This report, Report FY20-01, is a product of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The Reserve Forces Policy Board is, by law, a federal advisory committee within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As mandated by Congress, it serves as an independent adviser to provide advice and recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components. The content and recommendations contained herein do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Title 5, and the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, Section 102-3 (Federal Advisory Committee Management), this report and its contents were deliberated and approved in open, public sessions.
IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE

Using the National Guard and Reserves
INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Maj Gen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret), Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

SUBJECT: A Report for the Transition to the next Administration by the Reserve Forces Policy Board on Improving the Total Force using the National Guard and Reserves

- The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is a federal advisory committee established in law to provide you with independent advice and recommendations on strategies, policies and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components.

- The RFPB met on June 3, 2020 and voted to approve work on near term priorities aimed at immediately removing barriers that adversely affect the efficiency, readiness and overall lethality of the Reserve Components. The Board also recommends the continuation or initiation of several ongoing or follow-on policy efforts to optimize longer-term effectiveness for the Total Force (TAB A).

- Priorities for the near term
  1. Emphasize a Total Force Policy
  2. Formalize the operational reserve
  3. Improve AC/RC integration, particularly as it relates to the National Defense Strategy.
  4. Enact duty status reform.
  5. Eliminate disparity in benefits between AC and RC members.
  6. Allow the accrual of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits for all Reserve Component members.

- Optimizing the Total Force for the long term
  1. Integrate the Reserve Component and enhance Active Component and Reserve Component permeability.
  2. Prioritize and maintain RC readiness.
  3. Continue to include the RC in the Cyber Mission Force.
  4. Implement Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) management reforms.
  5. Transition service members at Home of Record (HOR) RC sites.
  6. Minimize installation and infrastructure duplication and ensure National Guard and Reserve installations receive adequate funding.
  7. Reinstate RC headspace exemptions and statutory requirements for RC Chief and Director Positions.
  8. Integrate the RC into the Space Force from the outset to leverage their unique skillsets.
• The implementation of the Board’s recommendations will align policies, resourcing, and decision making constructs to maximize the Reserve Components as part of the Total Force designed to meet our long-term national security requirements at home and abroad.

• The inaugural edition of this report was published in 2016, and the attached 2020 edition continues the Board’s tradition of providing the Secretary of Defense a summation of the most important issues impacting the reserve components.

• As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the recommendations were deliberated and approved in an open, public session. Also consistent with the Act, a copy of this report will be posted to the RFPB web site at https://rfpb.defense.gov/Reports/.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: BG John B. Hashem, 703-681-0600
A Letter to Secretary Esper:

I have the distinct privilege to transmit your Reserve Forces Policy Board’s Transition Report entitled “Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves.” This report contains fourteen recommendations for consideration by the next administration and builds on your efforts to strengthen the Total Force.

The Board appreciates the Department’s strong support for the Reserve Components as we fulfill our statutory duty of making recommendations to enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components. Your unwavering support of the Guard and Reserves as Secretary of Defense, along with the staunch support of dedicated military and civilian leaders, has made it possible for the Board to develop a series of policy recommendations that ensure the Reserve Components are integrated and leveraged to deliver maximized service in defense of the Nation.

While much has been done to ensure the Reserve Components remain essential to the Total Force moving forward, there is more to do. The transition to great power competition described in the National Defense Strategy did not signal a corresponding end to the period of continuous conflict that began with the attack on the United States on 9/11; nor did it indicate a decrease in homeland security missions. This demanding environment calls for a transformative approach to meet the Nation’s defense requirements in the most flexible and cost-effective manner possible. The Reserve Components comprise 38% of the Total Force and bring critical skills and capabilities to the fight for about one-third the cost per capita of the Active Component. In a time of constrained fiscal resources, with new threats emerging on a seemingly daily basis, any complete discussion of national defense and security must include the Reserve Components.

In this report, the Board identifies key policy initiatives aimed at immediately removing barriers that adversely affect the efficiency, readiness, and overall lethality of the Reserve Components. The Board also recommends the continuation or initiation of several ongoing or follow-on policy efforts to optimize longer-term effectiveness for the Total Force. The implementation of the Board’s recommendations will align policies, resourcing, and decision-making constructs to maximize the Reserve Components as part of the Total Force designed to meet our long-term national security requirements at home and abroad.

A copy of this report, along with all other reports submitted by the Board, can be found at https://rffp.defense.gov/.

On behalf of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,

Arnold L. Punaro
Major General, USMCR (Ret)
Chairman
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
5113 LEESBURG PIKE, SUITE 601
FALLS CHURCH, VA 22041

CHAIRMAN

July 1, 2020

A Letter to the Secretary Designee:

Congratulations on your selection as leader of a powerful and diverse Department of Defense.

As you develop your vision and strategic objectives for the Department, consistent with the President’s priorities, ensuring your officials have a thorough familiarity of the Reserve Components and their capabilities will ensure the best use of our national assets. As one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department of Defense, the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s statutory requirement is to provide independent advice to you to enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

The Department’s strong support for the Reserve Components, along with the staunch efforts of dedicated military and civilian leaders, has made it possible for the Board to develop a series of policy recommendations that ensure the Reserve Components are integrated and leveraged to deliver maximized service in defense of the Nation.

While much has been done to ensure the Reserve Components remain essential to the Total Force moving forward, there is more to do. The current environment calls for a transformative approach to meet the Nation’s defense requirements in the most flexible and cost-effective manner possible. The Reserve Components comprise 38% of the Total Force and bring critical skills to the fight for about one-third the cost per capita of the Active Component. In a time of constrained fiscal resources, with new threats emerging on a seemingly daily basis, any complete discussion of national defense and security must include the Reserve Components.

I have the distinct privilege to transmit to you the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s Transition Report entitled “Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves.” This report contains fourteen recommendations for consideration by the next administration and builds on previous Department of Defense efforts to strengthen the Total Force. In this report, the Board identifies key policy initiatives aimed at immediately removing barriers that adversely affect the efficiency, readiness, and overall lethality of the Reserve Components. The Board also recommends the continuation or initiation of several ongoing or follow-on policy efforts to optimize longer-term effectiveness for the Total Force. The implementation of the Board’s recommendations will align policies, resourcing and decision-making constructs to maximize the Reserve Components as part of the Total Force designed to meet our long-term national security requirements at home and abroad.

We look forward to continuing to provide independent and objective advice to you in your role as Secretary of Defense. A copy of this report, along with all other reports submitted by the Board, can be found at https://rfpb.defense.gov/.

On behalf of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,

Arnold L. Pumaro
Major General, USMCR (Ret)
Chairman
July 1, 2020

A Letter to the Head of the Transition Team:

At this time, the Nation and the Department of Defense face significant challenges in a number of critical areas. The external threats and the internal demands coupled with an unpredictable fiscal environment and unprecedented national debt make today’s security situation arguably more challenging than ever before.

By statute, the Reserve Forces Policy Board is one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department and provides the Secretary of Defense with independent advice and recommendations designed to enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components, thus strengthening the Total Force. As the Transition Team prepares the next administration to address operational, readiness and budgetary requirements of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defense, ensuring senior officials have a thorough familiarity of the Reserve Components and their capabilities will ensure the Reserve Components are integrated and leveraged to deliver maximized service in defense of the Nation.

While much has been done to ensure the Reserve Components remain essential to the Total Force moving forward, there is more to do. The current environment calls for a transformative approach to meet the Nation’s defense requirements in the most flexible and cost-effective manner possible. The Reserve Components comprise 38% of the Total Force and bring critical skills to the fight for about one-third the cost per capita of the Active Component. In a time of constrained fiscal resources, with new threats emerging on a seemingly daily basis, any complete discussion of national defense and security must include the Reserve Components.

I have the distinct privilege to transmit to you the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s Transition Report entitled “Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves.” This report contains fourteen recommendations for consideration by the next administration and builds on previous Department of Defense efforts to strengthen the Total Force. In this report, the Board identifies key policy initiatives aimed at immediately removing barriers that adversely affect the efficiency, readiness, and overall lethality of the Reserve Components. The Board also recommends the continuation or initiation of several ongoing or follow-on policy efforts to optimize longer-term effectiveness for the Total Force. The implementation of the Board’s recommendations will align policies, resourcing, and decision-making constructs to maximize the Reserve Components as part of the Total Force designed to meet our long-term national security requirements at home and abroad.

We look forward to continuing to provide independent and objective advice to the Secretary of Defense. A copy of this report, along with all other reports submitted by the Board, can be found at https://rfpb.defense.gov/.

On behalf of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,

Arnold L. Punaro
Major General, USMCR (Ret)
Chairman
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today's Reserve Component forces provide the indispensable operational force and the strategic expandability the military services routinely employ to meet the Nation’s defense requirements defined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Reserve Component (RC) members constitute 38% of the Total Force and have repeatedly deployed and operated with their Active Component (AC) counterparts in Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and numerous other contingency, humanitarian, and homeland support missions to include providing the majority of the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) pandemic response forces. The RC’s operational record consistently demonstrates exceptional performance delivered at less than one-third the cost of the comparable AC units when not mobilized. The Reserve Components also do not require the massive infrastructure and personnel support cost associated with the Active Component. While the utilization of the RC and related policies has changed radically since the end of the Cold War, and more recently after 9/11, numerous challenges remain that hinder future success for the Total Force. Because the AC cannot execute the NDS without the additional combat power provided by the RC, national security, defense and resourcing decisions by leaders and policymakers always impact the Reserve Component. For this reason, it is essential that leaders and policymakers understand the composition of the Reserve Component, their significant cost advantaged contributions, and challenges Reservists and Guardsmen face when volunteering.

Priorities for the Near Term

While much has been done to ensure the RC remains essential to the Total Force moving forward, there is more to do. Commissions, studies and think tanks over time have recommended numerous reforms to ensure the RC is ready, accessible and interoperable with the AC. Similarly, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) identified key policy initiatives aimed at immediately removing barriers that adversely affect the efficiency, readiness and overall lethality of the RC. To create the foundations necessary to ensure the RC remains an operationally viable element of the Total Force, the Department of Defense and Military Service Secretaries should implement the following near term recommendations:

- **Emphasize a Total Force policy.** The Department of Defense needs to strengthen and enhance the Total Force policy to provide comprehensive guidance and oversight to the services. The current Total Force perspective held by some Active Component leaders adversely impacts efficient utilization and resourcing decisions regarding the Reserve Components to include determining the correct balance between AC and RC forces (Chapter 2.1).
• **Formalize the operational reserve.** The Department should plan, program and budget for the continued operational use of the Reserve Components. The Department should officially define the term “operational reserve” to ensure the RC remains a ready, relevant, responsive and lethal element of the Total Force. Moreover, the Department should adjust the policies, rules, regulations and resource allocation practices that sub-optimize utilization of the operational reserve (Chapter 2.2).

• **Improve AC/RC integration, particularly as it relates to the National Defense Strategy.** The RC constitutes 38% of the Total Force and provides critical capabilities and capacity in meeting security requirements at home and abroad. The Department should take steps to further integrate AC and RC forces to balance near term priorities and prepare for great power competition in a period of constrained resources (Chapter 2.3).

• **Enact duty status reform.** The Department needs to continue efforts to simplify and streamline the current complex model of 32 separate and distinct duty statuses used within the RC (Chapter 2.4).

• **Eliminate disparity in benefits between AC and RC members.** Family members of RC service members killed in the line of duty while training now receive identical benefits as those granted to AC service members. Efforts must continue to ensure parity in incentive pay, hazardous duty pay, and bonuses (Chapter 2.5).

• **Allow the accrual of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits for all Reserve Component members.** While RC service members now receive the same benefits as AC counterparts vice being penalized solely for belonging to the RC, Strategic Sealift Officers remain ineligible for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits (Chapter 2.6).

Insufficient RC knowledge and personal experience allows common misperceptions to persist with some Service and DoD leaders, ultimately limiting effective AC/RC integration and inhibiting the best utilization of RC capabilities. Monitoring and controlling effectiveness in Total Force policy is best facilitated with an enterprise view of the RC to support decision making at the Department level. This includes performance assessments to gauge:

• Sustainable frequency of activation to balance mobilization and the social contract
• High standards and quality of force with resources, capability parity, and training access
• Affordability by fully burdened life cycle cost of manpower analysis
The current Total Force approach adversely influences decisions regarding the use of the Reserve Components, the proper balance between AC and RC forces and resourcing. The use of outdated and cumbersome personnel management policies, statutes and information systems (that are difficult to navigate) creates inefficiencies that reduce the Services’ desire to utilize the RC, which in turn affects the overall effectiveness of the Total Force.

**Optimizing the Total Force for the Long-Term**

The Reserve Forces Policy Board also recommends continuing or initiating several ongoing or follow-on policy efforts to optimize longer-term efficiency, effectiveness and lethality of the RC, which will improve the Total Force as a whole. They include the following:

- **Integrate the Reserve Component and enhance Active Component and Reserve Component permeability.** To improve recruiting and retention of talent, the Department must improve the flexibility of Active and Reserve personnel management systems to ease transitions between the two components and the civilian workforce (Chapter 3.1).

- **Prioritize and maintain RC readiness.** The Department should direct the services to plan for and program funding for recurring and routine operational employment of the RC and use both base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations funding as appropriate (Chapter 3.2).

- **Continue to include the RC in the Cyber Mission Force.** The Department must ensure that critical cyber capabilities and skill sets developed by industry, at little to no cost to the government, are fully utilized (Chapter 3.3).

- **Implement Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) management reforms.** The Department should better manage and utilize this pool of over 225,000 personnel, many of whom are talented, previously trained and remain largely under-utilized (Chapter 3.4).

- **Transition service members at Home of Record (HOR) RC sites.** Utilizing available infrastructure, this would enhance RC recruitment opportunities, enable a more holistic, coordinated transition, and promote the well-being of service members and their families (Chapter 3.5).

- **Minimize installation and infrastructure duplication and ensure National Guard and Reserve installations receive adequate funding.** Efforts to consolidate sites and build joint centers must continue, as the Department can no longer sustain separate sites for each individual unit or service (Chapter 3.6).
• **Reinstate RC headspace exemptions and statutory requirements for RC Chief and Director Positions.** The Department should make changes to the structure of Reserve General and Flag Officer positions only after a careful, deliberate and recurring analysis of requirements and retain adequate, commensurate grade structure for RC leadership (Chapter 3.7).

• **Integrate the RC into the Space Force from the outset to leverage their unique skillsets.** As the DoD shapes the Space Force, use of RC personnel with valuable skills developed by industry at little to no cost to the government, can provide immense benefits to the Department (Chapter 3.8).

The transition to great power competition described in the National Defense Strategy summary did not arrive with a corresponding end to the period of continuous conflict that began with the 9/11 attack on the United States or with a decrease in homeland missions. As long as both global competition and operational commitments continue, this state of increased operational need stresses the force. Today’s strategic environment consists of changing security threats, increased homeland demands, and growing fiscal pressures on the Department. The DoD leadership cannot address these demands without looking internally at the Department’s own progress in remedying the growth in its high risk, high cost business management areas.¹ The political establishment’s inconsistency in sustaining long-term budget agreements increases the complexity of the aforementioned environment and requires adaptability and resourcefulness to meet the requirements of the National Defense Strategy. This demanding environment calls for a transformative approach to meet the Nation’s defense requirements in the most flexible and cost effective manner possible. The implementation of the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s (RFPB or “the Board”) recommendations will align policies, resourcing, and decision support constructs to maximize RC effectiveness as part of the Total Force to meet our long-term national security requirements.

