A U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft assigned to the 146th Airlift Wing, California Air National Guard releases fire retardant over the trees in the mountains above Palm Springs, Calif., July 19, 2013. The unit was activated to assist the community in fighting wildfires. (DoD photo by Senior Airman Nicholas Carzis, U.S. Air National Guard/Released)
14 June 1951

The first Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Mr. Charles H. Buford (center) is sworn in by Mr. Ralph N. Stohl, Director of Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (left), during a special ceremony in the office of the Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall (right) at the Pentagon.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


The Reserve Forces Policy Board met on September 15, 2016 to determine which Reserve Component matters the Board considered appropriate for inclusion in a separate report to the President and Congress that fulfills the requirement of Section 113(c)(2) of Title 10, United States Code. The attached Annual Report covering Fiscal Year 2016 is respectfully submitted for that purpose.

This Annual Report summarizes two Board reports, covering 11 recommendations made to you over the course of Fiscal Year 2016. Thus, we have complied with our statutory mandate to serve as an independent source of advice to you and the Department.

In fulfilling our mission in Fiscal Year 2016, the RFPB operated in an open and collaborative fashion with officials throughout the Department of Defense and elsewhere, assuring that diverse perspectives were considered in the process of formulating and approving the Board’s recommendations to you.

AR NOLD L. PUNAR O
Chairman
“... the Secretary shall transmit to the President and Congress a separate report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on any reserve component matter that the Reserve Forces Policy Board considers appropriate to include in the report.”

10 USC § 113(c) (2)
# Table of Contents

- **Executive Summary** ........................................................................................................... 1
- **Introduction** ......................................................................................................................... 5
- **Organizational Overview** ..................................................................................................... 7
- **Summary of Meetings** ......................................................................................................... 11
- **Other Activities** .................................................................................................................. 45

*Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom*

- **RFPB Reports of Advice and Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense** ......................... 53

- **Impact of Recommendations Made** .................................................................................... 61

- **Appendix 1 - Members of the RFPB** ................................................................................... 63
- **Appendix 2 - Staff of the RFPB** .......................................................................................... 65
- **Appendix 3 - Governing Statutes** ....................................................................................... 67
- **Appendix 4 - RFPB Reports** ............................................................................................... 71
Coast Guard Station Washington reserve crewmembers aboard a 29-foot Response Boat — Small patrol the waterways around the Tidal Basin in Washington, D.C., July 20, 2014. Station Washington reservists train year-round to maintain their boat-crew qualifications and boarding-team-member qualifications. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Matthew S. Masaschi)
The Reserve Forces Policy Board provides the Secretary of Defense with independent advice and recommendations designed to strengthen the Reserve Components. During fiscal year 2016, the Board held four quarterly meetings and delivered two reports to the Secretary of Defense, containing 11 total recommendations. The Board also continued work on a study by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to research Reserve Component operational effectiveness, originally commissioned during FY 2015. IDA completed analysis of data collected during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and the executive summary is included in this report in the “Other Activities” Section. The IDA report, titled “Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom”, found no sizeable differences between Active Component and Reserve Component forces in measurable metrics. The Board also commissioned a follow-on report examining similar data for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, scheduled for completion in 2017.

The Board delivered the first report to the Secretary of Defense on April 11, 2016. This report, entitled “Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on a Proposed Definition of the term ‘Operational Reserve’ in relation to Reserve Components” recommended a formal definition for the term “Operational Reserve,” which is widely used but not standardized in doctrine or policy.

Broad and enduring use of the Reserve Components over the last 15 years has driven an evolution of the Reserve Components from a strategic reserve to an operational, battle-tested force with the capability and capacity to meet global requirements. Despite this transition, some Reserve Component policies and statutes remain tied to an outdated and often irrelevant employment model. Additionally, though the term “Operational Reserve” is regularly included in DoD descriptions of the Reserve Components, lack of clarity and multiple interpretations of this term often lead to confusion and misunderstanding.

Because of these issues, the Board recommended the Secretary of Defense approve the proposed definition for the term “Operational Reserve” for inclusion in all relevant directives, instructions, and publications throughout the Department.

Proposed Definition: An Operational Reserve provides ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for military missions that are planned, programmed, and budgeted in coordination with the Active Component.

The second Board report, delivered on April 13, 2016, was titled “Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board Offering support to Recommendations from the National Commission on the Future of the Army.” The National Commission on the

Executive Summary

The Reserve Forces Policy Board provides the Secretary of Defense with independent advice and recommendations designed to strengthen the Reserve Components. During fiscal year 2016, the Board held four quarterly meetings and delivered two reports to the Secretary of Defense, containing 11 total recommendations. The Board also continued work on a study by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to research Reserve Component operational effectiveness, originally commissioned during FY 2015. IDA completed analysis of data collected during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and the executive summary is included in this report in the “Other Activities” Section. The IDA report, titled “Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom”, found no sizeable differences between Active Component and Reserve Component forces in measurable metrics. The Board also commissioned a follow-on report examining similar data for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, scheduled for completion in 2017.

The Board delivered the first report to the Secretary of Defense on April 11, 2016. This report, entitled “Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on a Proposed Definition of the term ‘Operational Reserve’ in relation to Reserve Components” recommended a formal definition for the term “Operational Reserve,” which is widely used but not standardized in doctrine or policy.

Broad and enduring use of the Reserve Components over the last 15 years has driven an evolution of the Reserve Components from a strategic reserve to an operational, battle-tested force with the capability and capacity to meet global requirements. Despite this transition, some Reserve Component policies and statutes remain tied to an outdated and often irrelevant employment model. Additionally, though the term “Operational Reserve” is regularly included in DoD descriptions of the Reserve Components, lack of clarity and multiple interpretations of this term often lead to confusion and misunderstanding.

Because of these issues, the Board recommended the Secretary of Defense approve the proposed definition for the term “Operational Reserve” for inclusion in all relevant directives, instructions, and publications throughout the Department.

Proposed Definition: An Operational Reserve provides ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for military missions that are planned, programmed, and budgeted in coordination with the Active Component.

The second Board report, delivered on April 13, 2016, was titled “Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board Offering support to Recommendations from the National Commission on the Future of the Army.” The National Commission on the
Future of the Army (NCFA) was established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 to study the structure of the Army and transfer of certain aircraft, and to submit a report to the President and Congressional Defense Committees. The NCFA final report included 63 recommendations to improve the Total Force Army. The RFPB analyzed the NCFA recommendations and determined 13, compiled into 10 Board recommendations, warranted Board support and recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

The RFPB recommended the Secretary of Defense support the following recommendations from the National Commission on the Future of the Army:

- NCFA Recommendation 1: The Nation must maintain and sustain an All-Volunteer Force.
- NCFA Recommendation 6: The Congress and the Administration should return to predictable and responsible budgeting processes that meet minimum funding requirements.
- NCFA Recommendation 12: The President should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund an Army that maintains an end strength of at least 980,000 uniformed personnel (450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve) at planned readiness levels.
- NCFA Recommendation 26: The Army must manage and provide forces under the Total Force approach.
- NCFA Recommendation 27: The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions that would allow individuals from all components to fill positions to foster an Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components. A review should be completed within nine months after publication of this report, and any new designations should be completed within eighteen months.
- NCFA Recommendation 30: The Army should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund no fewer than 3,000 man years annually for 12304(b) utilization of the Reserve Components. The Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Army and the Office of Management and Budget should also provide for the use of Overseas Contingency Operations and supplemental funding for Reserve Component utilization under 12304(b).
- NCFA Recommendation 31: The Secretary of Defense should update the January 19, 2007 memo “Utilization of the Total Force” to allow flexible
involuntary mobilization periods in an effort to achieve common “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) periods for all components.

- NCFA Recommendation 32: The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.

- NCFA Recommendation 33: The Army should add specific guidance on goals for future use of multicomponent units and related initiatives to the Army’s Total Force Policy Implementation Guidance for fiscal year 2017.

- NCFA Recommendation 37: The Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should continue to support and adequately fund the Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPSS-A) as the cornerstone of the effective management and enhanced integration of the components of the Army. The Army must maintain the program’s current schedule as a critical underpinning capability for the Army to support the Total Force.

- NCFA Recommendation 49: As recommended in 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense should plan in fiscal year 2017 and execute no later than the end of fiscal year 2018 a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of national mobilization.

- NCFA Recommendation 52: The Secretary of Defense should incorporate in defense planning and fiscal guidance the analysis of Army expansion requirements for force-sizing and capability-mix analyses in fiscal year 2017. This guidance would give priority to the retention of expansion-required leaders, infrastructure, and materiel in the defense budget and program.

- NCFA Recommendation 57: Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should implement the Commission’s plan (Option Three) for distribution of the Apache fleet. The Commission’s plan maintains twenty-four manned Apache battalions including twenty in the Regular Army equipped with twenty-four aircraft each and four in the Army National Guard equipped with eighteen aircraft each. The plan adds only two Black Hawk battalions to the Army National Guard. The Army should commit to using the four Army National Guard Apache battalions regularly, mobilizing and deploying them in peacetime and war.

Additional background information for RFPB recommendations is included in Appendix 4 of this report.
A U.S. Soldier assigned to the Army Reserve 423rd Military Police (MP) Company holds an American flag, accompanied by his fellow Soldiers, as they march in formation at the start of a departure ceremony in Shoreham, N.Y., June 12, 2014. Soldiers with the 423rd MP Company departed for Fort Bliss, Texas to train before deploying to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in support of military police operations for U.S. Forces. (DoD photo by Sgt. 1st Class Mark Bell, U.S. Army/Released)
Introduction

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is a federal advisory committee established by statute within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Its purpose is to “serve as an independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.” By law, the Secretary of Defense transmits annually to the President and Congress a separate annual report from the RFPB on reserve component matters the Board considers appropriate to include in the report.

During fiscal year 2016, the RFPB successfully fulfilled its statutory role by delivering to the Secretary of Defense two reports containing 11 recommendations. As required under Section 113(c)(2) of Title 10 U.S. Code, this Annual Report contains those reserve component matters the Reserve Forces Policy Board considers appropriate to include in the report for transmission from the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress. The text of statutes governing Board operations is included as an appendix to this report.

An M1A1 Abrams tank drives down a dirt road during a training event on Camp Lejeune, N.C., July 21, 2016. The event brought together active and reserve Marines to train for possible future deployment. (Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Callahan)
Senior Airman Ashley Espin, Specialist Casimir Remond, and Specialist Molina, all members of Joint Task Force Empire Shield conduct a patrol of Grand Central Station on Sept. 20, 2016 following the recent bombings in Manhattan and New Jersey.
In accordance with Section 10301 of Title 10, U.S. Code, the 20-member Reserve Forces Policy Board is led by a civilian chair and includes a non-voting Military Executive and Senior Enlisted representative, a member (serving or retired) of each of the seven reserve components of the armed forces, and ten U.S. citizens with significant knowledge and experience in national security and reserve component matters. Board members represent a wide range of military, industry, business, professional, and civic experience, which combined provide the Secretary of Defense with a unique and independent body of senior officials to provide advice and recommendations on reserve components strategies, policies, and practices.

The Board is supported by a full-time staff consisting of a Colonel or Navy Captain from each of the six DoD reserve components, plus a part-time detailed member of the Coast Guard Reserve. These officers also serve as liaisons between their respective components and the Board. The law requires them “to perform
their staff and liaison duties under the supervision of the military executive officer of the board in an independent manner reflecting the independent nature of the board.”

The RFPB is one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department of Defense. In September 1949, in response to inadequate recruitment and strength in the reserve program of the armed services, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson established a Civilian Components Policy Board. On June 13, 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall re-designated the Civilian Components Policy Board as the Reserve Forces Policy Board. In July, 1952, Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 establishing the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The act provided that the Board “acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense...shall be the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters pertaining to the Reserve Components.” Passage of the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 and the Reserve Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act of 1967 underscored the Board’s role and expanded its authority, responsibility, and membership. In 1995, a member of the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was added to the Board’s membership.

In 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommended that the RFPB’s governing statute (10 USC 10301) be amended, because the Board was not structured to obtain and provide independent advice directly to the Secretary of Defense on a wide range of National Guard and Reserve matters due to the nature of its membership and its subordination to other offices within DoD. Other than the Chairman, the Board’s membership included only DoD officials who made recommendations through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The current statute establishes the Board as an “independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense.”

In the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, after receiving input from the Department of Defense and a wide range of outside experts, Congress significantly changed the operating framework and membership of the RFPB to its present structure. The revised law became effective July 1, 2011. On September 12, 2011, Arnold L. Punaro succeeded William S. Greenberg as Chairman of the RFPB.

Fiscal year 2016 was the fifth full year of Board operations under the revised statute and produced two (2) reports totaling eleven (11) recommendations. The 11 recommendations were deliberated, debated, and approved during four meetings over the course of the year.
U.S. Airmen with the Washington Air National Guard wade through mud and debris looking for signs of missing persons in Oso, Wash., March 27, 2014. U.S. Service members with the Washington National Guard partnered with state emergency management personnel and civilian volunteers to search for survivors following a mudslide that covered 1 square mile in a rural community 55 miles northeast of Seattle. (DoD photo by Spc. Matthew Sissel, U.S. Army National Guard/Released)
U.S. Soldiers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team and Canadian Army paratroopers with the 3rd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment prepare for a static line parachute jump from a U.S. Air Force C-130H Hercules aircraft Sept. 5, 2014, at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, during exercise Steadfast Javelin II. Steadfast Javelin II is a NATO-led exercise designed to prepare U.S., NATO and international partner forces for unified land operations. (DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Tim Chacon, U.S. Air Force/Released)
Summary of Meetings

Quarterly Meeting – December 8, 2015

The quarterly meeting was held on December 8, 2015 in the Secretary of Defense Conference Room. Presentations were made by Mr. David LaCroix, Standards of Conduct Office, DoD Office of General Counsel, The Honorable Kathleen Hicks, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute, VADM (Ret) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve, MG Tim Orr, Subcommittee Chair on enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland, and BG Tim Hilty, Assistant Adjutant General – Army, of Pennsylvania, in open session. Closed session presentations were made by Mr. Joe Adams, Institute for Defense Analyses, and GEN Mark Milley, Chief of Staff, US Army.

MajGen (Ret) Arnold Punaro, Chairman, administered the oath of office to incoming board members Lt Gen (Ret) Charles Stenner, MG Tim Orr, Maj Gen Scott Rice, MG Lewis Irwin, and Mr. Phil Carter and presented Secretary of Defense Appreciation certificates to outgoing Board members Dr. John Nagl and Lt Gen (Ret) James E. Sherrard III.

The Chairman called the meeting to order and announced, as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), that the Designated Federal Officer was present and had pre-approved the opening of the meeting and the agenda.

Mr. Lacroix presented the Board’s annual “Ethics for Federal Advisory Committee Members” training, focusing on Special Government Employees and ethics rules applicable to members and the Designated Federal Officer. Chairman Punaro thanked Mr. LaCroix for his sustained support and urged members to contact the DoD Standards of Conduct office for any questions.

Chairman Punaro introduced Dr. Nora Bensahel and Phil Carter. Dr. Bensahel discussed Force of the Future (FotF), ways to keep ‘talent,’ and the first steps towards FotF. Mr. Carter discussed issues with recruiting and retention data collection, costs expenditures in health care, the loss of intellectual property, and the demographics of new recruits into the services. LTG Barno added that the services don’t have mechanisms in place to tell what happens when we lose ‘talent.’

Chairman Punaro noted that he continued to hear requests for a “Reagan Era” budget but when adjusted for inflation we currently have Reagan Era budgets, but due to increasing costs, the size of the Force is dramatically smaller than 30 years ago.
Chairman Punaro introduced GEN Grass, Chief of the National Guard Bureau. GEN Grass discussed his recent trips to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Romania. A consistent theme throughout his trip was, “Can't tell the difference” between AC and RC Soldiers. The Chairman thanked GEN Grass for his comments. He then started the closed session of the meeting.


