


2006

*Annual  
Report  
of the*

**RESERVE FORCES  
POLICY BOARD**





## About the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB)

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The RFPB is a statutory board created by The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and codified in Title 10, United States Code. 10 USC 175 establishes the Board, while 10 USC 10301 describes the functions, membership, and organization of that board and states the principal duty of the RFPB: “The Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components.” 10 USC 113(c)(2) places an additional requirement to submit an annual report to the President and Congress to be delivered concurrently with the Secretary of Defense annual report.

The Board’s membership requirements ensure the presence of the highest levels of expertise. Statutory members include a civilian Chairman appointed by the Secretary of Defense, a reserve flag or general officer to act as Military Executive, the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and flag or general officers from the Joint Staff and each of the Active and Reserve Components. A senior policy advisor from each of the Reserve Components makes up the RFPB support staff.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD  
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February 2007

As the nation begins its sixth year of conflict since 9-11, the Reserve Components of the Armed Services continue to be actively engaged in providing operational support in the war on terrorism, sustaining global commitments, assisting other federal agencies in securing our southern border, and responding as part of disaster recovery missions. The services continue their efforts to transform while engaged. They continue to identify the kinds of forces needed to engage an evolving enemy in the near term while continuing to provide for the strategic needs of the nation in the future.

As the principal policy advisory body to the Secretary of Defense on matters related to the Reserve Components, the RFPB has explored many issues brought by Board members, the Reserve chiefs and other interested parties. The Board has chosen to make policy recommendations on a select few that impact the continued evolution of operational Reserve concepts and policies, selected Joint officer management policies and educational curriculum, and finally provide comment on the activities and studies of organizations that conduct policy research and provide strategic insights on the Reserve Components such as the ongoing Commission on the National Guard and Reserves.

As the newly appointed Chairman it is a privilege to follow in the distinguished footsteps of those that have preceded me. The RFPB has the potential to be an effective policy tool for the Secretary of Defense. I intend to ensure that the Board's potential is realized during my tenure.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "G. Kim Wincup", is positioned above the printed name.

G. Kim Wincup  
Chairman

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*The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for 2006 contains the Board's independent review of Reserve component issues and reflects a consensus of the 24-member Board to the President of the United States and Members of Congress in compliance with the reporting requirement provided for in Title 10, United States Code, Section 113(c)(2). Although most policy recommendations and board positions have the unanimous support of the Board, this report does not purport that individual Board members, the Military Services or the Department of Defense concur with every recommended action or position.*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The increased contributions made by Reserve forces and the type of capabilities they bring to today's missions will continue to be needed both now and in the future. The time when the Reserve Components functioned primarily as a strategic reserve is over. In addition to their war fighting role, Reserve Component units, especially in the National Guard, have been engaged in an increasing array of domestic operations.

During 2006 the Reserve Forces Policy Board made several key policy recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that will assist the Department in providing a more-accessible, more-capable and more-prepared Reserve Component (RC) that is able to more fully integrate in the growing Joint operational environment.

The Department, including the Military Departments and the Services, has gone to great lengths to establish expectation management strategies to adapt the social compact—the set of expectations and obligations that govern how the nation utilizes, compensates, and takes care of reservists and their families. Predictability, flexibility, and choice, in addition to more money, are some tenets of a comprehensive compensation strategy that recognizes the delicate balance between the Service, family, and employer that members of the Operational Reserve must maintain.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board believes strongly that the Department can unlock the

full potential of the RC and mitigate the costs associated with additional mobilizations by developing flexible force management, targeted compensation, and innovative employer support strategies designed to evoke negotiated voluntary active service.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Military Personnel Policy, in coordination with the Joint Staff, initiated a working group that started meeting in July 2006 engaged in the process of developing the tools and systems to implement the approved DoD Plan for Joint Officer Management (JOM) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The RFPB has determined several key elements of RC interest that should be addressed as the JOM working group works to operationalize the intent as stated in the DoD JOM/JPME plan.

The RFPB asserts that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols phase III report, *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves*, published in July 2006, merits careful consideration. The RFPB strongly recommends that all Services and the Department carefully consider the conclusions of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols phase III study, particularly where there are consistencies of findings and/or recommendations with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 05), the eight post-QDR Execution Roadmaps, and the ongoing Congressionally-appointed Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR).

