# The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board



**APRIL 2004** 

This is the Reserve Forces Policy Board's report on Reserve component programs and other matters required to be presented to the President and Congress annually by 10 U.S.C. 113 (c) (2). It includes the collective views of the Board members and does not necessarily reflect the official policy position of the Department of Defense, or any other department or agency of the United States Government.



#### DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

NOV 17 2004

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for 2003

Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for 2003 is provided to you in compliance with title 10, United States Code, section 113(c) (2).

The report represents the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the official policy positions of this Department or any other Department or Agency of the United States Government.

Attachment: RFPB Annual Report

Pour Wolfmite





DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

NOV 17 2004

Honorable Richard B. Cheney President of the Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

The Reserve Forces Policy Board Annual Report for 2003 is provided to you in compliance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 113(c) (2).

The report represents the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the official policy positions of this Department or any other Department or Agency of the United States Government.

The Board continues making excellent contributions to ensure that the National Guard and Reserve are adequately manned, equipped, trained, and ready as part of the Total Force. The Board's assistance to the Department and me has been significant and most appreciated.

Sincerely,

Tane Wilfit

Enclosure: RFPB Annual Report





#### DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



NOV 17 2004

Honorable J. Dennis Hastert Speaker of the House of Representatives Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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Sincerely,

Paul halfit

Enclosure: RFPB Annual Report



## **Reserve Component Programs**

## The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board 2003

Reserve Forces Policy Board Office of the Secretary of the Defense Washington, DC 20301-7300

April 2004

## **Reserve Forces Policy Board Members**

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RADM Grant Hollett, USNR (Ret)

President Elect, RFPB Alumni Association



Mr. Bryan Sharratt

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**COL Samuel Nichols, Jr.** Senior Policy Advisor, USAR

**YNCM (SW/AW) Arthur M. Rivers** Senior Enlisted Advisor


**SFC Michael E. Biere, USAR** *Personnel Operations NCOIC* 

**Ms. Patricia A. Elkins** *Executive Assistant* 

## Current and Former Chairmen of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

2002-Present	Albert C. Zapanta

- 1994-2002Terrence M. O'Connell
- **1989-1994** John O. Marsh, Jr.
- 1985-1989Will Hill Tankersley
- 1977-1985 Louis J. Conti
- 1957-1977 John Slezak
- **1955-1957** Milton G. Baker
- 1953-1955 Arthur S. Adams
- Inception 1953 Charles H. Buford





The logo of the Reserve Forces Policy Board represents the Total Force as the shield for the Nation. The United States is identified by its national symbol, the eagle. A blue field represents the Military Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps is a part of the Department of the Navy. The Coast Guard may become a part of the Navy Department in time of war or when the President so directs. Three stars depict the Active component, National Guard, and Reserve. Seven vertical stripes of the shield stand for the seven Reserve components: Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board reflects a consensus of the 24-member Board. Although most policy recommendations and Board positions have the unanimous support of the Board, this report does not purport that individual Board members, the Military Services, or the Department of Defense concur with every recommended action or position.

The Annual Report contains the Board's independent review of Reserve component issues and a consensus evaluation of Reserve component programs. The report includes the collective views of the Board and primarily focuses on the period from 1 October 2002 through 30 September 2003; however, also includes information and projections into 2004.

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Reserve component (RC) mobilizations, from Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle to a new round of activations and deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, witnessed an increase in 2003. These deployments began to stress some segments of the Services, prompting both accurate and exaggerated news reports, as well as interest from the President and the Secretary of Defense. The deployments raised concern and presented the question: How do we relieve the pressure on the Guard and Reserve? The war in Iraq was fought and won, then transitioned into a dangerously charged peace enforcement operation and the dawning of a new age became abundantly clear. We now know, without a doubt, that the Global War on Terrorism will be long term. We must fight on many fronts and use all available national elements of power.

We are fully committed, the course is set, and we must now adjust for a long-term commitment of resources, a commitment designed to pace the force and institute flexibility, predictability, and surge capabilities into our responsiveness to the fight, whether at home or abroad. These new imperatives became the driving force behind the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) efforts in 2003.

#### **Executive Summary**

In 2003, the challenges we faced in 2002, posed by homeland defense and security together with mobilization and demobilization, only intensified. These issues have given new urgency to RC transformation and rise to a greater intensity in the cries for reform in the mobilization process, in how equity issues are perceived on the ground by our RC members, and ultimately, in long-term support to postconflict stabilization. United States Northern Command, in the midst of Initial Operational Capability, quickly realized that the competing requirements between homeland defense and expeditionary warfare would require extraordinary planning and result in a delicate balance that could be achieved only through extreme personal sacrifice by hundreds of thousands of those in uniform, their families, employers, and ultimately their communities. This Board, through a continuing series of field visits and extremely successful Citizen-Patriot Forums, quickly came to realize that we **must fully** explore the changing contract between the RC member, his or her family and employer and his or her Service, the Department of Defense and America. The Board will focus efforts in 2004 on framing this contract. The necessity for maintaining first response capability, as well as the need to surge when required, has, in part, driven the need for this report to address these matters.

#### The Business Cycle

The RFPB Symposium, "Strategic Challenges: Transforming the Total Force Vision for the 21st Century" was held at the National Defense University May 19-20, 2003, with over 220 participants in attendance. Four major forums presented views related to the Symposium's main topics on the first day, and on the second day, breakout sessions addressed the questions raised by those forums. The Symposium's Executive Summary, Appendix II in this report, and recommendations were briefed to the Secretary of Defense and fed into the RFPB business cycle for the remainder of the year.

Some of the major recommendations from the symposium included:

• <u>Mission</u>: The Reserve component must maintain unique Title 10, Title 14, and Title 32 capabilities while developing a portfolio of mission capabilities to support both Homeland defense and expeditionary warfare.

• <u>Emerging Doctrine</u>: The Reserve component must train and fight jointly and be on an equal footing with the Active component in training, equipment, utilization and benefits. • <u>Employment</u>: The Reserve component must reform, transform, and modernize to create a new availability and Service paradigm. This means streamlining mobilization and deployment processes while maintaining the American militia tradition.

• <u>Citizen Connectivity</u>: The Department should explore national service options and increase the Reserve component emphasis on Citizen Patriot links and contacts.

These recommendations have also supported the issues addressed by the RFPB and given new urgency to this Board's mission; they have renewed focus to our efforts on behalf of the nearly 1.2 million men and women in uniform with the National Guard and Reserve. In many instances, our field visits revealed recurring issues created by bureaucratic Cold War constructs that continue to slow down and frustrate our Armed Forces. The RFPB has examined these issues in one form or another since its inception in 1952. The difference this year was that the same barriers were highlighted - most publicly and painfully - as they continued to obstruct and often restrain the Services' best efforts to achieve Total Force integration.

As one of the most significant outcomes of the May Symposium, the RFPB Chairman asked members to volunteer to serve on specific task groups to support the Board's business cycle and to ensure Service representation in all undertakings. These partnerships were established as task groups:

• <u>Task Group Joint Forces Command</u> (JFCOM) – engaged in mobilization, demobilization, doctrine, joint training and education;

• <u>Task Group Northern Command</u> (<u>NORTHCOM</u>) – engaged in strategic mission support of Guard and Reserve roles in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security; • <u>Task Group Special Operations Com-</u> <u>mand (SOCOM)</u> – engaged in reviewing the role of RC special operations forces, particularly in post conflict stabilization and support operations;

• <u>Task Group National Defense Univer-</u> <u>sity/Senior Service Colleges</u> – engaged in and supporting RC education, curriculum development and participation in joint wargames, simulations, and exercises; and,

• <u>Task Group Public and Private Coopera-</u> <u>tion</u> – engaged in reconnecting with public and private sector constituencies.

It is equally important that the RCs reconnect with our stakeholders, the American people. Since the Revolutionary War and the establishment of General George Washington's Citizen Patriot militia. Citizen Patriots have traditionally been the mainstay of our national security. As community leaders, they provide a reservoir of unique civilian skills and capabilities not normally resident within the Department of Defense (DoD). Secretary Rumsfeld's reform and transformation initiatives offer a unique opportunity to define a new Total Force Policy that ensures a strong bond with our country's Citizen Patriots, and meets the needs and requirements of a 21st Century Armed Forces.

#### Recommendations

The Board's recommendations concerning the most significant issues covered in this Annual Report are summarized as follows:

• Mobilization

o Develop a joint tracking system to track and manage Individual RC members, including interim measures to integrate existing Service specific system data, to share this data across DoD at the appropriate levels, and to dedicate funding to accelerate system development. o Establish partnerships with industry leaders to develop solutions on sharing the talents of the individual RC members, improving employer support and volunteerism, and strengthening member rights and responsibilities.

o Continue the recent progress in funding and providing medical and dental screening for RC members through resources such as FEDS-HEAL.

o Improve level of education and training for RC members and their families regarding TRICARE and Family Support Programs.

o Establish effective Mobilization Cap Management policies that improve predictability for RC members and responsiveness in meeting mobilization requirements.

o Streamline the process within DoD for the Military Departments to gain approval of involuntary activations to achieve predictability and responsiveness.

o Establish formal procedures when notifying RC members of pending activation to ensure that irreversible employment or personal financial decisions are not made prior to the actual issuance of activation orders.

o Explore opportunities for developing force structure that allows for a "just in time," rather than a "just in case" approach, and offering financial and other incentives that attract and retain Reservists for stressed units. Evaluate industry options as ways to employ a "just in time" philosophy as it relates to personnel requirements.

o Review "best practices", policies, and statutes governing the management of the IRR at the OSD annual Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Mobilization Management Conference, with a goal of improving the overall deployability, resourcing, and relevancy of the IRR as a mobilization asset. o Resource the background security investigation infrastructure at a level that would give both Active component (AC) and RC members a much shorter timeline for approval of a final clearance.

o Develop policies and revise statutes and regulations that better support volunteerism and reduce reliance on involuntary activations that stress RC forces.

o Provide a policy exclusion to preclude RC volunteers on active duty in excess of 179 days (270 combatant command exclusion) from counting against a Service's active duty end strength and controlled grade limitations. Seek change to Title 10 Sections 115, 517 and 523 to allow Services more flexibility in managing and employing RC members by removing or modifying the end strength and control grade limitations in Title 10 that restrict the use of volunteers.

o Evaluate development of a Joint Mobilization Process.

o Seek one organization to guide RC transformation to improve consistency, balance, sharing of ideas, and best business practices, and to ensure the right policies and legislative proposals are fully developed.

• Equity Issues

o Seek equity in pay and benefits, to include the entire compensation and benefits package for performing the same duty in the same location regardless of component– Active, Guard, or Reserve.

o Simplify and clarify travel and per diem entitlements to provide uniformity of interpretation and equal payment to all our members.

o Continue all efforts to review and evaluate the many proposals and combinations of proposed solutions to provide relief for income protection. o Change DoD policy to remove the inequity suffered by RC members on active duty for less than 140 days and those RC members without dependents, who receive less than their counterparts.

#### • <u>Stabilization and Reconstruction</u> <u>Operations</u>

o Create a command structure and organize units to reflect units of action that have modularity, flexibility, and that take advantage of the special talents that RC members, because of their civilian skills, are able to contribute to Stabilization and Reconstruction operations.

o Explore new ways to bring additional volunteers into the RC who possess special skills that are most useful during Stabilization and Reconstruction operations. Give consideration to expanding the auxiliaries, using Temporary Reserves, retirees, volunteers from the business community, or other creative mechanisms to meet the needs of the military.

• Building Joint Reserve components

o Support and manage the Joint Office Management program to preclude the need for a joint duty waiver to be appointed as a RC Chief.

o Include the RFPB in any future Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) task force in order to ensure that the needs of the RC are developed in parallel to their AC counterparts.

o Make changes to JPME to include provisions for the training and building of joint duty qualified RC officers and Noncommissioned Officers.

• Legislative Issues

o Avoid any further delays in filling validated senior military officer requirements

necessary to execute the National Security Strategy.

o Ensure all Reserve officers receive joint duty experience as required by Goldwater-Nichols vice providing a permanent waiver of joint duty experience for officers to be appointed as Reserve Chief or National Guard Director.

o Maintain separate Active and Reserve Personnel Appropriations until RC equity concerns have been addressed.

o Develop an equitable DoD policy that proscribes assignment to combat zones of both military spouses when they have children, regardless of component–Active, Guard, or Reserve.

o Pursue solutions that provide protections for RC students who lose tuition and/or placement at colleges and universities as a result of a call to active duty.

#### Conclusion

This year's report has been redesigned to reflect the RFPB's 2003 transformation into a body that operates within a strategic 18-month business cycle. Our annual symposium, field visits, trips to our Combatant Commanders, the establishment of our RFPB task groups, and all other efforts serve to support and reinforce matters and issues that we address in our Annual Report. The strategic recommendations contained within this report reflect the views of the Chairman and the members of the Board, not necessarily those of DoD.

Our efforts in 2004 will be shaped by the Secretary of Defense's request to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to engage the Board in force rebalancing. As provided in Title 10, United States Code, the RFPB is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the RC and shall provide an annual report on RC programs and other appropriate matters for transmission by the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress. As such, the Board is particularly well suited to engage a great many issues at the strategic level that impact the RCs.

> Albert C. Zapanta Chairman Reserve Forces Policy Board

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#### Mission

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), as provided in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on Reserve component (RC) matters. The RFPB acts independently in its advisory role to evaluate proposals and actions or situations impacting RCs that would: create, change, or discontinue pertinent laws, directives, instructions, or other guidance media; alter the missions or the composition, operation, readiness, or other essential elements of one or more RCs; or impact directly upon the RCs in such matters as cultural and environmental issues. The RFPB shall provide an annual report to the Secretary of Defense for transmission to the President and Congress.

#### The Chairman's Vision

The RFPB provides independent, timely advice, and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on challenges facing the RCs. Our direct charter from the current Secretary of Defense is to aid efforts to support transformation, rebalance and strengthen the RCs, and assist the RCs in reconnecting with America.

#### History of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

President Harry S. Truman, on October 15, 1947, directed the Secretary of Defense to take every practicable step for the strengthening of all elements of the RCs of the Armed Services. In response, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal appointed the Committee on Civilian Components to make a comprehensive, objective, and impartial study of the RCs of the armed forces. The committee recommended that the Secretary of Defense create a standing committee to recommend policies and procedures affecting the RCs. The then Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis Johnson, adopted the committee's recommendation, and on June 14, 1949, created a Civilian Components Policy Board.

In 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall changed the name of the Board to the Reserve Forces Policy Board to more accurately reflect the Board's focus. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 codified a Reserve Forces Policy Board within the Department of Defense. Although the RFPB had existed via regulations for a number of years, Congress envisioned a somewhat different purpose for the RFPB. As outlined in 10 USC 10301, the Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the RC. Further, it was envisioned by Congress that this Board would act independently to monitor, review and evaluate proposals, actions, and situations impacting the National Guard and Reserve forces-a goal the Board steadfastly maintains.

In September 2002, the Board commemorated its 50th anniversary with the establishment of an annual "Citizen Patriot Awards" program. The fiscal year 2002 Awards were presented to the Honorable John O. Marsh Jr. and to the WWII Women's Air Service Pilots, Citizen Patriots who made considerable contributions to the national defense.

The Board has been able to keep pace with the evolving role of the RCs over the years. As the Guard and Reserve mobilizations in support of the Global War on Terrorism have illustrated, we are once again at the beginning of a new era, where the windows of opportunity are enormous, and the challenges equally daunting. The RFPB stands ready to continue its important role in support of the RCs in successfully carrying out the roles and missions specified in the President's National Security Strategy. This page intentionally left blank.

The Reserve components (RC) have contributed significantly to military operations during the past decade. As stated in the "Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense" report of December 20, 2002, "Reserve Component support has increased from 1.4 million duty days in FY 1989 to nearly 13 million duty days in FY 2001. Reservists have responded to the call of duty when needed, well trained and ready." The Total Force policies, Abrams Doctrine, downsizing, and increasing demands to support peacetime missions and contingencies have been major factors in the increased reliance on the Reserve Forces. In a two-year period following September 11, 2001, about 300,000 of the 1.2 million RC personnel were called to active duty. RC members were quick to support operations centers, flight operations, and to provide security at the Pentagon, World Trade Center, airports, and military installations around the Nation. They fought on the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq and tracked terrorists throughout Asia and Africa. They are maintaining the peace in the Sinai, Balkans, Afghanistan and now Iraq, and participated in a wide range of domestic missions. There is no indication that this increased reliance on the RCs will change in the foreseeable future, thus, transformation is a necessity.