Mr. Adams provided background on how the study was being conducted. He reviewed personnel contributions by service, SIGACTS, THOR Aviation Database input, mission and performance assessments, lesson learned, transcripts, and interviews, and briefly commented on forthcoming engagements and obstacles and challenges related to the study.

Dr. Nagl, LTG Barno, and Dr. Davidson mentioned 3 key takeaways from the IDA update:

- There was a shared burden between AC and RC
- There was a shared risk between AC and RC
- There were similar results between AC and RC

The Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Mark A. Milley, comments on his vision for the Reserve Components as part of the Army Total Force during the December 8, 2015 Board Meeting. (Photo: US Army Photo, Mr. Jerome Howard)
Dr. Nagl recommended these key takeaways be used for the title of the study – “Shared Burden, Shared Risk, and Similar Results.”

The Closed Session final presentation consisted of remarks GEN Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army. GEN Milley discussed his informal perspective, the “World according to Milley,” and provided insights about how he planned to improve the readiness of the Army, as both an individual service and as a vital component of the Joint force.

He described geostrategic challenges in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Regional/Global Terrorism and how the Army is adapting to meet current and future threats.

He emphasized his goals regarding reserve component (RC) utilization in the current training spectrum and how he plans to keep them relevant in the future. GEN Milley expressed concern with the number of RC training days saying, “39 days is not enough.”

GEN Milley also talked about Cyber security and the relevant capabilities the Army and the Reserve Components could provide to the Department of Defense.

Chairman Punaro thanked GEN Milley for taking the time to address the Board and for his support of reserve forces during his career. The Chairman then called the open session of the meeting to order and announced, as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), that the Designated Federal Officer was present and had pre-approved the opening of the meeting and the agenda. The Chairman announced the meeting was open to the public and noted no persons had submitted requests to appear before the Board. The Chairman asked if anyone present wished to address the Board and no one indicated a desire to do so.

Chairman Punaro then introduced The Honorable Kathleen Hicks, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Hicks outlined key challenges in the international security environment and the implications for U.S. National Security Strategy. She described the following five insights that should help guide policymakers devising a National Security Strategy: Changing power dynamics, enduring U.S. support for engagement, the reality of selective engagement, the importance of preventative approaches, and challenges to deterrence.

Chairman Punaro thanked Ms. Hicks and then introduced Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute. Ms. Eaglen provided her perspectives on key defense policy challenges, the politics of defense, and the resourcing of national security requirements. She discussed the defense drawdown and the Budget Control Act,
the limits of defense reform; the lack of understanding of the compounding effects of the BCA and the preceding defense budget reductions, and domestic political constraints on defense spending and defense programs.

Chairman Punaro thanked Ms. Hicks and then recognized VADM (Ret) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve. VADM Cotton discussed the subcommittee examination of reserve component availability and access policy. He also detailed the subcommittee evaluation of continued use of the Reserve Components, Active/Reserve force size and mix, 1:5 mobilization to dwell ratio, and other assumptions governing Reserve Components use. The discussion included Overseas Contingencies Operations use, the limited flexibility of the 12304(b) involuntary mobilization authority, and Reserve Component duty Statuses.

VADM Cotton presented working definitions of the terms “Operational Reserve” and “Strategic Reserve.” After some discussion, MG Lord, the Military Executive, set a suspense date of 13 January 2016 to submit edits and suggestions for the definitions to the Operational Reserve Subcommittee, to be compiled and presented to the Board at the March, 2016 RFPB meeting.

Chairman Punaro thanked VADM Cotton and then recognized MG Tim Orr, Subcommittee Chair on enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland. MG Orr introduced BG Tim Hilty, Assistant Adjutant General of Pennsylvania and Dual Status Commander for the World Meeting of Families and the Papal visit to Philadelphia in September of 2015.

BG Hilty discussed the key elements of the operation and the roles the Pennsylvania National Guard and US NORTHCOM played during the visit. BG Hilty detailed the Dual Status Command structure and the successful command and control of Title 10 and Title 32 assets during this and similar combined response events. He also mentioned that despite the event being designated a National Special Security Event which activated Presidential Policy Directive 22, the National Guard was not reimbursed outside of base budget funding.

Chairman Punaro thanked all in attendance for their support of the RFPB and the men and women of the Reserve Components and adjourned the meeting.

**Quarterly Meeting – March 9, 2016**

The quarterly meeting was held on March 9, 2016 in the Secretary of Defense Conference Room. Presentations were made by Mr. Joe Adams, Institute for Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Robert O. Work, discusses the Secretary’s agenda for the Department and the primary goals during his tenure during the March 9, 2016 Board Meeting. (Photo: Defense Media Activity)

Analyses, The Honorable Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Patrick Murphy, Acting Secretary of the US Army, Mr. Brad Carson, Senior advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Performing the Duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, VADM William Moran, Chief of Naval Personnel, The Honorable Thomas Lamont, The Honorable Robert Hale, and LTG (Ret) Jack Stultz, Commissioners, National Commission on the Future of the Army, Lt Gen (Ret) Charles Stenner, Subcommittee Chair for Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel, VADM (Ret) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve, MG Tim Orr, Subcommittee Chair on Enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland, Col Bart Pester, USMCR Senior Policy Advisor to the RFPB, and COL William Hersh, ANRG Senior Policy Advisor to the RFPB.

MajGen (Ret) Arnold Punaro, Chairman, administered the oath of office to incoming board members Mr. Brett Lambert, Dr. Charlotte Warren, and Maj Gen Sheila Zuehlke and presented Secretary of Defense Appreciation certificates to outgoing Board member SGM Mike Biere and retiring staff member COL Ty Clifton.
The Chairman called the closed portion of the meeting to order and announced, as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), that the Designated Federal Officer was present and had pre-approved the opening of the meeting and the agenda.

Chairman Punaro then introduced Mr. Joe Adams, Institute for Defense Analyses, to discuss the initial findings and ongoing efforts in the study of Reserve Component Operational Effectiveness and Performance during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Both Chairman Punaro and Maj Gen Zuehlke recommended IDA brief Service Chiefs and Reserve Component Chiefs upon completion for the study. Mr. Adams interrupted his presentation to allow time for the Board to hear from The Honorable Robert Work, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Secretary Work stated that the Secretary of Defense came into office with a specific agenda for change while acknowledging a finite timeline, and he defined SECDEF’s change areas with the following four specific goals: winning the war of talent, maintaining technological superiority, reviewing DoD War Plans to question the assumption of priority, and reviewing Better Business Practices encouraging free flow of ideas in and out of the Pentagon.
Mr. Adams then continued the update on RC performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He reviewed personnel contributions by service; SIGACTS, Casualty data/mishap data, Mobility data, Strike data updates, mission and performance assessments, and lessons learned. Mr. Adams concluded with a summary of remaining tasks to further determine trends and identify areas for additional analysis.

Chairman Punaro thanked Mr. Adams and then introduced The Honorable Patrick Murphy, Acting Secretary of the US Army. Secretary Murphy discussed the total force perspective of the Army, continuing reductions in both personnel and budget, and the conscious decision to trade modernization for readiness.

Secretary Murphy briefly discussed the findings of the National Commission of the Future of the Army, stating that 40 of the 63 recommendations were absolutely doable. He outlined three specific priorities: Soldier for Life, Public/Private partnerships, and Best/Expanded Business Practices.

Chairman Punaro thanked Secretary Murphy and then introduced Mr. Brad Carson, Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and

The Honorable Thomas Lamont, The Honorable Robert Hale, and LTG (Retired) Jack Stultz, Commissioners of the National Commission on the Future of the Army, discuss the charter, process, and recommendations of the Commission during the March 9, 2016 Board Meeting. (Photo: Defense Media Activity)
Readiness, Performing the Duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Mr. Carson presented his views on the Force of the Future, some of the systematic issues with the Military Personnel System, the lack of performance measures for talent management, and the effort to address systemic issues with P&R working groups.

Mr. Carson suggested many problems loom on the horizon for the all-volunteer force. Recruiting and retention will become more difficult as a smaller percentage of society meets eligibility requirements. He described the Reserve Component as operational, and identified the need to track non-military skills of reserve component members. He noted the intent of Force of the Future is to change the way the services think about their personnel.

Chairman Punaro thanked Mr. Carson and then introduced VADM William Moran, Chief of Naval Personnel. VADM Moran discussed Navy recruiting and retention, fleet personnel readiness, and plans and initiatives to allow the Navy personnel system to meet future challenges. He noted the current DoD bureaucracy was built in the 1950s and is very resistant to change. He pointed out that 84% of recruits are legacy, from military families, and while they are generally high quality recruits, this trend does not help diversity.

VADM Moran concluded the Navy needs a better understanding of and management system for existing talent. He also noted the service needs flexibility and creative solutions to avoid personnel shortages when the economy improves.

Chairman Punaro thanked VADM Moran. He then called the open session of the meeting to order and announced, as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, that the Designated Federal Officer was present and had pre-approved the opening of the meeting and the agenda. The Chairman announced the meeting was open to the public and noted no persons had submitted requests to appear before the Board. The Chairman asked if anyone present wished to address the Board and no one indicated a desire to do so.

Chairman Punaro then introduced The Honorable Thomas Lamont, The Honorable Robert Hale, and LTG (Retired) Jack Stultz, Commissioners, National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA). Mr. Lamont, Mr. Hale, and LTG Stultz discussed the charter, process, and recommendations of the National Commission on the Future of the Army.

Mr. Lamont stated the establishment of the commission was driven by the Army Aviation Restructuring Initiative, but it was also asked how the Army should organize, within anticipated future resources, and at acceptable levels of risk.
Mr. Hale focused on the Aviation Restructuring Initiative, and noted the commission objected to the Army’s initial recommendation because it offered no surge capacity, and was counter to a One Army policy. He described how the commission’s recommendation balanced wartime capacity, surge capacity, peacetime deployments, and cost, with an offset of a reduced Blackhawk fleet. He discussed multi-component units and development of better relationships between the three Army components.

LTG Stultz discussed the commission’s findings on the need to operate and manage one Army, and to recruit and train as one Army, with permeability across components. He noted the all-volunteer force is essential but comes at a price, and that duty status reform is needed but will require congressional action.

Chairman Punaro thanked Mr. Lamont, Mr. Hale, and LTG Stultz. He then recognized Lt Gen (Ret) Charles Stenner, Subcommittee Chair for Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel. Lt Gen Stenner discussed the Personnel Subcommittee tasking portion of a previous SECDEF tasking to provide advice on how the Reserve Components fit into the evolving Department of Defense Force of the Future (FOTF) Initiative.
Lt Gen Stenner reviewed Chairman Punaro’s August 2015 initial input to USD P&R concerning SECDEF’s request, and further discussed SECDEF’s November 18th initial list of approved reform initiatives, primarily focused on permeability, recruitment, and retention, as well as the January 28th quality of life reforms.

Lt Gen Stenner provided an update on previous RFPB recommendations concerning the Reserve Components Survivor Benefit Plan, Duty Statuses, and Post-911 GI Bill benefits. He stated the subcommittee met with Mr. Plummer, Senior Advisor to the USD (P&R), to discuss the Board’s previous recommendations and the FOTF proposals.

Lt Gen Stenner concluded by stating that the Personnel Subcommittee would continue to work with OSD and the Services to determine FOTF impacts on the RC and would participate with DoD working groups under formation to address all FOTF Initiatives.

Chairman Punaro thanked Lt Gen Stenner and then recognized VADM (Ret) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve. VADM Cotton provided a history and update on the Operational Reserve subcommittee’s actions to reach consensus on a definition of Operational Reserve and Strategic Reserve.

VADM Cotton stated definitions discussed at the December meeting had been offered to the services’ “3s” for comment. Based on requested changes and subsequent discussion, definitions for each term were proposed to the board for a vote, with the recommendation that the definitions be provided to the SECDEF for adoption in doctrine.

After additional discussion and modification of the Operational Reserve definition, the Board reached agreement and voted to recommend the definition to the SECDEF. Based on board discussion, VADM Cotton did not submit the definition of Strategic Reserve for a Board vote.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve the proposed definition for the term “Operational Reserve” for inclusion in all relevant directives, instructions, and publications throughout the Department.

Proposed Definition: An Operational Reserve provides ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for military missions that are planned, programmed, and budgeted in coordination with the Active Component.
Chairman Punaro thanked VADM Cotton and then recognized MG Tim Orr, Subcommittee Chair on Enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland. MG Orr briefly discussed the Council of Governors mission, stating that it was established by the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act to advise the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security on matters related to the National Guard and civil support missions, as well as to strengthen partnerships between the Federal and State governments to provide for greater national security against all types of threats.

MG Orr discussed the Council of Governors February 2016 meeting where the council was briefed on the Fiscal Year 2017 Defense Budget and the Strategic Trends for the FY2018 Program Build. He stated that the Council of Governors thoroughly discussed the NCFA Report Recommendations and provided their collective approval.

MG Orr detailed the council’s lengthy discussion with the Secretary of Homeland Security on Cybersecurity. The council members were concerned with both the catastrophic effects of cyber attacks and information sharing by DHS and private corporations regarding response actions. They reviewed the Justice Department’s Cybersecurity role and current coordination with states, received an update on National Guard Cyber Mission Forces resourcing, and then discussed upcoming DoD Policy Guidance (Cyber, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, and Dual-Status Command).

MG Orr concluded with a discussion on FY16 NDAA Military Technician Conversion Provisions, which directed that 20% of the National Guard’s Title 32 dual status MILTECH personnel be converted to Title 5 Federal personnel with no state oversight. He stated the Governors were adamantly opposed to this, and had petitioned Congress to change the law or at least delay its implementation.

Chairman Punaro thanked MG Orr and then recognized Col Bart Pester, USMCR Senior Policy Advisor to the RFPB. Col Pester provided a briefing to the board on proposed content for the RFPB New Administration Transition Book to the SECDEF and incoming administration.

Col Pester stated that the proposed RFPB New Administration Transition Book would provide an overview of the RFPB and its recent advice and recommendations, provide a background on the Reserve Components and related strategic issues, and present an actionable set of recommendations based on previous and continuing RFPB work. He presented the draft Transition Book’s Table of Contents, to include RFPB issue papers and recent reports, as well as actionable recommendations.
After discussion, the Board favorably voted to develop the New Administration Transition Book and provided it to inbound DoD leadership.

Chairman Punaro thanked Col Pester and then recognized COL William Hersh, ARNG Senior Policy Advisor to the RFPB, to discuss the RFPB Proposed Response to the NCFA Report. COL Hersh started by recommending the RFPB commend the NCFA for its hard work, and thoughtful and comprehensive analysis in carrying out its mandate from the Congress. He further commended the distinguished members and the staff of the Commission for their continued service to the Nation in support of this important effort. COL Hersh presented the NCFA mission statement which stated, “In light of the projected security environment, conduct a comprehensive study of the roles and structure of the Army, and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Army.” He noted of the 63 recommendations in the NCFA, 13 were related to the Reserve Components in the following areas: all-volunteer Force, minimum funding requirements, end strength, integration of the total force, utilization, personnel & pay integration, strategic mobility, and force structure.

COL Hersh then facilitated a Board discussion on proposed RFPB recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the 13 NCFA Reserve Component-related recommendations. Following Board discussion, the Board favorably voted to support the NCFA recommendations and provide additional RFPB comments.