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The Reserve Forces Policy Board is a Federal Advisory Board codified in Title 10, Section 10301 to “serve as an independent adviser to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on strategies, policies and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency and effectiveness of the Reserve Components of our Armed Forces.” While one of the oldest advisory committees in the Department of Defense, in operation for more than 70 years, the RFPB’s operating framework was revised in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, which elevated the Board from originally acting through the former Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to an independent Board with the authority to report directly to the Secretary of Defense. This framework allows the Board to review and provide independent recommendations on policies impacting the Reserve Components (RC) as a whole, as well as their performance as a component of the Total Force, without the restrictive lens of the individual Services’ or the Department’s hierarchy. The independent nature of the Board enables it to make important recommendations focused on optimizing this critical national asset.

The Board is composed of 20 distinguished, proven leaders and subject matter experts from within the Department of Defense, the Government and the Private Sector. Eighteen of the twenty are voting members, with a Military Executive (an RC general or flag officer) and a RC Senior Enlisted Advisor both serving as non-voting members (a list of board members and brief biographical summaries can be found in Appendix A).

In consideration of the changes that have occurred since the Board published its inaugural edition of this report in 2016, the Board has identified (and incorporated in this report) numerous enterprise-level recommendations that provide opportunities for immediate improvement, means to optimize the Total Force for the long term and valuable reference material regarding RC operations and composition. These recommendations were reviewed through the lenses of the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy and updated to reflect current and future priorities. RC service members comprise 38% of the Total Force and bring critical skills and capabilities to the fight for less than one-third the per capita cost of the Active Component. In a time of constrained fiscal resources with new threats emerging on a seemingly daily basis, any complete discussion of national defense and security matters must include the RC.
The Board hopes this report will stimulate conversations and solutions, and believes enacting these recommendations will ensure the Reserve Component is effectively integrated and leveraged to deliver maximized service in defense of the Nation. Each of the recommendations and topics included in this book was deliberated and approved during open session meetings of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Copies of Board-approved slides, minutes and reference materials are available at http://rfpb.defense.gov/.

Notes: For the purposes of this publication in July 2020, the abbreviation “RC” refers collectively to the forces that constitute the seven Reserve Components: i.e. the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Army National Guard, Air National Guard and Coast Guard Reserve. DoD or simply, “The Department” refers to the Department of Defense. Thirty-eight percent of the Total Force includes only those service members attached to the Selected Reserve and excludes members of the Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard.

General Paul M. Nakasone, USA, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, thanks the Board for their service and discusses the topic of Reserve Component (RC) integration into the Cyber Mission Force.
1.1: THE GLOBAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS

The current security environment is complex and unstable with a myriad of state, non-state actors, and global events challenging American interests at home and abroad in ways never perceived when the framework that governs the Reserve Component was established. Our domestic political and fiscal environment adds complexity with its political division and unsustainable debt. Negative budget impacts created by the COVID-19 pandemic and escalating national debt may result in significant downward pressure on the Department of Defense topline. This threatens to degrade U.S. military readiness and capabilities in the absence of a strategic and transformative approach to Total Force Policy and AC/RC integration. Even before the pandemic, the high cost of modernizing the force was forcing trade-offs in force structure and readiness of the force. Today's security conditions are changing dramatically and at an ever increasing pace. This results in less global stability while maintaining our national security is becoming more difficult due to an ever increasing national debt. The National Defense Strategy, released by Secretary Mattis in 2018, aligned DoD’s efforts to build a more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready joint force. It also seeks to strengthen alliances while attracting new partners, and reforming the Defense Department to achieve greater performance and affordability. Secretary Esper then renewed emphasis on taking care of our service members and their families as we navigate the challenges of the 21st Century.

Department of Defense leaders have consistently stated that defense budgets require three to five percent of real growth annually to implement the National Defense Strategy. Sufficient resources to achieve the National Defense Strategy remain in doubt with Secretary Esper anticipating flat budgets, not counting inflation for the foreseeable future. The Secretary’s May 2020 comments to the Brookings Institution convey the interaction of the security environment and pandemic influenced budget outlook:

On the top line, I’ve said that we need -- if we’re going to continue to increase readiness, make this shift to implement the NDS, et cetera, we need a 3 to 5 percent annual real growth year over year. I am concerned of course that the massive infusion of dollars into the economy by the Congress and the executive branch, nearly $3T, may throw us off that course, if you will, because, look, we all recognize that the United States has an enormous debt and we have to deal with that too. And so there is a concern there that that may lead to smaller defense budgets in the future at the critical time at which we need to continue making this adjustment where we look at China then Russia as our long-term strategic competitors.

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2 [https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/05/05/esper-flat-budget-could-speed-cutting-legacy-programs/](https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/05/05/esper-flat-budget-could-speed-cutting-legacy-programs/)

The 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary outlines the challenges in the security environment:

*Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. National security. China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea. Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors.*

Following the strategy's publication, the congressionally directed, bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy agreed with the Department and framed the challenges in reporting:

*The security and wellbeing of the United States are at greater risk than at any time in decades. America’s military superiority—the hard-power backbone of its global influence and National security—has eroded to a dangerous degree. Rivals and adversaries are challenging the United States on many fronts and in many domains. America’s ability to defend its allies, its partners and its own vital interests is increasingly in doubt. If the Nation does not act promptly to remedy these circumstances, the consequences will be grave and lasting.*

More recently, the Defense Business Board communicated an urgent platform of national security imperatives using three major areas in their May 2020 report focused on transformation, redirection of DoD resources, and benchmarking performance to compete with China.

- Changing Security Threats
- Growing Fiscal Pressures
- Defense Business Operations are Big Business

All of these perspectives – NDS, bipartisan commission, Defense Business Board - view China as the primary strategic competitor. An important aspect of this competition includes a comparison of influence of GDP on military spending. Although China’s economy ranks 2nd in nominal GDP according to IMF statistics, it ranks 1st when viewed in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), which is nearly double that of the United States. This disparity has implications when considering the trajectory of the PLA’s spending compared to the DoD because PLA spending has more purchasing power within its own system than the United States has when comparing overall defense spending. China seeks to grow its global economic and military influence – and dominate its regional neighbors. Secretary Esper made this point in his December 2019 remarks to the Reagan National Defense Forum:

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4 NDS Summary, p. 1
In this new era of great power competition, our war fighting advantages over strategic competitors are being challenged. The international rules-based order is increasingly under attack. China and Russia – today’s revisionist powers – are modernizing their militaries while seeking veto power over the economic and security decisions of other Nations. China’s economic rise has allowed it to triple its annual military spending since 2002 with estimates reaching close to $250B last year. Beijing continues to violate the sovereignty of Indo-Pacific nations and expand its control abroad under the pretense of Belt and Road infrastructure investments. Meanwhile, it is pursuing competitive advantages, often in illicit ways in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G, while exploiting other nations’ intellectual property for its own gain.\(^7\)

In the South China Sea, China is expanding its hold on disputed island reefs that are closer to Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia and creating new islands from ocean sand piled onto live reefs. In addition to the disastrous ecological impacts, these artificial islands support new military grade runways and provide China with anti-ship missile sites in the middle of international shipping channels. The shadow of China hangs large over Taiwan, and China continues to repress dissension in Hong Kong and among Uighurs and other minority populations. Chinese influence is not limited merely to Asia but has expanded on a global scale through the Belt and Road initiative, and with Chinese attempts to gain goodwill by assisting countries struggling to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Russia also constitutes a threat as its malign activities have imparted regional instability in the areas of its western borders and throughout Europe. Russia forcibly annexed Crimea and remains militarily engaged in Eastern Ukraine. The Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all NATO members since 2004, are especially vulnerable as Russia promotes unification with Russian minority populations in the satellite states of the former Soviet Union. In Syria, Russia’s military support for the regime has resulted in the targeting of anti-Assad militias, which complicates options for the growing diaspora of Syrian refugees. Unable to match the West economically or militarily, Russia continues to use both cyber and influence operations to sow chaos in the United States and among our global partners.

Iran and North Korea are significant U.S. adversaries who pursue nuclear weapons and continue to develop long-range missile technology. Both countries maintain large militaries with significant capabilities while continuing to test their emerging technology and provoke neighbors. North Korea has positioned forces to threaten Seoul and tested ballistic missiles while Iran has emerged as a regional hegemon in the Middle East, striking ships in the Strait of Hormuz, carrying out a drone attack on Saudi refineries, and using surrogates to attack other countries in the region.

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\(^7\) https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2035046/reagan-national-defense-forum-keynote-remarks/
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), after having established a physical caliphate in Syria and Iraq, surpassed Al-Qaeda in promoting worldwide terror attacks and continues to spread propaganda via the internet and social media. While the geographic caliphate has been destroyed and ISIS has been denied a base of operations, high profile attacks in Europe and elsewhere demonstrate ISIS’ willingness and ability to operate from small cells, to kill innocent civilians, and to harm any Nation that opposes their ideology.

From a fiscal perspective, the added costs incurred by the response to the novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has increased the U.S. debt to GDP ratio to levels not seen since the Second World War. This places increased pressure on DoD’s portion of the discretionary budget over and above the continued growth of mandatory spending (e.g., Social Security, Medicare/Medicaid, interest on the debt). Before COVID-19, the DoD expected Defense spending as a portion of GDP to decline to 2.7% by 2025. In its May 2020 report to the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Business Board noted the Secretary’s anticipation of flat budgets, increasing economic fiscal pressure and deficits going forward. The RFPB agrees with the Defense Business Board that this environment requires improved efficiency with limited resources and new benchmarks to gauge success: “U.S. Defense budgets are unlikely to satisfy the global strategic requirements set forth in the National Defense Strategy.”

While addressing the National Defense Strategy on February 6, 2020, Secretary Esper stated the United States needed to maintain a competitive advantage in a new era of great power competition with Russia and China. To meet these challenges, DoD is modernizing its forces, experimenting with new technologies that ensure battlefield success and reforming the way the Department does business to ensure taxpayer dollars are aligned with the strategy's priorities. The goal is full, irreversible implementation of the National Defense Strategy (DoD press release Feb 6, 2020).

As a sign of things to come, the fiscal year 2021 (FY21) DoD budget projections are flat for the next five years. DoD cannot attain its long-term goals under these conditions and needs sustainable, predictable, adequate and timely budgets necessary for long-term global great power competition. Recent history indicates this is highly unlikely, and the Department will be forced to manage risk and make hard decisions between maintaining readiness today and modernizing the force for tomorrow. In this environment, the Reserve Component is an exceptional bargain and offers the ability to maintain capabilities for roughly one-third the cost of similar active forces.

1.2: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES

To confront dynamic global security conditions while recognizing domestic fiscal constraints, the United States military, as the bedrock of our national security, protects our citizens and interests at home and abroad, preserves regional stability, renders humanitarian assistance and imparts stability to the world. The demands on the U.S. Military have never been greater, but exploding deficits, continuing resolutions, and proposed flat budgets severely curtail the ability of the United States to adequately respond. As the demand for military capabilities continues to exceed capacity, the Nation will continue to rely on the reserve components to augment and reinforce the Active Component forces as a front line of defense and to respond to disasters at home and abroad.

Board consultant Mark Cancian, Colonel, USMCR (Ret) and Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, discusses Reserve Component support to Combatant Commands.
1.3: THE RESERVE COMPONENT

The Reserve Component consists of seven service components: the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard and Coast Guard Reserve. As an integral part of the Total Force, the RC provides:

- **Surge Capacity.** The RC augments the number of forces on active duty when the Active Component alone is insufficient to fulfill the full spectrum of DoD missions abroad and in response to state and national emergencies at home. In addition to providing forces for steady state commitments as part of the operational reserve, the RC provides depth as a Strategic Reserve. This provides decision space to leaders and scalability in operations by providing high quality, reliable and affordable forces. Utilization of, and reliance upon, the reserve components to meet operational requirements have increased dramatically since the first Gulf War, transforming the National Guard and Reserve from a strategic to an operational force with capabilities and capacity that are inextricably linked to the Joint Force’s capacity to meet global Combatant Commander requirements. Since September 11, 2001, over 1 Million RC service members have been mobilized for various operational missions at home and overseas. In June 2020, there were over 90,000 reservists mobilized with over 41,000 for the aforementioned deployments and operations. The RC contribution to DoD’s COVID-19 pandemic response peaked at 5,700 service members from the federal Reserve Components and 49,523 Guardsman; 35,443 remained activated as of June 23, 2020.†

- **AC/RC Integration.** RC forces are no longer used solely as a strategic force. They are fully integrated into all peacetime and combat operations, including pre-planned missions in support of Combatant Commanders and have been increasingly relied upon as an integral part of the Total Operational Force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Spending</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Medicare Health Fund Contributions</td>
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<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Military retirees drawing retirement pay (# Retirees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Retirement payout costs (Mil Ret Cost)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Concurrent Receipt of disability and retirement (Disability Ret)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21%</td>
<td>Defense Health Program costs (DHP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>Military Personnel costs (Mil Pers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Military construction costs (Mil Const)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance costs (O&amp;M)</td>
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<td>1%</td>
<td>Procurement costs (Proc)</td>
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<td>1%</td>
<td>DoD Dependent (Dep Ed)</td>
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<td>Less than 1%</td>
<td>Family House cost (Fam Housing)</td>
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† OSD COVID-19 Activation Response Weekly Report 200623
• Affordable Capability. The RC provides highly experienced and combat-proven capability that is considerably less expensive to maintain when compared to the AC. As shown in Figure 1-1, the RC constitutes 38% of military personnel end strength, while only accounting for 16% of the total defense budget (including procurement, Research, Development, Test, Evaluation and infrastructure costs). The fully burdened, per-capita cost of the Reserve Component to the U.S. Government is typically less than one-third the cost of the Active Component. As an example, a RC member costs 29.6% when compared to an AC member per the FY19 Base Budget request. “The RC requires significantly less overhead and infrastructure across the range of costs in those categories.”

Figure 1.1: Lower RC Overhead

• Continuum of Service. The RCs contribute to the Continuum of Service concept by providing skilled and experienced personnel who enhance the effectiveness and sustainment of our All-Volunteer Force by providing flexible service options at a reduced cost to the government. Flexible service options make military service more attractive and increase the willingness of individuals to serve, particularly those with high demand civilian skills such as cyber, mechanical, and engineering. There are various studies on behalf of DoD, to expand opportunities in flexible service in order to retain RC Service members and entice AC Service members to remain in uniform in the RC.
- **Community Engagement.** RC members serve in all 50 states, the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia. They are represented in roughly 3,000 communities across the Nation as citizen Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen and provide a close bond to a broader cross-section of the American population than their AC counterparts provide. These bonds are essential in maintaining strong relationships and support for our military from the general U.S. population. These bonds inspire citizens to serve in the military and are vital to the U.S. military recruiting effort. The vast majority of RC members, families and employers (~75%) report a favorable opinion of reserve forces and a willingness to provide continuing support to the RC and the entire U.S. Military.

The Reserve Components have evolved beyond a strategic force relied on only in times of major war or national emergency. They are now used as an operational reserve for all peacetime and combat operations with the RC sharing the burden and the risks with AC forces.
1.4: MYTHS SURROUNDING THE RESERVE COMPONENT

The Reserve Components have been integral to the success of the Total Force for almost 20 years. However, barriers exist which will significantly hamper continued success if not addressed. These barriers arise from a lack of understanding of the Reserve Component to include its unique capabilities and the antiquated laws, policies and information technology systems used to manage the RC.