Since September 11, 2001, numerous studies, symposiums, conferences, and the documenting of lessons learned have been performed to closely evaluate how the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Services accomplished the business of mobilization and to pursue organizational and process improvements. Considerable evidence exists that the current mobilization process and organization is not sufficiently responsive to 21st century operational requirements and thus will not serve the nation well in the future. The goal has been to mobilize RC forces based on operational plans developed through a deliberate planning process; however, it is generally recognized that the need exists to move toward a capabilities-based approach in order to better respond to the current threat environment. The Services have used predictable operating cycles and advance notification to prepare for mobilizations. The existing operation plans were not sufficient to guide mobilizations; thus, a modified process that relied on additional management oversight and multiple layers of coordination was utilized. This process was slower and less efficient. It was reported by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) that the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) signed 246 deployment orders between September 11, 2001, and May 21, 2003, to mobilize over 280,000 RC members in comparison to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000 RC members during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The mobilization process begins with the identification of a force requirement by the Combatant Commander and continues until individuals and units arrive at their gaining commands. This process must be efficient, flexible, and responsive.

#### **DoD Mobilization Guidance**

The SECDEF has challenged his staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the Military Departments to find short and long-term solutions to lessons learned during the alert, activation, mobilization, and demobilization of forces in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Some of the most significant areas that need to be addressed include:

• Improving the process of activating Guard and Reserve personnel and seeking joint solutions to provide the best flow of forces (active and reserve) promoting judicious and prudent use of the RCs; • Seeking "quick wins" or "best practices" that will result in immediate process improvements in the activation of RC personnel;

• Seeking the best Active component (AC) and RC mix to allow greater flexibility, improve strategic surprise, and reduce the strain on Guard and Reserve personnel through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions;

• Structuring AC and RC forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilizations of the Guard and Reserve-in particular, seek to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response;

• Limiting the frequency and length of involuntary activations;

• Developing a full spectrum of initiatives and programs to encourage RC member "Volunteerism" for extended periods of active duty;

• Establishing a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements;

• Validating requests for forces in time to provide timely notice of activation;

• Making the activation and demobilization processes more efficient;

• Ensuring that RC members, when used, are given meaningful work for which alternative manpower is not readily available, but, retaining them on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary; and,

• Improving the capability to track RC members from alert through the activation and mobilization process, in theater, and through demobilization.

#### **Progress Toward Mobilization Reform**

The mobilization process owners, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) through the Military Departments and Combatant Commanders have been working to improve the process, rebalance the forces, and develop sustainability and predictability. Much remains to be accomplished and this chapter serves to focus attention on many of those issues and lessons learned.

The CJCS provided guidance to Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), with regard to developing a more agile, responsive process for mobilizing RC forces and individuals that requires changes in Service and joint doctrine, policy, and law. USJFCOM has assembled subject matter experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Reserve Forces Policy Board (OSD/ RFPB), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA), the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, Services, and all seven RCs to seek mobilization process reform. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD/P&R), in coordination with JFCOM, the Joint Staff, the Services, OASD/RA, and other OSD staff formed a working group to identify "Quick Win" opportunities to improve policy and process changes that could be implemented to improve the efficiency of the mobilization process. The following areas, having significant impact on mobilization reform, have been the primary focus of these two efforts:

• Using RCs forces Judiciously and Prudently;

• Preparing RC Units for Activation;

• Using RC personnel to Backfill Deployed Active Forces;

• Activating Members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR);

• Managing the Mobilization Cap;

• Involuntarily Activating Ready Reserve Members;

- Maximizing Predictability to the RCs;
- Sustaining RC Capabilities;

• Seeking Joint Capabilities Based Solutions;

• Maintaining Visibility of RC Forces;

• Obtaining Force Sustainability and Collective Training;

• Improving Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Training;

• Issuing/Revalidating Security Clearances;

• Improving Medical Readiness/ Resourcing;

• Improving Initiatives to Support Volunteerism;

• Improving IRR Access/Relevancy; and,

• Improving Individual Augmentee Management.

The mobilization process must be made more relevant, efficient, and effective. To do so will require total support and cooperation from DoD, Congress, and collaboration among the Services, Joint Staff, RCs, Combatant Commanders, and various defense agencies. Throughout the many studies, symposiums, and conferences, it has been clear that DoD, the Services and RCs have worked extremely hard to respond to the current challenges. The Board recognizes and applauds these positive efforts toward continual mobilization process improvement and transformation.

#### **Automated Systems**

The current process of mobilizing RC members is fragmented with "stove-piped" and incomplete tracking systems. These systems are not standardized or interoperable across the joint community and do not offer leaders and process users visibility of critical information required to make timely and accurate decisions. The Services, Combatant Commanders and joint planners have indicated the need for a common system of tracking RC personnel in the mobilization process from individual notification through demobilization. Thus, there is an immediate need to develop a joint tracking system to track and manage individual RC members. Long-term focus should be on developing a DoD common mobilization system, integrated and compatible with current and planned DoD and Service readiness, personnel management, and operational planning systems. This system should be capable of managing the mobilization process for all Services using standardized data. Ideally, this automated system will include all personnel, regardless of status. Accessibility to the data in these systems should be available real-time to the leadership within DoD and the Services to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the decision making process. The Services have recognized this problem and already have systems in place or under development to improve personnel tracking; however, these systems are not integrated nor do they contain consistent data elements. The Board recommends development of interim measures to integrate existing Service specific system data, to share this data across DoD at the appropriate levels, and to dedicate funding to accelerate further system development. Great effort needs to be taken to ensure lessons learned are factored into the development cycle.

#### Employer

Increased utilization of the individual RC members has increased strain on families and

employers. The Board is concerned that over a period of continuous mobilizations this factor will likely have a negative impact on the manning of our RCs. Protective measures must be put in place to ensure employer support does not become too great a burden, particularly for small companies, small business owners, and self-employed RC members. Much is being done today by OSD, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, and Congress, but the Board believes there is a need to develop policy as a basis for solutions on how to best share the talents of the individual RC member, improve employer support and volunteerism, and strengthen member rights and family support.

#### **Individual Medical Readiness**

The state of individual medical and dental readiness prior to activation has a tremendous impact on individual RC members, on overall unit readiness, and on the effectiveness of the mobilization process. Some RC members arrive at the mobilization processing station without prior/proper medical or dental screening. Often, these members have medical or dental problems that delay or prevent deployment. The so-called "early" benefit provided by the FY 04 NDAA provides some much-needed relief from these problems for Reserve component members ordered to duty in support of a contingency operation, but it will expire in December of 2004. The Board recommends this benefit be continued without lapse. The following approaches could significantly improve this deficiency: Implement DoD Individual Medical Readiness standards; improve the categorization and tracking of individual medical readiness of all RC members: and resource medical and dental readiness at a level that will allow RC members to meet/ maintain the statutory and regulatory requirements for medical and dental screening and readiness standards.

The Board recognizes that keeping all RC members fully ready, medically and dentally, is

very costly; however, with our continued reliance on the RCs, the need exists to determine the best alternatives to achieve this goal. The Board recommends DoD evaluate joint medical solutions and ensure DoD policies and statutes are sufficient to support cost effective medical and dental readiness of our RC members. One advance in this direction has been the policy for standardization of individual medical readiness reporting issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs which the Services are implementing. Another advance is legislation to allow for medical and dental screening and care of RC members who have been notified they will be called to active duty for a period of more than 30 days. DoD policy broadens the applicability of that provision by stating that a member of the Ready Reserve may at any time while in a military duty status be provided any medical and dental screening or care necessary to ensure the member meets applicable medical and dental standards for deployment, as provided in accordance with policies and procedures of the Military Service and RC concerned. The effectiveness of these policies throughout the Services and RCs will be evaluated during fiscal year 2004. Every effort must be made to provide Commanders the tools necessary to accomplish their responsibility of ensuring medical and dental readiness for their units

#### **Family Readiness and Healthcare**

Since the Gulf War, much has been done to improve all areas of family support, particularly healthcare; yet there is still a significant lack of understanding, access to, eligibility for, and rules governing TRICARE benefits, plus a lack of understanding of the importance of maintaining current Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) information. These programs are complex and not designed with our RC members in mind. It is therefore vitally important to educate the families of RC members, especially on the TriCare changes contained in the FY 04 NDAA. This is particularly important due to fact that approximately 50 percent of our RC members' families do not live within reasonable proximity to Military Treatment Facilities. The goal needs to be family healthcare and family healthcare education at the right level for the right person at the right time at the right cost regardless of demographics and existing medical coverage. Continuity of health care has been the number one issue of the RC Chiefs the last three years.

In addition, family members must be aware of and understand their military benefits and how to access them. Family Support Programs change frequently and it is challenging to keep RC members informed about the latest changes due to their geographic dispersion. These Programs are important to many RC members and their dependents upon return to active duty. There are some great initiatives within the Services to improve family support; however, much can be done to improve standardization and accountability across the Services. Family Support Programs are being designed from a Joint Service Total Force perspective and the Services and RCs are making every effort to ensure any member or family, whether Active, Guard, or Reserve, can use the family support programs available at any base or installation. Additionally, the National Guard has established over 400 Family Assistance Centers in the States and Territories to provide local support and coordination for services. All Services and RCs are also participating in Military One Sources, an employee assistance program accessible by a toll-free telephone number and through the internet. The greatest challenge in providing support for the families of Guard and Reserve members is their geographic dispersion. While the Internet is proving to be an effective tool in providing information about programs available to military families, many RC families do not reside close enough to an installation and therefore, cannot take advantage of those services. The Board supports the ongoing efforts to improve

TRICARE and Family Support Programs for our RC members but stresses the importance of timely education and assistance. This will be particularly important as we seek to utilize volunteers more frequently and for shorter periods of time.

#### Doctrine, Policy, and Law

To ensure judicious and prudent use of RCs and to reach a high level of efficiency and effectiveness, significant improvements to the mobilization process will require changes in policy, law, and doctrine. Proposed policy papers were developed as part of the "Quick Wins" process and submitted as recommendations to the SECDEF for consideration in support of continued process improvements. Even though these proposed policy recommendations are still under review by teh Department, they are provided in order to highlight the issues and show the level of effort to seek improvement. In addition, JFCOM, under their effort to develop a more agile, responsive process to mobilize RC forces and individuals, is working a number of issues that will have major impact on mobilization process reform. Presented in this section are some of the most significant issues developed during these forums along with recommendations for needed improvement.

• Using RCs Judiciously and Prudently. As DoD continues its commitment to winning the GWOT, the magnitude and duration of the conflict make the RC's role essential. It is important to protect this vital resource and ensure it remains available and ready to respond. The decision to activate RC forces must be made only after determining that it is both judicious and prudent to do so. The following precepts should be considered before sourcing a required capability to a RC unit or individual: o Activate RC forces with the consent when possible, of the individuals being called to full time duty.

o Employ RC units and individuals in a manner that maximizes the utilization of their core capabilities throughout the ordered duration of the validated requirement or the length of the original orders to active duty, whichever is shorter.

o Give early consideration to the feasibility of using alternate manpower sources-such as active duty forces, coalition forces, host nation support, civilian contracted labor, technological solutions, or other means that may be available.

o Apply innovative management alternatives such as using retiree volunteers and civilian auxiliary members.

o Provide as much predictability as is possible to the RC members, their families, and employers when sourcing requirements to RC forces.

• Preparing RC Units For Activation. All of our forces need to be responsive, flexible, agile, and relevant. The readiness level necessary to achieve these goals may pose unique challenges to RCs. In advance of the long-term efforts underway to transform the RC's force structure, the Services must take every opportunity to ensure Reserve units and individuals are ready to react quickly to a call to active duty or a change of mission status. In the near term, the Services must take those actions that are prudent and appropriate, and must provide additional resources as necessary, to bring service members and units to an increased state of readiness-first focusing on units that possess the capabilities most likely to be engaged in future operations. Some appropriate actions include: improving individual and collective training readiness, solving personnel shortages, cross-leveling equipment, and improving medical, dental, and family readiness.

• Using RC Forces to Backfill Deployed Active Forces. RC forces have historically provided installations with manpower, on a one-for-one basis, to perform the functions and services provided by Active component members who deploy forward. However, the duration and demands of global conflicts require a new approach that establishes minimum essential requirements and considers alternative manpower sources before activating RC forces for this purpose. When considering requirements, ensure that the function the RC member will perform is critical to supporting mission needs, including families and the installation community, during the period the active member is deployed. Some alternate manpower sources to consider are: joint and/or regional solutions to provide the service or function in lieu of activating a Reserve individual or unit; existing civilian or auxiliary workforces to provide the service or function on a temporary basis while the active member is deployed; and/or hiring of civilian contractors from within the regional community to perform the service on the installation. If necessary to activate Reserve medical members to backfill deployed Active medical members, do so when: there are no adequate regional or joint solutions, including greater reliance on the civilian sector to provide the patient population responsive, quality medical care; diminished staffing could affect the accreditation of the medical treatment facility, its outlying clinics, or its key programs; and/or the backfill is essential to the theater medical evacuation plan.

• <u>Managing the Mobilization Cap</u> (<u>MOBCAP</u>). The proposed "Quick Win" policy titled *Mobilization Cap Management* states, "The President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and with input from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, shall establish a mobilization cap, when appropriate, for reserve forces. The Secretaries of the Military Departments will provide justification of Reserve force requirements while applying policies and procedures for judicious and prudent use. To manage the flow of rotational forces, the Service may go above the established MOBCAP to provide overlap in support of long-term operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, will establish authorization levels for each Secretary of the military Departments within the approved mobilization cap." The Board concurs with the proposed policy of MOBCAP Management as a method of improving predictability and responsiveness.

• <u>Involuntarily Activating Ready Reserve</u> <u>Members</u>. The "Quick Win" policy titled *Procedures for Involuntarily Activating Ready Reserve Members* states, "The Secretaries of the Military Departments may activate without additional notification to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) those Reserve members:

o Specified or implied as necessary to provide the capabilities presented in already approved SECDEF Deployment Orders (DEPORDs) or already approved CJCS requests of the SECDEF to activate Reserve forces. This is allowable provided the requirement is resourced within the allocated MOBCAP and policy guidance on judicious and prudent use of Reserve forces, backfill for active duty forces, activating members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), joint capabilities based solutions, and preparing Reserve force units for activation have been met.

o Required to provide scheduled relief for approved ongoing operational missions with rotational manning.

o Required to meet the internal Title 10 responsibilities of the Military Departments. This is allowable provided the requirement is resourced within the allocated MOBCAP.

For all other requirements to order Reserve members to active duty pursuant to Executive Order 13223 of September 14, 2001, the Secretaries of the Military Departments must obtain SECDEF approval through the CJCS and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD/P&R). These requirements include those that are part of Deployment Orders (DEPORDs) or Executive Orders (EXORDs) being presented to the SECDEF for decision and those that a Service needs to activate in advance of the DEPORD approval process. " The Board believes that streamlining the process within DoD for the Military Departments to gain approval of involuntary activations is an essential part of achieving predictability and responsiveness.

• Maximizing Predictability to the RCs. The July 19, 2002, addendum to the Mobilization, Demobilization, Personnel and Pay guidance establishes a requirement to provide RC members with orders in a timely manner to facilitate predictability for them, their families, and their employers. For all but the most urgent operational requirements, the goal must be to provide the RC members a minimum of 30 days notice to report for duty. Predictability can be extended to the maximum amount possible by notifying RC members that they are being considered for activation. Once RC members are notified of a probable or pending activation, it is necessary to be diligent in assisting them to certify their readiness to activate and help their families and employers prepare to meet the challenges of the activation period. Another important tenet of predictability is transitioning to the alert period by issuing activation orders as soon as it is operationally feasible.