**NCFA Recommendation 1:** The nation must maintain and sustain an All-Volunteer Force.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board supports an All-Volunteer Total Force and has proposed recommendations aimed at preserving the operational capacity of the force while also expressing concern about the unsustainable growth of the fully burdened and life-cycle costs in our military personnel programs.

**NCFA Recommendation 6:** The Congress and the Administration should return to predictable and responsible budgeting processes that meet minimum funding requirements.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The RFPB supports the return to a predictable budgeting process that provides adequate resources to the
Department of Defense to ensure access to a manned, ready and modernized Total Force able to meet the needs of the nation, both at home and abroad.

**NCFA Recommendation 12:** The President should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund an Army that maintains an end-strength of at least 980,000 uniformed personnel (450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve) at planned readiness levels.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board continues to believe and recommend that the Department preserve Reserve Component end strength and force structure to help mitigate risk associated with Active Component force structure reductions and to hedge against fiscal and geostrategic uncertainty. The RFPB has emphasized to DoD the significant role the Reserve Components play as a fully integrated part of the operational force and encourages the Department and the Services to program and budget resources to enhance Reserve Component readiness and to plan for their recurring use.

**NCFA Recommendation 30:** The Army should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund no fewer than 3,000 man years annually for 12304(b) utilization of the Reserve Components. The Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Army and the Office of Management and Budget should also provide for the use of Overseas Contingency Operations and supplemental funding for Reserve Component utilization under 12304(b).

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board has recommended that DoD should continue to use the Reserve Components operationally and should include requirements for such use in service force generation models and DOD planning, programming, and budget documents. The Board further added that the Department should adapt the Global Force Management process to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for Reserve Component use to facilitate service planning, programming, and budgeting for the activation and employment of Reserve Component forces under Title 10, Section 12304(b) authority. The absence of adequate 12304(b) funding limits utilization of the Reserve Component forces for missions for which they are ideally suited.

**NCFA Recommendation 31:** The Secretary of Defense should update the January 19, 2007, memo “Utilization of the Total Force” to allow flexible involuntary
mobilization periods in an effort to achieve common “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) periods for all components.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Commission found that making deployment policies consistent among the components, particularly the duration of BOG in theater, would further foster an integrated Total Force culture, as would Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve cross-component assignments. The RFPB has recommended that the Services should better integrate their forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment. Deploying integrated units serving under common BOG rules is an important step in improving both integration and a sense of Total Force culture in the Army. The Board has also advocated that DoD develop and enforce a revised Total Force Policy that enumerates key principles necessary to encourage a Total Force culture. These actions would, as the Commission’s report suggests, help personnel from each Army component to better understand the other components and how they contribute to an effective Total Force.

**NCFA Recommendation 37:** The Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should continue to support and adequately fund the Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPSS-A) as the cornerstone to the effective management and enhanced integration of the components of the Army. The Army must maintain the program’s current schedule as a critical underpinning capability for the Army to support the Total Force.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Army components currently operate separate personnel and pay systems, thus creating barriers to personal readiness and a career of service that allows soldiers to transition easily between components. Achieving a singular personnel management and pay system for the whole Army would promote and provide the greatest administrative step toward implementing an integrated Total Force. The RFPB has previously recommended that the Services implement integrated Pay and Personnel Systems, encouraging them to move aggressively to complete implementation of their systems to hasten Reserve Component duty status reform and to allow for a continuum of service.

**NCFA Recommendation 49:** As recommended in 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense should plan in fiscal year 2017 and execute no later than the end of fiscal year 2018 a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability...
to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of national mobilization.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. After reviewing the 2010 QDR, the Board found that senior officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for preparing the 2010 QDR did not ensure that it complied with the requirements of Title 10, Section 118. Title 10 requires that the QDR include “the anticipated roles and missions of the Reserve Components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the Reserve Components can capably fulfill those roles and missions.” Those capabilities are generated during pre- and post-mobilization training. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey’s call, in his assessment of the 2014 QDR, for a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize the entire force reinforces this recommendation.

**NCFA Recommendation 52:** The Secretary of Defense should incorporate in defense planning and fiscal guidance the analysis of Army expansion requirements for force-sizing and capability-mix analyses in fiscal year 2017. This guidance would give priority to the retention of expansion-required leaders, infrastructure, and materiel in the defense budget and program.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The NCFA points out that since the future strategic environment cannot be predicted with certainty, the Army should protect its ability to regenerate capabilities and expand the force whenever necessary. The RFPB has previously expressed concern about the increasing risk associated with Active Component force structure reductions. While the Board specifically recommended preserving Reserve Component structure to mitigate this risk, the Board’s principal concern was ensuring that the Services retained sufficient ability to generate the forces it needs to meet operational demands. The Board also recommended the reinvigoration of the Title XI program which commits Active Component manpower to enhance Reserve Component combat readiness. The Board recommended this for three reasons. First, it would accomplish its statutory goal to sustain our hard-won Reserve Component readiness. Second, it would restore a valuable mechanism to break down cultural barriers and foster cooperation and integration between the components. Third, it would retain a sizeable pool of mid-grade leaders on active duty, which is
essential for rapidly reestablishing Active Component force structure should it become necessary.

**NCFA Recommendation 57:** Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should implement the Commission’s plan (Option Three) for distribution of the Apache fleet. The Commission’s plan maintains twenty-four manned Apache battalions including twenty in the Regular Army equipped with twenty-four aircraft each and four in the Army National Guard equipped with eighteen aircraft each. The plan adds only two Black Hawk battalions to the Army National Guard. The Army should commit to using the four Army National Guard Apache battalions regularly, mobilizing and deploying them in peacetime and war.

**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. This recommendation maintains twenty-four manned Apache battalions in the Army. Of these twenty-four battalions, twenty would be in the Regular Army (same as under the ARI) and four would be in the Army National Guard (compared to zero under the ARI). All of the Regular Army battalions would be equipped with twenty-four aircraft. The four Army National Guard battalions would be equipped with eighteen aircraft and thus would have to cross-level helicopters before deploying. The Board supports this recommendation because it ensures sufficient structural capacity to meet potential warfighting demands while maintaining a force mix that includes strategic depth in the Reserve Components.

**NCFA Recommendation 26:** The Army must manage and provide forces under the Total Force approach.

**NCFA Recommendation 27:** The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions that would allow individuals from all components to fill positions to foster an Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components. A review should be completed within nine months after publication of this report, and any new designations should be completed within eighteen months.

**NCFA Recommendation 32:** The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.

**NCFA Recommendation 33:** The Army should add specific guidance on goals for future use of multicomponent units and related initiatives to the Army’s Total Force Policy Implementation Guidance for fiscal year 2017.
**Recommendation:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support these Commission recommendations. The Board overwhelmingly believes that the most important recommendations of the Commission dealt with the promotion of better integration among the components of the Army. The Board has also made this argument, recommending to the Department that the Services should better integrate their forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment. While the Board has also lauded the Army for recent steps toward better integration, it has concluded that more can be done. The Commission similarly concluded that for the sake of a more effective and efficient Army and to achieve greater strategic depth, more must be done to fully implement a comprehensive partnership among the components and integrated programs. In this vein, the Board has also proposed that: the Army move toward stronger integration of its combat forces through a test integrating Reserve Component maneuver battalions into Active Component Brigade Combat Teams; that the Department should reinvigorate the Title XI program, which commits Active Component manpower to enhance Reserve Component Combat Readiness; and that the Services implement an AC-RC teaming or partnering program to encourage integrated operational training.

Chairman Punaro thanked all in attendance for their support of the RFPB and the men and women of the Reserve Components and adjourned the meeting.

**Quarterly Meeting – June 8, 2016**

The quarterly meeting was held on March 9, 2016 in the Secretary of Defense Conference Room. Presentations were made by SGM Terry Grezlik, Executive Officer to the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Honorable Eric Fanning, Secretary of the Army, The Honorable Peter Levine, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, The Honorable Todd Weiler, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Mr. Joe Adams, Institute for Defense Analyses, Lt Gen (Ret) Charles Stenner, Subcommittee Chair for Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel, MG Tim Orr, Subcommittee Chair on Enhancing DoD's Role in the Homeland, Mr. Jose Mayorga, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, VADM (Ret) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve, Dr. Karen Guice, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, MajGen Burke Whitman, RFPB Member, and Mr. Mark Cancian, RFPB Consultant.
MajGen (Ret) Arnold Punaro, Chairman, presented a Secretary of Defense Appreciation certificate to outgoing Board member RDML Brian LaRoche.

Chairman Punaro called the closed portion of the meeting to order and announced, as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), that the Designated Federal Officer was present and had pre-approved the opening of the meeting and the agenda.

Chairman Punaro then introduced SGM Terry A. Grezlik, Executive Officer to the Senior Enlisted Advisor (SEA) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SGM Grezlik provided his career history as an anecdotal example of expertise and diversity of experience brought to the force by today’s enlisted active and reserve component members. He discussed the role of the SEA as the voice of the joint enlisted force, and provided examples of the enlisted perspective to the board.

SGM Grezlik provided his thoughts on the greatest concerns of enlisted members, stating he is most often asked about the future of medical care and retirement.
He emphasized the importance of proactively and persistently communicating changes and subsequent impacts across all levels of military personnel.

Chairman Punaro thanked SGM Grezlik, and then introduced The Honorable Eric Fanning, Secretary of the Army. Secretary Fanning discussed the total force perspective of the Army, increasing integration between components, and smarter ways of recruiting, retaining, and employing the force. He stated when the Army meets future end strength numbers, 54% of the force will reside in the Reserve Component. He noted reserve soldiers want to deploy, and that the Army is increasingly involving state Adjutants General in decision making processes.

Secretary Fanning cautioned that increasing communications is not the sole solution, and emphasized the importance of honesty, especially as we cast aside old concepts and begin stress-testing total force integration. He discussed ongoing assessments of recruiting efforts, stating we can actually recruit fewer personnel but maintain greater numbers if we can target the right people, who will not attrite out and will likely stay beyond their initial enlistment period.

Chairman Punaro thanked Secretary Fanning, and then introduced The Honorable Peter Levine, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
Secretary Levine summarized actions accomplished since his April appointment as Acting USD P&R, highlighting upcoming announcements of additional Force of the Future initiatives as well as the department’s review of Goldwater-Nichols and joint officer qualifications. He described three targeted legislative proposals; voluntary opt-out of promotion cycle, enhanced lateral entry for hard to recruit/train career fields, and lineal number adjustment authority.

Secretary Levine stated that generally, he is analyzing needs for deviation from normal personnel systems, and would like to see overarching authorization for services to identify critical career fields for specific capability to build capacity. He discussed civilian hiring, noting civil service should be offered to military academy graduates unable to serve militarily as an alternative, and added that he would like to see a civilian direct hiring authority for recent graduates, as opposed to the current system which requires application and processing through the Office of Personnel Management USAJOBS system.

Secretary Levine briefly addressed the ASD Reserve Affairs reorganization, stating the department will need to continue to monitor and assess the effectiveness of these changes, to ensure the specific expertise needed to address unique reserve component issues is not lost.

The Chairman thanked Secretary Levine. He then called the open session of the meeting to order and announced, as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, that the Designated Federal Officer was present and had pre-approved the opening of the meeting and the agenda. The Chairman announced the meeting was open to the public and noted no persons had submitted requests to appear before the Board. The Chairman asked if anyone present wished to address the Board and no one indicated a desire to do so.

Chairman Punaro then introduced The Honorable Todd Weiler, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Secretary Weiler stated his goal was to parallel the structure of service Manpower and Reserve Affairs offices in his organization, but while eliminating barriers due to cultural differences. He discussed reserve component duty status reform, noting this was an opportunity for significant change, but added changes must be accomplished with consideration so that the end result is good, and not just fast.

Secretary Weiler noted the need to ensure recent accomplishments are not lost in the upcoming transition of administrations, especially ideas and concepts in some stage of development that have not yet been implemented. He addressed demographics of the all-volunteer force, noting how better permeability between
the components could help in reversing troubling trends. He suggested that as the services improve permeability between components, we will see an increase in diversity among recruits.

Chairman Punaro thanked Secretary Weiler, and then introduced Mr. Joseph Adams, Institute for Defense Analyses. Mr. Adams provided a brief review of previously presented findings on IDA’s study of RC performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and then detailed subsequent actions including testing of methods of analysis for accuracy and briefings to Reserve Component chiefs. He stated the data continues to indicate no significant differences in combat performance between components of a service, and overall operations were characterized by a shared risk and shared burden.

Mr. Adams noted performance data was not readily captured, and that only available data could be analyzed, but discussed the quantitative sources used, as well as the numerous anecdotal interviews that were converted into measurable data. He concluded with a summary of remaining tasks, an estimated time of completion, and a brief overview of the next part of the study covering Operation Enduring Freedom.

Chairman Punaro thanked Mr. Adams, and then recognized Lt Gen (Ret) Charles Stenner, Subcommittee Chair for Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel. Lt Gen Stenner reviewed key personnel changeover within OSD since the last RFPB meeting, including Secretary Levine and Secretary Weiler. He provided an update on the Personnel Subcommittee’s monitoring of the Force of the Future initiative, noting Secretary Levine’s focus on what is most important, and what can reasonably be accomplished in this administration’s remaining time.

Lt Gen Stenner discussed the Personnel Subcommittee’s continuing interest in Force of the Future, Blended Retirement, Duty Status Reform, Military Technician Reduction/Conversion, and Post-9/11 GI Bill Entitlements for Full Time National Guard Duty. He presented a brief update and current status on each of these topics. He concluded by stating that the Personnel Subcommittee would continue to work with OSD and the Services to determine potential reserve component impacts, while increasing collaboration with service-specific policy committees and boards on relevant issues.

Chairman Punaro thanked Lt Gen Stenner and then recognized MG Tim Orr, Subcommittee Chair on Enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland. MG Orr invited Mr. Jose Mayorga, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security, to discuss the unique aspects and qualities of domestic cyber defense operations.

Mr. Mayorga discussed focusing on cyber activities in the homeland, integration of the Reserve Component into the cyber mission force, and development of the cyber policy memo signed in May, 2016. He analyzed one of the primary questions identified concerning the use of the Reserve Component in homeland cyber operations, asking what can reserve component forces do under the context of total force training that can benefit a third party.

Mr. Mayorga expanded on the limitations required to function within these parameters, stating operations could not be offensive, could not provide assistance to law enforcement, and would be limited to protecting DoD infrastructure, enhancing situational awareness, and restricted to the Secret level or below unless expressly approved by SECDEF. He provided a brief overview of DoD homeland cyber assets, to include Army National Guard Cyber Protection Teams, and Air National Guard Cyber Protection Squadrons. He noted differences in the services’ approach to cyber force reserve component integration, stating the Air Force designed organizations from the outset to be total force, while the Army generally regards the Reserve Component as a surge force in cyber.

Chairman Punaro thanked MG Orr and Mr. Mayorga, and then recognized VADM (Ret) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve. VADM Cotton provided a brief update on the RFPB recommendation of a definition for “Operational Reserve,” and then introduced Dr. Karen Guice, Acting Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to discuss medical readiness and observable disparities between services and components within services.

Dr. Guice addressed a 2012 RAND study recommending standardization/optimization of physical health assessments, as well as standardization of data collection and measurement. She provided a review of DoD policy, noting six criteria of readiness and four ratings of medical readiness, but noted that the different ratings mean different things to different services.

Dr. Guice observed that standardization is improving, which in turn is improving lack of readiness due to administrative issues, but then questioned whether or not the 85% standard was sufficient or if it should be raised. She discussed initiatives to increase and expand the range of medical health care providers, such as finding a way to credential and certify combat medics, and expanded use of telemedicine.

Chairman Punaro thanked VADM Cotton and Dr. Guice. He then discussed Senate
Armed Services Committee provisions on General and Flag Officers contained in S. 2943, the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, and proposed the three RFPB subcommittee chairs look at how streamlining could be accomplished without adversely influencing reserve component representation at the most senior levels.

