assistant Adjutants General, or at the National Guard Bureau. Title 32, Section 314 authorizes an Adjutant General for each State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. There is no statutory limit on the number of Assistant State Adjutant Generals; however, they are limited by the National Guard Bureau.

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The number of Reserve Component General/Flag officers has grown since 2006 when there were approximately 620 versus 664. Over the same period, the number of Active Component General/Flag Officers grew from 906 to 943 (and was as high as 981 in 2010). Reserve Component General/Flag Officers serve in a variety of capacities. They serve in both operational and administrative roles in Reserve Component units, at service major command headquarters and their parent service staffs, or in a joint duty billet (See Table E-4[21]). The inclusion of Reserve Component General/Flag officers on Service Staffs and at Service Major Commands sustains cross-component integration. While using Reserve Component Flag/General officers in Joint billets helps them build the significant Joint Experience required for selection as a Reserve Component Chief.

TABLE E-4

Component	ANG	ARNG	USAFR	USAR	USMCR	USNR	Total
Adjutant General	18	36					54
Assistant Adjutant General	43	82					125
Joint	17	17	15	17	4	10	80
NGB	13	12					25
Not assigned		1				1	2
RC-Administrative	45	36	18	24		4	127
RC-Operational	3	28	1	40	4		76
RC-Training & Mobilization				20			20
Service Major Command	11	12	35	21	1	28	108
Service Staff	5	2	21	7	3	9	47
Total	155	226	90	129	12	52	664

The Board examined the ratio of General/Flag Officers to both end strength numbers and the number of Commissioned/Warrant Officers for each component (Table E-5[22]). It became apparent that the Air National Guard has the greatest proportion of General Officers when compared to either Total End Strength or its Officer Corps. In fact, the Air National Guard has one General Officer per 686 members/90 Officers compared to one General Officer per 3,300 members/308 Officers in the Marine Corps Reserve. Overall, 57% of all Reserve Component Flag/General Officers are located in the National Guard.

A number of factors are important when evaluating the number of General/Flag Officers in each component. First, the Air Force uses a large number of officers to operate their combat,

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[21] General and Flag Officer basic data was provided by the Reserve Components. The Categories, other than those that are self-explanatory, are subjective groupings developed by the RFPB staff. Roughly a third are assigned to positions on Service Major Command Staffs, the Service Staffs or Secretariats, or in Joint positions. Another third are Adjutant Generals, Assistant Adjutant Generals, or are serving at the National Guard Bureau. The final third includes General and Flag officers in positions that administratively manage Reserve Component units and personnel; lead Reserve Component operational units; or provide training assistance.

[22] For Flag Officers per Service Member and Flag Officers per Officer, larger numbers are better.

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bomber, tanker, trainer, airlift, and space platforms, which requires a higher percentage of General Officers than found in the ground components. By contrast, the ground components employ small formations of enlisted soldiers as their lowest warfighting formations – people are their platforms. Second, the Army and Air National Guard perform a Dual Federal-State Mission, which require State Adjutants General and Assistant Adjutants General; not found in the other Reserve Components.

TABLE E-5

Component	Generals and Flag Officers	Component End Strength	Officer Strength (Comm/Warrant)	Flag Officers per Service Member	Flag Officers per Officer
Army National Guard	226	358,200	44,400	1,585	196
Army Reserve	129	205,000	42,100	1,589	326
Navy Reserve	52	62,500	14,900	1,202	287
Marine Corps Reserve	12	39,600	3,700	3,300	308
Air National Guard	154	105,700	13,900	686	90
Air Force Reserve	90	70,880	15,600	788	173

A number of recent Department and Congressional efforts have sought to find efficiencies through the reduction of General/Flag Officers. In 2010, Secretary Gates directed that an Efficiency Review be done to examine all General/Flag Officer billets. As a result of this review, 140 positions were eliminated, reduced, or realigned. That review did not specifically examine the number and use of Reserve Component Flag/General Officers, although it did direct the elimination of some Joint billets filled by Reserve Component Officers.