Many early deploying units have procedures in place to deploy in less than 30-days without negatively impacting service members, their families or employers. For RC units that do not have these procedures, Reserve force predictability can be achieved through additional mechanisms. Some examples include: identification with Air and Space Expeditionary Force rotations, employment in continuing international peacekeeping missions such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo, early notification of members being considered for activation, and early consideration of Stop Loss action. Notification of RC members of their pending call to active duty should be managed efficiently. It is necessary to be skillful in providing them the care and respect they deserve, even when the conditions of their activation are uncertain and the environment is changing. Predictability for RC members, their families, and employers is extremely important. The Board recognizes the importance of predictability and also notes that some RC units have procedures in place to deploy in as little as 72 hours without negatively impacting RC members, families or employers. Though early notification is extremely important the Services and RCs should exercise care and consider establishing formal procedures when notifying RC members of pending activation to ensure that irreversible employment or personal financial decisions are not made prior to the actual issuance of activation orders.

• Sustaining RC Capabilities. Managing force requirements in support of prolonged contingency operations requires a significant RC contribution. Use of the RCs must be managed in a way that sustains their capabilities over the long run. To prevent overstressing capabilities, a process needs to be developed that tracks augmentees and individuals within units who have been previously activated to support the GWOT. The need exists to look toward other solutions such as shifting recruiting and retention efforts to target the replenishment of stressed capabilities and innovative training technology to reclassify RC members not previously activated so as to meet the skill sets for predictable requirements of future campaigns. The Services must begin now to look for approaches to sustain our Reserve forces for future requirements, such as, developing force structure that allows for a "just in time," rather than a "just in case" approach, and offering financial and other incentives that attract and retain Reservists for

stressed units. Several examples of force structure development include: construction of modular units that can be tailored to support required capabilities, and blending Active and RCs to support a common mission and take advantage of the inherent strengths and experience found in our RC. The Board recognizes that business may offer successful ways to employ a "just in time" philosophy as it relates to personnel requirements and recommends these options be evaluated.

• Seeking Joint Capabilities Based Solutions. To ease the pressure on stressed Reserve force capabilities, Combatant Commanders should request capabilities in as much detail as possible without specifying the Service provider. All Services that have forces available to meet a valid requested capability should be used to meet requirements. Requirements should be sourced to the Service that, within available forces, can best provide the capability. This should be done without a bias toward selecting the Service that, in the past, has traditionally provided the requested capability. Joint solutions should be sought to source Reserve capabilities and to ease the pressure on stressed skill sets within the RCs. Joint RC sourcing solutions should be sought that are judicious and prudent to meet all requirements externally to the Services and support their internal Service requirements for additional activated forces.

• <u>Maintaining Visibility of RC Forces</u>. Efficient management of RC forces requires full spectrum, real time visibility of our activated RC members. In order to manage RC use judiciously and prudently, to sustain the RC force capabilities, to ensure predictable use, and to plan for future campaigns, the Department must have automated systems to provide improved joint visibility in order to answer the following questions:

o What Reserve forces are approved for activation?

o What Reserve forces are requested

pending approval for activation?

o What Reserve forces are currently activated?

o Where are they serving, and how long have they been activated?

o When did they arrive in a theater of operations?

o When are they scheduled to rotate out of theater?

o When are they scheduled to be released from active duty?

o What Reserve forces have not been activated?

o What Reserve forces are supporting operational requirements in a training status?

Without this level of detail, it is impossible to efficiently provide flexible, agile, and responsive RC force capabilities. Full spectrum visibility is also essential to transforming the Reserve force role and toward improving the activation process.

• Obtaining Force Sustainability and Collective Training. To get RC members activated and in theater quickly will require innovation in our funding, training, and alert processes. The collective training time spent at home and/or the mobilization station must be reduced. The right level of funding to improve sustained training and equipment readiness must be sufficient to reduce the time from activation to arrival in theater. There is a direct correlation between the level of readiness funding and the ability to rapidly respond to the demands of the theater Combatant Commander. Reducing the deficit between mobilized mission readiness levels and peacetime standards, manning and resourcing levels will enhance the responsiveness of these units while decreasing the overall activation period required to meet standards and to perform the operational mission.

• <u>Improving Individual Occupational</u> <u>Specialist Training</u>. Each Service has occupational specialist training for its personnel

though it may be identified by a different name in each Service. In the Army, it is known as MOS training. RCs consist of individuals that are either prior service or non-prior service. Each Service component is challenged to a differing degree in training these personnel quickly to both meet deployability and unit readiness standards. The larger the unit that requires training, the greater the impact. While the unit may have willing service members filling required positions, they may not be deployable because they are not MOS qualified. Non-prior service members recruited under a split enlistment option (to accommodate civilian education schedules) may have attended basic training but still waiting a school seat for MOS training. Prior service members may have been recruited to a unit due to domicile proximity but may not have retrained in the appropriate skill. When a unit is activated, cross-leveling may be required to fill the skill vacancies created by this lack of qualified personnel. The Board recognizes and supports the Services' efforts in seeking improvements in these areas and stresses the need to continue those efforts that reduce the need for cross-leveling personnel.

• Issuing/Revalidating Security Clearances. The process for revalidating security clearances for mobilized RC members is lengthy and unresponsive to operational requirements. Additionally, Combatant Commanders will not always grant interim clearances for mobilized RC members, throwing the requirement back on the Services. Clearance requirements are often articulated at the highest level of clearance, rather than at the lowest levels needed to perform the job. It is necessary for Gaining Force Commanders to grant interim clearances for mobilized Reservists at the lowest level necessary to meet the requirements. Responsibility for final processing of administrative requirements for clearances must be resolved to prevent delay in the mobilization process. In the long term, DoD should resource the background investigation infrastructure at a level that would give both

AC and RC members a much shorter timeline for approval of a final clearance.

• Other significant recommendations that fall in this category include updating operational plans to reflect changes in mobilization requirements, updating mobilization directives and plans, developing wartime Joint Manning Documents for standing warfighting headquarters, seeking legislative changes to expand the option to mobilize members for the purpose of training, and retaining the flexibility of multiple involuntary activation authorities while ensuring predictability for members.

## Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Access and Relevancy

The IRR provides a rich source of personnel possessing a broad range of capabilities for the support of future operations. A recent GAO report found, however, that the IRR was not being utilized to its full potential. Reservists in the IRR are generally there to meet their minimum military service obligations and have various levels of qualifications based on their assigned skills when on active duty and the current validity of those skills. There are other Reservists in the IRR, by choice (family, civilian career, education), that prevent them from participating in an Inactive Duty Training (IDT) status under the traditional IDT guidelines. In either case, the IRR is a valuable pool of Reservists. A proposed "Quick Win" policy, developed to focus on this area, titled Activating Members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) states, "Members serving the remainder of their service obligation in the IRR can provide a depth of capabilities to support future conflicts. The decision to draw from this resource is a viable option and should be done with the consent of the member being called to full time duty, if possible; or if involuntarily activated, preferably using IRR not previously called. Activating IRR members involuntarily requires SECDEF approval of a coordinated recommendation from the Secretaries of the Military Departments, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. Services whose current force structure sets conditions for IRR members to be called to active duty as casualty personnel replacements must ensure that the intent, scope, and timing for the involuntary use of IRR members is included in plans presented to the SECDEF for his approval. In the mid term, review how the IRR is used, confirm the viability of the IRR in today's mobilization environment, track trained and ready IRR for utilization, and examine the use of Stop Loss and IRR." The Board agrees that the Services still need the ability to involuntarily activate IRR members to resolve deployment shortfalls. Some examples of actions that can be taken include: separate nondeployable members through proactive management of the IRR, improve education of separating AC members of their IRR responsibilities, improve annual mustering and monitoring of IRR members, reclassify members whose skills do not match required capabilities, and target recruiting to increase the number of trained and available IRR members. The Board supports the concerns of the Services with regard to the utilization of the IRR and recommends OSD include the review "best practices" and the policies and statutes governing the management of the IRR at their annual IRR Mobilization Management Conference, with a goal toward improving the overall deployability, relevancy, and resourcing of the IRR population as a mobilization asset.

## Volunteerism

There exists a need to conduct involuntary activations to support contingencies. This, in effect, means there must be a greater reliance on the use of volunteers to achieve this goal. Current policy, law, and regulations are not conducive to supporting RC members performing extended active duty in a volunteer status. Within DoD, the present paradigm of the traditional 39-day RC member must be changed and a transformation construct, such

as continuum of service, be instituted. Reliance on the RC is significant today and will continue into the foreseeable future; thus, it is crucial that our governing laws and regulations support this environment. The capability must exist to support both the traditional 39-day a year RC member and the new non-traditional RC member. The individual RC volunteer may suffer under the current system because the laws and regulations can negatively impact individual compensation, benefits, entitlements, and even career progression. The Board applauds the fact that every RC has developed methods to support the non-traditional RC member so the AC mission can be accomplished with volunteers. However, the Board realizes it will take DoD support and Congressional action to develop the policy, statutes, and regulations to support this transformation. To reduce the reliance on involuntary activations and stress on our RC forces, these changes are critical.

Concurrent with the efforts of the individual Services. OSD has contracted to conduct extensive research and data collection on development of viable initiatives in the volunteerism arena for all Services. These studies must answer the complicated, burning question of how to sustain the RCs with sufficient depth for a 5, 10, 20 or even 30-year war on terrorism. The answer must include a new "compact" with RC members, their employers and their families, which provides realistic incentives for extended participation beyond the confines of the original "Reservist" expectations for satisfactory participation of one drill weekend per month, plus two weeks during the summer. In addition, new initiatives should be developed in the areas of recruiting, career development, promotion, separation, retirement, and how the IRR is utilized.

One area that significantly impacts volunteerism is the fact RC members currently count against active duty end strength and controlled grade limitations (10 USC 115, 517, and 523) if they serve in excess of 179 consecutive days on voluntary active duty orders or in excess of 270 consecutive days in support of a combatant command. This impact is currently mitigated through delegation of end strength waivers to the secretaries of the military departments at the end of the fiscal year. However, all Services currently employ volunteer force management procedures based on the potential impact on end strength and controlled grades. Removing these restrictions will reduce the uncertainty associated with the current waiver process and facilitate the use of volunteers in support of increased operational commitments. The Board recommends, in the short term, SECDEF provide a policy exclusion to preclude RC volunteers on active duty in excess of 179 days (270 combatant command exclusion) from counting against a Service's active duty end strength and controlled grade limitations. More permanently, the Board recommends seeking a change to Title 10 Sections 115, 517 and 523 to allow Services more flexibility in managing and employing RC members by removing or modifying the end strength and control grade limitations in Title 10 that restrict the use of volunteers. In addition, the Board encourages the Services to "prime the pump" for increasing volunteerism by identifying and programming funding for day-to-day missions to be performed by RC volunteers. This will promote the changes in culture needed to increase the rate of voluntary activation in war.

## **Mobilization Process**

The mobilization process typically begins with the identification of requirements, which are then consolidated and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as "requests for forces." The Joint Staff validates and prioritizes the requirements and coordinates with supporting commanders and the SECDEF concerning timing of mobilizations, units and individuals to be mobilized, approval of the deployment of forces, and the issuing of the deployment orders. The Services review approved requirements and coordinate with Force providers and RC headquarters to verify individual and unit readiness. When units or individuals are firmly identified, the Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs approve the mobilization packages. Finally, the Services issue mobilization (activation) orders to RC units and individuals. This entire process can take anywhere from one day to several months, but normally takes several weeks. Most RC members complete the activation process within 24 to 96 hours though some RC members require lengthy post activation/mobilization training that delays movement into theaters of operation. Factors that impact the efficiency of the mobilization process consist of identifying valid mobilization requirements, negotiating the approval process, identifying and validating the appropriate fill, certifying individual readiness, notifying individuals in a timely manner, processing mobilization (activation) orders timely, completing the activation process (medical and dental certification, benefits/legal and mission related briefings, security clearance certification or processing, uniform and personal protective equipment issuance, establishing active duty pay accounts, etc), and validating mission specific training, equipment processing, etc. This process offers many challenges that can result in problems or delays that negatively impact individuals, families, employers, and mission readiness if not done efficiently and effectively. This process is ready for reform to meet today's operational requirements. Included below are some of the significant recommendations to improve this process:

• Identifying one organization as the single source process owner for identifying requirements, generating "requests for forces," and sourcing requirements based on capabilities;

• Developing a standard operating cycle concept to help increase predictability;

• Reviewing and improving the effectiveness of the existing Joint Billet validation process;

• Ensuring "requests for forces" are prioritized and filled as they are generated; replacing sequential decision making with a parallel and collaborative process;

• Streamlining the activation/mobilization process for RC members and equipment to remove duplicative processes and repetitive training;

• Increasing full time support manning to adequately support mobilization process;

• Developing policies and mobilization guidance that makes the process more efficient;

• Automating the process as much as possible and developing capability for all process owners to see the status of individual and/or unit processing;

• Improving supplemental personnel equipment issue process;

• Capturing readiness information on the resources within all the units that are available to meet the tailored requirements of Combatant Commanders to improve visibility to key mobilization officials within DoD, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and the Services;

• Investing resources early to enhance individual and unit readiness, with particular emphasis on pre-mobilization medical and dental screening and treatment, member processing, security clearance processing, training for mobilization, and equipment processing; and,

• Improving the tracking of medical conditions of individuals in a non-deployable status to ensure deployability.

The Board recognizes and applauds the fact that all Services, OSD, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and RCs have been diligently working to improve the mobilization process. The Board has supported and participated with various agencies within and outside of DoD in developing the best policy, as well as legislative change recommendations, to reform the mobilization process. The Board believes that JFCOM, through its initial efforts in working on mobilization process reform, has already had positive results on the development of process and policy changes among the Services. Much of this has been achieved through the coordination and cooperative efforts of the Services, OSD staff, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commanders. This effort served to highlight the positive aspects of having one organization actively coordinate and facilitate mobilization reform.

# Transforming the Reserve Components

In the Fiscal Year 2002 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, the topic of "Transformation" was addressed. The primary focus of the chapter on Transformation concerned the relevancy of the Abrams Doctrine in the 21st century and the potential positive and negative impacts of not retaining the doctrine. Today's increased reliance on the RCs is directly related to the Abrams Doctrine, total force policies, force downsizing, increased mission demands, and the fact that the "threat-based" approach of the past decade has been replaced by a "capabilities-based approach". Even though the Services have already been actively engaged in transforming, there has been a more concerned effort as a result of the lessons learned from the current contingencies, emerging challenges, and additional guidance from the SECDEF.

The Services recognize the importance of achieving strategic surprise, reducing stress on high demand-low-density career specialties

(active and reserve), and streamlining our reserve management practices in order to retain a strong, relevant Reserve Force. The December 2002 Reserve Component Contributions To National Defense report focused on two themes for transformation, which were rebalancing the force to enhance capabilities and creating flexibility in force management. The stage has been set and OSD and the Services are moving forward rapidly to identify and execute force structure changes, to actively participate in mobilization process reform, and to develop policy and legislative changes necessary to support innovative management practices for more effective and efficient utilization of the RCs.

The Services have successfully implemented measures to improve the force mix and early reliance on involuntary mobilizations. For example, between fiscal year 2005 and 2009 the Army will rebalance over 100,000 spaces of force structure in order to improve force readiness and ease the stress on the Guard and Reserve. The Air Force is organized and funded for the integration of RCs into every aspect of the Air Force mission. Their Air and Space Expeditionary Force construct allows for maximum use of volunteers, thus, minimizing the need for involuntary mobilization within the first 15 days of a rapidly developing contingency. The Naval Reserve contains a significant portion of the Navy Airlift capability and Maritime Patrol capability, yet they are fully integrated to the point of seamless operations. Beginning in fiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard began commissioning the first of thirteen Maritime Safety and Security Teams for domestic security operations, reducing the need for Reserve-staffed Port Security Units to respond to local contingencies. Port Security Units are designed to support the Combatant Commanders overseas in strategic ports of debarkation. Every Service has already made structural changes in the ACs and/or RCs that reduce stresses on critical skills and enhances capabilities. Many of these changes began before

September 11, 2001, though now the need to continue is fully recognized. In some cases changes in reserve management policies are being implemented to improve volunteerism.