Chairman Punaro then recognized MajGen Burke Whitman, RFPB Member, to provide an update on the New Administration Transition Book, with a current list of issues intended for inclusion. MajGen Whitman asked the board for additional issues to be considered, and the following issues were recommended for addition:

- General Officer/Flag Officer numbers and distribution
- Reserve Component integration in cyber missions
- Reserve Component/Active Component cost comparison update
- Reserve Component Medical Readiness
- Installation and infrastructure reduction
- Myths about the Reserve Component and Accessibility

Chairman Punaro thanked MajGen Whitman and then recognized Mr. Mark Cancian, RFPB Consultant, to address Goldwater-Nichols reform efforts and current defense budget information. Mr. Cancian provided a summary of congressional proposals to address issues targeted by the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation. He provided a review of the original legislation and the rationale, conditions, and interests behind it.

Mr. Cancian noted that both the House and Senate versions of the 2017 NDAA with provisions to reform Goldwater-Nichols have been threatened with a presidential veto, though due to different controversial proposals in each version. He observed the majority of proposed reforms address the following organizations/areas:

- Size/makeup of the National Security Council
- DoD Acquisition
- Reduction of General/Flag officers
- DoD Infrastructure
- Combatant Command structure and composition
- Joint Staff structure and composition
- Other DoD organizational issues
Mr. Cancian pointed out that none of the reform proposals are really designed or intended to save money.

Chairman Punaro thanked all in attendance for their support of the RFPB and the men and women of the Reserve Components and the meeting was adjourned.

**Quarterly Meeting – September 15, 2016**

The quarterly meeting was held on September 15, 2016 at Army Navy Country Club in Arlington, Virginia. The entire meeting was held in “Open” session with presentations made by The Honorable Dr. Janine Davidson, Under Secretary of the Navy, Gen. Joseph Lengyel, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, MajGen Burke Whitman, RFPB member, SGM Michael Lewis, RFPB Senior Enlisted Advisor, Mr. Matthew Dubois, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Integration, Lt Gen (Ret) Charles Stenner, Subcommittee Chair for Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel, Ms. Jeri Busch, Director, Military Compensation Policy, VADM (Ret) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve, and Mr. Mark Cancian, RFPB Consultant.
Chairman Punaro administered the oath of office to new Board members Dr. Nora Bensahel, Maj Gen Daryl Bohac, RDML Linda Wackerman, SGM Michael Lewis, and new consultants Maj Jason Hollan, LT Lena Moore, and Capt Austin Murnane. He then presided over an awards ceremony for departing Board members Dr. Janine Davidson and Lt Gen L. Scott Rice, as well as staff member SFC India Boddie.

Chairman Punaro then called the open session of the meeting to order and announced, as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, that the Designated Federal Officer was present and had pre-approved the opening of the meeting and the agenda. The Chairman announced the meeting was open to the public and noted no persons had submitted requests to appear before the Board. The Chairman asked if anyone present wished to address the Board and no one indicated a desire to do so.

Chairman Punaro then introduced The Honorable Dr. Janine Davidson, Under Secretary of the Navy. Dr. Davidson began by stating that her time on the RFPB and the Air Force Commission has given her tremendous perspective for her daily activities in her new position as the Under Secretary of the Navy. She shares the Secretary of the Navy's priorities which are his “4 P's” - People, Power, Platforms, and Partnerships, and within those priorities, her areas of focus are primarily the internal functions of the Navy.
Dr. Davidson discussed the need to ensure the budget is strategy informed, stating “what we are buying is directly linked to how we fight.” She then outlined five focus areas she has identified to address immediate issues. Her first focus area is the Navy’s Strategy and Budget. She wants to balance the Navy & Marine Corps maritime strategy with the high capital demands of ships and aircraft, while keeping the operational emphasis on effective and efficient employment of assets against Russia, China, Iran, and other antagonists.

Dr. Davidson stated her second focus area is resetting and modernizing Navy Forces after 15 years of high operational tempo, to include addressing the age of equipment, parts availability, cannibalization rates, and loss of experienced maintainers.

Dr. Davidson’s third focus area is meeting the Navy’s Headquarters reduction requirements while minimizing the loss of logistical support and experience provided by critical civilian personnel. She also wants to counteract the impression that Navy civilians are not fully valued members of the team.

Dr. Davidson’s fourth focus area is Innovation. She stated the Secretary of the Navy is increasingly encouraging technology to assist in the warfight, and is examining F-35 aircraft on amphibious ships, and unmanned systems in the air, sea, land, and under-the-sea domains. She emphasized that proper planning for data management and integration of this technology will be critical especially considering cyber security issues. She stated one of the Navy’s largest challenges will be funding the replacement for the Ohio class submarine in the mid-2020s.

Dr. Davidson’s final focus area is People. She stated that the Force of the Future initiatives aimed at recruiting and retaining experienced people will be critical to manning the Navy. She stated the cyber security career field exemplifies areas where the military is unable to compete with civilian industry. Members with critical expertise are leaving the service for higher paying jobs, but they still want to serve, and that the Reserves provide an opportunity for a continuum of service and continued return on training investment. She also stated that the Continuum of Service initiative could potentially allow for a return to active service for select personnel.

Chairman Punaro thanked Dr. Davidson and then introduced Gen Joseph Lengyel, Chief, National Guard Bureau. Gen Lengyel began by saying that the relationship between the National Guard and the Active Services is excellent and has synchronized the employment of combat capabilities within the Total Force. He said that he is inspired, optimistic, and hopeful that his tenure as the Chief of
the National Guard will be easy given this positive atmosphere, but he warned that the relationship is still fragile and requires constant communication and increased understanding.

Gen Lengyel defined the National Guard’s three mission sets as the Warfight, the Homeland, and Partnerships. He said these mission sets help to maintain the operational force with the goal of investing in readiness through sustained operations as part of the Total Force. For Warfighting, the Guard units meet federal standards and are ready for mobilization. For the Homeland, the Guard is ready for immediate response and can be there for the long haul. For Partnerships, the Guard is developing interactive international relationships with foreign countries, but also building partnerships with components to create a unity of effort, both in the homeland and abroad.

Gen Lengyel then discussed Army Guard and Air Guard personnel utilization rates for FY 2016 domestic and international operations. He further briefed that the National Guard mobilizations since 2001 peaked around 117,000 with OCONUS requirements combined with domestic support for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, but now is stabilized at approximately 10,000, demonstrating additional capacity which could be postured against known future requirements. He discussed Guard issues with ongoing funding constraints, and added that most challenges facing the Guard are universally applicable across the services and components. These challenges include sustainability, readiness, instability, pending legislation, and others.

Gen Lengyel added that predictability and advanced notification are critical factors in maximizing the effectiveness of the National Guard, and that continuing integrated training with Active Components and is essential to maintain readiness and interoperability. He noted that modernization of National Guard equipment is at the highest level he has ever seen, and mostly on par with the Active Components, which increases the effectiveness of total force training.

Gen Lengyel concluded by stating proposed cuts to General Officer and Flag Officer billets would likely disproportionally affect the National Guard and Reserve. He noted this would likely damage relationships with the Active Components because the lines of communication would shift, and parity between components in similar positions could be lost.

Chairman Punaro thanked Gen Lengyel and then recognized MajGen Burke Whitman, RFPB Board Member, who provided an update on the New Administration Transition Report, with a current list of issues intended for inclusion. The issues
were discussed and analyzed by Board members, and after deliberation the Board voted to submit the report to the Secretary of Defense for delivery to the Transition Team.

Chairman Punaro thanked MajGen Whitman and then recognized SGM Michael Lewis, Senior Enlisted Advisor to the RFPB, who presented a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on proposed changes to the RFPB Senior Enlisted Advisor (SEA) Billet. A recent policy change by Washington Headquarters Services had limited the SEA billet to only Army Reserve personnel, where previously it had been open to any of the Reserve Components. The proposal recommended reestablishing the billet as rotational with candidate recommendations from each service. After careful review and analysis, the Board voted to submit a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to restore the billet to its previous rotational status in accordance with standing federal statute.

Chairman Punaro thanked SGM Lewis and provided proposals to the board for FY 2017 and 2018 meeting dates, subcommittee membership, and content for the FY 2016 RFPB annual report. All proposals were agreed to by vote as presented for acceptance and publication to the RFPB website.

Chairman Punaro then introduced Mr. Matthew Dubois, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Integration, to discuss the recent reorganization of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Reserve Affairs. He outlined organizational changes, stating that the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Health Affairs, Reserve Affairs, and Readiness/Force Management were replaced by Health Affairs, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Readiness, in order to prioritize readiness and prevent isolation of Reserve issues to one office.

Mr. Dubois briefed that the change from Reserve Affairs to Manpower and Reserve Affairs in theory still complies with statutory requirements of Title 10. He noted the reorganization distributed a number of reserve component functions and manning throughout the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD P&R). He stated that, for the most part, the reorganization is a good news story, with mostly appropriate integration assisting the right OUSD P&R organizations in Reserve-relevant areas, such as the Duty Status Reform or Blended Retirement.

Mr. Dubois stated that during the reorganization, his Reserve Integration office was created to assume the Reserve functions that didn’t fit anywhere else, though many key functions, such as reserve component mobilization, readiness, training,
facilities, resources, intelligence, cyber, and data integration did not fall within his office’s responsibility. These functions were distributed to OSD staff.

Mr. Dubois emphasized that as an unforeseen result of the reorganization, some Reserve functions are being overlooked, and that he spends a significant amount of time convincing the appropriate offices of their responsibilities for specific functions. Often he finds those Reserve functions are taking a back seat to the office’s primary functions. These issues emerged immediately after the reorganization on November 1, 2015, and have been growing ever since. He provided examples of programs without clearly defined management by a specific office, including the Individual Ready Reserve and reserve mobilization.

Mr. Dubois stated that he feels that the current structure does not provide for a central advocate who supports and manages Reserve issues, and is therefore not meeting Title 10 requirements for reserve component oversight. As a result, staff responses to reserve component issues have degraded from preventative and proactive to entirely reactive.

Chairman Punaro recommended the RFPB consider a working group to perform an independent analysis of the ASD RA reorganization sometime in the next calendar year. Lt Gen Stenner asked the Reserve Chiefs’ opinions about this reorganization. Mr. Dubois commented that not all reserve positions in OSD are being utilized correctly and would advise the Chiefs that some should not be filled. MG Lord commented that the RFPB staff could review the issue and provide recommendations on assessment of the reorganization and gather the views of the Reserve Component Chiefs.

Chairman Punaro thanked Mr. Dubois and recognized Lt Gen (Ret) Charles Stenner, Subcommittee Chair on Supporting and Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel. Lt Gen Stenner provided a briefing on personnel system reforms concerning the Blended Retirement System (BRS), and the RFPB recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on Senate-proposed reductions to General Officer/Flag Officer positions.

Lt Gen Stenner introduced Ms. Jeri Busch, Director, Military Compensation Policy, who provided a briefing on the Uniformed Services BRS scheduled for implementation on January 1, 2018, and specifically its impact on reserve component members. She compared the current retirement system with BRS, stating that under BRS, 85% of service members will receive some retirement benefit, compared to only 14% of Reservists under the current system. The BRS combines a defined benefit, individual contribution to the Thrift Savings Plan, DoD
automatic contributions to TSP, and DoD matching TSP contribution up to 4%. BRS also includes the possibility of continuation pay and a lump sum distribution.

Ms. Busch briefed BRS eligibility and timelines for opt in/opt out decisions. Eligibility for reserve component members is based on accrued retirement points, rather than total years of service. Because of this, a larger percentage of reserve component personnel will be eligible at initial BRS implementation than Active Component members. Ms. Busch stated eligibility is defined in 10 USC Section 12733. She added the decision to opt in is irrevocable, and that Retired Reserve, Inactive National Guard, and Inactive Standby List RC members are not eligible for BRS.

Ms. Busch continued, stating members are eligible for continuation pay after 12 years or 4,320 points. A four year Selective Reserve service commitment is required. She emphasized that everyone who qualifies for retention pay will get something based on defined multipliers of monthly basic pay, which are 0.5 to 6 for the Reserve Component and 2.5 to 13 for the Active Component.

Regarding training and education, Ms. Busch stated BRS leader’s training started in June of 2016 and additional BRS courses have been developed or are under development on Joint Knowledge Online. Members will have a requirement to complete informational training within their first two years of service. She revealed that OUSD (P&R) has staffed two proposed legislative changes to address concerns with the BRS - one concerning the time frame for continuation pay and the other to address the continuation pay multiplier for Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and/or Full Time Support (FTS) RC members. She stated that timing of non-regular retirement annuity does not change – RC members are eligible to begin receiving annuity at age 60 (unless reduced), and a lump sum of 25% or 50% may be elected.

Lt Gen Stenner thanked Ms. Busch and then outlined the proposed General and Flag Officer (G/FO) reductions contained in Senate bill 2943 Sections 501, 502, and 503, also known as the National Defense Authorization Act for 2017. He provided a proposed RFPB response developed by the three RFPB subcommittee chairs. After analysis of the issue, discussion, and deliberation, the Board voted to make the following recommendations to the Secretary of Defense:

**Recommendation:** Retain the statutory requirement of O-9 for the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard, and the Chiefs of each Reserve Component.

**Recommendation:** The RFPB supports amending the language of the FY 2008 NDAA, which mandates the NORTHCOM deputy commander only be filled
by a National Guard member. Place the best Reserve Component Officer, regardless of component, in the commander or deputy commander positions at NORTHCOM. Evaluate other key leadership positions to be filled by Reserve Component Officers.

Chairman Punaro thanked Lt Gen Stenner and recognized VADM (Ret) John Cotton, Subcommittee Chair, Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available, and Sustainable Operational Reserve Subcommittee. VADM Cotton provided an update on the Operational Reserve Definition and the Presidential Declaration of National Emergency (DNE) and corresponding transition from Title 12302 to 12304(b) involuntary mobilization authority.

VADM Cotton provided an update on the RFPB’s “Operational Reserve” definition recommendation that was submitted in April 2016 and stated there has been no response or action to date. He reviewed the desired outcomes of the recommendation and suggested the Operational Reserve definition be included in the RFPB Transition Report.

VADM Cotton then discussed the Presidential Declaration of National Emergency (DNE) that provides authority for the primary method of involuntary mobilization for Reserve members and units since 2001. He stated this authority authorizes involuntary activation of up to 1 million personnel for up to 24 months under Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 12302, but requires the aforementioned DNE. He added the DNE was enacted by President Bush shortly after September 11, 2001, and has been renewed annually since, but that further renewal by a new administration is questionable.

VADM Cotton briefed that DEPSECDEF Work tasked DoD and the Services to develop a plan by December 01, 2016 to examine effects and provide courses of action for transition from a Reserve Access Authority under Title 12302 to Title 12304(b) as defined in DoDI 1235.12 by 30 September 2017.

VADM Cotton presented potential problems in the use of the 12304(b). He stated as currently written, the authority limits the flexibility for use of the Reserves for emergent requirements due to a 365 day limit on Reserve activation and a requirement that mobilizations be pre-budgeted and pre-planned. He also discussed disparities in benefits between 12302 and 12304(b), even though the actual missions could be identical. He discussed proposed Title 12304(b) improvements, including numerous DoD Legislative change proposals, 2017 Housed Armed Services Committee NDAA draft language, and internal DoD efforts to achieve benefits parity. He mentioned that OSD/HA is looking at early/extended
Tricare for Reserve members and that draft 2017 VA legislation includes provisions to provide eligibility for GI Bill benefits under 12304(b).