The House Armed Services Committee Report 112-78, which accompanied the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), applauded Secretary Gates' efforts to reduce the number of General/Flag officers on active duty. However, the committee expressed disappointment that the Department made no substantial proposal in the budget request to reduce the statutory limits. The 2012 NDAA imposed modest new restrictions on exceptions for counting Active Duty General/Flag Officers against their respective service's limits, but did not impose new limits on Reserve Component General/Flag Officers.

Subsequently, Senate Appropriations Committee Report 113-85, which accompanied the recently passed 2104 Defense Appropriations Act, added its support for DoD efforts to reduce the overall number of General/Flag Officers in the Department. The report also expressed concern about General/Flag officer costs, and directed the Comptroller General to provide a report to the Congress identifying all direct and support costs associated with these officers.

Worthy of note, the committee report did not explicitly include or exclude Reserve Component General/Flag Officers. However, the Board feels that the Department should conduct a broad review of the number and use of Reserve Component General/Flag Officers; it should understand the associated costs; and include Reserve Component General/Flag Officers in relevant reports to Congress.

Recommendation #10 - Reserve Component General/Flag Officer Usage: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary (Personnel and Readiness), in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Services, to conduct a thorough review of the number and use of Reserve Component General/Flag officers to ensure efficient use within the Reserve Components; support their respective parent Service, and meet Joint General/Flag Officer requirements. In the case of the Army and Air National Guard, these reviews should be conducted in conjunction with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Reserve Component Infrastructure

Another area where the Board searched for efficiencies is in the Reserve Component's physical infrastructure inventory.[23] Every year the Department prepares a Base Structure Report (BSR) that lists all DoD sites. In the 2012 BSR, the Department reported that the Reserve Components operate a total of 4,377 sites, on 2.6 million acres, with a replacement value of $83B. Generally, there are two types of Reserve Component sites – DoD and Army National Guard State-Managed sites. DoD Sites are DoD-owned or those sites that receive significant funding from the Department of Defense. State-Managed sites are National Guard sites managed by the Army National Guard that are state-owned or receive state funding. Of the 4,377 Reserve Component sites, 1,637 are DoD sites (with a replacement value of $53B), and 2,740 are Army National Guard State-Managed sites (with a replacement value of $29B).

The 4,377 Reserve Components sites include: Camps, Forts, and Bases; Armories and Centers; Ranges and Training Areas; Airfields; Maintenance Facilities; and Recruiting Offices, including leased facilities. Table E-6[24] lists the various categories developed by the RFPB Staff and gives the total number of sites in each Reserve Component.

The Fiscal Year 2014 budget includes $693M for Reserve Component Military Construction (MILCON) to plan for and design Reserve Component facilities; build Reserve

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[23] The Board used data, provided by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to prepare the 2012 Base Structure Report. It was the most current and detailed information available at the time of the review.
[24] The Chart depicts the total number of sites, from the DoD 2012 Base Structure Report, associated with each of the subjective categories developed by the RFPB staff to describe the uses of Reserve Component facilities. The numbers include both DoD-Managed sites and Army National Guard State-Managed sites.

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Component facilities; or significantly modify Reserve Component facilities. $2.7B is allocated for funding Base Operations and $1.5B for facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization.

TABLE E-6

Categories	ANG	USAFR	ARNG	USAR	USMCR	USNR	Total
Airfield or Related Site	127	3	74	2			206
Armory or Center	30		2327	726	36	106	3225
Base, Camp, Fort	15	10	73	4			102
Closed	1	2		1			4
Maintenance and Storage	2		153	40	1		196
Other	15	1	72	14	5		107
Range	9	3	16				28
Recruiting			270	13			283
Training Area	10	1	190	24		1	226
Grand Total	209	20	3175	824	42	107	4377

In order to identify potential opportunities for efficiency, the Board looked for large densities of Armories and Centers in metropolitan areas across the nation to consolidate many of the 4,377 sites. Research found that the Reserve Components operate 3,255 readiness centers and armories, and have a presence in or near 2,731 cities. Most communities have just one Reserve Component site (usually an Armory or Center), but there is a significant site presence[25] in or near 14 U.S. cities. Thus, DoD should look at areas with the greatest number of centers and armories for opportunities to consolidate facilities to achieve long-term savings.