The Board concurs with the current direction and measures to rebalance the force and develop innovative management practices; however, it recommends that SECDEF consider one organization to guide this transformational process. This will improve consistency, balance, the development and sharing of ideas and best business practices, and ensure the right policies and legislative proposals are fully developed.

During the RFPB fiscal year 2003 field visits to Combatant Commanders, the Board members met with RC members individually and in groups to listen to their concerns. They expressed concerns about an inefficient activation/mobilization process but tended to accept this more often when they were fully utilized and providing meaningful support; however, the Board repeatedly heard negative comments about fairness and equity issues. Thus, in spite of the problems experienced by our RC members during the activation process, it is the Board's opinion that members are less likely to leave the Services because of these inefficiencies; rather, they most likely will leave over fairness and equity issues; i.e., "second class" treatment.

As the nation calls on our Reserve component (RC) members in increasing numbers and duration to support our National Security requirements, the level of attention focused on pay, incentives, benefits, entitlements and compensation issues rises exponentially. The current military environment has forced the Services to use RCs in ways that are not fully supported by the existing compensation programs. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) continues to hear recurring themes of equity and compensation issues between the Active components (ACs) and RCs. These comments are voiced most often as the RFPB visits the Combatant Commanders and deployed RC forces supporting the Global War on Terrorism. Equity in pay and benefits remains a concern for many RC members and for the members of the RFPB. Identifying the inequities and proposing solutions through DoD will continue to be a priority for the RFPB.

Regardless of which component a service member belongs to-Active, Guard, or Reserve, the pay and benefits for performing the same duty in the same location should be the same. To the RFPB this means the entire compensation package, not limited to just basic pay, but including incentives, bonuses, special pays, and such benefits as Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), medical and dental care, per diem, and family support programs. Recognizing the importance of these issues to the future of our Total Force, Congress and DoD have rightly focused their attention and efforts to address and correct many of the problems and concerns of our RC members. Most notable of these efforts are improved health care benefits, full commissary privileges, hostile fire and imminent danger pay and new tax breaks. However, there remain critical issues and areas where the Board feels that additional work and legislative change are required.

Current laws and regulations covering per diem, special and incentive pay, housing allowances, death benefits and other benefits and entitlements do not cover the way we are using our RCs. These compensation issues must be addressed if we are to continue to attract and retain the numbers and caliber of personnel needed in our RCs to meet military requirements. As these issues are examined we must be aware of both the statutory and budget implications associated with the recommended changes.

A recurring issue voiced to RFPB members has been the inconsistency in the method used by the different Services to interpret and subsequently pay travel claims. All the ACs and RCs are compensated using the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) to compute eligibility and amounts of payments for travel related expenses. The issue arises from the interpretation of the JTR, which seems to be different from one component to another. The Board sees this difference among the components as a significant morale issue. It is impossible to answer RC members who asks why their per diem payment or travel allowance differ from members assigned to a different component, especially when the members are stationed in the same location doing the same duty. The RFPB has heard this complaint over many years; however, the increasing use of our RC members, particularly in a deployed status, has raised the intensity level and visibility on this issue. On the surface this appears to be an administrative issue that could be easily fixed. However, when the RFPB has dug deeper into specifics, we always came away with the same response: This is a legal interpretation of the JTR. The Board does not view this as a systemic problem with the JTR, but rather a problem with the many different interpretations applied to these regulations. The Board unanimously supports any effort aimed at simplifying and clarifying travel and per diem entitlements to provide uniformity of interpretation and equal payment to all our members. Our RC members are daily carrying out hazardous missions and deserve fair equal treatment under the regulations.

As identified in the RFPB's Fiscal Year 2002 Annual Report, income protection upon mobilization is an important issue for many RC members. Many of these members can earn more in their civilian jobs than they earn when mobilized for active duty. This loss of income can cause many problems for the members and their families. A previous attempt to remedy this issue with a mobilization insurance system met with disastrous results and was quickly terminated by DoD. The current level of dependence on RC forces to support military commitments at home and abroad makes the insurance solution financially unsupportable without a huge outlay of funds from DoD's already taxed budget. While there does not appear to be an easy answer to this issue, the RFPB continues to support and encourage all efforts to review the many proposals and combinations of proposed solutions to provide relief. This is a significant recruiting and retention issue that will not go away and must not be placed in the too-hard-to-do box and forgotten.

BAH reform is another area of concern often voiced by mobilized RC members. Under current law, SECDEF has the authority to establish a housing allowance rate for RC members who are on active duty for less than 140 days, presently authorized as BAH II, which is a flat rate based on grade and dependency status but not location. In comparison to regular BAH, the average BAH II rate is currently about \$400 per month less. In high cost areas, the BAH-II rate is significantly less than the BAH-I rate. While this disparate payment system results in substantial cost savings to DoD, RC members serving tours of duty for less than 140 days receive significantly less housing entitlement money per day than their active duty counterparts. While there is an exception for those members serving in support of contingency operations, the separate BAH rates still apply for non-contingency duty. These distinctions between AC and RC members based solely on monetary considerations are no longer supportable. When the 140-day threshold was established 20 years ago, RC members were employed in a significantly different manner than they are today. RC members interested in serving tours of duty for less than 140 days are faced with a disincentive to volunteer, as their amount of BAH-II is less than that of their active duty counterparts and other RC members serving longer than 140 days. Because of our increased

reliance on RC members, need for improved retention and to encourage volunteerism, the Board recommends the Services, RCs, and DoD actively seek policy or other solutions to resolve BAH inequities for RC members on active duty for less than 140 days.

Family readiness is another area of great concern to the Board. As RC members are called to active duty repeatedly over a short period of time, or extended on active duty for long durations, the strain on the families at home becomes a morale and retention issue. In the traditional RC role of inactive duty and limited active duty for training, family readiness did not receive much attention. The Board is aware that there are new programs within DoD, the Services and the RCs addressing this issue and applauds these efforts to alleviate this problem. However, we continue to hear from our deployed RC members that their ability to perform the missions we are asking them to do is directly affected by family issues at home. Most of the complaints received by the RFPB are directly related to information flow. Many families have been left in the dark regarding the duration of the mobilization and the date the RC member will return home. Also, comments from RC members indicate a need for increase emphasis on keeping RC member's families current on benefits and entitlements, and where to go to get questions answered or needed services provided. Often RC family members and even a significant number of RC members do not have Active duty experience nor live in the vicinity of military installations, resulting in a large knowledge gap regarding benefits, entitlements, and support services. Thus, extended Active duty becomes a whole new world to many of these RC members and their families. The Board believes strongly that family preparation prior to deployment, proper education of the member and the family, and most of all, frequent and continuing communication between the RCs and the families are the keys to successfully meeting this challenge. The Services do a great job of taking care of Active duty families; thus, we must figure out the way to translate that same level of care to our RC member families.

Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have presented an opportunity for the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) to explore and contribute to providing recommendations to issues related to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Stabilization and reconstruction operations are sometimes referred to as the post-conflict phase of operations, although as we have seen in Iraq, the line between the conflict and stabilization phases is very gray. Reserve Component (RC) units such as Civil Affairs, Psychological **Operations**, Military Police and Engineers already play a key role in these operations. The RFPB is very interested in stabilization and reconstruction operations and plans in 2004 to actively focus on the development of policy, organizational structure, and its impact on RC units and members, to include the use of civilian volunteers. Given the strong emphasis placed on force rebalancing and transformation, the RFPB has a role to play in reviewing current proposals for reform. The Board will coordinate with various DoD and other Federal Agencies including National Defense University, the Office of Force Transformation, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, leading scholars, and "think tanks" that have ongoing work in this area.

The demands of warfighting in the 21st century and insuring post-conflict stabilization demand new thinking and approaches for how the RC can best contribute to this effort. The RFPB is working with others and doing independent research concerning the viability of expanded use of Auxiliaries and recalled retirees; utilizing authority that exists for creating a Temporary Reserve; expanding use of State Defense Forces; and, examining other mechanisms that will meet the needs of the military and contribute to a new paradigm of what Reserve service can mean. For example, the Board has an active program of engaging senior business leaders regarding national security issues that particularly impact them and their employees who are RC members. The RFPB has discovered they are interested in supporting various new initiatives that contain real possibilities for developing active volunteerism with the business community. Typically, these are senior level business persons who may or may not have had previous military experience, but they have a skill that is needed in the context of stability and reconstruction operations and they are willing, for a short time, to serve in the military when the Nation requires their skills–a true example of the Citizen Patriot.

The RFPB is positioned to provide valuable insight in advising DoD on how to best meet our needs in the area of stabilization and reconstruction operations. While other agencies are doing outstanding work on the development of force structure and organizational management, the RFPB can and will explore how to best tap into the almost limitless talent residing in the civilian community among our Citizen Patriots as a unique challenge. This page intentionally left blank.

Today, the Reserve Components (RCs) are being utilized to a degree to which they haven't experienced since Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The RCs are intimately integrated into the Homeland Defense mission, as well as the entire expeditionary mission, as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is executed. Joint Operations and the RCs are now full partners, hand in hand, as they work to plan, organize, and equip themselves to fight the wars that lie in front of them. Full integration of the RCs in Joint Operations is no longer an idea, but a reality of how business is being accomplished. Given our current strategic situation, National Security policy and future commitments, the future utilization of the RCs will most likely resemble how it is being used today - with the exception of it being more 'Jointly' orientated and tasked. The concept of the "weekend warrior" is antiquated an extinct concept and construct of the past. With the new steady and future state of increased RC involvement, training, equipping, maintaining, and educating our members to a similar level of our active duty counterparts is reality. During the past year, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) closely watched the progress being made in RC Joint Officer Management, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program and the utilization of the RC in Homeland Defense/Security.

# Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

Joint Officer Management and JPME are inextricably linked. Understanding service cultures, practices, and procedures are fundamental to successfully operating in the joint environment - whether it be at a Headquarters or unit level. Service members coordinating joint operations must know joint procedures, capabilities, and doctrine. RC members are now serving in increased numbers and frequency on joint staffs and in joint billets. This trend will continue as the RC continues to be integrated into the Total Force. Therefore, it is intuitive, RC members must receive both JPME and joint duty experience to maximize the effectiveness of the Department's initiative to adhere to the Goldwater-Nichols requirement on joint force integration. Without the RC member receiving the education or the opportunity to serve in joint billets, the RC member will never become fully qualified as a Joint Service member; and with the continued use of the RC, the Department will not be utilizing it's best resource, the RC member, as efficiently and effectively as possible.

One of the first challenges to RC Joint Officer Management is in the area of education. Fortunately, there has been an improvement over the past several years in this area. The Armed Forces Staff College has been successful in their innovative Advanced JPME pilot program by incorporating both distance learning and phased resident options to the RC member. The first iteration of the course received positive comments from the RC community. The next 'pilot' class began in the first quarter of fiscal year 2004 and received accolades from a larger target audience. Future plans are to have the course available to all Active Component (AC) and RC members. As this and other related courses improve from lessons learned, the issue of JPME for the RC should be relegated to one of availability of funds instead of systemic barriers to program integration.

The second challenge to becoming a fully qualified Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) is to be billeted in a Joint Duty Assignment. There are RC members, both officers and non-commissioned officers, serving at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Unified Combatant Commands and Joint Task Force headquarters who are not given credit for "joint duty" experience because their billets are not designated as Joint Duty Assignment. In many instances, the problem is further complicated by the fact that some of these RC personnel are assigned to billets considered liaison positions within the organizations and thus, not included in the organization manning/authorization document. This situation is most common with RC "fulltime support" personnel in the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve.

A report to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representative by the General Accounting Office (GAO) (03-238), regarding the education piece of this issue, stated the absence of a strategic plan for Joint officer development is a significant barrier to JPME integration and implementation. Further studies by independent contractors concluded operational and organization changes are needed in order to implement the mandated JPME program.

Importantly, regarding the Joint Duty Assignment issue, DoD Instruction, 1215.20, September 12, 2002, (RC Joint Officer Management Program) provides policy and guidance for RC Joint Officer Management. This instruction provides guidance for identifying and validating RC joint positions, tracking officers with joint experience and education, and managing the program to ensure an adequate pool of joint qualified officers are available to meet staff requirements.

Most recently, OSD has put forth a legislative proposal for fiscal year 2005 to permanently waive the requirement for RC Chiefs to have significant joint duty experience. The current waiver expires in law on December 31, 2004. The Board has gone on record in opposition to a permanent waiver. Instead, the Board believes that the Joint Officer Management program should be appropriately supported and managed to preclude the need for a waiver to be appointed as an RC Chief.

To date, compliance with this DoD Instruction has been limited. The Board believes that DoD Instruction, 1215.20 can be a catalyst for change to address the systemic problems that are seen as barriers to the full integration of the RC-Joint Officer Management program. Congress has suggested creating a Task Force to further study JPME. The RFPB should be included in any future JPME task force in order to ensure that the needs of the RC are developed in parallel to their AC counterparts. The Board will continue to monitor all efforts concerning Joint Officer Management and JPME.

## Joint Reserve Intelligence Program

The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program was established in January 1995 by Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements", which approved the "Implementation Plan for Improving the Utilization of the Reserve Military Intelligence Force." The plan's vision was revolutionary in that it directed the defense intelligence community to train reservists for mobilization by engaging them in "real-world" missions during peacetime.

The mission of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program is to implement this vision via the integration of the Reserve Component Intelligence Elements throughout the defense intelligence community. The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program also ensures that RC members who are not co-located with their respective gaining commands have the necessary tools and communications to provide cogent, timely, and useful all-source intelligence that supports strategic and tactical intelligence requirements of the unified combatant commands, combat support agencies, and service intelligence organizations.

The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program Program Manager, Defense Intelligence Agency, Reserve Intelligence Integration Office established twenty-seven (27) Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers located throughout the continental United States. Each Joint Reserve Intelligence Center shares the common mission of providing resources and Reserve support to assist the defense intelligence community in meeting intelligence missions at all classification levels. Joint Reserve Intelligence Program RC members utilize the equipment and infrastructure provided by the Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program to assure a collaborative intelligence production between the Reserve Component Intelligence Elements and the defense intelligence community in a virtual environment. The present ability of AC customers to quickly and reliably task RC personnel with contingency, crisis, or peacetime requirements illustrates the success of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program in meeting the needs of the larger defense intelligence community.

The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program also provides the Joint Military Intelligence Program funded reimbursable dollars to hire Reserve Component Intelligence Elements personnel for intelligence operations, training, and support to meet the unified combatant commands' most critical defense intelligence needs. This funding provides flexible, tailored, and timely reserve support for contingency, surge, and crisis operational missions and essential DoD intelligence production requirements.

For the past nine years, Congress has inserted legislative language into the Defense appropriations bill granting funded reimbursable authority for the upcoming years. Funded reimbursible authority authorizes unified combatant commands to utilize Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds for reimbursement of pay, allowances, and other expenses when members of the RCs provide intelligence support. This has been a very successful program, except that fiscal year cross over and delays in the Defense Appropriations Bill result in periods when Funded reimbursible authority is not authorized, which negatively impacts the combatant commands' ability to utilize valuable intelligence assets for real world requirements. The most viable way to improve the effectiveness of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program would be for Congress to establish a permanent Funded reimbursible authority a position also supported by the Board.

The second most important way to perfect the intent of the Joint Reserve Intelligence

Program would be for DoD to establish and resource true "joint reserve intelligence units" to support the unified combatant commands and intelligence combat support agencies at the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers. In their present configuration, Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers are in actuality "consolidated work centers" because the billets are not Joint Duty Assignment designated. The current system is unstable and provides less than optimal war fighter support because service-based RC units and individual mobilization augmentees tend to get tasked by their own service during times of high Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO). Establishing joint reserve intelligence units that provide dedicated support to specific joint intelligence operation centers would also enhance Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers usage by bolstering war fighter confidence in the ability of the Reserve units to provide effective, virtual, remote support from the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers sites.

Finally, but not least in importance, is the issue of the growing need for long-term financial support for continual improvement in the technical infrastructure managed by the subordinate Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program. The Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program is currently in the process of installing a state-of-the-art Joint Windows Enclave at all three levels of classification throughout the twenty-seven (27) sites of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center system. Without budgeting for continual capital replacement and infrastructure improvement, however, the Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program infrastructure would eventually lapse into irrelevance due to failure to keep pace and compatibility with the intelligence automation systems used by the joint war fighters.