VADM Cotton briefed his subcommittee would continue to monitor DNE, NDAA, and 2017 Budget developments, as well as DoD internal proposed changes, initiatives, and application of benefits. He said the subcommittee would coordinate with Service comptrollers for FYDP forecasting and budgeting for Title 12304(b), and emphasize with Services the need for proactive expectation management and education regarding eligibility for benefits for Reserve members scheduled for activation under Title 12304(b). He stated he would revisit these issues regularly to determine whether RFPB action is warranted to ensure authorities do not limit regular operational employment of the Reserves.

Chairman Punaro thanked VADM Cotton and recognized Mr. Mark Cancian, RFPB Consultant, who provided an update on Goldwater-Nichols reform efforts, Overseas Contingency Operations funding (OCO), and Force Structure recommendations. Mr. Cancian updated the board on reform issues discussed during the previous meeting, highlighting cuts in General/Flag officer positions, reductions in 3-star and 4-star AC/RC billets, and a 25% cut in civilian SES personnel. He noted that that the Administration supports the general concept, but objects to its scale and specificity. Chairman Punaro noted the RFPB at its previous meeting had recommended that the O-9 rank be retained for the chiefs of the Reserve Components.

Mr. Cancian then discussed proposed reforms to strategy and planning, the Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD organizational issues, officer early promotions, health care restructuring, changes to the Blended Retirement System, and the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service. He stated that the NDAA in expected form faces a high veto potential due to disputed OCO funding, Guantanamo Bay detainee restrictions, and many restructuring provisions.

Mr. Cancian then expanded on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. He noted OCO was designated for wartime operations and is not restricted by BCA caps. OCO uses and limitations were formally published by the Office of Management and Budget, limiting use by geography and purpose; specifically combat operations including combat losses, reset, training, and special equipment. He noted there have been frequent exceptions to this interpretation by the Executive Branch and Congress, such as the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account and the 2013 and 2015 budget deals.
Mr. Cancian discussed how regular use of OCO in recent years has led some budget personnel to argue the RC costs more. He stated costs covered by OCO don’t require offsets, while costs not covered by OCO come out of capped base budget and use of RC forces requires offsets. He provided the example of peacekeeping rotations in the Sinai peninsula. This mission is not covered by OCO, and RC employment for this mission creates a $40 billion dollar cost above the planned budget, whereas use of AC forces does not create an additional expense. He noted as a counter argument that RC use in this type of mission temporarily increases AC end strength and therefore reduces Operational Tempo. He suggested that the RC should push for more aggressive use of OCO to get around disputes over base budget funds.

Mr. Cancian concluded with a reminder to the Board that not all force structure discussions are taking place from a total force perspective, and that efforts to provide education by the RFPB and other RC proponents must continue.

Chairman Punaro thanked Mr. Cancian and all in attendance for their support of the RFPB and the men and women of our Reserve Components. The Reserve Forces Policy Board concluded business and the meeting was adjourned.
Airmen maneuver through concealing smoke during tactical combat casualty care training at Francis S. Gabreski Airport in Westhampton Beach, N.Y., Oct. 21, 2016. The airmen, assigned to the 106th Rescue Wing Security Forces Squadron, learned to react to enemy contact and attacks from improvised explosive devices while focusing on combat care. (Air National Guard photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher S. Muncy)
Other Activities

Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom

The deployment of reserve component forces during OIF has been the largest since World War II. The Reserve Components demonstrated their availability and reliability in providing forces for operational use through a decade of sustained combat operations. Commanders and senior Department of Defense officials have lauded reserve component contributions and performance. Some have even publicly commented that the Reserve Components are as effective as their active counterparts; however, the Department does not have thorough, deliberate analysis of the effectiveness of reserve component units in a theater of operations.

The RFPB’s report on Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense recommended that such an analysis be conducted in order to form future RFPB recommendations on the effective utilization and employment of National Guard and Reserve forces.

In May 2015, the RFPB commissioned a $1.2 million study by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) on the operational effectiveness of the Reserve Components with data collected during OIF and OEF from 2001-2014.

In late 2016, IDA completed the analysis of data from OIF in a report titled Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Executive Summary is included below. The full report is available on the RFPB website at http://rfpb.defense.gov. IDA subsequently began analysis of similar data for OEF, and completion of that portion of the study is expected in mid-2017.

A Marine fires his M240G machine gun during a live-fire weapons training exercise as part of Javelin Thrust 2012 on Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., July 9, 2012. The Marine is assigned to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Law Enforcement Battalion. Javelin Thrust is an annual exercise that allows active and reserve Marines and sailors from 38 different states to train together.
Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Joseph Adams
Amy Alrich
John Brinkerhoff
Rachel Dubin
Ann Gilbride
Lance Hancock
Jeffery Jaworski
Drew Miller
Daniel Nakada
Pete Picucci
Richard Polin
Jenns Robertson
Brandon Shapiro
Katherine Vinci
Executive Summary

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn (OND), Americans witnessed the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of reserve component (RC) members who answered the call of duty to serve their nation during a time of conflict. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) tracks the individuals deployed in various databases, while history offices, lessons learned organizations, and numerous publications highlight OIF operations. What is absent is how well the individuals and organizations performed with respect to standards, doctrine, and expectations, given resourcing, equipping, training, and time constraints. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) tasked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to conduct an operational assessment of RC forces in support of OIF/OND, from the years 2003 to 2011. To the extent possible, IDA was to identify data that could be used to quantify RC performance and where comparative analyses could be conducted.

A. Background

The armed forces were already involved in operations both at home and abroad when OIF commenced. No-fly zones were being maintained over Iraq, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) were underway, along with other global operations. RC forces were already being utilized to meet these commitments. States also used their National Guard forces following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, placing members in airports for additional security.

Correspondence between senior DOD leadership leading up to OIF features requests by the Services to increase the number of RC members involuntarily mobilized, and an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) response to those requests, which could be characterized as both cautioned and incremental.1 This correspondence also depicts an iterative learning process on how RC forces could be used.2 There was a general concern regarding overutilization of the RC and a preference for seeking individuals to mobilize voluntarily vice involuntarily mobilizing entire RC units.3 It is important to understand this context regarding future RC use.

1 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Partial Mobilization (World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks) and Redelegation of Authority Under Title 10, United States Code, Sections 123, 1123a, 527, 12006, 12302, and 112305, 12011, and 12012, 9 September 2001.
2 David S.C. Chu, Information Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Ordering the National Guard to Federal Active Duty, 7 November 2002.
B. Research Methodology

The first phase of the research entailed identifying operational data that could be used for assessments. Operational assessments are defined in joint doctrine as a continuous process that supports decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task or achieving an objective, with the assessment process commencing with the initiation of joint operational planning. 4 IDA engaged the Joint Staff, the military Services, combatant commands, OSD, and others to see what assessments had been conducted and also commenced a literature review on OIF assessments. Due to the absence of a DOD-wide repository of operational performance data, IDA had to rely on other data sources in order to conduct the assessment for the second phase of the research.

1. Data Extracts

IDA queried the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) for data extracts identifying monthly deployments from September 2001 through December 2014. This data would answer questions related to “who” served in OIF during what time periods.

2. Other Sources of Data

IDA was able to locate and acquire these sources of data for analysis: Significant Activities (SIGACTs) database; Theater History of Operations Reports (THOR)/Mission Report (MISREP) Analysis Tool; mobility databases; DMDC’s Defense Casualty Analysis System; accidental injury data from the Services; archived histories, testimonies, interviews, after action reports, and surveys; and studies conducted by other research organizations.

Since IDA was tasked to comment on the entire mobilization and deployment process, it was necessary to interview relevant senior officials who could provide contextual insights into the decisions associated with operational planning, readiness, personnel and force management, and the conduct of the OIF. Interview participants consisted of over 100 officials and included: Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; combatant and other warfighting commanders at all echelons; Military Service Chiefs; Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau; key DOD senior civilians; RC chiefs; State Adjutant Generals; and readiness and mobilization chiefs of the Joint Staff and the Services. Interviews were conducted “not for attribution” and, to the extent possible, when an official was from one Military Service and had supervision of or could comment on the performance of another Military Service and component, IDA documented those remarks. IDA used as many of the sources of data that could be applied to a specific Military Service.

4 Ibid.
C. Findings

1. Analysis of Aggregated Tactical Level Data Depicted No Sizeable Differences Between Active Component (AC) and RC Forces in Measurable Metrics

   Analysis of SIGACTs, THOR/MISREP, and mobility data indicate that RC forces did what they were tasked to do, with no sizeable differences in performance from that of their AC counterparts. Combined with analysis of deployment data, casualty data, and mishap data, findings depict a shared burden and shared risk.

2. Strategic and Operational Leaders Were Generally Pleased With RC Contributions and Performance in Support of OIF

   RC contributions and performance met the intent of leaders at the strategic and operational levels. RC members served the nation during a period of conflict. Without the RC, the nation could not have conducted OIF, met other global commitments, and preserved the All-Volunteer Force.

3. DOD Was Not Well Prepared for Large Scale Mobilization

   From both interviews and archived materials, initially, leaders generally lacked knowledge regarding the use of RC forces, including mobilization authorities and duty status. There was also confusion as to whether the administrative chain of command or the operational chain of command would be responsible for personnel and legal actions associated with RC forces. Over time, resource investments and institutional experience mitigated some of these impacts.

4. Disaggregation of the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) and List Had Major Implications to Services Utilization of RC

   The decision was made not to use the TPFDD and list for OIF. According to research participants, the TPFDD would entail an early alert of RC members. According to joint doctrine, the TPFDD is a critical component of the Joint Operation Planning Process, enabling commanders to assess risks to their plans and then sequence support for the joint force. This disaggregation of the operational plan from the TPFDD would ultimately dictate how the Military Services would be able to source their RC forces in support of OIF, posing force management challenges; RC individuals and organizations often had little advance notice regarding mobilizations. Furthermore, some individuals and units were mobilized and then trained to conduct new missions. TPFFD sourcing for these skills and missions, in many cases, did not exist. The global force management

---

system of today, with supporting infrastructure and systems, did not exist and would later evolve.

5. Relationships Between the AC and the RC Mattered

According to research participants, familiarity between AC and RC counterparts (from previous experiences and professional military education) improved the effectiveness of RC utilization. These relationships, over time, also built a foundation of trust that in many cases did not previously exist.

6. Readiness Levels Mattered; Individual and Collective

Individual readiness challenges added to the burden of cross-leveling personnel in organizations prior to deployment. Limited exposure to the equipment and systems of AC counterparts created a cycle of frustration and expectation mismatch between the AC and the RC. When RC forces had the same equipment and were trained on the same systems as their AC counterparts, they were more easily interchangeable.

7. Friction Between AC and RC Formations Varied

In functions where the RC brought to bear their military and civilian experience, minimal performance friction with the AC seemed to exist. The greatest performance friction appeared in ground combat discussions at division level and below; specifically, in Army National Guard Brigades and Marine Corps Reserve Infantry Battalions.

8. Performance Data Was Not Systematically Collected/Archived DOD-Wide

IDA used a variety of data sources to address the question of RC operational effectiveness. It was apparent that some of this data was collected at various times; despite the fact that joint doctrine describes how this data should be defined and captured, there was no enterprise-wide archiving of this data from OIF.

D. Recommendations

1. The Use of RC Forces Should Be a Major Topic of Service and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

The DOD conducts operations as a Joint, Combined, Total Force; therefore, all military leaders should have a basic knowledge of mobilization authorities and duty statuses for the RC of all Services, and the benefits and limitations associated with each. DOD should consider developing this knowledge earlier in leaders’ careers.
2. **DOD Mobilization Policies Should be Revised to Establish Decision Criteria for When Mobilizations Should Favor Individual Volunteers Vice Full Unit Mobilizations**

   Reliance on individual volunteers may come at the expense of having the option of mobilizing units for operations and sustainment of those operations, and may add to the burden of personnel turnover and cross-leveling.

3. **Infrastructure Readiness for Mobilizations Should be Reported**

   The DOD should have informed knowledge at all times regarding its ability to conduct large scale mobilizations and the associated risks.

4. **The DOD Should Prioritize All Opportunities for AC and RC Engagement and Exercise Mobilizations to Promote Greater Trust and Confidence Across All Components**

   While relationships were developed during OIF, future generations of AC and RC leaders should not wait for a mobilization in order to build relationships. Professional Military Education (PME), exercises, and current operations should all involve a heavy mix of AC and RC. In the absence of mobilizations, DOD should institutionalize exercise mobilizations in order to educate, train, and assess mobilization procedures and policy.

5. **DOD Should Permanently Establish "Individual Accounts" for All RCs Just As It Does For ACs.**

   AC forces have "individual" accounts that provide allowances for Service members who are in trainee status, transient, and separating from the force. Those same types of accounts should be considered for RC units so that there can be better manning of RC formations and, potentially, less cross-leveling of personnel during mobilization.

6. **To the Extent Possible, RC Forces Should Have the Same Systems and Equipment as Their AC Counterparts**

   More effective and efficient use can be made of RC forces if they have the same systems and equipment to train on and deploy with as their AC counterparts.

7. **The DOD Should Ensure That Operational Performance Assessments for All Operations are Captured and Maintained by the Joint Staff**

   Capturing this data during operations would permit objective, quantitative assessments of performance and, perhaps, provide additional information for Joint Operational Planning.
U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Chris Dugger, a firefighter with the 152nd Airlift Wing, Nevada Air National Guard, uses a hammer drill to bore through the concrete wall of a rubble pile to test the air quality behind the wall during Vigilant Guard 2013 in Northglenn, Colo., July 24, 2013. Vigilant Guard is a series of federally funded disaster-response drills conducted by National Guard units working with federal, state and local emergency management agencies and first responders. (DoD photo by Spc. Zach Sheely, U.S. Army National Guard/Released)
During Fiscal Year 2016, the RFPB delivered to the Secretary a total of two reports containing 11 recommendations. This section of the annual report includes a summary of these recommendations provided to the Secretary of Defense by the RFPB.

The RFPB met on March 9, 2016, and voted to recommend the Department consider an official definition for the term “Operational Reserve.”

- Recommendation delivered to the Secretary of Defense on April 11, 2016

Utilization of and reliance upon the Reserve Components to meet operational requirements has increased dramatically since the first Gulf War, transforming the Reserve Components from a strategic to an operational force with capabilities and capacity required to meet global requirements. Today, over 25,000 Reservists and Guardsmen are activated to help meet the needs of the Department. Despite fifteen years of mobilization and support to global operations, as part of the Total Force, some reserve component policies and statutes remain tied to an outdated strategic reserve employment model and hinder access.

While the term “Operational Reserve” is well known and routinely utilized by senior defense officials to describe the Reserve Components, the lack of a formal DoD definition limits recognition of the critical role the Reserve Components play in the Nation’s defense. Officially defining the term “Operational Reserve” will help ensure that the Reserve Component remains a ready, relevant, and responsive element of the Total Force.

The RFPB’s Subcommittee on the Operational Reserve took an in-depth look at how the Services utilize their Reserve Components and met on numerous occasions with representatives from each Service’s Reserve Operations Staff to define what constitutes an Operational Reserve. During these discussions the need for an official definition of the term “Operational Reserve” was validated and the Subcommittee and representatives developed the definition contained below.

The RFPB recommends SECDEF approve the proposed definition for the term “Operational Reserve” for inclusion in all relevant directives, instructions, and publications throughout the Department.
**Proposed Definition:** An Operational Reserve provides ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for military missions that are planned, programmed, and budgeted in coordination with the Active Component.

Approving this definition recognizes the previous contributions of the Reserve Component and the necessity for continued access to meet the needs of the Services, the Department, and the Nation.

“Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board Offering Support to Recommendations from the National Commission of the Future of the Army”

- Recommendation delivered to the Secretary of Defense on April 13, 2016

The RFPB met on March 9, 2016 and voted to recommend the Secretary of Defense support specific recommendations by the National Commission of the Future of the Army.

The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) was established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 to study the structure of the Army, study the transfer of certain aircraft, and to submit a report to the President and the congressional defense committees on these matters by February 1, 2016. The Reserve Forces Policy Board discussed the Commission’s recommendations, and voted to lend strong support to 13 of the 63 NCFA recommendations considered to be Secretary of Defense level issues.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board commends the Commission, and the Commissioners and staff, for their thoughtful and comprehensive analysis in carrying out their mandate from the Congress. Their recommendations, if enacted, will improve the world’s most capable and battle-tested Army.

**NCFA Recommendation 1:** The nation must maintain and sustain an All-Volunteer Force.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board supports an All-Volunteer Total Force and has proposed recommendations aimed at preserving the operational capacity of the force while also expressing concern about the unsustainable growth of the fully burdened and life-cycle costs in our military personnel programs.

**NCFA Recommendation 6:** The Congress and the Administration should return to predictable and responsible budgeting processes that meet minimum funding requirements.
The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The RFPB supports the return to a predictable budgeting process that provides adequate resources to the Department of Defense to ensure access to a manned, ready and modernized Total Force able to meet the needs of the nation, both at home and abroad.

**NCFA Recommendation 12:** The President should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund an Army that maintains an end-strength of at least 980,000 uniformed personnel (450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve) at planned readiness levels.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board continues to believe and recommend that the Department preserve Reserve Component end strength and force structure to help mitigate risk associated with Active Component force structure reductions and to hedge against fiscal and geostrategic uncertainty. The RFPB has emphasized to DoD the significant role the Reserve Components play as a fully integrated part of the operational force and encourages the Department and the Services to program and budget resources to enhance Reserve Component readiness and to plan for their recurring use.

**NCFA Recommendation 30:** The Army should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund no fewer than 3,000 man years annually for 12304b utilization of the Reserve Components. The Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Army and the Office of Management and Budget should also provide for the use of Overseas Contingency Operations and supplemental funding for Reserve Component utilization under 12304b.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board has recommended that DoD should continue to use the Reserve Components operationally and should include requirements for such use in service force generation models and DOD planning, programming, and budget documents. The Board further added that the Department should adapt the Global Force Management process to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for Reserve Component use to facilitate service planning, programming, and budgeting for the activation and employment of Reserve Component forces under Title 10, Section 12304b authority. The absence of adequate 12304b funding limits utilization of the Reserve Component forces for missions for which they are ideally suited.
NCFA Recommendation 31: The Secretary of Defense should update the January 19, 2007, memo “Utilization of the Total Force” to allow flexible involuntary mobilization periods in an effort to achieve common “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) periods for all components.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Commission found that making deployment policies consistent among the components, particularly the duration of BOG in theater, would further foster an integrated Total Force culture, as would Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve cross-component assignments. The RFPB has recommended that the Services should better integrate their forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment. Deploying integrated units serving under common BOG rules is an important step in improving both integration and a sense of Total Force culture in the Army. The Board has also advocated that DoD develop and enforce a revised Total Force Policy that enumerates key principles necessary to encourage a Total Force culture. These actions would, as the Commission’s report suggests, help personnel from each Army component to better understand the other components and how they contribute to an effective Total Force.

NCFA Recommendation 37: The Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should continue to support and adequately fund the Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPSS-A) as the cornerstone to the effective management and enhanced integration of the components of the Army. The Army must maintain the program’s current schedule as a critical underpinning capability for the Army to support the Total Force.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Army components currently operate separate personnel and pay systems, thus creating barriers to personal readiness and a career of service that allows soldiers to transition easily between components. Achieving a singular personnel management and pay system for the whole Army would promote and provide the greatest administrative step toward implementing an integrated Total Force. The RFPB has previously recommended that the Services implement integrated Pay and Personnel Systems, encouraging them to move aggressively to complete implementation of their systems to hasten Reserve Component duty status reform and to allow for a continuum of service.

NCFA Recommendation 49: As recommended in 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense should plan in fiscal year 2017 and execute no
later than the end of fiscal year 2018 a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability
to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of
national mobilization.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission
recommendation. After reviewing the 2010 QDR, the Board found that senior
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for preparing
the 2010 QDR did not ensure that it complied with the requirements of Title
10, Section 118. Title 10 requires that the QDR include “the anticipated roles
and missions of the Reserve Components in the national defense strategy and
the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the Reserve
Components can capably fulfill those roles and missions.” Those capabilities are
generated during pre- and post-mobilization training. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Martin Dempsey’s call, in his assessment of the 2014 QDR, for a
comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize the entire force reinforces
this recommendation.

**NCFA Recommendation 52:** The Secretary of Defense should incorporate in
defense planning and fiscal guidance the analysis of Army expansion requirements
for force-sizing and capability-mix analyses in fiscal year 2017. This guidance
would give priority to the retention of expansion-required leaders, infrastructure,
and materiel in the defense budget and program.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission
recommendation. The NCFA points out that since the future strategic environment
cannot be predicted with certainty, the Army should protect its ability to regenerate
capabilities and expand the force whenever necessary. The RFPB has previously
expressed concern about the increasing risk associated with Active Component
force structure reductions. While the Board specifically recommended preserving
Reserve Component structure to mitigate this risk, the Board’s principal concern was
ensuring that the Services retained sufficient ability to generate the forces it needs
to meet operational demands. The Board also recommended the reinvigoration
of the Title XI program which commits Active Component manpower to enhance
Reserve Component combat readiness. The Board recommended this for three
reasons. First, it would accomplish its statutory goal to sustain our hard-won
Reserve Component readiness. Second, it would restore a valuable mechanism to
break down cultural barriers and foster cooperation and integration between the
components. Third, it would retain a sizeable pool of mid-grade leaders on active
duty, which is essential for rapidly reestablishing Active Component force structure
should it become necessary.
**NCFA Recommendation 57:** Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should implement the Commission’s plan (Option Three) for distribution of the Apache fleet. The Commission’s plan maintains twenty-four manned Apache battalions including twenty in the Regular Army equipped with twenty-four aircraft each and four in the Army National Guard equipped with eighteen aircraft each. The plan adds only two Black Hawk battalions to the Army National Guard. The Army should commit to using the four Army National Guard Apache battalions regularly, mobilizing and deploying them in peacetime and war.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. This recommendation maintains twenty-four manned Apache battalions in the Army. Of these twenty-four battalions, twenty would be in the Regular Army (same as under the ARI) and four would be in the Army National Guard (compared to zero under the ARI). All of the Regular Army battalions would be equipped with twenty-four aircraft. The four Army National Guard battalions would be equipped with eighteen aircraft and thus would have to cross-level helicopters before deploying. The Board supports this recommendation because it ensures sufficient structural capacity to meet potential warfighting demands while maintaining a force mix that includes strategic depth in the Reserve Components.

**NCFA Recommendation 26:** The Army must manage and provide forces under the Total Force approach.

**NCFA Recommendation 27:** The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions that would allow individuals from all components to fill positions to foster an Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components. A review should be completed within nine months after publication of this report, and any new designations should be completed within eighteen months.

**NCFA Recommendation 32:** The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.

**NCFA Recommendation 33:** The Army should add specific guidance on goals for future use of multicomponent units and related initiatives to the Army’s Total Force Policy Implementation Guidance for fiscal year 2017.

The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support these Commission recommendations. The Board overwhelmingly believes that the most important recommendations of the Commission dealt with the promotion of better integration
among the components of the Army. The Board has also made this argument, recommending to the Department that the Services should better integrate their forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment. While the Board has also lauded the Army for recent steps toward better integration, it has concluded that more can be done. The Commission similarly concluded that for the sake of a more effective and efficient Army and to achieve greater strategic depth, more must be done to fully implement a comprehensive partnership among the components and integrated programs. In this vein, the Board has also proposed that: the Army move toward stronger integration of its combat forces through a test integrating Reserve Component maneuver battalions into Active Component Brigade Combat Teams; that the Department should reinvigorate the Title XI program, which commits Active Component manpower to enhance Reserve Component Combat Readiness; and that the Services implement an AC-RC teaming or partnering program to encourage integrated operational training.

U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Sean Meehan, left, and Staff Sgt. Kane Lawlor, both tactical air control party specialists with the 227th Air Support Operations Squadron, New Jersey Air National Guard, provide cover April 10, 2014, after a tactical air insertion with an Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter assigned to the 1st Battalion, 150th Aviation Regiment, New Jersey Army National Guard at Fort Dix, N.J. The New Jersey National Guard participated in a joint training exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps. (DoD photo by Tech. Sgt. Matt Hecht, U.S. Air National Guard/Released)
U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornet aircraft assigned to the River Rattlers, Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 204, fly in a column formation during a photo exercise in Louisiana July 11, 2009. VFA 204 is stationed on Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class John P. Curtis, U.S. Navy /Released)
Impact of Recommendations Made

The RFPB is not required by statute or policy to track or assess the degree to which its recommendations and advice are agreed to or actually implemented by the Department of Defense. However, in an era of increasing fiscal constraint, the Board feels that good governance drives all governmental organizations to be accountable and effective in the use of limited resources devoted to its work.

In order to continually gauge its effectiveness, the RFPB intends to have its staff actively monitor the responses to and implementation of RFPB recommendations by the Department.

Appendix 1 - Members of the RFPB

Major General (Ret) Arnold L. Punaro, US Marine Corps Reserve – Chairman

Reserve Component members
Major General Daryl L. Bohac - Air National Guard Member
Major General Lewis G. Irwin - Army Reserve Member
Major General Timothy E. Orr - Army National Guard Member
Rear Admiral Francis S. Pelkowski - Coast Guard Reserve Member
Rear Admiral Linda R. Wackerman - Navy Reserve Member
Major General Burke W. Whitman - Marine Corps Reserve Member
Major General Sheila Zuehlke - Air Force Reserve Member

Citizens having significant knowledge of and experience in policy matters relevant to National Security and Reserve Component matters
Lieutenant General (Ret) David W. Barno, US Army
Dr. Nora Bensahel, Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, SIS American University
Mr. Phillip E. Carter, Senior Fellow and Counsel, Center for New American Studies
Vice Admiral (Ret) John G. Cotton, US Navy Reserve
Ms. Frances Dawn Halfaker, CEO Halfaker and Associates
Mr. Brett B. Lambert, Vice President of Corporate Strategy, Northrop Grumman Corporation
Ms. MaryAnn E. Tierney, FEMA Region III Administrator
Dr. Charlotte J. Warren, President, Lincoln Land Community College
Major General (Ret) Cornell A. Wilson, Jr., US Marine Corps Reserve

Non-voting members
Major General Walter T. Lord, ARNG - Military Executive Officer
Sergeant Major Michael J. Lewis, ARNG - Senior Enlisted Military Adviser to the Chair

Consultants
Colonel (Ret.) Mark Cancian, USMCR
Major Jason Hollan, USAR
Lieutenant Lena Moore, USNR
Captain Austin Murnane, USMCR
Advisory and Support Staff of the Reserve Forces Policy Board pose for a photo during the September 15, 2016 Board Meeting (Photo: Defense Media Activity)
Appendix 2 - Staff of the RFPB

Military Executive Officer - MG Walter T. Lord
Enlisted Military Advisor - SGM Michael J. Lewis
Chief of Staff - CAPT Jay “Homer” A. Gagne
Designated Federal Officer (DFO) - Mr. Alex J. Sabol
Senior Policy Advisor for Army National Guard - COL William J. Hersh
Senior Policy Advisor for Army Reserve - COL Erik Folkestad
Senior Policy Advisor for Navy Reserve - CAPT Jay “Homer” A. Gagne
Senior Policy Advisor for Marine Corps Reserve - Col Bart L. Pester
Senior Policy Advisor for Air National Guard - Col Matthew M. Groves
Senior Policy Advisor for Air Force Reserve - Col Kevin J. Merrill
Senior Policy Advisor for Coast Guard Reserve - LT James P. McKnight
Administrative Assistant/Executive Secretary - Mrs. Cindy S. Tyrie
Administrative Support - SFC Jay C. Brown
Members with the U.S. Forest Service’s Lassen Interagency Hotshot crew stationed at Susanville, Calif., observe an Alaska Army National Guard UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter approach a landing zone June 30, 2013, over Palmer, Alaska. The 21-member team contained a 40-acre wildfire and conducted clean up operations. (DoD photo by Percy Jones, U.S. Air Force/Released)
Appendix 3 - Governing Statutes

Title 10, United States Code, Section 175. Reserve Forces Policy Board

There is in the Office of the Secretary of Defense a Reserve Forces Policy Board. The functions, membership, and organization of that board are set forth in section 10301 of this title.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 10301. Reserve Forces Policy Board

(a) In General.— As provided in section 175 of this title, there is in the Office of the Secretary of Defense a board known as the “Reserve Forces Policy Board” (in this section referred to as the “Board”).

(b) Functions.— The Board shall serve as an independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components.

(c) Membership.— The Board consists of 20 members, appointed or designated as follows:

(1) A civilian appointed by the Secretary of Defense from among persons determined by the Secretary to have the knowledge of, and experience in, policy matters relevant to national security and reserve component matters necessary to carry out the duties of chair of the Board, who shall serve as chair of the Board.

(2) Two active or retired reserve officers or enlisted members designated by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Army—

(A) one of whom shall be a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or a former member of the Army National Guard of the United States in the Retired Reserve; and

(B) one of whom shall be a member or retired member of the Army Reserve.

(3) Two active or retired reserve officers or enlisted members designated by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy—

(A) one of whom shall be an active or retired officer of the Navy Reserve; and

and
(B) one of whom shall be an active or retired officer of the Marine Corps Reserve.

(4) Two active or retired reserve officers or enlisted members designated by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Air Force—

(A) one of whom shall be a member of the Air National Guard of the United States or a former member of the Air National Guard of the United States in the Retired Reserve; and

(B) one of whom shall be a member or retired member of the Air Force Reserve.

(5) One active or retired reserve officer or enlisted member of the Coast Guard designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(6) Ten persons appointed or designated by the Secretary of Defense, each of whom shall be a United States citizen having significant knowledge of and experience in policy matters relevant to national security and reserve component matters and shall be one of the following:

(A) An individual not employed in any Federal or State department or agency.

(B) An individual employed by a Federal or State department or agency.

(C) An officer of a regular component of the armed forces on active duty, or an officer of a reserve component of the armed forces in an active status, who—

(i) is serving or has served in a senior position on the Joint Staff, the headquarters staff of a combatant command, or the headquarters staff of an armed force; and

(ii) has experience in joint professional military education, joint qualification, and joint operations matters.

(7) A reserve officer of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who is a general or flag officer recommended by the chair and designated by the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve without vote—

(A) as military adviser to the chair;

(B) as military executive officer of the Board; and

(C) as supervisor of the operations and staff of the Board.
(8) A senior enlisted member of a reserve component recommended by the chair and designated by the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve without vote as enlisted military adviser to the chair.

(d) Matters To Be Acted on.— The Board may act on those matters referred to it by the chair and on any matter raised by a member of the Board or the Secretary of Defense.

(e) Staff.— The Board shall be supported by a staff consisting of one full-time officer from each of the reserve components listed in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 10101 of this title who holds the grade of colonel (or in the case of the Navy, the grade of captain) or who has been selected for promotion to that grade. These officers shall also serve as liaisons between their respective components and the Board. They shall perform their staff and liaison duties under the supervision of the military executive officer of the Board in an independent manner reflecting the independent nature of the Board.