During the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), consolidation of Reserve Component units into Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRC) was employed in a limited but successful way. There were 125 AFRCs built to support the closure of 387 Army Reserve Component facilities (about 10% of the Army Reserve Component facility inventory), and 37 Navy and Marine Reserve Centers; 32 of the 125 were Joint facilities (housing Reserve Components other than the Army). The 2005 BRAC helped established Armed Forces Reserve Centers in 8 of the 14 cities with the greatest density of Centers and Armories.

A recently-completed Joint Construction Efficiencies Analysis Study, sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, found that it is cheaper to build and operate joint Reserve Component Armories and Centers. The study found that joint Reserve Component construction projects saved an average of 27.9% off of the estimated unilateral construction costs. Additionally, the study reported that it costs approximately 47% more to

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[25] Significant presence is subjective. The Board considered 7 Armories and Centers significant. Cities with significant presence include: Birmingham, Alabama; Montgomery, Alabama; Sacramento, California; Indianapolis, Indiana; Baltimore, Maryland; Jackson, Mississippi; Kansas City, Kansas; New York City, New York; Columbus, Ohio; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Portland, Oregon; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Houston, Texas; and Madison, Wisconsin.

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operate unilateral facilities than an equivalent joint facility. However, it should be noted that while long-term savings can certainly be achieved through consolidation, there is always an up-front cost to build these Joint Reserve Centers before savings can be achieved. Even with up-front costs, the data validates the assertion that potential savings could be garnered with further Reserve Component facility consolidation.

Recommendation #11 - Reserve Component Infrastructure: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), in conjunction with the Under Secretary (Personnel and Readiness) and the Services, to conduct a thorough review of Reserve Component infrastructure and to aggressively seek opportunities to consolidate Reserve Component centers, armories, bases, training areas, and other administrative facilities. In the case of the Army and Air National Guard, these reviews should be conducted in conjunction with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

In addition, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary (Personnel and Readiness) to establish a Reserve Component Facility Consolidation Board to more efficiently develop, in conjunction with the Services, Reserve Component Facility Consolidation Plans for integration into the Department's Program and Budget Submissions.

Finally, within the Department's BRAC Governance Structure, The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) to establish a Reserve Component Facility Consolidation Cross Service Working Group to more efficiently analyze, develop, and coordinate Reserve Component facility consolidation proposals.

Reserve Component Equipment

The final area examined for possible efficiencies is Reserve Component Equipment. Reserve Component equipment requirements total some $244B[26]. Since 2009, Reserve Component equipment requirements have increased by about $28B. In the most recent National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER), the Reserve Components reported having 803 major equipment items. A portion of the equipment listed is Critical Dual Use equipment; organizational equipment necessary for the accomplishment of Reserve Component Federal and (in the case of the National Guard) State missions. The ground Reserve Components report the greatest number of major equipment items, followed by the Navy Reserve and Air Reserve Components with the fewest[27]. Reserve Component major equipment items mirror those found

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[26] Fiscal Year 2014 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER) published in March 2013
[27] In the FY14 NGRER the Reserve Components reported the following numbers of Major Items of Equipment: ARNG-271, USAR-230, USCMR-212, USNR-42, ANG-30 and USAFR-18.

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in the Active Component and include the following: fixed-wing and rotary aircraft; simulators and support equipment; ships and other watercraft; ground combat and support vehicles; radios, computers, and other communications support equipment; individual protective equipment; and rifles and night vision goggles.

To fund these Reserve Component equipment requirements, Congress appropriates funding in three distinct ways: through the Services for Reserve Component equipment procurement (detailed in the annual P-1R budget exhibit); through supplemental funding (National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation); and through direct Congressional adds. Between 2009 and 2014, the Services procurement for the Reserve Components totaled approximately $33B[28]. Most of that sum was procurement for the Army's Reserve Components. In addition, appropriations for the same period through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) totaled some $5.5B. Direct Congressional adds from 2009 through 2012 increased Reserve Component equipment funding by another $1.1B (see Table E-7).