# Reserve Components in Homeland Security (HLS) / Homeland Defense (HLD)

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, had a major impact on the way we view emergency and disaster response. Today, the terms of 'homeland security' and 'homeland defense' are now part of our everyday language when discussing emergency and disaster response issues. HLS is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. HLD is the military protection of the United States territory, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. It also includes routine, steady state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U. S. military forces for action if deterrence fails.

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established in February 2002 to provide command and control for DoDs homeland defense efforts and to coordinate support to civil authorities. NORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces and is not considered to be a "first responder". NORTHCOM will operate in support of another federal agency, unless circumstances dictate that DoD is the lead federal agency, in which case NORTHCOM will be supported to ensure mission accomplishment. Whenever military personnel of the DoD perform a domestic mission, operation or other activity, it is important to understand the legal authority for that action. The core mission of the DoD is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the national security interests of the United States. The core mission includes providing land, sea and aerospace defense of the homeland.

One legal implication of employing military personnel of the DoD on U.S. territory is consideration of the Posse Comitatus Act, which is codified at 18 USC section 1385. While the express term of the law places restrictions on use of the Army and Air Force to execute civilian laws, DoD policy applies those same restrictions to the Navy and Marine Corps as a matter of policy. The Act does not apply to the National Guard when not in Federal status. The potential applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act is evaluated and resolved before military personnel undertake any mission, operation or activity on U.S. territory, especially when providing support to civil law enforcement authorities. NORTHCOM's command and control relationship with the National Guard, when in Federal status, is the same as that of any other combatant commander. There is no formal, direct linkage between NORTHCOM and individual State National Guard Headquarters or state and local officials.

NORTHCOM has encountered several challenges since its formation less than two years ago. For example, the organizational structure was created, but assigning individuals to fill critical positions from both the AC and RC is still an ongoing challenge. A second issue that is least understood but actually the most important is that of organizational culture. NORTHCOM, as one of the unified combatant commands, utilizes the traditional warfighter construct to plan, coordinate and execute its operations, thus, requiring more discussion to fully engage all mission areas.

When authorized under Title 32 USC, members of the National Guard may be ordered by the governor to perform certain duties in a Title 32 status. Members in this status are paid with federal funds but the members remain under the authority, direction and control of their respective governors. Under constitutional and statutory authority, the President may call or order National Guard members into federal service. When called to Federal service under this authority (Title 10), members are subject to the authority, direction and control of the President and the DoD.

## **Summary**

The most significant challenge to "Building Joint RCs" is that of transformation. Regardless of policy, instructions, or directives, the Board believes necessary change can not occur unless the most senior DoD leadership, both civilian and military, provide the impetus for a real transformation that includes both a change of culture and organizational systems. Any effort short of this

type of transformation will only provide shortterm fixes while ignoring long-term systemic problems. The fear of unintended consequences should not keep leaders from trying to make those changes needed to make the Total Force a reality. All interested parties must be willing to come to the bargaining table with an attitude that will allow them to change something in order to achieve a greater good. The adage that "you can either be part of the problem or part of the solution," seems appropriate as a challenge to overcome the present institutional inertia. The Board is committed to doing whatever is necessary to help facilitate the process of change and achieve the attainable goal of creating the Total Force.

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Legislatively, 2003 was a very busy and productive year for the Reserve components (RCs). While not prioritized or all-inclusive, the below items were of concern or note to the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) this year.

# General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) Management

The RFPB is very interested in the farreaching legislative proposals put forth by the Department of Defense (DoD) with regard to the GO/FO Management. These proposals are as a result of the recent GO/FO Management Study conducted by the Department, and also as a part of the SECDEF's Transformation proposals. The Board is concerened that its independent voice withregard to the potential impacts on RC senior officers is missing from these proposals.

• Increasing in GO/FO Reserve authorizations. The Board has not been aware for several years that the Services have validated the need for an increase in senior Reserve officers based on the increased demands placed on RCs. The mose recent DoD GO/FO study determined once again that the number of GO and FO requirements continues to exceed the number authorized in Title 10. DoD, however, will not propose a legislative increase in authorizations until it undertakes a further study of the entire pool of senior leaders to include DoD civilians. At the time of writing, this further study has not begun. The Military Departments and Combatant Commanders are now faced with waiting until this tudy is completed before addressing their Reserve senior leadership shortage. The Board does not concur with any further delays in filling validated senior military officer requirements necessary to execute the National Security Strategy and supports increased authorizations.

• Permanent exemptions from grade ceilings for the 'Chairman's 12' and 'Chairman's 10'. Twelve Regular and ten Reserve GO and FOs serving in joint duty positions are exempt from grade ceilings. These exemptions are due to expire 31 Dec 2004. In its GO/FO Management Study, the Department stated its desire that these exemptions be made permanent. However, the legislative change needed to support that objective was not submitted to Congress. The Board, in its review of the GO/FO Management study, agreed with this proposal and included the legislative language to make these exemptions permanent in its comment. The fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act includes these permanent exemptions. The Board is grateful for Congress' support on this important issue.

• Extension of "Good of the Service" waivers for significant joint duty experience for officers appointed as Reserve Chief or National Guard Director. The Board is aware of DoD support for a permanent waiver to possessing significant joint duty experience for officers to be appointed as Reserve Chief or National Guard Director. The Board disagrees with seeking permanent waiver authority for the Secretary of Defense from Congress. Rather, the Department should make the needed improvements to ensure that all Reserve officers receive joint duty experience as required by Goldwater-Nichols.

• <u>Increasing age, service and tour lengths</u> <u>for senior Reserve officers</u>. The DoD supports increases in these areas as part of its transformation proposals. The Board believes that changes to age or service limitations for the most senior officers, or increasing tour lengths for Reserve Chiefs or National Guard Director should be studied openly to assess the potential impact on Reserve promotions and retention. The Board has not been apprised of any studies in this area, nor does the Board find that current statutes in these areas create obstacles to effective management of the Reserve by its senior officers. The Board recommends caution before changing the current statutes.

## Positive Legislative Changes Supporting the Reserve Component

• <u>Personnel Appropriations Merger</u>. The DoD proposed the merger of the Reserve Personnel appropriation with the active duty account, for budgetary flexibility. Many Reserve proponents, to include the RFPB, were concerned that a result of this merger would be a shifting in the fourth quarter of each fiscal year of reserve training dollars into the active duty pay account. Reserve equity concerns should be addressed along with any merger of appropriations.

• <u>Alteration of Ready Reserve Training</u> <u>Requirement</u>. The DoD proposed that the current annual training requirement of 48 drills and two weeks of annual training duty be converted to 39 days of equivalent duty. Congress responded to the wide concern from Reserve proponents about the possible negative impact of this proposal on Reserve pay and retirement point accounting, and did not make this legislative change. The Board desires to participate in any further study on this issue by DoD.

• <u>Pay and benefits equity issues</u>. A number of advancements in equity in pay and benefits have occurred this past year. The Board is extremely pleased with the progress made, but is disheartened that it had to take a Global War on Terrorism, with its extreme reliance on the RCs, to get these advancements. A partial list of these issues follow: o Unlimited Commissary Visits. Unlimited commissary privileges have been extended to Reservists and their families, and to gray-area Reserve retirees, in the same manner as active duty service personnel.

o Above-the-Line Tax Deduction for Overnight Travel Expenses of Military Reservists. Reservists who itemize their expenses may now deduct for all overnight travel expenses incurred for travel more than 100 miles away from home.

o Hostile Fire and Imminent Danger Pay for Reservists. Effective September 11, 2001, Reservists performing inactive duty training at certain duty locations are authorized hostile fire and imminent danger special pay at the same monthly rate paid to members serving on active duty.

o Health Care Improvements. Health Care improvements for Reservists include: earlier eligibility for TRICARE for Reservists and their families to up to 90 days before effective date of active duty orders and extending to 180 days after separation; medical and dental screening for Guard and Reserve units alerted for mobilization.

o High Tempo Personnel Allowance. Just as their active duty counterpart is compensated monetarily for deployments that exceed the norm, RC members will now receive monetary compensation when their participation in contingencies is repetitive.

o Federal Long-Term Care Insurance. This program is now open to gray-area Reserve retirees.

## **Future Areas of Concern**

Congress directed DoD to study two areas whose outcome is of extreme interest to the RFPB.

• Mobilization Report. DoD must prepare

a report that outlines the numbers and durations of mobilizations of Reservists for the past two years. Additionally, the Department is to address the effects on RC recruiting and retention of these mobilizations, the lessons learned from these experiences, a description of changes in the armed forces envisioned by the Secretary, and an assessment of the process used for calling RC members to active duty. The RFPB, under its mandate of providing policy advice on matters concerning the RCs to the SECDEF, must be intimately involved in the preparation and outcomes presented in this report.

• <u>Concurrent Deployment of Military</u> <u>Spouses with Children</u>. The DoD currently lacks an overarching policy that proscribes assignment to combat zones of both military spouses when children are involved. Current policy in this regard addresses Active component members only. But, many times marriages involve an active member married to a RC member, or two married RC members. The Board wants to ensure that there is no inequity in treating any of these situations, no matter which component or mix of components.

In addition, the following two areas are of great concern to the Board, not only because of the resulting inequities to RC members, but also due to their potential negative affect on retention and volunteerism:

• Equity in Pay and Benefits. Under current law, significant inequities exists in Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for RC members serving on periods of active duty less than 140 days, and for RC members without dependents who must maintain a primary residence while serving temporary periods of active duty. Because of our increased reliance on RC members, the need for improved retention and the need to encourage volunteerism, the Board recommends the Services, RCs, and DoD actively seek solutions to resolve these inequities. • Equity for Student RC members. The Department has had great success working with the Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges organization to protect student RC members who are involuntarily called to active duty. However, the Board believes a permanent, consistent long-term solution that provides protections to our student Reservists who may lose tuition and placement at colleges and universities as a result of a call to active duty is important.

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In the first days of the mobilizations, the arrivals of the first volunteers, and the initial deployments following September 11, 2001, we thought we were facing a surge. The emergency response to the attack would last for as long as we needed to swiftly defeat the enemy, as we have many times in the past.

Throughout 2002 and 2003, we came to accept that we were not just facing a single bow wave, but that surging national need that would drive the Guard and Reserve to active duty for months had indeed reached a plateau to support the Global War on Terrorism. The need is now ongoing; indeed we need the Guard and Reserve in ways not envisioned during the last 50 years– not when the Abrams doctrine was enacted and certainly not after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Even in the spring and summer of 2001 our senior service colleges and national defense strategy reflected the notion of "Strategic Pause". We anticipated at least a 15-year hiatus before this nation would face a peer competitor.

Yet we now face an asymmetrical enemy, one who targets civilians, adapts to our response and clandestinely communicates and plans worldwide. The levels of mobilization that must be sustained to fight this enemy of loose collaborators under the umbrella of terrorism must likewise be paced to support the fight. Our legacy mobilization systems, equipment and policies must change. This report reflects just the tip of the iceberg – systems and policies entangled in over a myriad half century of laws, policies and regulations across the Services. They impede our current and urgent need for simple, seamless, and joint response. Ultimately they compromise command and control and our operational capabilities. They impact morale.

What we learned this past year as mobilizations continued, some back to back, and new requirements initiated, was that our pay and entitlements systems re significantly outdated; that we were creating new problems that could take years to resolve; that our mobilization processes are in need of major reform; and the stress on the force must be reduced.

Yet our people perform admirably as they always do when asked. We must do better for them. They serve in a force that is the single most technologically advanced in the world. We have to pay them better, equip them right, and support them fully in this fight, and we have to do it now. In effect we have to "change the tire on the car while it is traveling down the road at 60 miles an hour." There is simply no time to pull over.

Fixing the Guard and Reserve may require more than a transformation; it may very well require a revolution and one that we must undertake immediately. We must find solutions that support our soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, and coastguardsmen now, and we need to fully involve their employers in this process. The employers are the other factor in this equation that have been on the sidelines too long. Employers must be part of the solution.

This report includes a number of proposed changes to Title 10 that must be pursued to support this long-term conflict. Likewise we must move now to develop only two categories of service, active or reserve. We need one pay system for all members of the Armed Forces and we need it now. Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) is more than 4-6 years away but we need it today.

We need to work with Congress to determine a better measurement of the effectiveness of our Armed Forces than the false and arbitrary measurement of active duty end strength, a "roll call" taken every September 30th at midnight. That does nothing to measure our strength or our effectiveness.

We need to fully integrate equipping plans

with those of the Active components. Since Guard and Reserve personnel are integral players in today's Total Force, participating side by side with their Active counterparts, their equipment must be compatible and interoperable with the Active components in order to fully leverage their capabilities. Equipment and prioritizations need to be reassessed to truly become a Total Force.

This year the SECDEF has required the Services to undertake the task of force rebalancing. This Board aggressively agrees with the concept of placing more frequently used and needed forces in the AC. However, this is still only a partial response to the issue of rebalancing. We must find a way to allow for volunteerism and capture that spirit as a virtue of American citizenship; and volunteerism must not be a detriment to RC members, their families, or employers.

Finally, the process of realigning the AC and RC must focus on developing a new mix, not merely developing a band-aid for the old one. This should be built on the notion of achieving the mission first while prosecuting the long-term war on terrorism with the full spectrum of forces available. We have to use this considerable technology at our fingertips to build modular, tailored force capabilities, using all individuals and their talents, including the Individual Ready Reserve.

Like smart engineers who design buildings and wait to see the patterns that pedestrians take between the buildings before building the sidewalks, we need to suspend our bureaucratic disbelief in the next year and actually see where these magnificent young people take us.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) maintained a very busy schedule during fiscal year 2003 with four Quarterly Board Meetings, visits to three Combatant Commanders, coordination of a symposium focused on Reserve component (RC) missions, doctrine, employment and citizen connectivity, and held a Citizen Patriot Forum in Sacramento, CA. In addition, the Board made trips to Army Reserve Personnel Command, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Forces Command (FORSCOM), and U.S. Army Reserve Command Headquarters to review and discuss issues that impacted the timely and effective mobilization of RC members. Many of these issues have been addressed in detail throughout this report.

## **Quarterly Board Meetings**

The first quarter fiscal year 2003 Board meeting convened December 3, 2002. The primary purpose of this meeting was to complete previous business, receive current briefings, and review new business. Topics of discussion and briefings included updates from OSD Public Affairs, ASD Legislative Affairs, Reserve Component Comprehensive Review presented by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Northern Command Total Force Homeland Defense/Civil Support Relationships Study, and a Joint Staff RC Studies Briefing. The Honorable Thomas Hall, ASD Reserve Affairs participated in the meeting. The executive session reviewed upcoming visits to Combatant Commands, upcoming meetings and symposiums, plus reviewed and provided comments on the Annual Report.

The second Board meeting, hosted by the California National Guard, was held at the State Headquarters, Sacramento, California on January 15, 2003. The Chairman, RFPB welcomed Board members and guests, explaining that the meeting would be conducted in three parts; an open session, a closed executive session, and a Citizen Patriot Forum. Topics of discussion and briefings included California National Guard Headquarters command briefing, presentation of California Army and Air National Guard issues, FORSCOM Command Readiness Program, update on the Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education study, National Naval Reserve Policy Board's proposals and recommended Board positions, and the Boards fiscal year 2002 Annual Report.

The third Board meeting was held in the Pentagon, on April 2, 2003. Topics for discussion and briefings included updates on Homeland Defense and Base Realignment and Closure Process, General/Flag Officer (GO/FO) Study, outstanding National Naval Reserve Policy Board issues, the fiscal year 2002 RFPB Annual Report, and AC/RC Mix and Strategic Surprise briefing from OASD/RA. A panel comprised of representatives from 12 military associations provided a briefing on their legislative initiatives for 2003. RADM Richard Carmona, the Surgeon General, served as luncheon speaker. The day concluded with an evening reception at the Library of Congress for members of Congress. On April 3, 2003, the Board participated in a Strategic Policy Forum at the National Defense University.