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# INTRODUCTION

Post 9-11 strategic realities continue to challenge our defense establishment in ways nobody could have imagined before that fateful day. The Global War on Terror is widely recognized as a “long war.” After our initial expeditionary responses and successful major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, those operations have become protracted campaigns where we are engaged by an adaptive, intelligent enemy that demands we continue to support stability operations at reasonably high levels. We are fighting this war while transforming and rebalancing our armed forces to become more expeditionary, agile, and Jointly interdependent.

Today’s pace of operations is expected to endure, though not necessarily at the same level as that experienced during the past several years. The increased contributions made by Reserve forces and the type of capabilities they bring to today’s missions will continue to be needed both now and after the war is won. The time when the RC functioned as a strategic reserve is over.

In addition to the war-fighting role of RC units, they have been engaged in an increasing array of domestic operations, especially in the National Guard. The states continue to employ Army and Air National Guard military capability to protect lives and property of Americans inside the United States in response to hazards ranging from natural disasters to criminal activity. Since 9-11, these homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities missions have included, among many others, airport security, G-8 Summit and Winter Olympics support, Hurricane Katrina response, and border security.



*A pair of 25-foot Transportable Port Security Boats patrol in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where members of Coast Guard Port Security Units provide waterside security for JTF GTMO. Port Security Units, used to support Combatant Commanders overseas, are staffed primarily by Reservists.*

New National Guard capabilities have been successfully validated by DoD and will be competing for resources within the Services. They include the Joint Force Headquarters-State, the Joint Interagency Training Capability, CBRNE<sup>1</sup> Enhanced Response Force Packages, and Critical Infrastructure Protection-Mission Assurance Assessments.

During 2006, the Reserve Forces Policy Board made several key policy recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that will assist the Department in providing a more accessible RC that is able to both more fully integrate in the growing Joint operational environment and provide the wide range of capabilities expected from Reserve Component members.

Lastly, the RFPB is looking forward to possible policy issues that will develop in the coming year as a result of the reports of think tanks and the ongoing Commission on the National Guard and Reserves established by Congress.

<sup>1</sup> Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive

## LEVERAGING THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE FOR THE LONG WAR

In order to fight and win the Long War, today's pace of operations may continue for the foreseeable future. It is clear that the military will not be able to meet all of its mission requirements without a significant sustained contribution from its Reserve Components. One issue confronting the administration and senior Defense officials is how to continue to leverage the Reserve forces at this rate without suffering undue social, political and economic costs from repeated, widespread mobilization.

*It is imperative that we make clear to the nation the new employment paradigm for use of the RC in the Long War. Doing so is key to our ability to hold the Reserve force together and preserve public support, both of which are vital to our ability to win the Long War.*

The Department, including the Military Departments and the Services, has gone to great lengths to establish expectation management strategies to adapt the social compact—the set of expectations and obligations that govern how the nation utilizes, compensates, and takes care of Reservists and their families. The Army and Marine Corps in particular have taken dramatic steps to ensure that Reservists understand, as early as initial enlistment, that mobilization is an expectation, not an exception. The other Services have taken similar steps to ensure their members are cognizant of the fact that the “one weekend a month, two weeks a year” mantra is gone forever.

Many in the Department use the term “Operational Reserve” to describe the expectation for increased active service from the RC to fight and win the Long War. The recent works of

the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, are among a large body of work that recognizes the paradigm shift away from a purely strategic reserve model to one that balances the use of the RC as a strategic and operational force. In fact, it is widely recognized that the transformation of the Reserve Forces to an operational reserve was underway well before 9/11.

The call-up of nearly 267,000 members of the Reserve Components for duty to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm marked the beginning of the end of an exclusively strategic reserve. Following Desert Storm, mission requirements increased and began to strain a downsized active force—a peace dividend from the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Reduced budgets, combined with rising operational tempo, spurred a sustained increase in the use of the Reserve Components to relieve operational stress on the active forces. The Reserve Components are also the repository for capabilities needed in the later phases of major theater war, particularly in support of stabilization and reconstruction efforts abroad, and in conducting homeland defense missions at home.

As a result, Reserve Component contributions to Total Force missions steadily grew between 1992 and 1996, reaching a sustained level of 12 to 13 million duty days per year (figure 1 below) for each of the six years prior to 9/11. It was during this period that the operational role of the Guard and Reserve began to take shape. The RC

contribution grew following 9/11 at a staggering rate; over 41 million days in 2002, 62 million in 2003, 65 million in 2004 and 68 million days in 2005.