TABLE E-7

($M)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
P-1R	8,649.2	5,999.5	6,303.0	4,814.2	2,948.5	4,077.3	32,791.7
NGREA	1,247.5	950.0	850.0	1,000.0	1,500.0		5,547.5
Direct	95.0	210.2	792.1	47.2			1,144.5
Totals	9,991.7	7,159.7	7,945.1	5,861.4	4,448.5	4,077.3	39,483.7

Despite the considerable investment in Reserve Component Equipment, the Reserve Components remain about $51B or about 21% short of the total equipment requirements (not including authorized substitutes).[29] For comparison, in Fiscal Year 2009, the Reserve Components were $42B or about 20% short of the total equipment requirements.[30] From Fiscal Year 2009 to 2013, Air Force Reserve Component equipment requirements rose from about $59B to $88B and Army Reserve Component equipment requirements fluctuated between $132B and $143B. In 2009, Army Reserve Component shortages constituted about 95% of DoD's total Reserve Component equipment shortages; however, in 2013 they declined to 78%. Meanwhile, the Air Force Reserve Component's equipment shortages rose to 21% of the total for DoD. In both cases, the rapidly escalating cost of new weapons systems; the cost to deploy modern capabilities to aging air and ground systems; and increased budget pressure will continue to challenge the Services as they try to meet the equipment needs of their Reserve Components.

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[28] Procurement Programs Reserve Components (P-1R) Reports are available for each Budget Year from the website of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The FY2014 P-1R Report is available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget2014.html
[29] FY14 NGRER, page 1-3.
[30] FY10 NGRER, page 1-6.

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Modernization of Reserve Component Equipment remains both a challenge and a concern. The age of aircraft in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve has increased relative to aircraft age in the regular Air Force. Despite high overall equipment levels in the Army Reserve (86%) and Army National Guard (91%), modern equipment levels are lagging behind their active counterparts at 66% and 84% respectively. During recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, theater commanders often restricted the deployment of non-modernized equipment into combat theaters. Thus, the lack of modernized equipment degrades the training readiness and interoperability of Reserve Component units with their active partners.

Co-locating and sharing equipment is another efficient way to reduce equipment procurement costs by reducing equipment procurement quantities; lowering maintenance costs by consolidating maintenance activities; and potentially facilitating cross-component training with recently modernized equipment sets not fully deployed across the force. In a limited way, DoD already uses equipment sharing to reduce costs. Air Force Associate Units share equipment for training and operational use. The Army Combat Training Centers use shared equipment pools to equip units visiting the centers for training. The Army's Reserve Components often concentrate equipment for storage, maintenance, and training. Therefore, DoD should explore creative opportunities to collocate and share AC and RC equipment for training and operational use.

Recommendation #12 - Cross-Component Equipment Sharing: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to review options and explore creative opportunities to co-locate and share Active and Reserve Component equipment for training and operational use with a view toward improving Active and Reserve Component integration and reducing overall equipment procurement requirements. In the case of the Army and Air National Guard, these reviews should be conducted in conjunction with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

CONCLUSION

The Reserve Forces Policy Board makes these recommendations to the Secretary of Defense under our statutory charter. The RFPB stands ready to make its members and staff available for further consultation or discussion on these matters as the Department shall require.

Respectfully submitted,

Arnold L. Punaro
Major General, USMCR (Ret)
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

APPENDIX A
SLIDES APPROVED BY RFPB ON 12 DECEMBER 2013

APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation #1 - Plan and Use the RC Operationally: DoD should continue to use the Reserve Components operationally and should include requirements for such use in service force generation models, and DOD planning, programming, and budget documents.

Recommendation #2 - Develop and Enforce a Revised DoD Total Force Policy: DoD should develop and enforce a revised Total Force Policy to encourage a Total Force culture and improve Active and Reserve Component integration.

Recommendation #3 - Study the Effectiveness of the RC: DoD should charter an independent and impartial study to assess the operational effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

Recommendation #4 - Preserve RC to Mitigate Risk from AC Cuts: DoD should preserve Reserve Component end strength and force structure to mitigate risk associated with increased Active Component force structure reductions and to hedge against fiscal and geostrategic uncertainty.