The fourth quarter Board meeting was held in the Pentagon on July 9, 2003. Topics for discussion and briefings included updates on the Air Force Guardians of Freedom Program and the National Guard's new initiatives to transform the National Guard, AC/RC mix, GO/FO Study, Legislative issues, and the Citizen Patriot Award nominations for this year. The Honorable Dr. David S. Chu, USD Personnel and Readiness, was the luncheon speaker. Dr. Chu's remarks were both timely and relevant, dovetailing with a number of topics addressed by the Board in its executive session. His remarks focused on transformation, important elements of the DoD legislative package sent to Congress in April, senior officer tour lengths, joint training, civil

service reform, the stationing of troops in Europe, outsourcing of military jobs, and the AC/ RC mix.

## **Pacific Command (PACOM)**

Seven members of the RFPB, the Alumni President, three staff members and one special guest traveled to the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) to discuss RC issues with the Combatant Commander, subordinate commanders, and RC members in Hawaii from January 8 to January 11, 2003. The party next traveled to U. S. Forces Korea (USFK), meeting with the Combatant Commander and staff, subordinate commanders and RC members from January 11 to January 14, 2003. The Board then visited the California National Guard and conducted a Board meeting followed by a Citizen Patriot Forum in Sacramento California on January 15.

The Board received briefings from U.S. Pacific Command; Marine Forces Pacific; Special Operations Command Pacific; Commander U. S. Pacific Fleet; U. S. Air Force Pacific; U. S. Army Reserve Pacific; 624th Air Force Reserve Unit, 154th ANG Wing, 9th Reserve Support Group; and the 14th Coast Guard District. While in Korea, the Board received briefings from Commander, USFK; Reserve Forces Support Theater Orientation Brief with participation and follow-on briefings by representatives from all major RC organizations in country. The Board also visited the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the Joint Security Area, and the Korean Combined Operations Intelligence Center.

Key Issues in PACOM included: Impact of Homeland Security (HLS) missions on the RC missions, the need for funding, training, and development of a Mission Essential Task List for the National Guard, concerns with problems caused by separate pay system for mobilized Reservists, timely processing of security clearances, lengthy mobilization process, equipment modernization and replacement, increased need for full time support personnel, increased concern regarding the impact that continued mobilizations may have on future recruiting, and retention.

A key issues in USFK was the necessity for RC members to be able to mobilize and deploy immediately while remaining in theater. In every location the Board visited, the need for immediate flow of forces into theater was stressed, while the effects of the "tyranny of distance and the tyranny of time" were likewise cited as factors affecting all aspects of mission planning. There were also concerns regarding a perceived inequity of tax breaks and other benefits between soldiers assigned to Korea and Bosnia. The Board fully supports development of an interactive, transparent process that meets the Combatant Commanders' requirements by providing timely access to RC forces.

On a positive note, the Board learned that one unit, the 412th Engineer Command, Vicksburg, MS, did have the authority and process in place to directly mobilize in Korea. In addition, it was shared that multi-component units and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are an asset and working well in theater. RC members, many with years of service history in Korea, often find themselves the "continuity" and repository of operational knowledge for their units and activities.

# Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

Ten members of the RFPB, the Alumni President, three staff members, and one special guest met at NORTHCOM Headquarters, Colorado Springs, Colorado on January 16-17, 2003. The Board received a command brief as well as briefings on Global War on Terrorism, Inter-Agency development, operations, manpower, exercises, and Reserve intelligence. The Board also visited with Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) representatives and many of the RC members mobilized for duty at NORTHCOM. The effort underway at NORTHCOM to make the headquarters a fully integrated, mission flexible, tailorable AC/RC component organization, was very positive. NORTHCOM was in the process of defining staff relationships, IMA requirements, and developing its Ready Reaction Force requirements. NORTHCOM is seeking full integration in its development.

The NORTHCOM mission of securing our borders highlights the need for a comprehensive political/military strategy that is clearly different for Canada and for Mexico. It should be developed with an awareness of differences in language and culture. The development of NORTHCOM with the continental U. S. in its AOR represents both challenge and opportunity to build this organization from the ground up as a fully integrated, seamless, total force headquarters. The Board strongly endorses any and all efforts to leverage RC capabilities and test new concepts for RC utilization by this organization, with the view to adaptation and adoption across the total force.

# **European Command (EUCOM)**

Two members and one staff advisor from the RFPB attended the 11th International Air Reserve Symposium (IARS) in Naples, Italy, September 5-7, 2003. Three members and one staff policy advisor visited senior leaders and major commands in Western Europe and the Balkan States from September 7-13, 2003. The purpose of the trip was to provide Board members with insight into the deployment of Reserve forces throughout the European theater and to gather information on RC issues faced by both theater commanders and RC personnel. The last time the board visited EUCOM was in February 2002.

At the 11th IARS, the Board received briefings from senior leaders from Air Reserve component members from the Netherlands, Australia, Scotland, Israel, Great Britain, South Africa, and Germany. Each country presented their respective issues that dealt with RCs and

composition, funding, military policies, training and equipping. The Board received briefings from EUCOM; Special Operations Command, Europe; Marine Forces Europe; U.S. Army Europe; 7th Army Reserve Command; Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (94th General Hospital) and held a Town Hall meeting; U.S. Air Forces Europe; 28th ID- Camp Bondsteel (KFOR) and 35th ID-Eagle Base-Tuzla (SFOR) and held a Town Hall meeting. A consistent theme focused on the critical role of Reserve forces in enabling theater commanders to meet mission requirements. The importance of the RCs has increased since Operation Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. Commanders emphasized they would not be able to keep up with the increased operations tempo without RC support.

Key and reoccurring issues included: compensation, health care, equity issues comparing and contrasting RC and AC performing the same functions, heavy use of IMAs and mobilized traditional RC members from home station, and uncertainties about length of deployment. In addition, there were concerns regarding the need to coordinate and streamline Reserve requirements common across Services, the need to improve the mobilization process, the need to designate IMA personnel that can deploy on 24-48 hours notice and the need for additional fulltime support for theater Combatant Commanders. This page intentionally left blank.

This was the Reserve Forces Policy Board's (RFPB) first annual symposium, focusing fully on Reserve component (RC) missions, doctrine, employment, and citizen connectivity. This year's topic – "Strategic Challenges: Transforming the Total Force Vision for the 21st Century" was particularly relevant because it occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Over 200 senior leaders from academe, government, industry, public organizations and private policy related institutions, Department of Defense (DoD) and military leaders - active and reserve, including over 50 flag ranking officers - participated. With the unfolding war and campaign as a backdrop, speakers and forum discussants used clear topical examples to make their points.

The symposium concentrated on four strategic objectives for the RCs; primary mission, emerging doctrine, employment, and the RC link to their public constituency. On the first day, speakers from academia, government and military presented views related to the symposium's strategic objectives while the second day sessions concentrated on addressing the four strategic objectives. The Symposium attracted high level presenters from the DoD and the Congress. All seven RC chiefs participated, as did all RFPB members, alumni, congressional staffers, academics, private sector and community leaders, first responders, members of the news media, state and local government representatives, the Guardian Angels and National Defense University staff and faculty.

On the second day, summary briefings were prepared from the breakout sessions to include key action recommendations. The Chairman of the Board presented these key insights and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense following the Symposium.

# **KEY INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### Mission

• Maintain Title 10 and Title 32 unique capabilities and responsibilities and service unique capabilities.

• Develop portfolio of RC capabilities for both expeditionary warfare and homeland defense.

• Plan for flexibility and reliability in RC missions and "on call" for deployment time periods.

• Design doctrine to support transformation that supports operational availability but is still tailorable and flexible.

## Doctrine

• The RC must train and fight jointly, integrate and be on an equal footing with the AC in training, equipping, benefits, and utilization.

• Force structure must support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) steady state.

• Develop correct mission balance between the RC and AC first, and then work on force mix.

• Support development of auxiliary forces.

## **Employment**

• Cafeteria style Employment Model with a variety of options and combinations.

• Full RC participation in equipment modernization and access to simulations and gaming.

• Capitalize on critical civilian skills especially in the Information Technology (IT) arena.

• Determine rotating and standing forces to conduct experimentation.

#### Citizen Connectivity

• Continue with efforts/programs to facilitate connectivity with the public.

• Explore national service options and other outreach programs.

• Continue with transformation initiatives focusing on the needs of the future.

• Increase emphasis on Citizen Patriot links and contacts.

## SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS** - National Military Strategy - Reserve Component Implications General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gen Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff, spoke on Operation Iraqi Freedom using the theme "Jointness Comes of Age." General Pace assessed the effectiveness of our military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, highlighting the application of precision weaponry, flexible planning, agile execution, and speed as force multipliers. He observed that firepower application historically required large tonnage of bombs and artillery to achieve target destruction. In contrast OIF demonstrated the effectiveness of precision weapons fire to destroy numerous targets. Precision fires are seen as an integral component of maneuver warfare and are truly joint.

Speed of movement and precision fires have transformed war fighting, literally be-

coming a "new way of war." Planning and execution at all levels, tactical, operational and strategic, enhanced by real time situational awareness can dramatically shift timelines.

Speed of mobilization and logistics were likewise important, particularly in utilization of prepositioned equipment. The use of the RC in these campaigns is essential. *Yet the mobilization process demands dramatic process change*. Units need a process, which maximizes timely alert and notification. General Pace observed that headquarters use too much notification time, leaving too little time for units to react and be mobilized. Key recommended changes include the force mix, and the organizational construct of the RC in Homeland defense.

**KEY NOTE SPEAKER**-Dr. Stephen J. Trachtenberg, President, George Washington University, and Professor of Public Administration

Dr. Steven Trachtenberg, gave a stirring speech on the need for mandatory national service to infuse a shared national vision. He presented the theme of service and education by asking: "What ever happened to the concept of national service?" He stated that public schools need to be involved in this process to insure both fluency in English and establishment of a common American identity. The common cohesive vision through a concept of national service will become the school of the nation. This school will lead to better understanding of military and public service. The concept of the citizen soldier serving the nation will lead to a fairer mix of classes.

At present the upper classes have no shared burden and the burden of service has shifted to the lower classes. At present there is no maximum synergy between energy and brains - national service would reinvigorate this relationship. Recent history teaches us – Vietnam particularly – where the "Left" opposed the draft and national service, now, perhaps is the time this can be changed. There is now an opportunity for a common vision. There is also in education today "a disconnect between academe and student." Training and education of the RC will demystify the relationship between the military and academe. Universities today are "gated communities" that hold elitist notions. *National service would help demystify these notions*.

#### **SPECIAL GUEST SPEAKER**-**Honorable Newt Gingrich**, Former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, and CEO of the Gingrich Group

From the political perspective, the Honorable Mr. Newt Gingrich gave a forceful dinner keynote address on homeland security, the impact of domestic terror, and the need for a shorter response time for RC mobilization. Mr. Gingrich began with a warning: "We are in a period of crisis. What we do here in regard to the utilization of the RC during this crisis and beyond is critical to our country. We could lose this country unless we act." We are in a new era where real time weapons of mass destruction particularly the biological threat can effect 35% to 90% of our population. This is not hype. The threat is real. We are waiting for the "other shoe to drop." This will make 9/11 look pale by comparison. This cannot be pre-empted by military strikes. We must get ready for this threatened strike.

Mr. Gingrich reminded participants that militarily we are structured for the industrial age and now need to enter the information age. Change is ongoing – hence accept it. Stories need to be told – tell them. Think about coalition partners – for example in the anthrax case. Think about time: Six internet years are like 100 years in regular time. Previous thinking was that jointness applied above the level of tactics; today's application of jointness is at every level. OIF and Afghanistan particularly show the links at the tactical level. There is now a need for a central system to disseminate knowledge that distributes rapid dissemination of unclassified lessons learned and an on going analysis of the learned methodology.

**KEY NOTE SPEAKER-Transforming Reserve Component Readiness, General Larry R. Ellis,** *Commander U.S. Army Forces Command* 

General Ellis addressed the state of RC readiness and how readiness can be transformed. He focused on the continuum of service and the need for improved readiness of the RC. He proposed a series of specific approaches to address these readiness issues, including the need for a seamless personnel and pay system for active and reserve forces. He reviewed the need for equitable training and education opportunities for reservists, particularly for leader development.

General Ellis noted that the question of "who funds activities during alert for mobilization" remains unanswered. In the legislative arena, he recommended a single tri-component funding line with no restrictions on AC/RC equipment use and medical and dental care equitability. *Central to his presentation was the need for a balance between active and reserve forces, and the mix of those forces.* 

#### KEYNOTE SPEAKER - The Combatant Commander: Your Ultimate Customer, Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., Commander, Joint Forces Command

ADM Edmund Giambastiani likewise spoke on the critical theme of military transformation. He presented a thumbnail sketch of his top ten list which emphasized the strengthened role of joint war fighting at every level. He plans to use joint exercises to emplace transformational requirements. Key transformational tenets include lighter joint force, utilization of all available forces and experimentation and demonstrations through the use of live, virtual and constructive simulation methodologies. He opined that we must take risks and allow for the ability to fail. Within this approach, simulations can help in the conduct of the experiment. Simulation and modeling use can precede the experiment and be thereby useful in guiding the experiment through operational concepts and designs that have been virtually proved successful.

He advocated the need for mission rehearsal – going from embedded training to mission rehearsal. He plans to change the existing RC sequence of alert, mobilize, deploy to a simple alert – deploy. In summary, Admiral Giambastiani *presented the case for jointness in every facet of training through demonstrations and exercises and the deployment of forces.* 

#### **KEYNOTE SPEAKER**-**Congressman Steve Buyer (R, Indiana)**, Co-Chairman, House National Guard and Reserve Components Caucus

Congressman Buyer, himself a Reservist, presented a challenge to the participants during his keynote presentation: transform the Reserves, now! Use of the RC in the War on Terror and in the current series of campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is at an historic high. He observed that we are using Reserves too much. This utilization cannot be sustained unless comprehensive approaches are undertaken. He reminded the audience that Guardsmen and Reservists want to serve but they do not want to serve full time. Mr. Buyer was not satisfied with the continual incremental approach to change. *He strongly suggested the need for force rebalancing*.

Representative Buyer examined the need for better strength management. He felt there were too many proposals before Congress on military pay and entitlements. This incrementalism on benefits needs to be changed to present the entire benefits issue at one time. He recommended changes to the force structure and mix, because the "as is" mix of RC under present commitments is unacceptable. Further the balance and force structure mix imbalance needs to be resolved. He advised that the RC and AC should become fully integrated yet remain separate.

#### **FORUMI KEYNOTE SPEAKER-Honorable Thomas F. Hall,** Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Mr. Hall was the keynote speaker for a panel discussion on the primary missions of the RCs in support of the national security objectives. Secretary Hall's keynote accented the challenges the RC face. Innovation and transformation must proceed in ways that are right for America. The American public must be educated about the Guard and Reserve. The first challenge is to educate employers and the public constituency. The Reserves only account for 8.2% of the DOD budget, yet are now providing GWOT support to the active forces with over 240,000 Reservists. This is a historic high. The major issue facing governors and employers is the forecastability of deployment. The major concern of Reservists is health care coverage for the entire family. Payment for differential health care is a must option.

Secretary Hall asked rhetorically: Is the Total Force concept dead? Is this policy still working? Can it work? Certainly the mobilization concept of operations is center stage during war, but what is the policy in the future? Mobilization as a concept and as a process has dominated our thinking. We know that on any given day we now have approximately 50,000 Reservists on active duty. So the question is, "What is the steady state of Reserves being called upon to perform certain duties?" If this number is about 50,000 then let us recognize this and codify it. There is a need to recognize what mix of Active and Reserve forces are required under a steady state of present and future conditions. What is the

nature of this mix? Inherent in the AC/RC mix is the protection of the homeland within the context of the conduct of a global campaign. We need to have the right structure for the conduct of this global campaign. Secretary Hall opined that the personnel system supporting both campaigns and the global war is an inadequate relic of the Cold War. Our personnel policies have to recognize the nature of the away game - expeditionary warfare - and the home game - homeland defense. There is a need for a seamless flow between the personnel policies of both active and reserves. We recognize a force in being. There is now a time in our history to shape the policies for the future.