Lack of familiarity about the RC from some senior Service and DoD leaders, as well as the American public at large, results in common misunderstanding which limits effective integration and inhibits best use of needed capabilities and experience. The DoD also lacks an updated Total Force Policy and has not totally embraced the Total Force concept as it was outlined by Secretaries of Defense Melvin Laird and formalized by James Schlesinger in the 1970s, and validated by successive Secretaries of Defense. The most recent Secretary to communicate a Total Force directive was William A. Cohen his September 4, 1997 memorandum titled “Integration of the Reserve and Active Components.” Known as the “Seamless Total Force” or “Total Force Integration” memorandum, the directive called for Department leaders to eliminate all residual cultural and structural barriers to effective integration within the Total Force. In this context, integration meant conditions of readiness in addition to trust at all levels that the Reserve Components are trained and equipped to serve as part of the Joint Force. Secretary Cohen prescribed four principles that he considered necessary for Total Force Integration to be a reality:

- Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by the senior leaders throughout the Total Force
- Clear and mutual understanding on the mission for each unit – Active, Guard, and Reserve - in service and joint/combined operations, during peace and war
- Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions
- Leadership by senior commanders – Active, Guard, and Reserve – to ensure the readiness of the Total Force

Both the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense provided a significant amount of guidance via their memoranda, including the follow-up title “Progress on the Integration of the Reserve and Active Components,” dated January 4, 2001. Secretary Cohen outlined specific areas for the Department to address, including laws, policies, systems, and processes to support a Total Force in addition to ensuring the Department resourced Commanders with training and equipment for interoperability in joint operations. A 2017 RAND Corporation study covered the history of Total Force Policy, showing that in 2001 formal Secretary of Defense directives
on this concept went silent until 2008, with the publishing of Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, under Secretary Gates.

In the time between Secretary Cohen’s last memo and the publishing of the DoDD 1200.17 version that exists today, the Congress chartered the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve with the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA on October 28, 2004. When the Commission reported out to Congress on January 31, 2008, its findings and recommendations highlighted the challenges with ensuring the RC was ready as an operational force. It also highlighted the outdated laws, policies, systems and processes that struggled to efficiently support multiple components and the operational but part-time nature of reserve service members. The Reserve Forces Policy Board notes that while progress has been made, the aforementioned lack of understanding and misperceptions adversely affect decisions regarding the use of the Reserve Components, achieving a proper balance between AC and RC forces, resourcing, equipping and difficulty in improving policies, systems and processes across the Defense enterprise. These outdated personnel management statutes, policies, and information systems (that are difficult to navigate) create inefficiencies, which reduce the Services’ desire to plan, program, and utilize the RC. This in turn affects the overall effectiveness of the Total Force.

Today’s RC fulfills the roles of both a Strategic Reserve and an Operational Reserve. The Strategic Reserve consists of forces in dwell conducting routine training, while the Operational Reserve consists of fully integrated forces that are regularly employed. Although DoDD 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force* provides a definition in the glossary for RCs as an operational force, Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* does not contain a definition for the term operational reserve. Without a formally defined operational reserve definition, proper planning, prioritized funding for readiness, and predictability for effective RC employment inhibits the Total Force.

Most notably, a general lack of understanding regarding RC organization, capabilities, policies, access, cost, etc. has led to senior service and other leaders to believe the RC is not as capable or effective as their AC counterparts and that they cost too much. The RFPB’s independent analysis shows that both assumptions are incorrect.
Myth 1:

The Reserve Components are not as capable nor effective as their Active Component counterparts. In 2015, the Reserve Forces Policy Board commissioned the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to study the operational effectiveness of the National Guard and Reserves during Operations Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OND and OEF). This analysis had never been done before and established a benchmark for reserve performance in combat operations. IDA’s analysis of aggregated, measurable, tactical level and individual data, showed no sizeable differences in performance between AC and RC during OIF/OND and OEF when the RC forces had adequate pre-deployment training. Both components shared comparable burden and risk. Additionally, strategic and operational leaders were pleased with RC contributions and performance in support of OIF/OND and OEF. In fact, during numerous interviews conducted by IDA, senior leaders said that they were unable to distinguish between AC and RC personnel under their command.

Myth 2:

The Reserve Components can cost more than their Active Component counterparts. An in-depth analysis by the RFPB, shown in Figure 1-2 on the following page, shows that Reserve Component forces cost substantially less than Active Component forces. The RFPB began this analysis in 2012 because of concerns that existing DoD methodologies included only direct personnel and unit operating costs. The RFPB analysis included indirect costs, such as the DoD health program, dependent education, family housing, most military construction, commissary, and other infrastructure costs. Results showed that per capita RC cost is approximately 28.6% of an AC service member (based on 2018 data - for specifics, see Section 4.2 Reserve Component Cost Comparison and Efficiencies). These findings were consistent with those of other independent organizations. For example, in July 2016 the Congressional Budget Office released its analyses of the structure and cost of the military from the perspective of major combat units. Their findings were nearly identical to the work done by the RFPB when considering direct, indirect and overhead costs for active, guard and reserve units. The results are also similar to those of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, the National Commission on the Future of the Army, and the RAND Corporation.

Nevertheless, the myth of higher cost persists. This likely arises from two special situations: rotation of forces overseas and unexpected activation of reserve forces. If DoD wants to maintain a continuous overseas presence by rotating units from the United States, a base of three or four active-duty units is needed to maintain one deployed. A base of five or six RC units is needed to keep one continuously deployed because reservists cannot deploy as often as active-duty troops, and reserve units
have less usable deployment time because of the time needed for activation and train up. Even though reserve units cannot deploy as often as active-duty units, the RFPB believes that the lower overall cost of reserve units make them attractive in this rotational situation, although continuous deployment is a better mission for the active-duty force. The other situation is when a reserve unit is activated, but the money for increased personnel compensation and operational activity was not previously included in the budget. In this situation, DoD must identify funding from other sources, hence, the perception that reserve forces are “more expensive.” However, the failure to anticipate and budget for reserve activation does not make them more expensive. Many DoD activities from healthcare, to equipment maintenance, to recruiting and retention bonuses periodically require unexpected funding. Further, when reserve forces are activated in a situation like this, the personnel tempo of active-duty units is reduced because they do not need to deploy, which has a positive impact on retention benefits.

During the June 5, 2019 RFPB meeting, Deputy Secretary of Defense Norquist described how this AC/RC cost differential supported the National Defense Strategy. He explained that allocating resources to grow Active Component end strength was a risky bet, since Congress and future administrations might decrease the size of the military at some point, requiring DoD to let service members go after expending effort on recruiting and training of those personnel. Mr. Norquist then described how from this perspective, allocating funding for investment and modernization, which was required by the National Defense Strategy to enhance capabilities for great power conflict, could be achieved by relying on the lower cost Reserve Component.

Figure 1.2: Cost Comparison AC v RC Unit
1.5: OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT

The achievements of the RC over the last 20 years highlight the necessity for AC/RC integration and accountable reform measures to ensure the RC remains viable to the Total Force and can meet or exceed the current National Defense Strategy requirements. Several commissions have made recommendations, to include:

- The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 2005 - 2008
- The National Commission on the Future of the Army 2015 - 2016
- The National Commission on Military, National and Public Service 2017 - 2020

Other government studies and think tank reports have provided recommendations and reform proposals to the Department of Defense to ensure the RC is ready, relevant, accessible and employed to meet the Nation’s defense needs. Despite the adoption of some reforms, much work remains.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board has identified several policy initiatives aimed at removing existing organizational and policy barriers, which adversely influence the agility, readiness, and overall effectiveness and lethality of the RC. As active and reserve force structure is reviewed, it is critical that the RC remain an operationally viable element of the Total Force. To tackle these barriers, the Department leadership should immediately implement the following recommendations:

- Revalidate and emphasize a Total Force policy
- Formalize the operational reserve by definition and in statute
- Increase AC/RC integration in culture, policy, force structure, and modernization
- Enact DoD policy for computing fully burdened and life-cycle cost for military personnel on an annual basis
- Enact Duty Status Reform with the goal of reducing the overall number of duty statuses
- Eliminate disparity in benefits between AC/RC members
- Allow the accrual of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits
- Include the Guard and Reserve in the Space Force from the beginning
1.6: ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT

Title 10, United States Code Section 10101, states there are seven Reserve Components within the Armed Forces of the United States – the Army and Air National Guard, as well as the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard Reserve. As of January 2020, RC military strength totaled 803,370 service members, providing approximately 38% of the total DoD military force structure. The RC provides DoD with a broad array of combat and support capabilities for use at home and abroad, located in roughly 3,000 communities across all 50 states, the U.S. territories of Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia. In addition to these personnel, often referred to as “Drilling Reserve and Guard,” 224,841 individual ready reserve and inactive National Guard members, provide an additional cadre of trained personnel when needed.

The purpose of the Reserve Component is:

“to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components” (10 USC 10102)."

The National Guard is both a Reserve Component and a state militia. The statutory role of the National Guard is further articulated in Title 32, which states,

“Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other Reserve Components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed” (32 USC 102).

As a state militia, the National Guard is available to state and territorial authorities for a wide range of domestic support operations. The Guard is unique in that it is DoD’s only military force, active or reserve, with civil law enforcement authorities (while under the control of a state governor). (Additional information about each of the Reserve Components can be found in Chapter 5).
1.7: RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE

RC members have been involuntarily mobilized for seven major operations in the last 29 years, including large-scale mobilizations for the first Persian Gulf War, the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, Operation Noble Eagle (United States, Canada), Operation Enduring Freedom and Freedom's Sentinel (Afghanistan), Operation Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn (Iraq) and Operation Inherent Resolve (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Following the Hurricane Katrina disaster in 2005, the Guard and Reserve activated members within affected communities and deployed an unprecedented RC force in excess of 50,000 personnel who, while working alongside a very small active military force, saved lives, alleviated suffering and stabilized the Gulf States.

Between 2017 and 2019, the Guard and Reserves once again provided unprecedented domestic hurricane relief, activating members to support recovery operations for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, Michael and Dorian. On November 1, 2017, Robert Salesses, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Integration and Defense Support of Civilian Agencies, said:

“Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria put tremendous strain on all levels of government and service members of all components stepped up to save lives, restore critical services and help those affected transition to recovery.”

At that time, DoD had accepted 311 mission assignments from FEMA and other federal partners. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) said DoD had assigned 13,470 personnel, including 7,857 National Guard, to support hurricane relief efforts.

In October 2018, Army Brigadier General Rafael Ribas was appointed the dual-status commander for Florida. He commanded a Joint Task Force made up of 5,000 DoD personnel, half of whom were National Guard (Title 32 and State Active Duty), in a civil support mission to those areas affected by Hurricane Michael in Florida.

On September 1, 2019, with sustained winds of 185 mph, Hurricane Dorian strengthened into a category 5 hurricane and made landfall at Elbow Cay, Bahamas. Hurricane Dorian then proceeded along the southeastern United States coastline leaving considerable damage and economic losses in its wake. This made 2019 the fourth consecutive year to feature a category 5 hurricane, which is a record, surpassing the three-year period from 2001-2005.

On September 3, 2019, Air Force General O’Shaughnessy, Commander of U.S. Northern Command, stated at a Pentagon news conference, “More than 5,000 National Guard troops and 2,700 active duty personnel are either deployed or are positioned to respond within 24 hours in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other partners.” National Guard troops in Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina and Virginia were prepared for rescue and recovery operations.
Since 9/11, more than one million RC members have been involuntarily activated across the seven Reserve Components in support of overseas contingency operations. Over half the Nation’s individual guardsmen and reservists have been mobilized for active duty more than once. Most mobilizations (89%) have resulted in deployments to combat zones. Since 1991, the National Guard has been called up nearly 7,000 times (an average of 311 events per year) to support Domestic Operations Missions such as key asset protection, law enforcement, natural disasters, search and rescue, border support and others. The RC has become a force of choice for Peacekeeping Operations, taking leading roles in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Sinai and Syria.

The Reserve Component does not require as much infrastructure as the Active Component. It incurs far lower costs for base operations support, such as maintenance, security, utility costs associated with housing, childcare and recreation facilities found of major installations. This is true whether the reservists is mobilized or in a drill status. Despite activating and deploying over one million National Guard and Reserve members, DoD did not build any more hospitals, schools family housing, daycares or other dependent care facilities to support these activated service members. DoD spent $730.8B in military construction from 2011 to 2018. Over 85% of that was spent on the Active Component. Less than 1% was appropriated specifically for the reserve components.
On February 15, 2019, Presidential Proclamation 9844 “declared a national emergency concerning the southern border of the United States to address the border security and humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests.” As of July 1, 2020, 2,415 National Guard personnel were assigned to the southwest border mission for Operation Faithful Patriot, where they support Customs and Border Protection in a number of roles including placing concertina wire, transporting Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) personnel and conducting surveillance. On February 13, 2020, the mission was continued for another year, and in April 2020, the Department approved transitioning to federalized National Guard in a Title 10 Status for southern border operations beginning on October 1, 2020.

On March 13, 2020, the President declared a national emergency concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. The Federal Government, along with State and local governments, took preventative and proactive measures to slow the spread of the virus and treat those affected. National Guard and Reserve forces provided unprecedented support for the COVID-19 response with over 6,700 federal RC and 46,000 National Guard members recalled for duty at the peak as of May 2020. On July 1, 2020, 31,631 National Guard members remained activated for COVID-19 response operations.

**Figure 1.3: Reserve Duty Days (Historical)**

**RC: Now an Operational Reserve**
1.8: THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE

In 1970, DoD adopted a Total Force Concept (i.e. consideration of all forces, active and reserve) that was to be applied in planning, programming, manning, equipping and employment of the force. This occurred because, with the prospective end of the draft (which ended in 1973), U.S. active duty forces alone would not be large enough to face challenges posed by the Soviet Union and Communist China. In 1973, the Army, at the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army General, Creighton Abrams, took a further step by increasing the combat forces on active duty and compensating by putting a large part of the support forces in the RC. This created greater dependency and interest in the reserve forces; it also had the effect of preventing the use of military force without reserve involvement and ultimately gaining the collective support of the American people. Since this reorganization, inclusion of the Guard and Reserves in the Nation’s military efforts has been instrumental in sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, as well as engaging the public with its military.

Since 1991, the seven Reserve Components have evolved from being used solely as a separate strategic force and only being relied on in times of major war or national emergency. They are now used as an operational reserve, fully integrated into all peacetime and combat operations, as recognized in DoDD 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force. This Total Force approach allows the DoD to collectively manage risk with forces from both components.

From the codification of our current seven Reserve Components stated in Public Law No. 66-476, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, up to and including the Persian Gulf War in 1990/91, the RC operated primarily as a Strategic Reserve force and provided an annual average of 3,000 active duty person-years of operational support to DoD’s missions. Figure 1-3 shows how the RC has transformed. Between the Gulf War and September 11, 2001 (9/11), RC contribution increased to an annual average of 35,000 active duty person-years of operational support. In the 19 years following 9/11, the RC fully transitioned from a Strategic Reserve into an operational reserve with contributions increasing to approximately 146,000 active duty person-years annually. DoD has relied extensively on Guard and Reserve forces with involuntary individual and unit mobilizations totaling more than one million Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines since 9/11 (as of February 2020). Since the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn as well as the troop drawdown in Afghanistan, RC requirements have declined, but even so, over 40,000-reserve service members have remained mobilized over the last several years in support of contingency operations, with a significant number of RC members expected to remain on active duty to support real world operations going forward. However, while increased reliance on the RC has occurred over the last 29 years, inclusion of the RC when planning and budgeting for the Total Force has fallen short of the original intent.