## FORCE GENERATION MODELS

The Services have invested considerable energy developing force generation models oriented around predictable rotational mobilization planning factors. For example, the Army developed the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model. The ARFORGEN process allows commanders to predict deployment windows and manage readiness and training of forces accordingly. These windows are based on the objective cyclic rotation rates of Active and Reserve Component forces defined in the July 9, 2003 Secretary of Defense memorandum, *Rebalancing Forces*: one operational deployment in three years for the active component, and

one operational deployment in six years for the Reserve Component.

The ARFORGEN Model will allow the Army to move away from the inefficient “alert, mobilize, train and deploy” mobilization cycle where National Guard and Reserve members typically spent months training after mobilization, but before deployment, to prepare for their upcoming mission. ARFORGEN will enable a “train, mobilize, deploy” cycle. RC members will spend the early years of the cycle focusing on schools and individual training in their specialties and move to collective training later in the cycle. By the last year of the cycle, they will be fully prepared for deployment, dedicating nearly all their time on active duty to performing the actual mission. The Marine Corps and Air Force have also developed force generation models that bring predictability and a more equitable distribution of the burden across the force, while the Navy

## Total Force Contribution



Source: OSD Reserve Affairs

and Coast Guard pursue integration into active units or forces as a means to operationalize their reserve forces.

### INCREASING VOLUNTEERISM

For the most part, the Services' force generation constructs, coupled with their efforts to adapt the social compact, should be able to meet the demand. However, there will still remain niche capabilities within the force where the operational demand exceeds the "1-in-6" constraint. In addition to relying on mobilization to cure this shortfall we should also make a concerted effort to meet demand with volunteers.

The Department enjoys unprecedented volunteerism from the RC despite a system designed specifically to support the Strategic Reserve model that sometimes discourages such behavior. We have invested considerable effort in removing the policy, legislative and cultural barriers to voluntary service to meet the Secretary of Defense's objective of reducing reliance on involuntary mobilizations without growing additional Reserve force structure.

Parity of pay and benefits is considered to be a significant barrier to voluntary active service. For example, until FY06 Reserve members serving less than 140 days of active duty received a lower rate for Basic Allowance for Housing than their active counterparts.

Many seemingly bureaucratic barriers also exist. For instance, the Department's force management system encompasses 32 distinct categories of Reserve duty status. Reserve members frequently face a complicated gamut because of the different forms of benefits, and sometimes pay, that are associated with these statuses. This system is fraught with complex



*Lance Cpl. Stephen E. Davis, 20, of Hampstead, Md., and a vehicle recovery operator assigned to Motor Transport Platoon, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), prepares for a convoy operation in Camp Fallujah, Iraq, on January 23, 2006. Davis volunteered for his first tour to Iraq knowing he would most probably redeploy with his Reserve unit in 2007.*

rules and procedures that inhibit volunteerism and negatively impact the Department's ability to access Reservists to perform operational missions.

Organizational barriers are also limiting factors. To overcome them, some of the Services are developing pilot programs to achieve varying (increased) levels of reserve participation. For example, the Army's Rapid Response Reserve Unit (RRRU) pilot, a cousin to the Variable Participation of Reservists at Unit Level (VPR-U) concept, seeks to align entire units of volunteers with short-notice, predictable or sustained rotational global mission requirements.

Great strides have been made over the past several legislative cycles to close the gap in terms of parity of pay and benefits while also removing bureaucratic and organizational obstacles to voluntary active service. However, it is important to note that pure parity is a double-edged sword. While it ensures equitable compensation for active and reserve members performing the same duty, it perpetuates a one-size-fits-all approach that assumes the active and reserve forces have the same compensation objectives. Unfortunately, they do not.

### SEPARATE ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPENSATION STRATEGIES

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The compensation strategy of the active force is focused on manning (recruiting and retention). For example, most of the bonus structure is designed to ensure manning objectives are met, resulting in the availability of the right number and mix of skills.

On the other hand, the compensation strategy of the Reserve forces must address manning and volunteerism as interdependent and equally important objectives in order to fully leverage the Reserve forces. Only recently, has the Department begun to recognize volunteerism as an objective of equal importance to affiliation. For example, the TRICARE Reserve Select program allows access to reasonable healthcare coverage based on deployed service in an operational mission and a commitment to remain affiliated. Developing compensation strategies that target volunteerism will enhance our ability to accomplish the mission without resorting to more mobilization or growing force structure.