With Dr. Michael Krause moderating the panel, Secretary Hall, Dr. Michael Doubler, Dr. Lewis "Bob" Sorley, and Ms. Lynda Davis examined the various past influences that have shaped the primary missions of the RC. One important influence is the militia concept. There are three fundamentals that should be considered: volunteers, a mix of state and federal missions, and overseas deployments. As we look at the AC/RC future, we should remember these three fundamentals. Another fact, which shaped the mission of the Reserves, was the utilization of Active and only limited Reserves during the Vietnam War. American will waned during the Vietnam War. This lack of public support for the fighting forces lead to the formulation of a force structure placing heavy reliance of combat units in the National Guard and combat support and combat service support units in the Reserves.

Hence the mission of the Reserves was to reinforce the Active force upon declaration of war. The essentials of the Total Force Plan were to mobilize Reserve units in the event of war. In this plan, the Active forces could not easily go to war without mobilizing the Reserves. Reserve connectivity to the American public community – so it was thought – would assure full public support of the military engaged in the conflict. General Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, developed the Total Force structure concept to assure that the will of the nation would be fully committed, when and if military forces were used in war. However, even though the force structure changed, the mission of the Reserves did not: The Reserves continue to reinforce the Active forces when mobilized and committed to war. This Total Force structure concept needs to be considered when additional missions are added.

With the sense of new mission is not an either or proposition for the Reserve Forces. Inherent in the Departmental name - Department of HLS and DoD are two missions. There may now be recognition of a new a stabilization mission inherent in nation building - as in Iraq and Afghanistan - and Peace Keeping in nations around the world. There is a need for building the infrastructure for democracy. Inherently there is a dual mission with multi-jurisdictions - but is must be a joint setting. There is now a definitive need for civil support operations. Embedded in the Guard is the sense of community, at home or abroad. The Guard and Reserves bring this support of the community with them. And in this future commitment the mission of the Reserves is changing.

#### FORUM II KEYNOTE SPEAKER - Honorable Stephen Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Dr. Cambone was the lead speaker for a panel discussion on how emerging doctrine is redefining the Total Force with a focus on mission balance, rapid and early deployments, and long-term joint operations. He recounted the steps toward military transformation beginning with President Bush's redefinition of the nature of war to a preventive and preemptive doctrine. Thus military transformation is not only embedded in doctrine, organization and equipment, but perhaps most importantly the cultural transformation. We are now in a period of cultural change. Our military is a sound instrument; we have all of the necessary new guidance – the National Security Policy, the national military strategy and others that give us focus and direction. There are changes we need to make, particularly in the fields of acquisition, procurement and logistics. Organizational changes, such as the creation of NORTHCOM, Strategic Command (STRATCOM)/Space Command (SPACECOM) and the Department of HLS demonstrate the transformational fact that *"jointness has come of age."* 

There is an on-going momentum for transformational change. These matters are of some urgency since we are at war, a war that is unlikely to be short. There is a definite need to transform the RC. A constituency from Governors, Service Chiefs, and Reserve Chiefs is particularly interested in homeland defense, but the RC will continue to play in both foreign and domestic missions. One of the issues discussed is how to distribute capabilities so as to manage the increased OPTEMPO particularly for the Reserve components. While the CJCS is working the force balance issue, the answers are not obvious, but force management is a problem as well as force mixture. These issues must be addressed. One of the key tenets of change will be joint training versus what we used to do in training by the Services. We will also need to look at our abilities to stabilize a given nation after operations are concluded. This may be an RC role in the future.

#### FORUM II KEYNOTE SPEAKER - VADM (USN, Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Office of Force Transformation, OSD

VADM Cebrowski discussed that transformation of our military forces requires a broadening of the RC capability base. Transformation reflects a shift of the military focus from fighting great power wars to fighting as a great power force. There is a "new American way of war" emerging based in part on the substitution of information technology for mass. There is a misalignment of roles and missions from the industrial age, which need to be transposed to the informational age. The mobilization of logistics must be transformed. One example is that the Air Force once used 1,000 bombs on a target that can now be destroyed with just one bomb. Targeting technology made the difference. High-speed forces cannot drag around a giant supply depot if you have that kind of speed. That means you have to be looking at very good battlefield transparency. One of the things that we see broadly is that information technology is running well ahead of the physical domain.

Previously our forces were structured to be reactive and punitive, in the new way of warfare our forces must be structured to be proactive and pre-emptive. This places a premium on small, fast, light, agile – "high speed" units that have all of the attributes of depths of effects, mobile targeting, persistent surveillance mentioned by the previous speaker. Labor-intensive units are in chemical biological, military police, staffing, and intelligence guard units as examples. Logistics units are presently labor intensive. But the potential is not uniform. The RC needs to be transformed the same way, from labor intensive to information technology intensive.

Dr. James Carafano moderated this panel comprising Secretary Cambone, Admiral Cebrowski, Dr. Daniel Goure, and Mr. Jack Spencer. They discussed how emerging doctrine for the Total Force can be built with focus on mission balance, rapid and early deployments, and long-term joint operations.

There are no long-term, large-scale mobilizations forecasted, short of a World War IV scenario. Rather the problem is short/medium term mobilizations for combat followed by longer occupations or stability operations. What force structure is needed for support or stabilization operations? It is likely that the new Homeland Security Department will be overwhelmed and will require support from DoD to accomplish the mission. Most likely this support will come from RCs. It is equally likely that the RC may become "fractioned," pulled to separate commitments, between homeland defense and expeditionary warfare – the home and away game analogy. We need to balance in both domains; and the answers here are not obvious or simple. Perhaps we must consider outsourcing work using the examples of military training in Bosnia, Kosovo etc.

Certainly the terrorist attacks on 9/11 changed the nature of war and thereby changed the nature of transformational requirements. Now, how do we update and transform the RCs in this global war on terrorism? We do not have a single front in this war, but rather a war that is fought at home and abroad. At home we need to become more capable of responding better, with enlarged and more robust capabilities to a multiplicity of threats.

The RC is best suited for this. There will need to be a change in the law on equipping, training, and structure to better serve the RC. Organizationally, we need to look at the laws that constrain the personnel system and the processes of the RCs and adjust them according to the changed defense of the homeland mission. There are cultural, funding, and connectivity issues associated with each of these changes, but essential is the need to enhance RC capabilities so that they can respond quickly and decisively.

The Title 10 and Title 32 authorities must change over the next ten years to allow the most effective and continual war of homeland and global defense. There will need to be specialization of the RCs. One aspect of this specialization could be in stability operations and in the conduct of nation rebuilding. The "new vision required" must change the culture, which places the RC "as a force in reserve." Since the world has changed, RCs must be sized, structured, and equipped so that a continual defense can be conducted. The statutory laws come from a two-century need; these laws have served well. As we change the statutory authority we must be sure to continue to build trust in the institutions that have served so well. Right now we know that over 200,000 RC members on duty will not be sustainable.

The question of keeping the RC as a strategic reserve is one of profound importance. The current level of mobilization is probably not sustainable. For continuing operations like we're seeing now, we need to make some space between the AC and RC. This will require analyzing where the biggest risks will be in 5-10-15 years, and design the AC/RC mixture to meet that threat, because that's how long it will take to make the changes happen. But the decisions need to be made in the next 6 to 8 months.

FORUMIII KEYNOTE SPEAKER - Honorable Paul F. McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

The implications of transformation and the 9/11 attacks were considered in Secretary McHale's speech. He presented seven issues, which confront NORTHCOM, including its relationship with the National Guard, Posse Comitatus, and Title 10/Title 32 mix.

Mr. McHale pointed out that an important consideration is the assignment of land forces to NORTHCOM, particularly for training. Forces that will be operationally assigned when the need arises need to be ready, trained, missioned, and known by the command. In short, those forces that are required for the defense of the nation need to be "in a serious relationship" with NORTHCOM. He discussed Title 32 versus Title 10 authorities for forces as well, noting that this is a serious question that has yet to be resolved. Likewise, how should the relationship between NORTHCOM, the Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard be defined? How should there be interaction? Certainly there should be "robust coordination", but should it be further defined?

MG Richard O. Wightman Jr., moderated this panel to focus on the employment of the Reserve components. With Secretary McHale and each of the Reserve Forces Chiefs participating - LTG H Steven Blum, USA; LTG James R. Helmly, USA; LtGen Dennis M. McCarthy, USMC; VADM John B. Totushek, USNR; Lt Gen James E. Sherrard, III, USAF; RADM Robert J. Papp, Jr. USCG; each considered the need for a new employment and service paradigm for the RCs - one that reflects the changing patterns of use and enhances the capabilities of our military forces. Each of the service chiefs presented their service views on the emerging employment doctrine, organization and structure. Central consideration was the dichotomy between Homeland defense – which the National Guard and the Reserves can do well and the continual support of Active forces in global expeditionary warfare. Further, new missions such as stability operation and nation building give an entirely new dimension to the force structure, balance, mix and employment consideration.

The relationship of ground forces to NORTHCOM was discussed; particularly the National Guard and Reserve element. A central perspective was the participants' recognition that if the military goes to war, it is planning on taking the National Guard and Reserve with it. Hence a central planning and structure questions is: How can the National Guard and Reserves be committed to homeland defense, and who will do homeland security if the National Guard and Reserves leave?

LTG Blum began the panel by advocating a

new National Guard concept, which reflects the old "Minute Man". The National Guard should be able to defend the United States when we go to the away game. We certainly have the same concept for defense of the Homeland. We do need to work out the NORTHCOM – land component – Reserve and Guard relationship for all aspects of commitment of forces. Training jointly will be a key. All services are a part of NORTHCOM that should be used for a standing joint headquarters that has forces identified. In any case, we are ready to take part in the "unannounced home game" and are "ready to do what needs to be done."

LTG Helmly articulated the need to realistically structure the Reserves so that all missions - support of active forces in expeditionary warfare, support of homeland defense security needs and potentially stability operations - can be satisfied. This realism must be capabilities based. What is required to support all of these missions, balanced by recognition of the time requirements? This time dimension needs to be measured with the unit's commitment. Reserve capabilities must be so structured that trained units - not just individuals - are committed over time. He pointed out that capability requirements must drive employment. The time must consider unit deployment and return, in short the commitment time. An example is to structure, one of kind units, so that there are enough of them to rotate into a forecasted contingency.

LtGen McCarthy, in commenting on the continuum of service, noted that OSD and OASD(RA) have the right approach. The Total Force approach for example does not fit, so that the one size approach does not fit all. *Therefore the continuum of service as a policy must affect each service and must be considered differently.* By contrast, Marine mobilization during the period 1990 till 2002 was the smallest, including Desert Shield and Desert Storm. However, now with OIF it is the highest. So we need to look at the continuum of service.

VADM Totushek pointed out that mobilization is in for change. The key element is that mobilization as a process is in need of change. Dollar investments are needed. We have an open mobilization system and it is network centric, but we have not invested any dollars in the mobilization process. *What is critical is that 100% of some capabilities need to stay in the Reserves.* It is essential that we have the right mix. The nation cannot afford more than required.

Lt Gen Sherrard indicated that each service RC is different and "the Reserves can be as good as the AC service lets us be, with funding and manpower being the key elements." In the Air Force Reserves mobilizations don't start from a full stop. For example fully 39% of Air Force Reservists are working every day, and many crews were in the airlift system and simply continued on when mobilized.

RADM Papp reminded the participants that the Coast Guard is a small organization of approximately 38,000 men and women. He reviewed the employment of over 50% of the 8,000 Reservists, which is small by absolute numbers, but when measured as a percentage of utilization is large.

### **FORUM IV KEYNOTE SPEAKER - Senator Lindsey Graham**, *(R, South Carolina)*

Senator Graham was the keynote speaker for a forum discussion regarding the need for new commitment by Citizen Patriots. He indicated that we must drive technology to provide instant information sharing across government. Senator Lindsay Graham described legislative initiatives to reduce RC retirement age, provide tax credits to RC employers, and improve RC health care.

Mr. John Rendon, moderated this forum

which featured discussants - Mr. Tony Blankley, Mr. Robert Thomas, Ms. Helena Ashby, Dr. Thomas McGinn, III, Mr. John Winkler, and Mr. Arnaldo Salinas representing first responders, media, local government leaders, and private organizations. One discussant strongly supported the need for public involvement. What was significant was the Guard and Reserve grass root support, which shows in Congress. Strategic planning is key. A panelist with professional lifetime detective experience indicated local Guard community support is essential.

Final comments indicated that there are many Americans potentially interested in volunteering: Retirees, older reservists, and new immigrants. There are several volunteer organizations that can be expanded. For example, the Civil Air Patrol, the Coast Guard Auxiliary. There may be medical volunteers to treat mass casualties. There will also be a medical need for military assistance to civil authorities - like the helicopter evacuations in civilian traffic accidents two decades ago; now there may be the same civil assistance to military authorities.

# FORUM BREAKOUT DISCUSSION GROUPS

The Symposium's second day concerned the construction of four groups to work on the questions of (1) RC Roles and Missions - led by Secretary Reginald Brown, ASA/M&RA; (2) Towards an Emerging Doctrine for the 21st Century - led by Secretary Michael Dominguez, ASAF/M&RA; (3) New Availabilities and Service Employment Paradigms led by Secretary William Navas, ASN/M&RA; and (4) The Citizen Patriot and Building Public Constituency, led by MG Richard O Wightman Jr., Military Executive to the RFPB. Each question was broken into four subtopics with small groups working on each. After lunch, each group leader presented the conclusions of his group.

# SUMMARY OF THE BREAKOUT FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

### FORUM I - Honorable Reginald Brown,

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; VADM Mark Feichtinger, USNR; Maj Gen John E. Spiegel, USAF; Maj Gen Frances Wilson, USMC; Dr. Michael Krause; Mr. Charles Arce

This panel considered the question: What are the primary missions of the RC? The panel's perspective was that the mission of the RC remains the historical mission – that is – to support and defend the nation. For the RC this mission must now be considered in two dimensions: Homeland Defense and the support of expeditionary campaigns. Within these two missions there are several perspectives. The first perspective considers the RC as a force in strategic reserve, secondly as an operational force multiplier, thirdly as a force for defense, and fourthly as a stabilization force in support of expeditionary campaigns. This latter consideration would help to create the conditions for success in "winning the peace" following a military campaign.

The panel evaluated the primary mission and its relationship to the Total Force Structure approach - known as the Abrams Doctrine and how it contributes to public and political will. One perspective was that the Total Force structure is not as effective with the change in national security and military strategy to one of preemption. Another perspective maintained the need to continue Service Title 10 capabilities and responsibilities for both wartime and homeland defense. The panel wanted to maintain and balance the unique RC capabilities throughout the transformation process. Key recommendations were to examine the right force structure between Active and Reserve mix and balance and the adoption of future roles and missions in homeland defense and expeditionary warfare.

### FORUM II - Honorable Michael

**Dominguez**, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; MG Raymond F. Rees, USA; RADM John Cotton, USNR; RADM Robert Papp, Jr., USCG; with Dr. James Carafano and Dr. John Blair

The central question for the panel was: How to build the emerging doctrine for the Total Force with a focus on mission balance, rapid deployment, and long-term joint operations? The forum answered this question by validating the need for public and political support in the employment of forces. If the RC goes to war they must have the support of the people. This centrality comes from the national security strategy flows through the need for part time and full time forces required by the mission and structures the forces based on these considerations. One consideration was to streamline the decision-making process for rapid integration of the RC. The doctrine must focus on training the RC to fight in the joint arena.

The RC should be structured, organized, and trained to the Military Departments requirements, but with an association with Active component units for training and operational execution. The forum's perspective indicated that speed and effectiveness of RC is critical. The RC must have the required funding for implementation. In re-balancing the Reserve Forces the present and future operational tempo must be considered. RC training must consider high demand and lowdensity units in order to meet the mission requirements.

The forum indicated that balance is essential in meeting the future mission needs of the Total Force. The RC should receive equipment based on mission; it should have capabilities that allow it to execute the mission; equipment and manning must have technology that allow communication with all services and the Department of Homeland Security. Manning the RC must include *personnel interchangeability between the components and the same pay and medical care systems.* An innovative perspective of the forum was to include auxiliary and volunteer organizations to assist with specific missions. Key forum recommendations were: the RC must be budgeted into the AC war plans; a streamlined chain of command for RC integration into the active forces; the RC must fit service component mission; there must be a correct mission balance between AC and RC as well as equal benefits.