10 DoDD 1200.14
1.9: OBSTACLES LIMITING LONG-TERM SUCCESS

The Reserve Components have been integral to the success of the Total Force over the last 19 years. The remaining barriers, if left unaddressed, will inhibit continued success in the future. The source of these obstacles generally originates from a lack of understanding of the RC along with a misunderstanding of the tools used to manage the RC, such as:

- Antiquated laws and policies
- Legacy information technology systems that do not enable cross component processes, seamless mobilization onboarding, or enable a part time, distributed workforce
- Service approaches to equipping their RCs
- Lack of familiarity across DoD on the RCs

RC forces have become increasingly operational over the last few decades; yet there remains a general lack of understanding within the DoD regarding the RC’s capabilities, accessibility, and costs as well as other important areas such as National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) and parent service procurement accounts. Many of the Department’s senior leaders remain unaware of the differences between the National Guard and the Reserves; the strengths and capabilities resident in each Reserve Component; the cost to maintain and use the RC; or the constraints affecting their use. This lack of knowledge leads to common misperceptions (or myths) about the RC, which limits effective integration and inhibits its use. In addition, use of outdated personnel management statutes, policies and information systems (that are difficult to navigate) creates inefficiencies that reduce the Services’ desire to use the RC, which in turn affects the overall effectiveness of the Total Force. During an era of limited resources, reduced force structure and threatened readiness, these barriers must be eliminated to enable optimized use of the RC as an effective component of the Total Force.
1.10: THE LACK OF A TOTAL FORCE POLICY AND DEFINITION FOR AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

DoD has struggled and not fully embraced the Total Force concept since its inception at the end of the Vietnam War. The notion that reservists and guardsmen are somehow less capable, less committed, or less professional has continued to persist among some senior leaders in the Department. Each service has a Total Force policy but an overarching policy to provide unity of command and effort is lacking at the DoD level. Establishing a DoD level policy will reduce biases and create tangible progress in uniformly managing and maintaining a ready Total Force. Enhanced AC/RC integration is the cornerstone to a stronger, more agile, and more lethal military. A DoD level policy would inculcate a Total Force culture and align units linked with a wartime mission according to the National Defense Strategy by tying ends, ways and means together. If not addressed, the current practice of prioritizing active forces first in line for resources will continue and thus extend the cultural divisions, leading to a loss of RC operational edge and risks a return to the period when the Guard and Reserves were seriously undermanned and did not have the necessary training or equipment to immediately meet operational requirements. This absence of Total Force perspective stalls decisions regarding the use of the Reserve Components, the proper balance between AC and RC forces and resourcing. A cultural tsunami needs to occur within DoD to embrace Active and Reserve members as part of the same team – not separate teams competing, against each other, for resources.

Today’s RC force fills the role of both a Strategic Reserve, as well as a fully integrated operational reserve. Most senior leaders sanction this concept and use these terms freely. However, these terms are defined neither in joint doctrine nor within DoD policy. The Department of Defense must formerly define the term operational reserve that will necessitate and adequately prioritize funding to maintain operational readiness and provide predictability for effective RC contributions to the Total Force going forward.
1.11: ANTIQUATED LAWS, POLICIES AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The current military personnel management system was first established during the Cold War and remains largely unchanged. Defense personnel management statutes, policies and information systems have not kept pace with demographic or technological changes over the last 50 years. Two examples of this are the 32 separate and distinct RC duty statuses and the disconnected and nearly obsolete information systems used to manage the force. Complex duty statuses and inefficient or difficult personnel management systems provide little incentive for the Services to make use of the RC during a contingency and often lead to wasted resources and increased operational tempo for an active force already stretched thin. In many cases, the expertise needed for an operation resides in RC units that are sidelined while AC units struggle to handle situations beyond their normal skillsets. The Department urgently needs to modernize business practices and systems for assessing, recruiting, developing, utilizing, sustaining and retaining its military manpower. As a whole, current enterprise business operations do not consider the part-time reservist. The nature of part time RC service finds the service member interacting with the business enterprise on non-continuous basis and often remotely from the public domain. Existing resource-intensive and time-consuming work-arounds (e.g. case management, ad hoc and labor-intensive “cells,” manual vouchers) demonstrate the unmet need for simple, fast, automated and remotely accessible business support for a distributed part time work force. Assembly for unit training commonly brings as many IT and policy challenges as when the drilling reservist is off-network due to demand for limited IT resources at the unit and reduced enterprise support during weekends. These combined challenges by business area include:

- **Training:** Training center/armory bandwidth; computer availability; mandatory computer-based training time
- **Travel:** Multi-appropriation/multi-status travel; Annual Training allowance parity; manual vouchers
- **Finance:** AC/RC transfers; pre/post-mobilization process; authorization inequity
- **Human Resources:** Short-term DD214; interrupted TRICARE/status change; duty status complexity
- **Information Technology:** Common Access Card (CAC) limitations; weekend authorized system outages for maintenance on drill weekends; 30+ day login lockout policies; remote capability

Currently, each Service is pursuing efforts to modernize their integrated pay and personnel systems (IPPS) and divest legacy equipment. While each service approached modernization in their own way, the Marine Corps is the only service with a fully integrated system. The Army led with the National Guard, transitioning antiquated National Guard systems first, with all 54 states and territories completed in March 2020.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) entered a temporary agreement with a cloud provider to deploy IT capabilities approved by the Federal Risk Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP.gov) across the Department. The Board considers this the standard for enterprise capabilities that supports a distributed workforce.

1.12: SUMMARY

The Nation can ill-afford to ignore the robust capabilities of the National Guard and Reserves or the lessons learned and experience gained over the last 20 years of combat and real world response operations. Reserve component members bring unique capabilities and professional expertise to the Total Force gained through years of experience not only from spending years in the military on a particular weapons system but they bring invaluable expertise from the civilian sector. The Department should learn to exploit this expertise going forward, particularly in the areas of cyber, space, artificial intelligence and hypersonics. Rich repositories of talent reside in the RC that is cost-prohibitive to develop in the AC (i.e. doctors, nurses, lawyers, computer analysts, cyber experts, engineers, etc.). During a period of significant force structure reductions and budget cuts, continued investment in a strong National Guard and Reserve forces provides numerous benefits to the Total Force and is quintessential in balancing current threats while preparing for an era of great power competition in order to achieve U.S. national security objectives going forward. It is equally vital that senior leaders understand the importance of the reserve forces and define specific roles and expectations for them in future strategic and operational plans.
2.0: PRIORITIES FOR THE NEAR TERM

This chapter’s purpose is to provide leadership with a list of recommendations on issues that have been well known within DoD for many years but have not yet been resolved. These recommendations are intended, in accordance with RFPB’s statutory basis, to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency and effectiveness of the Reserve Components.

2.1: EMPHASIZE THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

While the Services each have individual Total Force policies in place, the Department of Defense lacks a comprehensive Total Force policy capable of providing critical guidance and oversight. This absence of Total Force perspective adversely affects decisions regarding the use of the Reserve Components, the proper balance between AC and RC forces and effective resourcing. In 2018, the definition of “Total Force” was added to the Joint Military Perspective section of Joint Publication 4-05 Joint Mobilization Policy (October 23, 2018). Per JP 4-05, the Total Force includes the organizations, units and individuals that compromise the DoD as resources for implementing the National Security Strategy. It includes AC and RC military personnel; military retired members; and DoD civilian personnel, including foreign national direct and in-direct, as well as non-appropriated fund employees, contractors and Host-Nation support (HNS) personnel. However, joint doctrine does not constitute policy nor provide directive guidance outside joint planning and operations.

The Department has failed to fully institutionalize the notion of a Total Force despite being an integral part of the Total Force since 1973. The perception that reservists and guardsmen are somehow less capable, less committed or less professional continues to persist among some senior leaders in the Department. This culture needs to change. Active and reserve members, as well as civilian employees, contractors and host-Nation support personnel, need to be embraced as members of the same team, not separate competing entities. To that end, the Department should encourage and incentivize a continuum of service to preserve talent from the AC that would be otherwise lost with Total Force reductions or otherwise routine transitions from the active force.

The RFPB has a long history of Total Force advocacy. In September 2012, then Secretary Panetta met with the RFPB and asked the Board to provide advice and recommendations on four strategic topics:

- Best Ways to use the RC in the Future
- AC/RC Mix
- Cost of a Strong Reserve
- How to Achieve Savings
To answer these questions, the RFPB established a Task Group to study these topics and develop recommendations for the Secretary of Defense. The report was completed in December 2013. The board made the following key observations in response to Secretary Panetta’s question, “What are the best ways to use the Reserve Components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance?”

- Employ the RCs operationally as integral elements of our National Defense Strategy to maintain their training and avoid the tendency to “keep them on the shelf.”
- The RCs should be used to support all ten DoD priority missions and other missions required by the President and Governors.
- The RCs have a demonstrated record of sustained accessibility, readiness and reliability.
- Many senior defense leaders are unaware of the differences between the National Guard and the Reserves; the strength of the RC; the capabilities resident in the RC; the costs to maintain and use the RC; or the limitations on their use.

Figure 2.1: Force Makeup AC/RC
Retaining already lean RC force structure is the most significant efficiency possible when considering that the fully burdened costs of a guardsman or reservist is less than one-third of an active duty service member.

Some senior defense leaders lack a Total Force perspective and thus focus on the Active Component as the only solution to today’s national security challenges.

One proposed RFPB recommendation was to improve and enforce a revised Total Force policy that enumerates key principles necessary to encourage a Total Force culture. Throughout the Department, senior civilian and military leaders should consider the following principles:

- Take responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force. The Department should view the Active and Reserve Components as co-equals and ensure the RC receives the same consideration in all matters.

- Ensure military readiness in both the Active and Reserve Components. The RC plays a critical role in meeting national security requirements and must be ready at all times.

- Develop a clear and mutual understanding of the roles and missions of each component (Active, Guard and Reserve) in each service and in joint/combined operations, during peacetime and war. The Department should provide a roadmap for long-term reserve integration, such as the previously published Joint Vision 2020.

- Provide the necessary resources to accomplish assigned missions. In order to be fully utilized as an operational reserve, the Department should direct the military services to adequately fund their Reserve Components for regular and routine participation in meeting Combatant Commander and other operational requirements.
Since the first Gulf War, reliance upon the Reserve Components to meet operational requirements has increased dramatically. This transformation of the National Guard and Reserve from a strategic to an operational force has achieved fulfilling the capabilities and capacity, which are inextricably linked to the joint force’s capacity to accomplish global Combatant Commander Requirements. Over the previous two decades, reservists and guardsmen have been ready, accessible and routinely utilized to meet mission requirements at home and abroad. As of June 30, 2020, over 43,000 members of the RC remain activated in support of named overseas contingency operations to meet the needs of the Department, with over one million involuntarily activated since 9/11 in support of these operations.11

Proposals to formalize the operational reserve are not new. In 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) prescribed proactive, bold and systemic reform that has largely not come to fruition in terms of roles and missions, funding mechanisms, equipping and training despite the Reserve Components making up approximately 38% of DoD’s military forces (Figure 2-1). More than 20 RFPB reports with recommendations to the Secretary of Defense have also identified the need to formalize the operational reserve. This chapter reaffirms the recommendations concerning the operational reserve in the RFPB’s 2016 Report “Improving the Total Force using the National Guard and Reserves” and provides the Department with recommendations to complete the transformation of the RCs to an operational reserve by design.

To address this, the Board recommends the following actions:

- Officially define the term “operational reserve” as applied to the utilization of the Reserve Component in Department policy.
- The Department must plan, program and budget for the continued operational use of the Reserve Components.
- Guidance on Reserve Component use should be included in a new Total Force Policy in addition to dedicated sections in the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance.
- Services should continue to include and leverage the Reserve Components in their force generation models.

11 OASD-RA-RTM-Mobilization Weekly Report 200623
• The Department should adapt the Global Force Management process to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for RC support, to facilitate service planning, programming and budgeting for the activation and employment of RC forces under Title 10, Section 12304b authority.

• Whenever possible, use Overseas Contingency Operations funding to support RC activities in real-world operations and when the Declaration of National Emergency ends, utilize 12304b authority to support operational requirements.

Acting on these recommendations recognizes the previous contributions of the Reserve Components and the necessity for continued access to meet the needs of the Services, the Department and the Nation. Failure to act on these recommendations insinuates the Nation remains tied to an outdated, Cold War Strategic Reserve model, governed by ad hoc, ineffective policies and other temporary fixes that force the RC to function in a degraded and inefficient manner. Failing to make the changes that recognize the evolution of the Reserve Component over the last two decades limits our response options during a great power competition. It is time to provide the Nation with a formalized operational reserve that is planned, programmed and budgeted to provide continuous support to the Total Force and the Nation’s defense.

**Officially define the term “operational reserve” for use in Department policy.**

The last 19 years demonstrated the AC is insufficient and cannot meet our overseas or homeland defense requirements without significant contributions from the RC. Declining budgets, reduced AC force structure and increasing global threats compel the need for the RC to be used on a routine basis as an operational reserve force and force multiplier. While the term operational reserve is well known and routinely spoken by senior defense officials to describe the Reserve Components and how they are used, the lack of a formal DoD definition that defines roles, responsibilities and funding requirements negatively impacts readiness and limits recognition of the critical role the RC plays in the Nation’s defense.

Since the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s last report, the Board recommended the Deputy Secretary of Defense promulgate the following policy definition:

“Operational Reserve” – An operational reserve provides both ready operational capabilities and on-call strategic depth to provide the full spectrum of lethality in support of U.S. defense requirements. In their operationally ready roles, Reserve Components provide responsive capacity that is accessible, routinely utilized and fully integrated with the active force to help meet ongoing and emergent Combatant Commander Requirements. The Reserve Components also provide the Nation’s strategic depth, permitting the active forces to expand substantially to meet the needs of a large-scale mobilization in response to a major power conflict or other national emergency.

This definition adds value to the current policy definition concerning Reserve Component utilization in DoDD 1200.17 “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force:”
• Adds detail to the meaning of operational capabilities and strategic depth
• Identifies the requirement to be operationally ready as a key starting point
• Communicates the importance of access policy and procedures for mobilization
• Describes the key practice of routinely utilizing for both emergent and ongoing requirements
• Adds “fully integrated” to operational capabilities in terms of the training integration and modernization necessary to enable employment
• Identifies the purpose of “strategic depth” as the ability and capacity to mobilize for major power conflict

Following the RFPB’s second recommendation on this matter, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Undersecretary of Personnel and Readiness agreed the policy-type definition provided the most appropriate use of the operational reserve term. As a policy definition planned for a DoD Issuance, the Department views its use as fitting for the purposes of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in addition to the Military Departments executing their organize, train, equip, resourcing and force generation roles. Since the “operational reserve” terminology persists throughout joint doctrine in a campaign-planning context, it is important to understand the policy definition distinction. As of June 2020, the initial coordination for revision to Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 included the aforementioned operational reserve definition.

**Recommendation #1:**

*Officially, define the term “operational reserve” for use in Department policy.*

The Department must plan, program and budget for the continued operational use of the Reserve Components.

The current DoD directive and polices concerning the planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) process provide the mechanisms for resourcing the routine use of the RC as an operational reserve. These common areas include planning goals, programming guidance and resource allocation needed to ensure RC forces
are ready and accessible. However, this structure results in disparate, service-centric practices that hinder an enterprise approach to Reserve Component resource allocation. This hinders the Department’s ability to provide executive direction on operational reserve policy efforts toward standardization for routine utilization of the seven Reserve Components. Routine utilization of RC forces will ensure Total Force Strategic readiness to meet mission requirements for great power competition, immediate conflict or emergencies and surge for a protracted conflict as communicated in the National Defense Strategy.

Plan. This phase focuses on planning the integrated and balanced military forces necessary to accomplish the National Defense Strategy while providing a policy framework that includes affordability and balanced risk. Here systematic analysis of current and programmed forces in relation to demand results in an evaluation of operational utility and cost effectiveness of major decision options facilitated by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. The Joint Staff's management and review of campaign and contingency plans produces this view of demand on the force in addition to assessments that evaluate resourcing, authorities and posture. As the least service-centric phase of the PPBE process, this is the area where Department executive leadership and oversight has the best opportunity to shape the DoD's utilization of the operational reserve from an enterprise perspective in areas common to the seven Reserve Components, recognizing that the military services each set their own priorities as idiosyncratic bureaucracies. A 2019 study sponsored by the OSD Office of Net Assessment analyzed the power dynamics between the Joint Staff, OSD and the Services while noting, “They [the services] alone are responsible for raising the forces and building the capabilities to conduct war.” For this reason, the RFPB advocates for clear common policies from defense leaders to embed the operational reserve into the defense enterprise.