### A NEW SOCIAL COMPACT

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*Predictability, flexibility, and choice, not just more money, are the tenets of a comprehensive compensation strategy that recognizes the delicate balance between the Service, family, and employer that members of the Operational Reserve must maintain.*

Direct monetary compensation alone doesn't address the unique challenges Reserve members face in fulfilling their military, family, and professional obligations. We cannot continue to

take such high levels of volunteerism for granted without addressing fundamental changes in our approach to force management, compensation, and employer support. The Services need the authority to test proactively negotiating clearly defined periods of voluntary active service with RC members and leveraging the power of choice by giving them the ability to choose from a flexible, graduated suite of benefits tailored to their situation.

### THE WAY AHEAD

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Eliminating barriers while increasing expectations of reserve service are critical steps forward, but taken alone will not likely produce the levels of volunteerism needed to achieve the mobilization offsets the Services seek. Commanders must have the flexibility to make a tailored, holistic approach, while the Department takes proactive measures to preserve family, community, and employer support. The Reserve Forces Policy Board believes strongly that the Department can unlock the full potential of the RC and mitigate the costs associated with additional mobilizations by testing various approaches to flexible force management, targeted compensation, and innovative employer support strategies designed to evoke negotiated voluntary active service.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board is working with OASD Reserve Affairs to seek broad authority for the Services to develop force management pilot programs to measure the effects of flexible force management, targeted compensation, and innovative employer support strategies on volunteerism.

## JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT (JOM) AND JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME)

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Military Personnel Policy, in coordination with the Joint Staff, initiated a working group in 2006 engaged in the process of developing the tools and systems to implement the approved DoD Plan for Joint Officer Management (JOM) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The goal for the working group is to transition from a one-size-fits-all, time-based credit system, to one that recognizes varying levels of qualifications and a continuum of Jointness throughout the personnel life-cycle. The proposed 21st century enhanced definition of “Joint matters,” to include involvement with interagency and non-governmental partners, will change how Joint billets are identified, how officers are developed to fill Joint positions and how they are recognized for their Joint experience. Currently, RC officers engaged in Joint activities, whether federal or state, are not eligible to receive Joint duty credit.

A key feature of the new JOM/JPME plan is that it recognizes the current and future requirement for qualified RC officers. Because of this increased requirement RC officers need to be given greater access to and subsequent recognition of Joint experience in education, training, exercises and assignments. Most importantly, the plan recognizes that Joint experience can be gained in a myriad of locations and organizational constructs. Further, the level or amount of Joint experience attained by an officer may be better measured by its currency, frequency, and intensity rather than an arbitrary period of time in a Joint position. This will have the effect of creating a system where Joint

experience accrues where “Jointness” is applied rather than being defined by tour-length as the single best indicator of Joint expertise.

### RESERVE COMPONENT CONCERNS

The RFPB has determined several key elements of RC interest that should be addressed as the JOM working group works to operationalize the intent as stated in the DoD JOM/JPME plan.

First, the JPME core curriculum must reflect the operational environment in the CONUS AOR as it relates to post 9-11 realities of Homeland Defense/Civil Support. The goal of JPME for this topic should be developing Joint leaders with a complete understanding of processes, procedures and governing statutes involved in military operations within multiple jurisdictions and levels of government regardless of component. This would manifest itself in leaders and subordinate staffs that understand the dynamics of applicable relationships of civilian and military authorities granted by statute or situation-driven extenuating circumstances.



*U.S. Air Force reservists' employers and supervisors settle in a C-17A aircraft for a bosses flight at March Air Reserve Base, Calif. The flight is part of the 452nd Air Mobility Wing's employer appreciation day and allows employers an opportunity to understand the role their reservists play in supporting the mission of the Air Force Reserve.*

The RFPB has identified a gap in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy as described in CJCSI 1800.01C. This educational gap exists because none of the following subjects are included: interagency-intergovernmental, inter-jurisdictional, and non-governmental capabilities, authorities, and responsibilities at corresponding levels of Joint military command while providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).

The current DSCA table top exercise in the JPME curriculum is a half day in duration and fails to address the initial contributions and activities of NORTHCOM's Joint Interagency Coordination Group or of National Guard forces within a state prior to any natural disaster, special security event, or man-made incidents which evoke a presidential or state emergency declaration. Military leaders require sensitivity in inter-jurisdictional relationships. The RFPB believes course work should include all activities associated with a request for military assistance followed by execution of Emergency Management Agreement Compacts with adjoining states. The current exercise begins when a Governor reports that his state assets have been overwhelmed and federal assistance is required. This leads to NORTHCOM sending in a Joint Task Force and federal force assistance being coordinated at that point.