#### FORUM III - Honorable William A.

Navas, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; MG Charles E. Wilson, USAR; RADM Grant Hollett, USNR (Ret); Maj Gen John Bradley, USAF; Maj Gen Leo V. Williams III, USMCR; with COL Mari K. Eder and Mr. Richard Odenthal

This panel considered the question of employment of the RC and focused on the question of a new availability and service paradigm for the RC, one that reflects the changing patterns of use and enhances the capability of our military forces?

The panel perspective reflected the changed circumstance since we were attacked on 9/11. The panel's insight included the need to formulate and formalize an employment doctrine for both Homeland Defense and war fighting capabilities. This insight includes use of a new rotational-based force with a predictable forecast of reserve utilization. Insights on modernization included full funding for training of Reserve component including use of simulation and distance learning capabilities. There are also certain critical civilian skills inherent in the RC, which are high payoff in application.

These skills include the IT, medical, hard sciences, contract management, and linguistic

knowledge. Another panel insight addressed the need for institutional and structural changes required to realize the employment concepts for the RC. NORTHCOM's role needs to be defined in its operational relationship with the RC and the political state leadership. A key perspective pointed to the need for scheduled rotational employment of the RC. The forum's approach was to recommend congruent legislation and policy changes that facilitate full integration of all components. Cultural obstacles to experimentation include limitations in the joint training and experimentation arena. The forum recommended that RC units should be identified for joint demonstration and experimentation. Key recommendations included streamlining the mobilization process and creation of a new service paradigm to reform, transform, and modernize.

### FORUM IV - MG Richard O.

**Wightman Jr.**, USA, Military Executive to the Reserve Forces Policy Board; MG Tim Haake, USAR; RADM Mary P. O'Donnell, USCGR; MG Paul Bergson (USA Ret); Mr. Bryan Sharratt; with Mr. John Rendon, Ms. Helena Ashby and Mr. John Brinkerhoff

The panel considered how to best link the public constituency of the Reserve components to build a Citizen Patriot. The key panel insight was that the basic constituency of RC was the community. Their connection to the community is in its every day commitment – through family, employers, neighbors and community action. Forum members advocated the concept of mandatory national service – discussed by a leading educator. Another insightful panel perspective was the use of voluntary organization to assist in executing some of the missions of Homeland Defense.

One insight concerned the prototype Citizen Patriot, building on citizen involvement for a national "neighborhood watch" as well as for response and mitigation for law enforcement, auxiliaries, Civil Air patrols, Guardian Angels and civilian specialties and skills. The forum indicated that *the RC should take the lead in forming partnerships, defining the missions and in conducting training and exercises.* Key recommendations are: continue with efforts and programs to facilitate connectivity with the public; explore the concept of national service and outreach programs; continue with transformation initiatives focusing on the needs of the future; and, increase emphasis on Citizen Patriot links and contacts.

# THE WAY AHEAD

The Honorable Albert Zapanta, *Chairman, Reserve Force Policy Board*.

The stated intent of the Chairman was to brief the results of the symposium to the Secretary of Defense, providing him with the direct inputs and feedback from participants, directly in line with the Board's charter. A formal report of the conference proceedings will be published by the end of the summer along with a Reserve component – focused issue of the *Joint Forces Quarterly*. This issue is planned for publication in Winter 2003. The results of the conference will also drive the RFPB's focus in preparation of it annual report for 2003 and will begin the cycle of preparations for the 2004 Symposium.

The Symposium further served to focus the Board's efforts in determining that the Board's way ahead will be one noted for its partnerships and its products. These include:

• A working partnership with US Joint Forces Command. This Board task force will concentrate on forming important relationships and connections with the force providers in both constructing mobilization and demobilization lessons learned from OIF and in the implementation of those lessons in joint operations.

• A working partnership with NORTHCOM. This task force will work with

the Command on RC issues related to HLD and the relationship between the Guard and Reserve, state and local leaders, and first responders at all levels.

• An educational partnership with the National Defense University and other Senior Service Colleges concerning the development of articles, reports and other publications, simulations, and wargaming of issues involving the Guard and Reserve for export to the states.


• A public-private partnership driven by the Board's alumni with a focus on development of an Executive Leaders Forum with the private sector.

### TOTAL MILITARY MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

Total Personnel = 4,614,401


			SELRES					
	Active	Guard	Reserve	Total	IRR/ING	Standby Reserve	Military Retirees*	TOTAL
ARMY	499,301	351,089	211,890	562,979	119,543	744	671,040	1,853,607
NAVY	382,235		88,156	88,156	64,699	2,520	476,921	1,014,531
MARINE CORPS	177,779		41,046	41,046	57,822	685	90,996	368,328
AIR FORCE	375,062	108,137	74,754	182,891	37,004	17,587	678,251	1,290,795
COAST GUARD	38,275		7,720	7,720	5,241	223	35,681	87,140
TOTAL	1,472,652	459,226	423,566	882,792	284,309	21,759	1,952,889	4,614,401
	-		SELRES			Standby	Military	
	Active	Guard	Reserve	Total	IRR/ING	Reserve	Retirees*	TOTAL
ARMY	26.9%	18.9%	11.4%	30.4%	6.4%	0.0%	36.2%	100.0%
NAVY	37.7%		8.7%	8.7%	6.4%	0.2%	47.0%	100.0%
MARINE CORPS	48.3%		11.1%	11.1%	15.7%	0.2%	24.7%	100.0%
AIR FORCE	29.1%	8.4%	5.8%	14.2%	2.9%	1.4%	52.5%	100.0%
COAST GUARD	43.9%		8.9%	8.9%	6.0%	0.3%	40.9%	100.0%
TOTAL	31.9%	10.0%	9.2%	19.1%	6.2%	0.5%	42.3%	100.0%
* Non-disabled retirees								

# **Total Military Mobilization Manpower**



Total Personnel = 4,614,401

Data as of September 30, 2003 USCG Data provided by USCG



## OUTPUT DELIVERED: TOTAL FORCE CONTRIBUTION

Note: Data shows "Direct Support" only, not "Indirect Support" (e.g., Recruiting, SUSPFO, Most AGR Supoort).


Active 71.4%


# Figure 3


# **Contributions in the Total Military Force**

(Strengths in Percentages)

	Active	Reserve	ARNG	ANG	IRR	ING	TOTAL
Army	42.2%	17.9%	29.7%		9.9%	0.2%	100.0%
Navy	71.4%	16.5%			12.1%		100.0%
Marine Corps	64.3%	14.8%			20.9%		100.0%
Air Force	63.0%	12.6%		18.2%	6.2%		100.0%
Coast Guard	74.7%	15.1%		Contra d'Andre I Propies	10.2%		100.0%








Data as of September 30, 2003

## TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY



Note: Percentages represent Operation & Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts only. Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) CIS database; FY 03 CIS Final Position data (00-FEB-04); USCG Data provided by USCG.




Figure 5

# Figure 6 Composition of the Ready Reserve

Rea	<u>.</u>		
Selecte			
Unit & Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) 856,607			Individual Ready Reserve/
		Individual <sup>3</sup> Mobilization Augmentees	Inactive National Guard
Units <sup>1</sup> (Paid Drill Strength Only)	AGR <sup>2</sup>		- 25
790,526	66,081	26,185	284,309

1. Includes training pipeline

2. Includes 71 USCGR RPA's

3. Includes 6,682 USCGR IMAs (most of the USCGR)

Data as of September 30, 2003

# SELECTED RESERVE AUTHORIZED/ASSIGNED END STRENGTHS

	FY 2001		
Authorized	Assigned	Fill Rate	
350,526	351,829	100.4%	
205,300	205,628	100.2%	
88,900	87,913	98.9%	
39,558	39,810	100.6%	
108,022	108,485	100.4%	
74,358	74,869	100.7%	
8,000	7,976	99.7%	
874,664	876,510	100.2%	
	350,526 205,300 88,900 39,558 108,022 74,358 8,000	AuthorizedAssigned350,526351,829205,300205,62888,90087,91339,55839,810108,022108,48574,35874,8698,0007,976	

		FY 2002			FY2003		FY2004
Component	Authorized	Assigned	Fill Rate	Authorized	Assigned	Fill Rate	Authorized
Army National Guard	350,000	351,078	100.3%	350,000	351,089	100.3%	350,000
Army Reserve	205,000	206,682	100.8%	205,000	211,890	103.4%	205,000
Naval Reserve	87,000	87,958	101.1%	87,800	88,156	100.4%	85,900
Marine Corps Reserve	39,558	39,905	100.9%	39,558	41,046	103.8%	39,600
Air National Guard	108,400	112,071	103.4%	106,600	108,137	101.4%	107,030
Air Force Reserve	74,700	76,632	102.6%	75,600	74,754	98.9%	75,800
Coast Guard Reserve	8,000	7,816	97.7%	9,000	7,720	85.8%	10,000
Total	872,658	882,142	101.1%	873,558	882,792	101.1%	873,330

Data as of September 30, 2003

# Figure 8 BUDGET AUTHORITY

(\$'s in M)

Component	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
Army National Guard					
Personnel	3,636.2	3,732.3	3,806.4	4,300.9	5,396.6
Operations & Maintenance	2,805.6	3,177.8	3,344.2	3,746.9	4,343.0
Military Construction	148.8	236.2	285.6	400.1	241.4
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	746.9	958.0	1,203.6	1,295.6	1,195.1
Army Reserve					
Personnel	2,182.9	2,318.1	2,457.7	2,682.4	3,127.3
Operations & Maintenance	1,258.5	1,481.3	1,577.1	1,766.6	2,127.0
Military Construction	102.1	123.1	108.5	165.1	100.6
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	187.6	217.8	294.6	287.3	583.1
Naval Reserve					
Personnel	1,450.6	1,454.4	1,576.2	1,660.9	1,861.1
Operations & Maintenance	982.0	972.2	983.6	1,012.6	1,239.2
Military Construction	31.6	28.3	64.3	52.6	74.9
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	172.1	132.9	122.5	38.5	67.3
Marine Corps Reserve					
Personnel	401.3	414.3	448.9	467.1	513.9
Operations & Maintenance	127.0	141.6	147.6	139.8	217.9
Military Construction	(4.1)	(10.8)	(15.5)		
(included with NR) Procurement <sup>1</sup>	59.9	79.6	48.7	45.4	263.5
Air National Guard					
Personnel	1,452.0	1,584.2	1,641.1	1696.8	1,999.9
Operations & Maintenance	3,216.1	3,292.4	3,472.1	3935.1	4,242.7
Military Construction	164.8	262.4	203.4	250.5	203.8
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	605.1	634.7	862.3	693.8	465.0
Air Force Reserve					
Personnel	856.7	884.9	971.0	992.0	1,164.9
Operations & Maintenance	1,790.2	1,779.8	1,903.6	1,999.0	2,145.0
Military Construction	34.4	63.8	36.5	74.0	85.8
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	210.5	186.7	132.6	186.5	154.7
Coast Guard Reserve					
Personnel	62.0	64.0	70.5	61.9	64.9
Operations & Maintenance	12.0	8.0	9.5	21.2	21.0
Military Construction	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Procurement	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Totals					
Personnel	10,041.7	10,452.2	10,971.8	11,800.1	14,128.6
Operations & Maintenance	10,191.4	10,853.1	11,437.7	12,600.0	14,335.8
Military Construction	481.7	713.8	698.3	942.3	706.5
Procurement <sup>1</sup>	1,982.1	2,209.7	2,664.3	2,547.1	2,728.7

Notes: 1. Procurement includes P-1R Exhibit amounts budgeted by the Services and NGREA funds. Source of Milpers, O&M, and Milcon data is the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller OUSD(C). FY03 CIS Final Position data (00-FEB-04). USCG Data provided by USCG.

### FY 2003 MAJOR EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

#### **Army National Guard**

HMMWV SINCGARS Night Vision Goggles, PVS-7D UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopters HEMTTs (Wrecker and Tanker) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) M871A3 Semi-Trailer, 22 1/2T Semi Trailers Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control M22 Chemical Alarm Detector (ACADA)

#### **Naval Reserve**

C-40A Transport Aircraft Individual Protective Equipment P-3C Aircraft BMUP kits P-3C Aircraft AIP Kits Naval Coastal Warfare Boats and Equipment F/A-18 Aircraft Modification (ECP-560) F/A-18 Aircraft Modification (Advanced Targeting FLIR) F-5 Aircraft Radar Upgrade P-3C Counter Drug Upgrade SH-60 Helicopter FLIR Kits

#### **Air National Guard**

F-16 Precision Attack Targeting System
F-16C/D Color Displays
F-16 Heads-up Display/Electronics Unit (HUD/AEU)
F-16 Advanced Identify Friend/Foe (AIFF)
C-130H2 APN-241 Radar
Tactical Data Link
C-130H2 Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) Lighting
F-16/A-10 ALR-69 Antenna Optimization
A-10 Re-engine
F-16 BLK 42 Re-engine

#### **Coast Guard Reserve**

Truck, Tractor Trailer Trailer, Connex Box Truck, Pick-up Forklift, 10,000 lb. Welder, Gas Powered MSU Equipment Package Two Additional PSU TOA Inventories Level A Suits Chem-Bio Detection Equipment Level A Communication Suites

#### **Army Reserve**

Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) HMMWVs High Frequency (HF) Radios All Terrain Lifting Army System (ATLAS) Container Assembly Refrigerated 9K BTU Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) Semi-Trailer Flatbed Breakbulk/Cont 22.5 Ton (M87A3) Movement Tracking System (MTS) Truck, Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) 53K

#### **Marine Corps Reserve**

F/A-18A+ ECP-583 CH-53 (HNVS) AFC-471 "B" Kits Initial Issue KC-130T Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) Quad Container Commercial Embarkation Boxes PAL Container KC-130T Electronic Flight Instrument (EFI) KC-130T Cockpit Armor/LOX Bottle Armor Plating KC-130T Oil Cooler Augmentation QEC/Aircraft Retrofit

#### Air Force Reserve

WC-130 Radar Modification
F-16 Litening Pod Upgrade Modification
F-16 Litening ER Pod Procurement
F-16 Color Display
F-16 Advanced Targeting Pod Procurement
KC-135R Engine Kits
C-5A Airlift Defensive Systems
C-5A Re-engine
HH-60G 200 Gallon Auxiliary Fuel Tank
Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Equipment

Source: FY 2004 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER)

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AC AGR AOR AR ASD/RA ASD/SOLIC	Active Component Active Guard Reserve Area of Responsibility Active Reserve Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defense/Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict
BAH	Basic Allowance for Housing
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
CC	Combatant Commander
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
DEERS	Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
DEPORD	Deployment Order
DIMHRS	Defense Integrated Manpower Human Resource System
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DoD	Department of Defense
ESGR	Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
EUCOM	European Command
EXORD	Executive Order
FO	Flag Officer
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FRA	Funded Reimbursable Authority
FTS	Full Time Support
GAO	General Accounting Office
GO	General Officer
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HLD	Homeland Defense
HLS	Homeland Security
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command

JDA	Joint Duty Assignment
JMIP	Joint Military Intelligence Program
JOM	Joint Officer Management
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JSO	Joint Specialty Officer
JRIC	Joint Reserve Intelligence Center
JRICP	Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program
JRIP	Joint Reserve Intelligence Program
JTR	Joint Travel Regulation
JWE	Joint Windows Enclave
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MOBCAP	Mobilization Cap
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDU	National Defense University
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
NPS	Non Prior Service
O&M	Operations & Maintenance
OASD/RA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFT	Office of Force Transformation
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONE	Operation Noble Eagle
OPTEMPO	Operations Tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/RFPB	Office of the Secretary of Defense/Reserve Forces Policy Board
PACOM	Pacific Command
PKSOI	Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute
PS	Prior Service
PSU	Port Security Unit
RC	Reserve Component
RCIE	Reserve Component Intelligence Elements
RFF	Request for Forces
RFPB	Reserve Forces Policy Board
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SOCOM	Special Operations Command

SOUTHCOM SPACECOM STRATCOM	Southern Command Space Command Strategic Command
TAR	Training and Administration of the Reserves
USC USEUCOM USFK USD/P&R USJFCOM	United States Code United States European Command United States Forces Korea Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) United States Joint Forces Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