(f) Relationship to Service Reserve Policy Committees and Boards.— This section does not affect the committees and boards prescribed within the military departments by sections 10302 through 10305 of this title, and a member of such a committee or board may, if otherwise eligible, be a member of the Board.

**Title 10, United States Code, Section 113. Secretary of Defense [EXCERPT]**

(a) There is a Secretary of Defense, who is the head of the Department of Defense, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within seven years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.

(b) The Secretary is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President and to this title and section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401), he has authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.

(c) …(1), the Secretary shall transmit to the President and Congress a separate report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on any reserve component matter that the Reserve Forces Policy Board considers appropriate to include in the report.
Coast Guard members from Port Security Unit 307, stationed in Clearwater, Fla., conduct live fire exercises in the Gulf of Mexico, June 11, 2015. The PSU is comprised of reserve and active duty Coast Guard personnel who maintain safety and security of the ports in their area of responsibility. (U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary photo by George Papabeis)
INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MajGen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret), Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board


- The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is a federal advisory committee established in law to provide you with independent advice and recommendations on strategies, policies and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

- The RFPB met on March 9, 2016 and voted to recommend for your consideration an official definition for the term “Operational Reserve.”

- Utilization of and reliance upon the Reserve Components to meet operational requirements has increased dramatically since the first Gulf War, transforming the Reserve Components from a strategic to an operational force with capabilities and capacity required to meet global requirements. Today, over 25,000 Reservists and Guardsmen are activated to help meet the needs of the Department. Despite fifteen years of mobilization and support to global operations, as part of the Total Force, some Reserve Component policies and statutes remain tied to an outdated strategic reserve employment model and hinder access.

- While the term “Operational Reserve” is well known and routinely utilized by senior defense officials to describe the Reserve Components, the lack of a formal DoD definition limits recognition of the critical role the Reserve Components play in the Nation’s defense. Officially defining the term “Operational Reserve” will help ensure that the Reserve Component remains a ready, relevant, and responsive element of the Total Force.
  - This lack of clarity can lead to confusion and uncertainty when the term is used.
  - The RFPB recognized the need for an official definition and submitted a recommended definition to the Secretary of Defense on 14 Jun 2013, but no further action was taken.

- The RFPB’s Subcommittee on the Operational Reserve took an in-depth look at how the Services utilize their Reserve Components and met on numerous occasions with representatives from each Service’s Reserve Operations Staff to define what constitutes an Operational Reserve. During these discussions the need for an official definition of the term “Operational Reserve” was validated and the Subcommittee and representatives developed the definition contained below.
Subcommittee on Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve

Vice Admiral John Cotton, USN (Ret)
Subcommittee Chair

Operational Reserve Assumptions

To examine the policies regarding the availability and access of RC forces within DoD and to evaluate the appropriate use of:

- Continued utilization of the RC
- AC / RC force size mix
- 1:5 Mob to Dwell ratio
- Other assumptions governing RC use
Operational Reserve Assumptions – Background

SECDEF “Utilization of the Total Force” Memo, dtd 19 January 2007: Established policy to guide force use including provisions that set a planning objective for RC involuntary mobilization at one year mobilized to five years demobilized; limited Individual RC involuntary mobilization to a maximum of one year; and required managing the mobilization of RC ground forces on a unit basis.

CNGB Memos to CSA/CSAF, dtd 11 May 2013: CNGB offered that “two-year notice, nine-months boots on the ground, 30-day individual notice, not more than 50 percent of a state’s force structure deployed at once and other policies were helpful over the last decade, but they should not govern force planning assumptions for future contingencies.”

RFPB Meeting, September 2014 – RC Chiefs Panel: BG Fountain, on behalf of the Director, Army National Guard, questioned the continued use of assumptions like those found in the December 2007 “Utilization of the Total Force” policy memo and the use of those assumptions, by the Services, in determining or influencing AC/RC force mix.

RFPB Meeting, December 2014 – Operational Reserve Subcommittee: VADM Cotton proposed that the Board examine what assumptions the Services use in making force size and AC/RC mix decisions. Members expressed doubt that the Department's 1:5 Mobilization to Dwell rotational use ratio is appropriate in planning for the future use of the RC. The Chairman concurred and tasked the subcommittee with developing the framework for such an examination.

RFPB Memorandum dated 14 July 2015 – Subject: Terms of Reference-Study on the Preparation, Use, and Performance of the Reserve Component (RC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Operational Reserve Component Subcommittee (ORSC) was tasked by the RFPB Chairman to examine preparation, use and performance of the Reserve Components during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to draw lessons learned and facilitate the preparation of advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on RC strategies, policies, and practices.
Operational Reserve
Key Leader Engagements

Actions since 8 December 2015 meeting:

- **17 February**: ORSC teleconference discussing final changes to working definitions for Operational and Strategic Reserve
- **19 February**: Staff Engagement with IDA for update on RC performance during OIF

Operational Reserve
Findings

Key takeaways:

1. OCO very important for RC utilization and **reductions will result in less operational support**
2. 12304b needs **more budget flexibility**, especially in the year of execution
3. There remains **too many RC duty statuses**
4. Different duty statuses trigger **different benefits** to the detriment of some RC service members
5. The terms Operational Reserve and Strategic Reserve are frequently used, but **neither have standard DoD definitions**
6. As a Strategic Reserve the **IRR adds depth** and expansibility
7. Service Mob to Dwell Ratios varied from **1:5 to 1:4**, and new DoDI 1235.12 removes terminology
No doctrinal definition for “Operational Reserve”

- RC limited by Cold War statutes and policies for strategic employment
- RC has transformed from strategic to operational, but access continues to be challenging
- RC capabilities and capacity are required to meet global contingency operations, especially with current fiscal trends

Definition submitted to Secretary of Defense as recommendation #1 from 12 December 2012 RFPB Meeting:

“Operational Reserve” – Routine, recurring utilization of the Reserve Components as a fully integrated part of the operational force that is planned and programmed by the Services. As such, the “Operational Reserve” is that Reserve Component structure which is made ready and available to operate across the continuum of military missions, performing strategic and operational roles, in peacetime, in wartime, and in support of civil authorities.

The Services organize, man, train, equip, resource, and use their Reserve Components to support mission requirements following the same standards as their active components. Each Service’s force generation plan prepares both units and individuals to participate in missions, across the range of military operations, in a cyclical manner that provides predictability for Service Members, their Families, their Employers, and for the Services and Combatant Commands.”
Operational Reserve Proposed Definition

From the 8 December 2015 RFPB Meeting:

“Operational Reserve” – A Reserve Component provides operational capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated into the operational force that is planned and programmed by the Services.

Proposed Final version (incorporates service suggestions):

“Operational Reserve” – An Operational Reserve Component provides ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for military missions that are planned, programmed, and budgeted in coordination with the Active Component.

Proposed definition shares intent of DoDD 1200.17, 29 October 2008 (excerpt) Subject: Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict including under sections 12301, 12302, 12304, and 12306 of Reference (a).

b. The Active Components (ACs) and RCs are integrated as a total force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies.
As Service appropriate, the RC structure is made ready and available to operate across the continuum of military missions by providing operational forces and strategic depth to meet rotational requirements, crises, contingencies, and in support of civil authorities. As required, the Services organize, man, train, equip, resource, and use their RCs to support mission requirements following the same standards as their active components. Each Service’s force generation plan prepares both units and individuals to participate in missions across the full range of military operations, providing predictability for Service Members, their Families, their Employers, and for the Services and Combatant Commands.

From the 8 December 2015 RFPB Meeting:

“Strategic Reserve” – A Strategic Reserve Component provides supplemental capabilities and capacity to meet military mission requirements, and will require additional time and resources for utilization.

Proposed Final version (incorporates service suggestions):

“Strategic Reserve” – A Strategic Reserve Component provides supplemental capabilities and capacity to meet military mission requirements, and will normally require additional time and resources for utilization.
Strategic Reserve Proposed Definition

“Strategic Reserve” – A Strategic Reserve Component provides supplemental capabilities and capacity to meet military mission requirements, and will normally require additional time and resources for utilization.

Proposed definition shares intent of DoDD 1200.17, 29 Oct 2008 (excerpt) - Subject: Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

e. The continuum of service is utilized to enhance the effectiveness of and sustain the all volunteer force with flexible service options that are attractive to a broad population.

f. Utilization rules are implemented to govern frequency and duration of activations. Since expectation management is critical to the success of the management of the RCs as an operational force, these rules enhance predictability and judicious and prudent use of the RCs.

Strategic Reserve Characteristics

The Strategic Reserve provides supplemental and complimentary forces, including the IRR, for DoD requirements. As required, the Services organize, man, train, equip, resource, and utilize their Strategic Reserve to augment and support mission requirements following the same standards as their Active Components.
Desired Outcomes

- SECDEF accepts RFPB definitions and amends DODD 1200.17 to provide standardization
- Definitions are incorporated into subsequent Joint Publication updates
- Services and components incorporate definitions to ensure dissemination and clarification
- Definitions are socialized with Think Tanks and Advocacy Groups to encourage inclusion in regular vernacular

Recommendation

Recommend SECDEF accept the following definitions for Operational Reserve and Strategic Reserve:

“Operational Reserve” – An Operational Reserve Component provides ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for military missions that are planned, programmed, and budgeted in coordination with the Active Component.

“Strategic Reserve” – A Strategic Reserve Component provides supplemental capabilities and capacity to meet military mission requirements, and will normally require additional time and resources for utilization.

Board voted to delete the word “Component” from the Operational Reserve Definition and not submit a definition for Strategic Reserve
Vice Admiral John Cotton, USN (Ret)
Subcommittee Chair

Operational Reserve Key Leader Engagements

Previous Engagements

- **13 May 2015**: Key Leader Engagement with Directors within ASD-RA, Deputy Director Regional Operations and Force Management (J-35), and Directors in Cost Assessment & Program Evaluations (CAPE)

- **27 May 2015**: Key Leader Engagements with Active Component Service “3” (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines)

- **19 August 2015**: Key Leader Engagements with ASD-RA (RC access), ASD Strategy and Force Development, J-8 Chief of Force Division, and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
Operational Reserve Observations

A perception is that “Accessing the RC is difficult”

- Current methodology viewed as unresponsive, using reservists requires too much lead time (30 day notification for involuntary mobilization is law/180 day notifications between mobilization approval and mobilization date is policy)

- Numerous authorities and policies have been “patched together” over years; no single source document exists

- In the Year of Execution, there is a lack of funding flexibility for pre-planned events (12304b)

- Each Service has different views on RC capabilities and employment, some are more integrated and interchangeable than others
4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict including under sections 12301, 12302, 12304, and 12306 of Reference (a).

b. The Active Components (ACs) and RCs are integrated as a total force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies.

c. Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) are total force missions. Unity of effort is maintained consistent with statutory responsibilities in operations involving Federal forces and non-federalized National Guard forces with Federal forces under Federal command and control and non-federalized National Guard forces under State command and control.

d. The RCs provide connection to and commitment of the American public.

e. The continuum of service is utilized to enhance the effectiveness of and sustain the all volunteer force with flexible service options that are attractive to a broad population.

f. Utilization rules are implemented to govern frequency and duration of activations. Since expectation management is critical to the success of the management of the RCs as an operational force, these rules enhance predictability and judicious and prudent use of the RCs.

g. Voluntary duty, per section 12301(d) of Reference (a) and section 502(f)(2) of title 32, United States Code (Reference (b)), is encouraged to meet mission requirements.
h. The RCs are resourced to meet readiness requirements per sections 3013, 5013, and 8013 of Reference (a). RC resourcing plans shall ensure visibility to track resources from formulation, appropriation, and allocation through execution.

i. Outreach services are established and available for RC members, their families, and employers from pre-activation through reintegration.
INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MajGen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret), Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

SUBJECT: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board Offering Support to Recommendations from the National Commission on the Future of the Army

- The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) was established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 to study the structure of the Army, study the transfer of certain aircraft, and to submit a report to the President and the congressional defense committees on those matters by February 1, 2016. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) met on March 9, 2016, discussed the Commission's recommendations, and voted to lend strong support to 13 of the 63 NCFA recommendations which we considered Secretary of Defense level issues. The rationale for our recommendations is included in Tab A.

- The Reserve Forces Policy Board commends the Commission, and the Commissioners and staff, for their thoughtful and comprehensive analysis in carrying out their mandate from the Congress. Their recommendations, if enacted, will improve the world's most capable and battle-tested Army.

- The RFPB is a federal advisory committee established in law to provide you with independent advice and recommendations on strategies, policies and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components.

- As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the recommendations were deliberated and approved in an open, public session. The briefing presented to and approved by the Board TAB B will be posted to the RFPB web site. Background information about the RFPB is at TAB C.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment(s):
As stated
Prepared by: COL William Hersh, 703-681-0600
On 9 March 2016, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) voted to support thirteen commission recommendations it consider Secretary of Defense level issues. The RFPB position on each of those thirteen recommendations is as follows:

NCFA Recommendation 1: The nation must maintain and sustain an All-Volunteer Force.

**RFPB Position:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board supports an All-Volunteer Total Force and has proposed recommendations aimed at preserving the operational capacity of the force while also expressing concern about the unsustainable growth of the fully burdened and life-cycle costs in our military personnel programs.

NCFA Recommendation 6: The Congress and the Administration should return to predictable and responsible budgeting processes that meet minimum funding requirements.

**RFPB Position:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The RFPB supports the return to a predictable budgeting process that provides adequate resources to the Department of Defense to ensure access to a manned, ready and modernized Total Force able to meet the needs of the nation, both at home and abroad.

NCFA Recommendation 12: The President should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund an Army that maintains an end-strength of at least 980,000 uniformed personnel (450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve) at planned readiness levels.

**RFPB Position:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board continues to believe and recommend that the Department preserve Reserve Component end strength and force structure to help mitigate risk associated with Active Component force structure reductions and to hedge against fiscal and geopolitical uncertainty. The RFPB has emphasized to DoD the significant role the Reserve Components play as a fully integrated part of the operational force and encourages the Department and the Services to program and budget resources to enhance Reserve Component readiness and to plan for their recurring use.

NCFA Recommendation 30: The Army should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund no fewer than 3,000 man years annually for 12304b utilization of the reserve components. The Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Army and the Office of Management and Budget should also provide for the use of Overseas
Contingency Operations and supplemental funding for Reserve Component utilization under 12304b.

**RFPB Position:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Board has recommended that DoD should continue to use the Reserve Components operationally and should include requirements for such use in service force generation models and DOD planning, programming, and budget documents. The Board further added that the Department should adapt the Global Force Management process to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for Reserve Component use to facilitate service planning, programming, and budgeting for the activation and employment of Reserve Component forces under Title 10, Section 12304b authority. The absence of adequate 12304b funding limits utilization of the Reserve Component forces for missions for which they are ideally suited.

**NCFA Recommendation 31:** The Secretary of Defense should update the January 19, 2007, memo “Utilization of the Total Force” to allow flexible involuntary mobilization periods in an effort to achieve common “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) periods for all components.

**RFPB Position:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Commission found that making deployment policies consistent among the components, particularly the duration of BOG in theater, would further foster an integrated Total Force culture, as would Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve cross-component assignments. The RFPB has recommended that the Services should better integrate their forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment. Deploying integrated units serving under common BOG rules is an important step in improving both integration and a sense of Total Force culture in the Army. The Board has also advocated that DoD develop and enforce a revised Total Force Policy that enumerates key principles necessary to encourage a Total Force culture. These actions would, as the Commission’s report suggests, help personnel from each Army component to better understand the other components and how they contribute to an effective Total Force.

**NCFA Recommendation 37:** The Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should continue to support and adequately fund the Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPSS-A) as the cornerstone to the effective management and enhanced integration of the components of the Army. The Army must maintain the program’s current schedule as a critical underpinning capability for the Army to support the Total Force.