Second, it is essential to formally identify Joint requirements for reserve officers on various Joint Task Forces, Joint activities, and staffs for resourcing purposes. Elements of these requirements should include education and experience required for assignment to RC Joint positions.

Once the requirement for RC officers is determined, there must be a personnel system that tracks the education and experience of RC



*A Texas National Guard soldier and Border Patrol Senior Agent Chad Wamsley accompany Ricky I, a Belgian Malinois, as the detection dog checks a tractor-trailer truck for drugs or concealed people at the Border Patrol's Interstate 35 checkpoint, north of Laredo, Texas. The soldier volunteered to serve for a year on Operation Jump Start, the National Guard's assistance to the Border Patrol securing the U.S. border with Mexico.*

officers in such a way that it can be used as a tool to ensure personal development and proper assignment throughout the course of a career.

## THE WAY AHEAD

The RFPB will continue to closely monitor the actions of the JOM Working Group to ensure RC concerns are addressed.

The RFPB is encouraged that the gap in JPME will be addressed by the second quarter of 2007 for two reasons. First, Homeland Defense (HLD) and DSCA have been Special Areas of Emphasis as topics for Joint education for several years. Second, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) accepted a National Guard Bureau (NGB) Joint Force Headquarters-State DOTMLPF<sup>1</sup> Change Recommendation Brief. In the resulting DOTMLPF Change Recommendations actions document (JROCM 173-06, 28 Aug 2006), NGB has been tasked as the overall lead agency, with support from

<sup>1</sup> *Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities*

the services, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, USJFCOM, and the Joint Staff, to conduct an analysis of JPME to determine areas for improvement to address emerging HLD and DSCA topics and propose recommendations for

Guardsmen to the Joint Training Functional Capability Board. It is expected that this effort will lead to a more holistic approach to DSCA curriculum that will benefit all officers attending JPME.

### BEYOND GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) completed the four-year **Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era** (BG-N) study in 2006. CSIS undertook the BG-N study on its own initiative and later received Congressional direction and Defense Appropriations to accomplish phases II and III. The five core study “baskets” were:

- (1) Reassess the civilian, Joint and service balance
- (2) Develop a strategy-driven, more efficient resource allocation process
- (3) Adapt to new missions and the evolution of warfare
- (4) Improve DoD’s ability to conduct interagency and combined operations
- (5) Streamline and improve Congressional oversight of the Defense Department.

The BG-N study looked 10-15 years into the future. CSIS consulted hundreds of defense experts and researched dozens of prior studies.

Phase III focused directly on the National Guard and Reserve components of the Total Force. CSIS’s principal author for this study, Christine E. Wormuth, met with the RFPB on June 7, 2006 at U.S. Joint Forces Command to discuss many of her findings and



Reserve Staff Sgt. Jonathan R. Cureton (middle), with the 7th Army Reserve Command Medical Support Unit-Europe, instructs active duty Soldier on how to insert an IV.

recommendations before completing her report. The phase III report, *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves* was published on July 12, 2006. It is available on-line at [www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn\\_ph3\\_report.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph3_report.pdf).

### THE FUTURE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

A significant portion of the August 8, 2006 RFPB meeting was devoted to discussion of the phase III report and its 43 findings and recommendations across six study areas.

### A COMMON THEME

More than half of the recommendations fell to what CSIS termed “adapting the social contract.” While individual members of the RFPB support or have problems with particular recommendations, the RFPB collectively acknowledges that CSIS correctly identified:

*That the social contract the nation has with the RC was developed when the RC’s function was as a permanent strategic reserve. This contract is now out of date, and out of balance with the RC service members, their families and their employers*

...

...who bear the dramatic consequences of the necessity to use the RC within the operational force. This out-of-balance social contract jeopardizes the long-term viability of the RC without adapting its terms to accommodate new expectations of greater service.

This report’s conclusions collectively validate the Operational Reserve (OR) initiatives advocated by the RFPB to meet a high operational tempo for the National Guard and Reserves for the next 10+ years.

### SYNERGIES AMONG THE BEYOND GOLDWATER-NICHOLS, CNGR & QDR STUDIES

The RFPB strongly recommends that all Services and the Department carefully consider the conclusions of the BG-N phase III study, particularly where there are consistencies of findings and/or recommendations with the

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 05), the eight post-QDR Execution Roadmaps, and the ongoing Congressionally-appointed Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR).