In 2014 and 2017 the RFPB recommended the Secretary of Defense deliberately consider the Reserve Components in senior reviews after observing that many senior defense leaders remain unaware of the differences between the National Guard and

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13 CJCSI 3141.01F Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans (January 31, 2019), 18.
the federal Reserves, the strengths of each Reserve Component, the capabilities resident in each of the Reserve Components, the cost to maintain and use the Reserve Components, or the limitations on their use. The RFPB noted little improvement between the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), advocating that the Secretary of Defense “address the size, shape and use of the Guard and Reserve in support of the DoD strategy” as originally required by Title 10, Section 118 to address the size, shape and use of the Guard and Reserve in support of DoD Strategy. Before its replacement with language regarding the National Defense Strategy, Title 10, Section 118 specified that the former QDR include:

The anticipated roles and missions of the Reserve Components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities and equipment necessary to assure that the Reserve Components can capably discharge those roles and missions.

Although no longer in statute, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) may address this topic’s past omission due to its statement that “In wartime, the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating aggression by a major power; deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD threats.” Because of this, the National Defense Strategy guidance can potentially facilitate the Department to plan Reserve Component roles, missions, sizing and posture for full mobilization, partial mobilization and routine operational reserve utilization to handle each level of the Global Operating Model. This includes strategic depth for major power conflict, immediate response to a national emergency and Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) driven support for long-term strategic competition driven by Combatant Command Campaign Plans.

Despite the National Defense Strategy inclusion of the term “fully mobilized,” the Reserve Forces Policy Board has not noted a deliberate, strategic Department-wide discussion-taking place to inform planning guidance concerning the relationship between the operational reserve and the Department’s fully mobilized state. This is apparent in the topic’s absence in the National Defense Strategy Commission report.

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15 Improving the Total Force, Using the National Guard and Reserve; A report to the new administration by the Reserve Forces Policy Board. RFPB Report FY17-01, 35.
19 Ibid, 4, 6-7.
Recommendation #2:

Defense leaders should incorporate the following concepts during the planning phase to formalize the operational reserve in the PPBE decision support process:

- National Defense Strategy guidance on the role of the Reserve Components.\(^{21}\)
- Defense Programming Guidance on Risk management handling for mobilization response timing and scale.
- Defense Programming Guidance on Reserve Component equipment modernization as it applies to system and combat integration with the Active Component.
- Global Force Management planning guidance for preplanned Combatant Command (CCMD) utilization under 10 USC Section 12304b in order to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for Reserve Component in sufficient time for services to budget for operational reserve utilization.\(^{22}\)

**Programming.** The programming phase includes the development of proposed programs consistent with the planning guidance, programming guidance and fiscal guidance while reflecting systematic analysis of missions and objectives to achieve, alternative methods of accomplishing them and the effective allocation of the resources. This phase also includes a risk assessment by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the capability of the force levels and support programs to execute the strategy approved during the planning phase.\(^{23}\)

This phase is the most opaque due to the sensitivity of options being considered, but also the timing becomes even more critical due to the short time senior defense leaders have to analyze each service’s program objective memorandum (POM) alignment when they are delivered and determine their coherence with planning phase strategic guidance.


Since operational reserve policy and resourcing is implemented according to individual service choices instead of an enterprise approach, the Board considers it extremely important that the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense provide oversight of this critical National Security policy aspect during senior reviews in the programming phase.

**Recommendation #3:**

The Board recommends senior Department leadership provide emphasis at the following key points during the programming phase in order to resource expected operational reserve utilization and address any risk assumed by the Military Departments on behalf of the Department of Defense:

- Include Defense Programming Guidance topics concerning the operational reserve
- Direct Military Departments to program Military Personnel, Procurement and Operations and Maintenance resourcing for continued operational use of the Reserve Components under 10 USC Sections 12304b for preplanned CCMD utilization and 12302 for partial mobilization when authorized.
- Direct that Military Departments provide an explanation of the scope of assumed 10 USC Section 12301(d) voluntary mobilization to meet CCMD requirements; demonstrate adequate Military Personnel, Procurement and Operations and Maintenance resourcing commensurate with that assumption; and communicate risk in RC capability gaps for operational reserve utilization in addition to risk to readiness needed in order to mobilize for major conflict.
- Direct that Military Departments demonstrate: resourcing of procurement funding to ensure Active Component and Reserve Component interoperability; identification of interoperability gaps per intent of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)-directed parity assessment; and provide a schedule of Reserve Component weapons systems inventory and modernization deliveries.

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24 Improving the Total Force, Using the National Guard and Reserve; A report to the new administration by the Reserve Forces Policy Board. RFPB Report FY17-01.

25 The FY 2019 NDAA amended Section 10541(b) of Title 10 USC by adding the requirement for a joint assessment by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the efforts of the Army to achieve parity among the AC, the AR and the ARNG with respect to equipment and capabilities. The assessment includes a comparison of the inventory of high priority items of equipment, including: AH–64 Attack Helicopters; UH–60 Black Hawk Utility Helicopters; Abrams Main Battle Tanks; Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles; Stryker Combat Vehicles; and any other items of equipment identified as high priority by the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
needed to fulfill the National Defense Strategy per strategic guidance on planning and risk acceptance.²⁶

- Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG): Address during DMAG sessions the aforementioned Defense Programming Guidance topics concerning the Reserve Components compared to CCMD requirements for military personnel resources, training standards, interoperability and readiness resources during the 3-star programmer’s review.

Budgeting. Current policy prescribes that the DoD components develop and submit detailed budget estimates for their programs in accordance with fiscal and joint programming guidelines and DoD 7000.14-R Financial Management Regulations.²⁷ Although the budgeting phase is less opaque than programming activity, any operational reserve resource omissions that persist through both phases translate into inefficiency in both mission effectiveness and business processes to the detriment of the National Defense Strategy mandate to reform the Department for greater performance and affordability.

The Reserve Force Policy Board observed that the most egregious gap across these PPBE phases systemically takes place in the Department’s procurement accounts. Lack of transparency in the equipping process has led to disparity in funding and investment in the RCs and resulted in the unsatisfactory outcome that the RCs are often:

- Reliant upon overused and outdated equipment
- Subject to a widening capability gap with the Active Components
- Unable to maintain pace with rapid technological change

At the same time, a solution to meet the requirement for increased funding transparency to procure equipment for the RCs, as identified and supported by Congress, remains elusive.²⁸ Congress and the DoD identify this policy issue as “equipment transparency.” In 2017, DoD reported to Congress after wide acceptance among the OSD components and most of the Military Departments, that it would proceed with implementing RC Budget Line Items (BLIN) in future Presidential Budget requests using the P-1 exhibit. However, the Department subsequently determined that RC BLINs would not be included in the FY20 President’s Budget request, primarily

²⁷ DoDD 7045.14 The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process (January 25, 2013 Incorporating Change 1, August 29, 2017), 11
due to perceived administrative and program execution challenges. Changes to long-established budgeting practices are challenging, however Congress consistently advocates in general for greater transparency in requested funding and compliance with Congressional direction.

During a December 2018 meeting of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Board Chairman, Major General (Ret) Arnold Punaro, USMCR noted the core cultural challenge concerning the status quo approach of service programmers and identified the BLIN as the key reform to improve equipment transparency. The BLIN represents the most feasible of the three course of actions provided to DoD by Congress as communicated consistently by DoD to Congress in not less than three official reports including the DoD Report to Congress on the Equipment Transparency Report and multiple annual National Guard and Reserve Equipment reports. Without implementation of the BLINs in the President's Budget, Congress may have to direct the Department to portray weapons system deliveries in RC appropriations. Only when one of these courses of action are implemented can Congress and the Chiefs of the Reserve Components be able to see the quantities and schedule for major weapons deliveries and modernization upgrades to Reserve Components, which operate predominately legacy systems (i.e. Block 30 F-16, C-130H, F-18C, KC-130T). The National Defense Strategy formalizes the deficiency in RC equipment transparency:

Without sustained and predictable investment to restore readiness and modernize our military to make it fit for our time, we will rapidly lose our military advantage, resulting in a joint force that has legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people.

The Board's assessment following the RFPB's review, deliberation and June 2019 vote on the RC equipment transparency and management problem set, is that the Department is at an inflection point where the maximum Active Component and RC interoperability is needed in order to implement the National Defense Strategy. During the review, the Board concluded that the RC modernization problem was worse than expected and that the Department will never catch RC forces up to the demands of the National Defense Strategy and interoperability with the Active Components without reforming its existing business practices. The Board transmitted the following recommendation to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on August 16, 2019:

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29 Official Reserve Forces Policy Board Open Session minutes, (December 12, 2018), https://rfpb.defense.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7utY00BxQ28%3d&portalid=67
**Recommendation #4**

Implement Reserve Component Budget Line Item Numbers (BLIN) that are mutually exclusive from Active Component BLINs in the Department of Defense President’s Budget Request. These mutually exclusive BLINs are designed to achieve full transparency and auditability of procurement funding to accomplish Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR). This is sound financial management and reform, critical to the Department’s success. The Chief, National Guard Bureau has stated he will not be able to definitively certify the procurement or receipt of expected items for which funds were appropriated until specific RC BLINs, or something similar, is put in place. The RFPB recognizes that any resolution must fulfill congressional desire for increased transparency and auditability, while maintaining the Military Services’ flexibility to address changing priorities.  

Implementing RC Budget Line Items in the budgeting phase facilitates key reforms that address a core auditability issue to ensure accurate data is available for senior defense officials to make informed data-backed decisions on RC investment and National Defense Strategy risk tolerance. Congress expects to see budgeted amounts for RC equipment, recapitalization and modernization followed by evidence that weapons systems were delivered to the RCs or upgraded by the Military Departments. The Board advised the Department on following steps essential to embedding this scale of business reform.

- Form a Cross Functional Team with the OSD components and Military Departments to implement a pilot program for RC BLINs in FY21 with full implementation in FY22.

- Develop implementation guidance for Military Departments to update Budget Materials for the FY21 President’s Budget.

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• Implement performance tracking budget analytics for end-to-end RC equipment transparency based on common enterprise data as a National Defense Strategy implementation metric.

• Update the policies in DoD Directive 1225.06 “Equipping the Reserve Forces” consistent with this memorandum.

These recommendations improve Reserve Component equipment Transparency by enabling auditability of equipment from programming to budget formulation, execution and delivery. Following the Board’s vote and transmission of this recommendation to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary met with the Department’s Principal Staff Assistants on the matter of “Reserve Budget Transparency” on January 9, 2020. This meeting resulted in a tasking to the Office of the Secretary of Defense components to provide the Secretary updates on a “tracking mechanism that depicts planned versus actual distribution of equipment to the Reserve Component” instead of implementing RC specific BLINS at that time. While the Undersecretary for Comptroller expressed concerns on using specific Budget Line Items, the Secretary’s guidance and follow-up task to the OSD components on a functioning mechanism that addresses Reserve Budget Transparency is significant and in the spirit with the Board’s recommendation.

**Execution.** This phase includes annual reviews by the DoD components to determine how well programs and financing have met joint warfighting needs. This includes assessing:

• Compliance with priorities expressed in the planning and programming guidance

• Compliance with Secretary of Defense decisions and guidance

• Program results, as measured by established performance metrics

Department policy directs that: “components shall incorporate these performance metrics in their program and budget submissions” in addition to directing that OSD staff offices “shall assess the findings of the DoD components and recommend program and budget adjustments where applicable, in coordination with the CJCS.”

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33 DoDD 7045.14 The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process (January 25, 2013 Incorporating Change 1, August 29, 2017), 11
As of the timing of this report, the Department lacks a formal, recurring mechanism to assess the planning, resourcing and utilization of the operational reserve because of the challenges described for the planning phase. Assessment of the operational reserve in the execution phase generates the decision-quality data one needs to address those challenges while facilitating long-term strategy and resourcing guidance. When then Secretary Mattis addressed the Reserve Forces Policy Board in December 2018, he outlined a framework that is readily adapted to assess the Departments RC utilization. The Secretary described the Reserve Component’s relationship to the Department as a force that first provides the strategic “shock absorber” for Global Campaign Plans to exploit opportunities and set the defeat mechanism while continuing to provide forces for ongoing operations. To this dual purpose, he charged the Department with defining the strategic versus ongoing operations problem in detail and determine a sustainable deploy to dwell ratio and develop a “strategic rationale” and CJCS-validated model supporting a system that:

- Contains a sustainable frequency of activation “that the force can stand.”
- Differentiates the challenges of each domain and major force element.
- Does not break the reservist-employer “social contract.”
- Maintains the high standards and quality of the force.\(^{34}\)

Since Secretary Mattis’ comments, the Department charted an ongoing study of deploy-to-dwell and mobilization-to-dwell to address the frequency of activation metric. During its June 2019 and September 2019 Quarterly meetings, the Reserve Forces Policy Board considered input from the field and an employer panel to assess the health of the social contract aspect.\(^{35}\) In order to maintain a strategic view of operational reserve execution and the system’s health, the Reserve Forces Policy Board recommends enterprise-level review by senior defense officials following the close out of every fiscal year that follow the Secretary’s construct:


Recommendation #5:

Incorporate Reserve Component enterprise-wide execution assessments during National Defense Strategy Implementation reviews at the Secretary of Defense Level. This includes aspects of RC Sustainable Frequency of Activation in addition to the resourcing, capability modernization and readiness needed to maintain the high standards expected by the Secretary of Defense.

**Sustainable Frequency of Activation**

- **Operational reserve mobilization utilization to requirement:** To what extent did the services fulfill requests for 10 USC Section 12302 mobilization for national emergencies, preplanned Combatant Commander Requirements under 10 USC Section 12304b and voluntary mobilization for contingencies under 12301d?

- **Operational reserve utilization – Social Contract:** Which service-identified major force elements or critical career fields in the RCs have demonstrated:
  - A worsening mobilization to dwell trend that diverges from the DoD 1:5 dwell policy goal?
  - A tapering of volunteer mobilizations for deployment and in-place employment under 10 USC Section 12301d?

**High Standards and Quality of the Force**

- **Operational reserve resourcing:** Did the services allocate sufficient RC readiness resources (Military Personnel funding, Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding, training quotas according to the Secretary of Defense’s Directed Readiness Tables)?

- **Operational Reserve Capability Parity:** Did the services modernize deploying RC forces with the same permanent equipment as deploying AC forces?

- **Reserve Enterprise Readiness:** How does the readiness recovery of the Reserve Components compare to the Active Components in relation to the full range of campaign plans in CJCSI 3141.01F Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans?

Execution analysis to assess National Defense Strategy implementation for response to an immediate conflict or emergencies and surge for a protracted conflict.

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**Recommendation #6:**

**Guidance on Reserve Component use should be included in a new Total Force Policy in addition to dedicated sections in the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance.**

The Reserve Forces Policy Board work to embed the operational reserve concept across the Department resulted in recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in 2014 and 2016 to establish a new Total Force Policy. DoD should develop and enforce a revised Total Force Policy to encourage a Total Force culture and improve active and Reserve Component integration. In the Board’s 2014 report, it observed that: “While the services have Total Force policies in place, the Department of Defense does not. This lack of Total Force perspective affects decision-making regarding the use of the Reserve Component.”

Total Force Policy naturally addresses more than the operational reserve aspects in order to generate the forces needed to ensure RC forces are ready, accessible and routinely utilized. This section outlines the core issues necessary to implement the operational reserve in policy and practice in addition to the larger National Defense Strategy.