Recommendation #5 - Expand RC in Key Skill Areas: DoD should examine those mission capabilities where the Reserve Components have a distinct advantage due to their civilian acquired skills and exposure to new technologies in the workplace (i.e. Cyber, ISR and UAV/RPA).

Recommendation #6 - Improve AC/RC Integration: The Services should better integrate its forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment.

Recommendation #7 - Effectively Use Available Manpower: As Active Component end strength and force structure declines, the Department of Defense should make better use of its available Total Force manpower.

Recommendation #8 - Invest in Reserve Component Readiness: In order to use the Reserve Components operationally and take advantage of the capabilities that migrate from the Active to Reserve Components, DoD must invest in Reserve Component readiness.

Recommendation #9 - Reserve Component Programmatic Review: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Director, Cost Assessment Program Evaluation (CAPE), in conjunction with the Under Secretary (Personnel and Readiness), the Under Secretary (Comptroller), and the Services to conduct a thorough review of Reserve Component programs to identify potential efficiencies. That review should include a detailed examination of:

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a) Reserve Component headquarters management structures to streamline management layers and eliminate unnecessary headquarters.

b) Reserve Component Overhead Costs to ensure efficient performance of assigned functions.

c) Reserve Component Full-Time Support requirements, authorizations, and distributions to ensure these programs are manned to efficiently meet critical unit administrative, operational, and combat readiness requirements.

Recommendation #10 - Reserve Component General and Flag Officer Usage: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary (Personnel and Readiness), in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Services, to conduct a thorough review of the number and use of Reserve Component General/Flag officers to ensure efficient use within the Reserve Components; support their respective parent Service, and meet Joint General/Flag Officer requirements.

Recommendation #11 - Reserve Component Infrastructure: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), in conjunction with the Under Secretary (Personnel and Readiness) and the Services, to conduct a thorough review of Reserve Component infrastructure and to aggressively seek opportunities to consolidate Reserve Component centers, armories, bases, training areas, and other administrative facilities. In the case of the Army and Air National Guard, these reviews should be conducted in conjunction with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Recommendation #12 - Cross-Component Equipment Sharing: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to review options and explore creative opportunities to co-locate and share Active and Reserve Component equipment for training and operational use with a view toward improving Active and Reserve Component integration and reducing overall equipment procurement requirements.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board – Basic Overview

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is a federal advisory committee mandated by law in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to "serve as an independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components." As required by statute, the board also produces an annual report which the Secretary of Defense transmits to the President and Congress on reserve component matters the board considers appropriate to include in the report.

The board consists of 20 members; a civilian chairman, a general/flag officer from each of the seven reserve components, a two-star military executive, a senior enlisted advisor, plus ten other U.S. citizens, who may or may not be government employees, with significant knowledge of and experience in policy matters relevant to national security and reserve component matters.

The board is supported by a staff consisting of a Colonel or Navy Captain from each of the six DoD reserve components. There is also a Coast Guard staff officer. These officers also serve as liaisons between their respective components and the board. The law requires them "to perform their staff and liaison duties under the supervision of the military executive officer of the board in an independent manner reflecting the independent nature of the board."

Established in 1951, the board is one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department of Defense.

In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, Congress significantly revised the operating framework and membership of the RFPB. Previously, other than the chairman, the board included only DoD officials and made recommendations through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. In 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommended that the RFPB's governing statute (10 USC 10301) be amended because the board was not structured to obtain and provide directly to the Secretary of Defense a wide range of independent advice on National Guard and Reserve matters due to the nature of its membership and its subordination to other offices within DoD. The revised law was effective 1 July 2011.

On 12 September 2011, retired Marine Corps Major General Arnold Punaro was sworn in as the first chairman of the board under the revised structure. Other new members were sworn in at an organizational meeting on 13 October.

The board is organized into four subcommittees: Sustainment, Readiness & Availability of the Operational Reserve; Continuum of Service / Personnel Policies; Homeland Operations; and Support for Service Members, Families & Employers. Subcommittees meet as required. The full board meets quarterly. The RFPB website is at http://ra.defense.gov/rfpb/.