The RFPB finds that there are numerous overlapping areas of interest with ongoing efforts of both the QDR execution roadmaps and the CNGR. Overlapping interests with the QDR are especially evident in the execution roadmaps for DoD institutional reform, building partnership capacity, authorities, and Joint command and control.

The CNGR has an overall objective to identify and recommend changes in policy, law, regulation, and practice to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of the United States. Without question the BG-N study’s findings and recommendations merit significant deliberation by the CNGR.



Storekeeper 3rd Class Matthew Noles of Columbus, Ga., hugs his wife after returning from a six-month deployment to the Middle East. Noles is one of 250 Navy Reservists who were mobilized, trained, equipped and deployed to conduct a cargo-handling mission in Kuwait.

**CSIS PHASE III REPORT FINDINGS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF  
PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE RFPB:**

1. Future roles & missions:
  - High Reserve and National Guard OPTEMPO is foreseeable for the next 10-15 years.
  - The RC should increase its focus on unconventional operations, stability operations, homeland defense, and civil support.
2. RC force structure in the 21st century:
  - The Army should increase combat structure in both the AC and RC.
  - It is unclear presently whether the Army's new support brigade structure is sufficient.
3. Challenges associated with use of RC as an operational force:
  - ARFORGEN (Army force generation model) should incorporate more pre-mobilization training. With increased training funding pre- and post-mobilization training can and should be improved.
  - Man and fund units at 105% for two years prior to deployment to avoid cross-leveling among units.
  - Craft new mobilization authorities to enable routine, but judicious use of the RC in the operational force.
  - Involuntary mobilizations of units and individuals not assigned to units should be limited to one time not to exceed 18 months per every six years.
4. Realigning the DoD workforce to maximize constrained resources:
  - Maximize the use of contractors for combat services support and deploy more contracting technical representatives and oversight.
  - Aggressively pursue the "sponsored reserve" concept (civilian contractors with reserve status and assigned to reserve units) to expand deployable contractors.
5. The RC's role in homeland defense and civil support:
  - Program for civil support as a central mission.
  - Leverage the National Guard's Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ State) to produce a minimum of ten regional civil support forces. Rotate the assignment responsibility & shield the JFHQ (State) [assigned to the regional civil support force] from deployment for a 12-month period.
  - Appoint a National Guard general officer as the Deputy U.S. NORTHCOM Commander and leverage the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as the principal homeland defense/civil support advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
6. Adapting the social compact:
  - The Services should develop a broad range of programs to implement the continuum of service concept. Expand the number and type of variable participation reserve unit pilot programs for linguists, etc., and to get increased volunteerism for "intensive reserve" (members/units which deploy more than one year out of every six years).
  - For certain specialties, the Services should permit opportunities for lateral entry for mid-career professionals.
  - Each Service should create and implement a fully integrated personnel and pay system by 2008.
  - Reduce the number of duty status subcategories.
  - Shield recently-deployed active duty members from re-deployment for two years when they join the RC.
  - Accelerate citizenship for National Guard and Reserve members (same as AC).
  - Allow RC members to attend college without risk of activation in exchange for a longer period of service.
  - Target compensation to needed skills and capabilities.
  - Limit deployments to 12 months and make them predictable.
  - Allow RC service members to transfer education benefits to family members.



*Members of the engineering and installation teams from five different Air National Guard units play basketball on Ali Base, Iraq.*

Some areas of agreement among BG-N, CNGR, and QDR are:

- Calls to accelerate the efforts to develop an Intensive Reserve through rebalancing, targeted compensation and other benefits
- Calls to avoid involuntary mobilization through an enduring, sustainable 1-year-in-6 force generation model
- Continuum of Service initiatives to include one pay/personnel system
- Need to streamline mobilization with improved training for warfighting, homeland defense and defense support to civilian authorities
- Calls for new authorities to speed responses to domestic catastrophes

## THE WAY AHEAD

The RFPB asserts that the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols phase III report merits careful consideration, especially with attention to the identified overlapping issues and areas of agreement with the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and the ongoing Commission on the National Guard and Reserves.

The CNGR study will be completed and report out in January 2008. The eight QDR execution roadmaps have various suspenses. The RFPB intends to work to assist these endeavors to their successful conclusions.

## FY06 RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD MEMBERS

### CHAIRMAN

Honorable William A. Navas, Jr.  
Acting Chairman,  
Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Washington, DC



### MILITARY EXECUTIVE

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MG Gus Hargett, Jr., ARNG  
The Adjutant General, Tennessee



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