Then-Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger articulated the first DoD Total Force Policy in his 1973 memorandum. The Secretary traced the policy back to “Presidential and National Security Council Documents, the Congress and Secretary of Defense Policy” before prescribing that “It must be clearly understood that implicit in Total Force Policy...that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active forces.” The memorandum’s introduction closes with “Total Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole.” This memorandum outlined several major elements of Total Force Policy with implications for characteristics of the operational reserve today:

- Timely responsiveness
- Combat capability
- Service Secretary resource oversight

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Today, DoD policies address these elements in a disaggregated and outdated manner. In its 2016 report, The Reserve Forces Policy Board recommended to improve and enforce a revised Total Force Policy that enumerates key principles necessary to encourage a Total Force culture. Two of these principles apply directly to embedding the operational reserve concept:

- Ensure military readiness in both the active and Reserve Components. The RC plays a critical role in meeting national security requirements and must be ready at all times.
- Provide the necessary resources to accomplish assigned missions. In order to be fully utilized as an operational reserve, the Department should direct Services to adequately fund their Reserve Components for regular and routine participation in meeting Combatant Commander and other operational requirements.  

**Key Civilian oversight considerations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission-focused individual and collective training resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC access to service operational training infrastructure and equipment sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business enterprise capability to automate RC onboarding and off boarding to active duty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Timely responsiveness.** The original DoD Total Force Policy emphasized the importance of ensuring RC readiness to meet objective response times and moving as much training to pre-mobilization as possible. This enduring guidance continues to fit the major power conflict aspect of the National Defense Strategy Global Operating Model. The meaning of “timely responsiveness” for the operational reserve adds to this the ability to respond to both declared national emergencies and Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)-driven support for long-term strategic competition. This involves:

- Keeping RC members “operationally trained” with RC military personnel and operational training period funding, adequate operations and maintenance flying hours and a high level of weapons systems sustainment.
- Funding, training equipment sets and quotas to access each service’s operational training infrastructure at training centers and ranges to train on the challenges anticipated by the National Defense Strategy.
- Reforming time and manpower intensive business activities across the DoD enterprise that sub optimize pre-mobilization readiness, the mobilization process and post-mobilization training found in healthcare management, human resource management and mobilization authority approval processes.

**Combat Capability.** At the time the DoD set the foundations of Total Force Policy to facilitate establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, Secretary Schlesinger recognized that RC combat capability brought about the viability of the Total Force to act as a whole. When the Department utilizes RCs as an operational reserve, capability gaps between the active and Reserve Components become pronounced and directly affect operational integration for combat in the theater of operations. In 2019, the U.S. Army published its official history of the Iraq War, presenting an

40 Improving the Total Force, 33.
41 Cantwell, 253.
example of when an ongoing policy of equipment cascading from the Active Components to the Reserve Components meets a National Emergency:

“One difference in capabilities between National Guard brigades and their regular Army counterparts was that, despite the Enhanced Separate Brigade (ESB) initiative, many National Guard units lacked the same modern equipment. While the Army had fielded the upgraded Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles in the 1990s, the workhorse vehicle of the National Guard wheeled fleet remained the antiquated “deuce and a half,” or 2½-ton truck, a vehicle so old that the last one had rolled off the production line in 1977. An even more significant disparity was the National Guard units’ shortage of armored vehicles, a problem that had bedeviled the coalition from the start of the war.” By December 2004, the Army only had 69% of the armored or hardened vehicles that it needed in Iraq and for National Guard units the shortfall was even more acute.42

Later in 2008 the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves highlighted this persistent capability gap problem at the then-Global War on Terror’s seven year point, recommending to Congress that DoD take the following action (among others) to address the diversion of modern equipment by the armed services from the RCs in addition to reforming the traceability of funding that the Department identifies for RC capabilities in the President’s Budget Request:

- **Recommendation #42.** Congress should require that Total Force equipment requirements be included in service and joint materiel development, acquisition and procurement plans, production contracts and delivery schedules.

- **Recommendation #43.** Program elements should be added to the DoD procurement budget justification material and accounting system to increase transparency with regard to Reserve Component procurement funding and to improve DoD’s ability to track delivery of equipment to the Reserve Components.44

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43 Ibid, 377.

44 CNGR, 232.
Although DoD established policies around the Commission’s recommendations in DoDD 1225.06, Equipping the Reserve Forces, examples exist in the Reserve Components of both the Navy and the Air Force where missions are wholly comprised of legacy weapons systems and equipment that each service no longer assigns to the Active Component. This is the result of “cascading” dated major end items from active forces to the reserves. At the same time of this equipping policy update in 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta met with the Reserve Forces Policy Board and tasked the Board with providing advice and recommendations regarding at set of questions that led to the chartering of two independent studies to assess the operational effectiveness of the Reserve Components in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Board first reported to the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Component effectiveness in Iraq “Limited exposure to the equipment and systems of AC counterparts created a cycle of frustration and expectation mismatch between the AC and the RC. When RC forces had the same equipment and were trained on the same systems as their AC counterparts, they were more easily interchangeable.” In 2017, the RFPB recommended to the Secretary of Defense that “To the Extent Possible, RC forces Should Have the Same Systems and Equipment as Their AC Counterparts,” describing that more effective and efficient use can be made of RC forces if they have the same systems and equipment to train on and deploy with as their AC counterparts.

The next phase of this study assessed RC performance in Afghanistan, confirming the trend direction in equipping policy: “As previously identified in the OIF study, equipment shortages were a concern for mobilizing and deploying RC forces and these shortages limited the training time and exposure to the systems being employed by the AC.” The Board reiterated their recommendation to the Secretary of Defense from the OIF study for the OEF phase: “To the extent possible, RC forces should have opportunities for the same training and the same systems and equipment as their AC counterparts.”

47 Ibid. vii.
49 Ibid
The implications of cascading equipment are clear in these examples and provide a sense of the trend for RC resourcing over time. However, these experiences did not compel any reform of the legacy processes that prioritize maximum flexibility of procurement decisions by parent Services over the Total Force Policy mandate to embed interoperable combat capability that the Department considers essential in bringing about the viability of the Total Force to act as a whole. Instead, the resourcing aspect of Total Force Policy happens mostly through supplemental funding via the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA).

In an Air Force example, the RFPB observed that nearly 75% of Air Force Reserve and 62% of Air National Guard procurement funding derived from NGREA. Since 2017, NGREA has provided the primary source of funding for key upgrades to the Air Force Reserve’s legacy F-16C Block 30 aircraft, which were produced and fielded in the late 1980s. NGREA alone is insufficient to completely upgrade 100% of the Air Force Reserve’s F-16C fleet. Additionally, the board noted during its March 2019 Quarterly meeting that the redirection of procurement funding meant for RC enabler units to higher priorities in year of execution is routinely an issue in each service. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness corroborated this problem in a memorandum, articulating that the full transparency and traceability of procurement funding desired by Congress would not be possible until implementation of specific Reserve Component Budget Line Item Numbers or something similar. Without this level of financial transparency, certification for the procurement or receipt of expected items for which funds were appropriated is impossible. At the same meeting, RFPB Chairman Punaro summarized the description of RC Equipment Management trends, which reminded him of the “bad old days of the 1970s and 1980s,” also adding “It’s worse than I thought.”

During a December 2018 meeting of the Secretary of Defense’s Reserve Forces Policy Board, the Board Chairman noted this core cultural challenge concerning the status quo approach of service programmers, identified a proposal to implement Reserve Component specific Budget Line Items as the key reform to improve equipment transparency in order to realize the combat capability piece of Total Force Policy and expressed support for the full implementation and, if needed, the Board’s future assistance in this area. When the Department acts to apply transparency reforms such as Budget Line Item Numbers or a on a “tracking mechanism that depicts planned versus actual distribution of equipment to the Reserve Component,” it will address an important deficiency that exposes the Reserve Components and overall joint force combat capability to reprogramming risk. Reprogramming disadvantages the RC when planned procurement funding arranged to RC capabilities late in the delivery schedule fits within the Congressional notification threshold and is reprioritized. The Department noted in the 2020 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report that: “The consistent

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51 Ibid. also 2020 NGRER
52 RFPB December 2018 Quarterly Meeting minutes: https://rfpb.defense.gov/Meetings/2018-Meeting-Minutes/12-December-2018-Minutes/
re prioritization of RC investments unintentionally results in early program terminations, restructuring, or delays and extends timelines for fielding current technologies and closing capability gaps. (Figure 2-3)" When the Department accepts risk in Reserve Component modernization in order to transfer procurement funds or acquisition deliveries to other priorities, Congress historically covers a small portion of that gap with supplemental National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) funding that only narrowly covers the Reserve Components’ modernization requirement.

Figure 2-2: Conceptual Depiction of RC Equipping Trends – Procurement Appropriation’s and Reprogramming\(^5^4\)

Despite the intent of NGREA to assist, the Services in equipping the Reserve Components, the Department noted to Congress in a 2019 report that the parent Services often score NGREA as an offset to the base budget in order to justify reprogramming funds away from equipping the RCs in order to accelerate higher Service priorities (Figure 2-2).\(^5^3\) This logic is applied with inordinate weight compared to the overall size of the DoD procurement program. Figure 2-3 illustrates that while the Services notionally planned $1.323B for the Reserve Components, which represents only 1.8% of the affected parent service procurement appropriations. The $1.3B of NGREA

Figure 2-3. RC Budget Portions of Parent Service Procurement Appropriations

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\(^5^3\) FY20 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER), 1-3.
\(^5^4\) Ibid, 1-3.
\(^5^5\) Ibid, 1-5.
supplemental funding represents the same small scale compared to overall procurement spending. This supplemental funding is intended by Congress to partially fill critical and unfunded requirements and is not meant to replace each Military Department’s responsibility to equip and resource its Reserve Components. The comparison of scale is best highlighted in the Air Force where the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard aircraft inventory contain the highest proportion of legacy and aging aircraft compared to the Active Component. There may be aircraft deliveries intended for the Reserve Components in the $218.5B “Aircraft Procurement – Air Force” portion of the service’s $15.4B FY18 budget, but the budget transparency does not exist to determine if the planned spending on the Reserve Components occurred in execution or if the money was reprogrammed from plans to equip the Reserve Components (Figure 2-4).

Figure 2-4. OMB reiteration of DoD procurement programs compared to asserted portion that “Shall be used for” the Reserve Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit</th>
<th>OMB FY18 Military Programs Appropriation</th>
<th>&quot;Shall be used for RC&quot; Total amount $M (FY18)</th>
<th>RC Budget Portion Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>Aircraft Procurement - Army</td>
<td>$641.0</td>
<td>$4,149.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253</td>
<td>Procurement WTCV - Army</td>
<td>$12.2</td>
<td>$2,243.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>Other Procurement - Army</td>
<td>$72.2</td>
<td>$6,469.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>Aircraft Procurement - Navy</td>
<td>$192.3</td>
<td>$15,056.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>Other Procurement - Navy</td>
<td>$29.4</td>
<td>$8,277.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Procurement - MC</td>
<td>$32.9</td>
<td>$2,064.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>Aircraft Procurement - AF</td>
<td>$218.5</td>
<td>$15,430.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>Other Procurement - AF</td>
<td>$125.3</td>
<td>$19,603.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,323.9</td>
<td>$73,296.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FY18 budget provides an example of both the transparency and parent service programming deficiencies, which begin with the services providing an estimate of planned procurement funding in their P-1R budget exhibits. This exhibit is a non-binding subset of the P-1 exhibits and hence not subject to audit readiness review. Since the funding amounts are non-binding, this means that the RCs cannot anticipate a level of investment to ensure that their systems are technically compatible to seamlessly integrate with the Total Force.

In FY18, the Office of Management and Budget reiterated the Department’s P-1R numbers in its budget exhibit with language that specific amount in each procurement appropriation “shall be made available” to specific Reserve Components (Figure 2-4). Despite this assertion, neither these numbers nor there association deliveries can be certified without implementing reforms to equipment transparency in the Department. FY18 appropriations by law can be spent in FY18-FY20. With two years of this time passed since the original appropriation, the amount of money expended to date in aircraft, combat vehicle and equipment procurement by the parent services for the reserve component is unknown.

56 OMB FY 2018 Budget Exhibit
Figure 2-4 demonstrates that the Chiefs of the Reserve Components can only expect to be equipped with 1.8% of total spending without the ability to anticipate the timing of weapons system deliveries such as the KC-46 and KC-130J aerial refueling aircraft funded by parent service procurement appropriations. For instance, the FY20 DoD National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report highlights U.S. Marine Corps KC-130J aircraft fielding where the parent service fully equipped the Active Component as of FY18 while planning to fully recapitalize the Marine Corps Reserve with 24 aircraft by FY26. As the later portion of the Future Years Defense Program approaches the execution year, the smaller portion of aircraft procurement for the RC becomes vulnerable for reprogramming and imposes the costly burden of sustaining two fleets and maintaining two training programs in the Marine Corps Reserve. In this example, the procurement for any aircraft deliveries for the Marine Corps Reserve would be in the $15.056B line for “Aircraft Procurement – Navy” with the amount planned for RC aircraft imperceptible to the reader despite the assertion that $192.3M “Shall be available for the Navy Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve (Figure 2-4).”

A Senate committee report for the FY19 National Defense Authorization Act articulates the deficiencies to Total Force integration that this lack of transparency leads to by providing language concerning the equipment cascading practice for rescue squadrons, as an example in the Reserve Component of the U.S. Armed Forces:

The committee is aware that the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF)—a report requested by this committee in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–329)—recommended that “new equipment will arrive at Air Reserve Component units simultaneously with its arrival at Active Component units in the proportional share of each component . . . The Air Force should no longer recapitalize by cascading equipment from the Active Component to the Reserve Components.” Further, the Commission members testified to this committee that “There is no more significant element to an integrated Total Force than a fully integrated fielding plan for all equipment, especially aircraft”… the committee remains concerned that the Air Force has not observed the principle of concurrent and proportional fielding for the fielding of the HH–60G replacement program.

The Senate clearly set its intent on simultaneous fielding of capabilities to both the active and Reserve Components:

However, the committee believes the Air Force’s current fielding plan does not fulfill the letter or spirit of the Commission’s recommendation of concurrent and proportional fielding and that the Air Force has not provided sufficient grounds to justify an exception to this fundamental component of Total Force integration.

58 FY20 NGRER, 1-3, 1-23.
59 OMB, 256.
61 Ibid
Bottom line, equipment transparency remains the RC’s most significant issue affecting funding in addition to procurement of current technology for RC forces. While combining the AC and RC request for procurement appropriations provides added justification for Total Obligation Authority (TOA), it is not transparent in delineating the execution of procurement funding between AC and RC.

**Service Secretary resource advocacy.** The Reserve Forces Policy Board found and noted in previous recommendations a persistent trend that many senior defense leaders lack a Total Force perspective and thus, focus on the Active Component as the default solution to overall force design, development and management challenges. Consequently, many of our senior leaders remain unaware of the differences between the National Guard and the Reserves; the strengths and capabilities resident in each of the Reserve Components; the cost to maintain and use the RC; or the limitations affecting their use. As a result, the Department fails to fully consider the RC in key strategic reviews and the Department’s decision support processes.

- **Joint Strategic Planning System:** The Department has yet to benefit from optimizing the operational reserve by including guidance on the reserve components in Global Force Management planning.62

- **Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System:** Senior civilian touchpoints in this core resource allocation process provide the opportunity to provide oversight on embedding the operational reserve across the enterprise, articulating guidance to the military services and assessing its utilization.