**RFPB Position:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The Army components currently operate separate personnel and pay systems, thus creating barriers to personal readiness and a career of service that allows soldiers to transition easily between components. Achieving a singular personnel management and pay system for the whole Army would promote and provide the greatest administrative step toward implementing an integrated Total Force. The RFPB has previously recommended that the Services implement integrated Pay and
Personnel Systems, encouraging them to move aggressively to complete implementation of their systems to hasten Reserve Component duty status reform and to allow for a continuum of service.

NCFA Recommendation 49: As recommended in 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense should plan in fiscal year 2017 and execute no later than the end of fiscal year 2018 a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of national mobilization.

RFPB Position: The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. After reviewing the 2010 QDR, the Board found that senior officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for preparing the 2010 QDR did not ensure that it complied with the requirements of Title 10, Section 118. Title 10 requires that the QDR include “the anticipated roles and missions of the Reserve Components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the Reserve Components can capably fulfill those roles and missions.” Those capabilities are generated during pre- and post-mobilization training. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey’s call, in his assessment of the 2014 QDR, for a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize the entire force reinforces this recommendation.

NCFA Recommendation 52: The Secretary of Defense should incorporate in defense planning and fiscal guidance the analysis of Army expansion requirements for force-sizing and capability-mix analyses in fiscal year 2017. This guidance would give priority to the retention of expansion-required leaders, infrastructure, and materiel in the defense budget and program.

RFPB Position: The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. The NCFA points out that since the future strategic environment cannot be predicted with certainty, the Army should protect its ability to regenerate capabilities and expand the force whenever necessary. The RFPB has previously expressed concern about the increasing risk associated with Active Component force structure reductions. While the Board specifically recommended preserving Reserve Component structure to mitigate this risk, the Board’s principal concern was ensuring that the Services retained sufficient ability to generate the forces it needs to meet operational demands. The Board also recommended the reinvigoration of the Title XI program which commits Active Component manpower to enhance Reserve Component combat readiness. The Board recommended this for three reasons. First, it would accomplish its statutory goal to sustain our hard-won Reserve Component readiness. Second, it would restore a valuable mechanism to break down cultural barriers and foster cooperation and integration between the components. Third, it would retain a sizeable pool of mid-grade leaders on active duty, which is essential for rapidly reestablishing Active Component force structure should it become necessary.

NCFA Recommendation 57: Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should implement the Commission’s plan (Option Three) for distribution of the Apache fleet.
The Commission’s plan maintains twenty-four manned Apache battalions including twenty in the Regular Army equipped with twenty-four aircraft each and four in the Army National Guard equipped with eighteen aircraft each. The plan adds only two Black Hawk battalions to the Army National Guard. The Army should commit to using the four Army National Guard Apache battalions regularly, mobilizing and deploying them in peacetime and war.

**RFPB Position:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support this Commission recommendation. This recommendation maintains twenty-four manned Apache battalions in the Army. Of these twenty-four battalions, twenty would be in the Regular Army (same as under the ARI) and four would be in the Army National Guard (compared to zero under the ARI). All of the Regular Army battalions would be equipped with twenty-four aircraft. The four Army National Guard battalions would be equipped with eighteen aircraft and thus would have to cross-level helicopters before deploying. The Board supports this recommendation because it ensures sufficient structural capacity to meet potential warfighting demands while maintaining a force mix that includes strategic depth in the Reserve Components.

**NCFA Recommendation 26:** The Army must manage and provide forces under the Total Force approach.

**NCFA Recommendation 27:** The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions that would allow individuals from all components to fill positions to foster an Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components. A review should be completed within nine months after publication of this report, and any new designations should be completed within eighteen months.

**NCFA Recommendation 32:** The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.

**NCFA Recommendation 33:** The Army should add specific guidance on goals for future use of multicomponent units and related initiatives to the Army’s Total Force Policy Implementation Guidance for fiscal year 2017.

**RFPB Position:** The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support these Commission recommendations. The Board overwhelmingly believes that the most important recommendations of the Commission dealt with the promotion of better integration among the components of the Army. The Board has also made this argument, recommending to the Department that the Services should better integrate their forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment. While the Board has also lauded the Army for recent steps toward better integration, it has concluded that more can be done. The Commission similarly concluded that for the sake of a more effective and efficient Army and to achieve greater strategic depth, more must be done to fully implement a comprehensive partnership among the components and integrated programs. In this vein, the Board has also proposed that: the Army move toward stronger integration of its combat forces through a test integrating Reserve Component maneuver
battalions into Active Component Brigade Combat Teams; that the Department should reinvigorate the Title XI program, which commits Active Component manpower to enhance Reserve Component Combat Readiness; and that the Services implement an AC-RC teaming or partnering program to encourage integrated operational training.
Proposed Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the National Commission on the Future of the Army Report

COL William Hersh
RFPB Senior Policy Advisor

Department of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board

- The RFPB commends the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) for its hard work, thoughtful and comprehensive analysis in carrying out its mandate from the Congress.
- The NCFA was charged with the daunting task of conducting a comprehensive study on the structure, size and force mix of the Army in an era of mounting strategic but fiscal constraint risk with an uncertain fiscal future.
- The RFPB commends the distinguished members and the staff of the Commission for their continued service to the Nation in support of this important effort.
Department of Defense
Reserve Forces Policy Board

Purpose: Make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for his decision on the NCFA.

• There are 63 recommendations in the NCFA broken down by responsible official.
• 13 of the recommendations relate to the Reserve Components in the following areas: All-Volunteer Force, minimum funding requirements, end strength, integration of the total force, utilization, personnel & pay integration, strategic mobility and force structure.

National Commission on the Future of the Army Report Mission

In light of the projected security environment, conduct a comprehensive study of the roles and structure of the Army, and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Army, in order to:

– Make an assessment of the size and force mixture of the Active Component of the Army and the Reserve Components of the Army.
– Make recommendations on the modifications, if any, of the structure of the Army related to current and anticipated mission requirements for the Army at acceptable levels of national risk and in a manner consistent with available resources and anticipated future resources.
– Make an assessment of proposed AH-64 transfers from Army National Guard to the Regular Army.
• National Commission on the Future of the Army

**Recommendation 1:** The nation must maintain and sustain an All-Volunteer Force.

**Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation:**
- So fundamental is an All-Volunteer Force to the governing principles of our nation, and so essential is an All-Volunteer Force in achieving the highest possible level of capabilities and readiness, the Commission considers sustaining the All-Volunteer Force vital to the future of the nation. All budget and force management decisions must be made with this goal in mind.
- The RFPB underscores that the All-Volunteer Force is a total force and expresses continued concern about the unsustainable growth of the fully burdened and life-cycle costs of the Active Component.

**Department of Defense**  
**Reserve Forces Policy Board**  
**National Commission on the Future of the Army**  

• National Commission on the Future of the Army

**Recommendation 6:** The Congress and the Administration should return to predictable and responsible budgeting processes that meet minimum funding requirements.

**Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation:**
- Congress and the Administration must find ways to provide the Army and all of DoD with adequate levels of funding under a process that is more predictable, thereby avoiding the budgetary turmoil that has plagued the federal government in recent years.
- The effects of the lack of predictable funding, “wreaks havoc with Army readiness modernization, and end strength.”  
  (Congressional testimony by Army senior leaders in March 2015)
Department of Defense
Reserve Forces Policy Board

- **National Commission on the Future of the Army**
  - **Recommendation 12:** The President should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund an Army that maintains an end strength of at least 980,000 uniformed personnel (450,000 in the Regular Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve) at planned readiness levels.

- **Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation:**
  - DoD should preserve Reserve Component end strength and force structure to mitigate risk associated with increased Active Component force structure reductions and to hedge against fiscal and geostrategic uncertainty. (RFPB - REPORT FY14-02 #4 Preserve RC ES & FS P.17)
  - The RFPB has emphasized to DoD the significant role the Reserve Components provide as a fully integrated part of the operational force that must be planned and programmed for by the Services.

Integration of the Total Force

National Commission on the Future of the Army

- **Recommendation 26:** The Army must manage and provide forces under the Total Force approach.
- **Recommendation 27:** The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions that would allow individuals from all components to fill positions to foster an Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components. A review should be completed within nine months after publication of this report, and any new designations should be completed within eighteen months.
- **Recommendation 32:** The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.
- **Recommendation 33:** The Army should add specific guidance on goals for future use of multicomponent units and related initiatives to the Army’s Total Force Policy Implementation Guidance for fiscal year 2017.
Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendations:
- The Commission report concluded that for the sake of a more effective and efficient Army and to achieve greater strategic depth, more must be done to fully implement a comprehensive partnership and integrated programs. The Commission finds that the goal should be to increase billets designated for multicomponent use and substantially increase incentives for service in multicomponent units.
- The RFPB has recommended to DoD that the Services should better integrate their forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment. (RFPB-REPORT FY14-02 #6 Improve AC/RC Integration P.18)
  - The Army should move toward stronger integration of its combat forces through a test integrating Reserve Component maneuver battalions into Active Component Brigade Combat Teams.
  - The Department should reinvigorate the Title XI program, which commits Active Component manpower to enhance Reserve Component Combat Readiness.
  - The Services should increase Reserve Component opportunities for attendance at Senior Enlisted Courses, Senior Service Colleges, and CAPSTONE.
  - The Services should implementing an AC-RC teaming or pairing program to encourage integrated operational training.

National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendation 30:
The Army should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund no fewer than 3,000 man years annually for 12304b utilization of the Reserve Components. The Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Army and the Office of Management and Budget should also provide for the use of Overseas Contingency Operations and supplemental funding for Reserve Component utilization under 12304b.

Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation:
- The Army Total Force Policy aligns the Army with Secretary of Defense Directive 1200.17, which requires the military services to manage their reserve components as an operational force. It also established a policy for the integration of the Army’s Active Component and Reserve Components as a Total Force. (Army Directive 2012-08)
- The Total Force Policy must be resourced for all Reserve Forces if it is going to be effective. The absence of adequate 12304b funding limits utilization of the Reserve Forces for missions for which they are ideally suited. (RFPB - RFPB-REPORT FY14-02 Plan & Use RC Operationally P.12)
National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendation 31:
The Secretary of Defense should update the January 19, 2007 memo “Utilization of the Total Force” to allow flexible involuntary mobilization periods in an effort to achieve common “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) periods for all components.

Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation
- The Commission found that making deployment policies consistent among the components—particularly the duration of BOG in theater—would further foster an integrated Total Force culture, as would Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve cross-component assignments.
- The report also stated that personnel from each Army component need to better understand the other components.
- The RFPB has recommended the DoD should develop and enforce a revised Total Force Policy that enumerates key principles necessary to encourage a Total Force culture. (RFPB Report FY14-02)

Take responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force.
Ensure military readiness.
Develop a clear and mutual understanding of the roles and missions of each component (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in each service and in joint/combined operations, during peacetime and war.
Provide the necessary resources to accomplish assigned missions.

National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendation 37:
The Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should continue to support and adequately fund the Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPSS-A) as the cornerstone of the effective management and enhanced integration of the components of the Army. The Army must maintain the program’s current schedule as a critical underpinning capability for the Army to support the Total Force.

Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation:
- The Army components currently operate separate personnel and pay systems, thus creating barriers to personal readiness and a career of service that allows soldiers to transition among components, popularly known as “continuum of service.”
- The NCFA recommended that achieving a singular personnel management and pay system for the whole Army would promote and provide the greatest administrative step toward implementing the Total Force Policy.
- The RFPB has recommended to DoD to refine/develop programs that allow for ease in transition from Active Duty to Reserve Component status (pay and personnel). (RFPB Annual Report)

Reduce the number of Reserve Component Duty Statuses.
Ease Personnel Transitions between components.
Encourage Active to Reserve Component transfers to retain talent and combat experience.
Implement an integrated Pay and Personnel System.
Improve the readiness of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).
Implement a Reserve Component Unit Variable Participation Program.

NCFA- Black, RFPB- Red, Army - Green
• National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendation 49: As recommended in 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense should plan in fiscal year 2017 and execute no later than the end of fiscal year 2018 a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of national mobilization.

• Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation
  – The Army does not mobilize forces in isolation, but does so as part of the DoD enterprise. The Commission noted that in his assessment of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey highlighted the acceptance of risk in the capacity of land forces and called for a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize the entire force.
  – The RFPB has recommended to DoD to develop a model to calculate and compare "life-cycle" costs. (REPORT FY13-01 #4 Ensure QDR Complies with Title10 – Sec118)

• National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendation 52: The Secretary of Defense should incorporate in defense planning and fiscal guidance the analysis of Army expansion requirements for force-sizing and capability-mix analyses in fiscal year 2017. This guidance would give priority to the retention of expansion-required leaders, infrastructure, and materiel in the defense budget and program.

• Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation
  – The NCFA stated that since the future strategic environment cannot be predicted with certainty, the Army should protect its ability to regenerate capabilities and expand the force whenever necessary.
  – The RFPB has recommended to DoD to retain the ability to surge and regenerate forces for unanticipated challenges with the Reserve Component as the force multiplier. (REPORT FY14-02)
National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendation 57: Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army should implement the Commission’s plan (Option Three) for distribution of the Apache fleet. The Commission’s plan maintains twenty-four manned Apache battalions including twenty in the Regular Army equipped with twenty-four aircraft each and four in the Army National Guard equipped with eighteen aircraft each. The plan adds only two Black Hawk battalions to the Army National Guard. The Army should commit to using the four Army National Guard Apache battalions regularly, mobilizing and deploying them in peacetime and war.

Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation
- Option Three would maintain twenty-four manned Apache battalions. Of these twenty-four battalions, twenty would be in the Regular Army (same as under the ARI) and four would be in the Army National Guard (compared to zero under the ARI). All the Regular Army battalions would be equipped with twenty-four aircraft. The four Army National Guard battalions would be equipped with eighteen aircraft and thus would have to cross-level helicopters before deploying.
- The RFPB has recommended to DoD that the Services should better integrate their forces organizationally, in training, and during operational employment. (RFPB - REPORT FY14-02 #6 Improve AC/RC Integration P.18)
  - The Army should move toward stronger integration of its combat forces through a test integrating Reserve Component maneuver battalions into Active Component Brigade Combat Teams.
  - The RFPB has recommended to DoD that multicomponent training partnerships and associations be re-examine, such as the use of round-out units and cross-component personnel assignments—including command.

NCFA- Black, RFPB- Red, Army - Green
• National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendation 13: The President should revise strategic and budget guidance to the Department of Defense based on changes in the security environment. The Department of Defense should then use this revised guidance as the basis for revising its planning guidance, and the Army should adjust its structure, readiness, and modernization plans accordingly.

• Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation:
  – The first step in addressing these capability and capacity questions is for the President and DoD to revise the defense strategic guidance based on the unanticipated changes in the security environment.
National Commission on the Future of the Army
Recommendation 23: The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should report to Congress within a year on a strategic mobility sufficiency analysis and associated risk mitigation plan from 2020 through 2040.

Proposed Position: Concur with Recommendation:
- The Army relies on the strategic mobility triad—pre-positioning, airlift, and sealift—to project land power into theaters of operation around the globe at the speed and tempo required by Combatant Commanders.
- This triad will be increasingly stressed by 2023 to meet war plan and scenario timelines. While current strategic mobility capacity meets timelines for the most demanding “fight tonight” contingencies, several factors will contribute to increased force projection challenges and risk over time.
For more information, please contact
The Reserve Forces Policy Board Staff
5113 Leesburg Pike, Suite 601
Falls Church, VA 22041
703-681-0600

The complete contents of this report are available at
www.rfpb.defense.gov