- **Defense Acquisition System:** The Department routinely plans new weapons systems deliveries to the reserve components on the tail end of full rate production, which exposes those deliveries to reprogramming risk. For business systems, parent services infrequently address adequately supporting the part time force as a requirement. Additionally, where the reserve components own legacy weapons systems not operated by the Active Component, the reliance on NGREA for modernization via Congressional supplemental that occurs in the execution year results in program management and contract inefficiencies.63

For these reasons, civilian oversight of planning for, resourcing and utilizing the reserve components as an operational reserve is critical. When Secretary Schlesinger signed the first Total Force Policy in 1973, he articulated:

- I want each Service Secretary to approach affirmatively the goals of producing Selected Reserve units, which will meet readiness standards required for wartime contingencies. Each Secretary will provide the manning, equipping, training, facilities, construction and maintenance to assure that the Selected Reserve units meet deployment times and readiness required by contingency plans. You will have my support and personal interest in overcoming any obstacles in these areas.64

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63 FY20 NGRER, 1-7.

Congress provided guidance five years prior to the first Total Force Policy, signing PL 90-168 into legislation following the introduction of “the Reserve Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act” in order to guarantee in law structure to formalize the responsibility of the Service secretaries to advocate and resource their Reserve Components, including all the aspects later described in the 1973 memo. The text of this legislation includes the authority for assistant secretaries in each Military Department to “provide the overall supervision of manpower and Reserve Component affairs,” which provides the structure necessary to enable oversight of implementing Total Force Policy in each service. This authority and structure faces an immense, but beatable challenge to inculcate Total Force culture capable of integrating active, reserve and guard component differences into the policymaking, planning and resourcing business activities of the Military Departments. Left to its own devices, headquarters management functions will not by nature conduct their activities through this lens due to lack of familiarity of the reserve components or frustration with the disparate policies, systems and personnel management considerations that come with them. These conditions lead to insufficient prioritization and advocacy of operational reserve resources, capability modernization and planning lead-time within military service headquarters. As such, the Reserve Forces Policy Board recommends strengthening civilian oversight on these matters by including operational reserve planning, resourcing, execution reviews and risk assessment in each of the DoD decision support systems.

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65 Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen (Air Force History and Museums program; 1997), 238.
Recommendation #7:

Strengthen civilian oversight on formalizing the operational reserve via reviews of planning, resourcing, execution and risk assessment in each of the DoD decision support systems.

Services should continue to include the reserve components in their force generation models.

In this report, the Reserve Forces Policy Board reiterates its 2016 recommendation to include the reserve components in each parent service’s force generation models. The Board generally assesses that this inclusion is taking place in support of Global Force Management in current operations such as Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM via the Army’s force generation (ARFORGEN) model, the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct, the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) and the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Generation Process (FGP). A force generation model for the U.S. Space Force remains pending.

The Board notes that the parent services’ human resources, logistics, health care, financial management and information business activities support each service’s force generation model. These business activities frequently line each model’s critical path and set the pacing items related to accessing the Reserve Components. The Board’s 2016 report observed that the use of outdated and difficult-to-navigate personnel management statutes, policies and information systems create inefficiencies that reduce the Services’ desire to use the RC, which in turn affects the overall effectiveness of the Total Force. The Board’s personnel subcommittee noted a best practice business activity with the Army Integrated Pay and Personnel System (IPPS-A) where the service is implementing the fielding in the National Guard first, taking the challenge head on of integrating the on boarding and off boarding of part time drill status guardsman to active duty. In the Air Force, the Military Department is transforming its mobilization business rules with the Agile Air Reserve Component Mobilization Process to delegate aspects of the process to tasked commanders. These initiatives represent examples of reforming the Department and directly addressing the frustration involved with mobilization processes. This frustration manifests in concerns over time to access the RC, which ultimately sub optimizes the Department by reinforcing the Active Component’s tendency to assume Reserve Component mobilization takes more time than the environment allows when sourcing for campaign plans and for emergent requirements.67

“The National Defense Strategy’s global operating model is expected to influence how each service adapts their force generation models.” In order to routinely utilize RC forces and maintain an operational reserve, these force generation models must address access to RC forces with maximization of predictability and advance notice to handle the operating model’s layers of great power competition, immediate conflict or emergencies and surge for a protracted conflict as communicated in the National Defense Strategy Summary.68

67 Improving the Total Force, Using the National Guard and Reserve; A report to the new administration by the Reserve Forces Policy Board. RFPB Report FY17-01, 82.
**Recommendation #8:**

The Department should adapt the Global Force Management process to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for RC support, to facilitate service planning, programming and budgeting for the activation and employment of RC forces under Title 10, Section 12304b authority.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board’s recommendation to adapt the Global Force Management process to annually identify and validate those operational requirements suitable for RC support originated from the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic Question Task Group in follow up to Secretary Leon Panetta’s request in 2012. The 2013 reply and 2014 recommendation to the Secretary of Defense provided advice intended to facilitate the advance notification, predictability and resourcing to meet global requirements. The Board reiterated this recommendation in its 2016 report while observing a tasking by OSD to the services with guidance to devise plans for a transition to 12304b authority, at the time anticipating no additional extensions of the September 11, 2001 Declaration of National Emergency, and hence 12302 authority, beyond FY17. This declaration remains in effect at the time of this report (June 2020) following its renewal on September 12, 2019. If the declaration is not renewed in September 2020, then the portion of preplanned Combatant Command missions that overlaps with FY20 and FY21 Overseas Contingency Operations cannot compete for service base funding until the FY23 programming phase.

The disruptiveness of this two-year gap provides the impetus to adapt the Global Force Management process to identify and validate those enduring operational requirements suitable for operational reserve support that must continue in the event the declaration is not renewed such as air defense, fighter combat air patrols, chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear-explosive (CBRNE), air mobility, aerial refueling and theater security cooperation. If this risk manifests to an issue, handling mechanisms may include Active Component personnel tempo surges, reprogramming, or additional supplemental funding requests to Congress in order to resource the reserve component man-years needed to fulfill the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. An adapted Global Force Management process must address identifying the requirements suitable for RC support in that overlay in addition to addressing the timing of Global Force Management requirement development that now occurs simultaneously with the programming phase.

This recommendation must acknowledge that since the 12304b authority’s

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establishment, significant drawbacks zeroed out any incentive for its use.\textsuperscript{71} In addition to 12304b man years having to compete for funding in each service’s base budget, the personnel drawbacks imposed penalties on reduced reserve retirement age, GI Bill, premobilization healthcare and other key benefits.\textsuperscript{72} In June and September 2019, speakers and guest panelists addressing the Reserve Forces Policy Board noted drawbacks to reservist retention and employer support when 12304b authority is used for non-combat, non-contingency, or stateside operations such as the Air Force Theater Security Package and the Marine Corps Unit Deployment Program.\textsuperscript{73} Congress improved the authority in the FY16 NDAA by authorizing a portion of the missing benefits for mobilized reservists.\textsuperscript{74} Further reform to this authority and attention to employer relations is needed in order to address these concerns. Finally, the RFPB articulated its existing recommendation before the issuance of the current 2018 National Defense Strategy and action on this topic must contend with the layers of great power competition, immediate conflict or emergencies and surge for a protracted conflict communicated in the National Defense Strategy Summary. When determining reserve component access policy to support competing below the level of armed conflict, Department attention on determining the right frequency of reserve mobilization-to-dwell, deploy-to-dwell and general employer support for operational reserve utilization absent declared emergencies and disasters is required. As a starting point, the Board considers this model sustainable when the Department can draw a connection for employers between the requirement for 12304b or competition-driven mobilization to a viable and important mission directly involved in setting Combatant Command Campaign Plan effects that clearly demonstrates traceability to national defense and direct national interests. This means avoiding the use of involuntary call-up authorities to maintain a standing force, provide Active Component backfill due to competition, or handle gaps resulting from unfunded Active Component manpower and workload choices.

\textsuperscript{71} \url{https://www.arpc.afrc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/698148/changes-to-DoD-mobilization-authority-could-impact-reservists/}


\textsuperscript{73} RFPB June 2019 Quarterly Meeting Minutes, \url{https://rfpb.defense.gov/Meetings/2019-Meeting-Minutes/5-June-2019-Minutes/RFPB}

\textsuperscript{74} RFPB September 2019 Quarterly Meeting Minutes, \url{https://rfpb.defense.gov/Meetings/2019-Meeting-Minutes/10-September-2019-Minutes/}

\textsuperscript{74} \url{https://www.arpc.afrc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2007398/reservists-receive-more-benefits-with-annual-DoD-mobilization-authorities/}
Recommendation #9:

Whenever possible, use Overseas Contingency Operations funding to support RC activities in real-world operations and, when the Declaration of National Emergency ends, utilize 12304b authority to support operational requirements.

Parent service base appropriations do not include adequate funding for the levels of reserve component operational use identified by Department campaign plans, Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) tasking and service force generation models. For instance, in FY19 Congress enacted $242.6M in Overseas Contingency Operations funding to support the military personnel incremental funding for Reserve Component pre- and post-mobilization training to include on-the-job skill proficiency and formal schools needed for specific deployment requirements in addition to the Yellow Ribbon reintegration program. This funding reflected under “special training” in DoD’s FY20 budget materials does not reflect the cost of active duty for mobilization itself. With this in mind, the Services must account for this pre- and post-mobilization requirement when calculating the person-years needed for preplanned Combatant Command operational support under the 12304b authority while taking care not to omit this aspect when prioritizing for operational reserve support among base funding resources.
2.3: IMPROVE ACTIVE COMPONENT AND RESERVE COMPONENT INTEGRATION

The RC comprises 38% of the Total Force and provides critical capabilities and capacity in meeting security requirements at home and abroad. While the DoD has made significant strides in AC/RC integration, further integration is essential to fully realizing its benefits, ensuring resilience during periods of constrained resources and resolving persistent barriers and myths that sub optimize the DoD enterprise.

The benefits, myths and obstacles pertaining to integration include:

**Benefits:**

- **Enhanced Operational Effectiveness.** Forces that train together in peacetime perform at higher levels in wartime because they have worked together and met the same standards.

- **Improved Cultural Integration.** Reduces intra-service barriers between components by creating sustained personal relationships, building mutual trust and confidence.

- **Increased Readiness.** Exercises skill sets related to RC mobilization and Total Force employment by routine mobilizations and utilization of the RC, ensuring units are available on a regular basis and prepared for a major mobilization.

- **Higher Retention.** RC service members join the Reserve to serve their country. Operational employment results in higher retention.

Despite these benefits, barriers to full integration continue to hinder efficient employment of the RC. These barriers include both the myths discussed in Chapter 1 along with systematic management and cultural obstacles discussed elsewhere in this report:

**Myths:**

- The Reserve Components are not as capable nor effective as their Active Component counterparts are (Discussed in chapter 1.4).

- The Reserve Components can cost more than their Active Component counterparts can (Discussed in chapter 1.4).

**Barriers:**

- A lack of understanding of the RC (Discussed in chapter 1.9).

- Antiquated laws, policies and information technology systems used to manage the RC (Discussed in chapter 1.9).
In the time since the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s last report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Historical Office released a book with key observations concerning AC/RC Integration: Forging a Total Force, The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve. Published in 2018, Col (Ret) Forrest Marrion, USAFR and Col (Ret) Jon T Hoffman, USMCR document the Department’s core challenges when it comes to AC and RC integration after analyzing the historical context from the beginnings of the U.S. military until 2011. The work’s conclusion includes important considerations for the DoD to incorporate when it comes to maximizing the benefits of AC/RC integration, addressing the myths and handling the obstacles:

- The impact of time-consuming retraining requirements due to repurposing of units or by their parent services.
- The importance of “continuing to routinely deploy [the RC] on a rotating basis” for readiness, proficiency and preserving combat experience.
- Predictable mobilization for important military operations retains talent, because “if the RC goes unused, the best people don’t want to waste their time with it.”
- The need to eliminate persistent anti-reserve bias and lack of knowledge of the RC on the part of the AC.
- Setting conditions of readiness and trust to ensure RCs are trained and equipped to integrate with the joint force.
- Identifying where cross-component AC and RC assignments may improve the ability of each service to integrate.
- Greater numbers of full time personnel increase readiness to perform an operational role.

A recent development highlighted equipping the RC as a persistent obstacle for AC/RC integration encountered at the military service level during the programming and budgeting phases, but currently imposed by an OSD in the current FY20 execution year. On February 13, 2020, the OUSD Comptroller communicated to Congress DoD’s decision to reprogram FY20 NGREA and several parent service procurement appropriations to fund Department of Homeland Security drug interdiction programs.

77 Ibid, 191.
78 Ibid, 192.
79 Ibid, quoted from Testimony of David McGinnis to a House subcommittee, 192.
80 Ibid, 194.
81 Ibid, 195.
82 Ibid, 195.
83 Ibid, 196.
This included:

- 100% of the $1.3B NGREA allocated to the National Guard and Reserves
- Congressional adds to fund equipment or modernization upgrades in other
- Procurement Army with Army National Guard HMMWV modernization impact
- Aircraft Procurement - Navy with P-8A Poseidon impact
- Aircraft Procurement – Air Force with C-130J Hercules impact

In his statement on the reprogramming action, Rep. Thornberry (R-TX), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee released:

“Congress has the constitutional responsibility to determine how defense dollars are spent. We take the Pentagon’s recommendations seriously during our deliberations, but the final decisions are contained in the bills passed by Congress and signed into law. Once those choices have been made, the Department of Defense cannot change them in pursuit of their own priorities without the approval of Congress.”

In almost near-real time to this action, National Guard Bureau Chief General Lengyel testified to Congress that DoD leadership for this decision did not consult him. In response to this decision, 19 states sued the Department of Defense and placed an injunction on the funds that the group of states considered “essential equipment for our troops” as described by the California Attorney General.

The Congressional Research Service’s chronical of the reprogramming matter [Report IN11274] cites OSD Comptroller’s reprogramming submission with the DoD rationale. The Comptroller documentation claims that parent service procurement funds were excess to programmatic needs and inconsistent with National Defense Strategy modernization goals. The DoD reprogramming document declares the entire NGREA account as early to programmatic need and cites under execution of prior year and especially first year funds, closing with the note that “This is a Congressional interest item.”

Due to the short amount of time it took for the FY20 parent service procurement budget submission to become “inconsistent with the National Defense Strategy,”

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86 https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2020/03/03/19-states-sue-the-trump-administration-over-border-wall-money-shift-1265003
87 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11274
the lack of consultation with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the recent testimony on the matter by DoD officials, the rationale cited by OUSD Comptroller is concerning for the following reasons:

- Congress demonstrates persistent interest in RC equipment transparency and equipping the Guard and Reserve when the parent services do not rank RC modernization or equipping requirements high enough in their budget submissions.

- The Secretary of Defense approved the FY20 program for parent service appropriations and submitted the FY20 Budget to Congress in the name of the National Defense Strategy.

- Secretaries of the Military Department with their FY20 program and budget submissions vetted these procurement requirements through their capability requirements, acquisition and resource programming corporate governance processes. Additionally, the services should be concerned that the OUSD Comptroller did not discern the challenges of executing first year funds during years with persistent continuing resolutions despite the OSD component’s previous coordination work on the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report.

- Combatant Commanders expect military services to present forces with interoperable and equally modern capabilities ready for combat or operations with minimal integration or in-theater refit, including the capabilities listed in the reprogramming document.

- OUSD P&R, in coordination with OUSD Comptroller, provides oversight on Prioritized Integrated Requirements List for the Guard and Reserve, which are formally coordinated with Congress by its request for a range of requirements that flexibly support all missions.

- Chiefs of the Reserve Components must contend with only being equipped with 1.8% of total spending without the ability to anticipate the timing of weapons system deliveries funded by parent service procurement appropriations. This results in the RCs now becoming unable to reliably coordinate with program managers to ensure support of legacy system modernization when not funded by the parent service.

- Service members ultimately handle the risk in execution, trusting their lives and safety with the equipment and training provided by the DoD with funding from Congress.

NGREA is three-year money. During the third and final year, the NGREA obligation rate has always been 99%. Historically the Department has not held the reserve components to the year-one obligation rate of 80%. Additionally, because of the flexibility of the appropriation, it is impossible to be early to need on any one program. The Prioritized Integrated Requirements List submitted to Congress formally by DoD covers service requirements from fabrication machines, to calibration sets, to snow removal equipment, ambulances and aircraft avionics modernization. The Services expect the RCs to use NGREA to fund RC procurements and upgrades that do not
meet prioritization thresholds within the Services’ centrally managed budget processes. NGREA investments are therefore vital for improving equipment on hand status, mitigating key readiness shortfalls and addressing compatibility issues.

During the March 2020 Quarterly Meeting of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, GEN Michael X. Garrett, Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command, provided remarks that addressed the lack of familiarity of the RCs and the challenges experienced by the AC senior leadership when working to further AC/RC integration. GEN Garrett described from his personal perspective that he did not know much about the reserve components prior to his 42 months of service at U.S. Army Central Command, 36 months as U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Chief of Staff and his current position as Commander of Army Forces Command.89

Prior to its 2016 report, the RFPB made the following recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on RC use, force mix and cost, the Board recommended the Services improve integration of their forces organizationally, both in training and during operational employment. Additionally, the Board recommended:

- The Army should move toward stronger integration of its combat forces through test integration of RC maneuver battalions into Active Component Brigade Combat Teams. While the Army has made laudable efforts to integrate its enabler formations in operational settings, it has done less to integrate its formations when they are not deployed. The Board noted, with enthusiasm, that the Army has begun to reexamine the establishment of multi-component units in its enabler formations during peacetime. While the Board is encouraged by this step, it recommends the integration of Army Brigade Combat Teams as well.

- The Department should reinvigorate the Title XI program, which commits AC manpower to the goal of enhancing RC combat readiness. After Operation Desert Storm, Congress mandated the establishment of a program to enhance the readiness of RC ground forces. As a result, the Army committed AC manpower to facilitate training and readiness. After 2001, global operational commitments impeded the ability of the Army to allocate personnel support to Title XI requirements. As operational Augmentee commitments for mid-grade officers and Non-Commissioned Officers have declined, the Army should reinvest in this program. Such a re-investment carries three important benefits. First, it accomplishes the statutory goals of Title XI to sustain hard-won RC readiness. Second, it restores a valuable mechanism to break down cultural barriers and foster increased cooperation and integration between the components. Third, it retains a sizable pool of mid-grade leaders on active duty, which is essential for rapidly reestablishing AC force structure when necessary.

- Increase RC opportunities to attend Senior Enlisted Courses, Senior Service Colleges and CAPSTONE. The Services should also ensure continued access and where feasible, increased access to senior leader development courses, adding to those opportunities provided through shared experiences on the battlefield or during operational training.

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89 RFPB Quarterly Minutes, March 2020.
On a promising note, the Army is moving forward with implementing an AC-RC teaming program that encourages integrated operational training. Beyond increasing the interaction between active and reserve component members, the Army is pairing AC and RC units together to form lasting relationships at all levels that will sustain and improve training readiness in the Reserve Components through partnered training activities, improving opportunities for leader and staff development, sharing operational experiences and promoting personal and professional relationships between AC and RC members. The Board supports the Army’s recently proposed Total Force Partnership Program and looks forward to its successful implementation not only among the Army’s Brigade Combat Teams, but within and among its enablers as well.

Although not a recommendation in the February 11, 2014 report, the Board has consistently advocated for increasing the permeability between the AC and RC as another area where integration can be improved between the components. Not only should the Department encourage transitions between components, they should make them easier. They should promote a Total Force personnel system that allows for the seamless transition of members within DoD, between the Services and their components. It is encouraging that the Military Departments have made significant progress on their integrated personnel and pay systems, with all services coming on line by 2025. As of May 2020, the Marine Corps is the only service with a fully integrated system, Marine Corps Total Force System.

In many ways, the Air Force leads the way in Total Force integration with the initiatives they have instituted, which are unique among the American military services. Integration through the stand-up of various Air Staff-level task forces, Total Force Associations (TFAs) and multiple key initiatives ensure the Air Force continues its flight path toward becoming an even more effective and efficient integrated Total Force Service while meeting the Nation’s National Military Objectives.

In the time since the RFPB’s last report, the Air Force evolved its original Total Force Task Force (TF2) and Force-Continuum (TF-C) concepts and formalized Total Force Integration as an office under the mission and organization of the Headquarters Air Force Director of Staff.90 The Director for Total Force Integration initiates policy refinements, facilitates Total Force Association (TFA) management and health assessments and conducts health assessments for those associations.91 Following this, the Air Force updated its policy for addressing Total Force Integration activities in late 2019.92 The policy document contains a number of goals, though not directive, that align with the past findings and recommendations of the Reserve Forces Policy Board:

- Optimizing force structure using analytically-grounded initiatives
- Leveraging and protecting the unique strengths of each component
- Utilizing opportunities for efficiencies

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91 Ibid.
92 Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-10 Total Force Integration
• Encouraging availability of experienced Airmen with unique civilian experience
• Development of Airmen who recognize and appreciate the strengths of each component

Additionally, the document outlines the policy and who has the responsibility in carrying out Total Force Integration activities including:

• Establishing the Total Force Initiative Proposal (TFIP) as a key coordinating mechanism between commanders to propose new or address concerns.
• Ensuring the inclusion of Total Force options in the Air Force Corporate Structure.
• Directing the education of Air Force personnel in Total Force concepts in addition to force development and assignment pathways to embed the concepts.
• Appointing the Headquarters Air Force Director of Staff as the functional manager for Total Force Integration (TFI) for the Air Force and the person who establishes TFI governing mechanisms.
• Designating the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the responsible person to: provide guidance, direction and oversight of the Air Force’s Total Force; oversee the effectiveness of Total Force Integration policies and procedures, serve as the focal point for resolving Total Force resourcing issues.
• Assigning Major Commands as the entities that “determine appropriate component utilization and force-mix options for both established and emerging missions” for their commands.93

Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-10, however, contains the statement that “Major Commands, the Air Reserve Component and force planners should achieve consensus on Total Force strategies and provide well-informed planning choice submissions to the Air Force Corporate Structure.”94 The terms “should” and “consensus” allows the chance for missteps in addition to diluting the chance of maximizing the capabilities and characteristics of each component while exasperating the competition for resources between components. The OSD Office of Net Assessment chartered a study to look at these dynamics of consensus and completion among the military services and the effect that cultural barriers and service competition has on formulating defense guidance. The study found that the “tyranny of consensus” has a halting effect that the organization possessing power can impose on coordination and decision-making.95

93 Ibid, 4.
94 AFPD 90-10, 3.
In addition to the implementation of NCSAF recommendations, the AF continues to identify and pursue a number of opportunities to more fully integrate and break down barriers to a robust “One AF.” The Total Force Integration Executive Committee (TFI ExCom), chaired by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, was formed in July 2014 and has evolved to better support TFI efforts across the Service. Charged with identifying parallel efforts and integrating Headquarters Air Force (HAF) efforts on Total Force initiatives, the Committee tracked 78 efforts, including the 42 NCSAF recommendations. The TFI ExCom provides a forum in which AF senior leaders can assess TF progress, address barriers to success, provide strategic direction, improve accountability, highlight interdependencies with other programs and reprioritize integration efforts across the Service. Perhaps the most visible evidence of the Air Force’s commitment to integration, Total Force Associations (TFAs) are another way the Air Force leverages the TF to efficiently and effectively meet mission requirements. The Air Force currently has 112 TFAs in most core mission areas, 25 of which are “active associations” sponsored by the Air Reserve Component. There are three key AF TF initiatives that deserve additional attention – High Velocity Analysis (HVA), Integrated Wing (I-Wing) and staff integration. Using the HVA process, the Air Force continually analyzes mission areas to determine the best force mix options. As of July 2016, TF-C has completed 67 HVAs to optimize the three-components in all primary mission areas. These efforts will be ongoing and directly support several NCSAF recommendations. The I-Wing pilot program seeks to test a new construct where a TF commander leads a multi-component unit. Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, has an existing KC-135 aircraft association construct, is executing this pilot program and will declare initial operating capability on 1 October 2016. If this construct proves successful, integrated units may supplement unit associations in the future. Finally, by fully leveraging the diverse talent in the TF, Headquarters Air Force (HAF) staff integration will improve the efficiency and capability of the staff to seamlessly develop TF policies, plans and programs. Coordination and collaboration between AF components at the institutional level will increase, which will help maximize TF operational capabilities as well as produce more capable, TF informed leaders for all components.

The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) echoed many of the concepts suggested by the Board as well as the need for increased overall integration. Their 2016 report, which included a section, entitled “Developing One Army,” contained 25 recommendations specifically targeted at increasing integration. While the Army has made significant progress since both the RFPB and NCFA reports and is publicly exhibiting a “One Army” philosophy at the most senior levels, there is still a need for increased and improved integration. The concept of integration is equally important to all the services, which are currently at various degrees of integration. A broad vision statement is needed to further integration and direct services to allocate
adequate funding for RC utilization. The goal should be to continue to push integration in each service to the greatest extent possible, eliminating misperceptions and barriers that hinder the Total Force concept. Integration in peacetime is critical to achieving optimal performance in war and will reduce the expenditure of blood and treasure in current and future conflicts.

The concept of integration is important to all services, which are currently at various degrees of integration. A goal should be to continue to push integration in each service to the greatest extend possible, eliminating misperceptions and barriers that hinder the Total Force concept. Integration in peacetime is critical to achieving optimal performance in operations, war, and will reduce the expenditure of blood and treasure in current and future conflicts.

Major General Tim Orr, The Adjutant General, Iowa, discusses the role of the National Guard with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau during the Board’s June 2017 meeting.
2.4: ENACT RESERVE COMPONENT DUTY STATUS REFORM

The DoD Reserve Component Duty Status Reform (DSR) legislative proposal is intended to simplify and streamline today’s overly complex and burdensome RC duty status system, which will also result in eliminating many of today’s pay and benefit inequities. Presently, RC service members report for scheduled training or operational support in one of 32 separate and distinct duty statuses, each with varying degrees of pay and benefits. Active component service members, by contrast, serve under a single duty status with a uniform set of benefits. These myriad duty statuses for the Reserve Components were directed by law or policy in order to track the costs associated with the administration, training and use of reserve forces.

Such a large number of duty statuses may have had a purpose at one time but many were developed in the Cold War Era of the last century and are now outdated. With the RC routinely called on for use as an operational force, the large number duty statuses can add confusion when they are employed. This byzantine system can result in unequal benefits for reserve members serving alongside active members while participating in the same operations and facing the same dangers. The unequal benefits even extend to what a reserve service member and their survivors can receive after a service connected death, including interment arrangements. The DoD understands the Reserve Component’s concerns about the complex and often-confusing Reserve Component duty authorities, as well as the Services’ concerns over impediments to training and accessing members of the Reserve Components. There are clearly negative impacts on the Department, Military Services and Reserve Component’s ability to focus on and accomplish their core missions. The time for reform is now and this complex system should be redesigned to enable the RC to meet enduring and future global power competition requirements.

Background:

The need for duty status reform has been recognized for some time, with the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve finding that reservists were serving in an array of statuses driven by a wide range of policies, laws and types of duty and recommended significantly reducing the duty statuses to which DoD concurred. The Commission on National Guard and Reserves recommend that duty statuses be reduced from twenty nine (at the time of the report) two: either you are on duty or you are not. The 2011 report of the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) also stated “the reserve duty system consists of a plethora of authorities to order a Reserve Component member to duty and a variety of purposes of duty – all of which need to be tracked in order to justify the budget request, remain within authorized strength limits and comply with utilization restrictions.” The QRMC found that “…without first addressing the convoluted and complex system of reserve duty, it would be difficult to bring meaningful change to compensation and benefits.” Of note, the 11th QRMC did develop draft legislation that reduces the number of authorities under which a RC member can be
ordered to perform duty, while retaining the ability of the Services and Congress to track and account for the purpose and funding of the duty.

Recognizing that duty status reforms directed in 2008 by Secretary Gates in response to the Commission on National Guard and Reserves recommendations were stalled, the RFPB voted June 5, 2013 to recommend the Secretary of Defense direct USD (P&R) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to jointly develop a plan that revises and reduces the total number of duty statuses driven by policies and authorities which fall under their purview. The Board also recommended that Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (OUSD), Personnel and Readiness (P&R) should propose necessary statutory modifications needed to implement duty status reduction to Congress.

To address this, Congress directed the Department of Defense to recommend reforms to the duty status system in order to remove inequities affecting personnel serving in the Reserve Components and to improve efficiency. FY16 NDAA (Section 515) directs the Secretary of Defense to assess the recommendation of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) to consolidate the 32 RC duty statuses currently authorized into six broader replacement categories and determine what impact consolidation will have on RC efficiency. Alternatively, the law allows the Secretary of Defense an alternate approach to consolidation of the statutory authorities, if preferable.

In response to congressional direction and a recommendation by the MCRMC, the Department engaged in a fully transparent and collaborative effort, working across all of government and throughout the DoD to ensure the reform proposal construct would benefit not only the Department and the Services, but also most importantly, the RC Service members and their families.

Department efforts to address reform began with an RC duty status reform assessment and review in December 2015. In June 2016, the Acting USD (P&R) submitted a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) stating that the Department desired to develop an alternate approach to MCRMC recommendations. The RAND Corporation was commissioned to support the effort. Additionally, DoD established a Senior Leader Steering Committee (SLSC) chaired by the ASD (M&RA) and working group to assess the MCRMC and analyze alternatives. The SLSC was composed of General/Flag officers and/or SES-level civilians from the Military Departments and their Components, the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau, DoD Chief Information Office, the Office of the DoD General Counsel and representatives from other DoD organizations as needed.

The SLSC oversaw a DoD Reserve Component Duty Status Review Working Group (DSR WG) composed of action officer-level subject matter experts on RC issues from the Military Departments and their Components, the Joint Staff, The Comptroller, CAPE, Legislative Affairs, Public Affairs, the National Guard Bureau, DoD Chief Information Office, the Office of the DoD General Counsel and representatives from other DoD organizations as needed. The Director for Military Compensation Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy chaired the DSR WG.
As directed in the NDAA for FY18 (Section 513), the Department submitted detailed legislation necessary to enact the DSR proposal in April 2019 for consideration in the FY20 legislation cycle, but it was not adopted due to timing. Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) never released the proposal for consideration for enactment in the FY21 NDAA due to concerns that surfaced at the last minute by the Veterans Administration (VA). The proposal is being prepared for resubmission in the FY22 NDAA and includes technical and conforming but not substantive changes based on VA and congressional counsel recommendations and enacted legislation.

Figure 2-5: Current Duty Statuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL AUTHORITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE OF DUTY</th>
<th>APPLIES TO</th>
<th>TYPE OF DUTY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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<td>10 USC 10147</td>
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<td>Annual Training</td>
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</tr>
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<td>10 USC 12301(d)</td>
<td>Additional/Other Training Duty</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(a)</td>
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<td>FTNGD/IDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(f)(1)(A)</td>
<td>Additional Training Duty</td>
<td>National Guard Only</td>
<td>FTNGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(f)(1)(B)</td>
<td>Additional/Other Training Duty</td>
<td>National Guard Only</td>
<td>FTNGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(d)</td>
<td>AGR Duty/Operational Support/Additional Duty</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12304(b)</td>
<td>Preplanned/Preprogrammed CCDR Support</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(f)(1)(B)</td>
<td>AGR Duty/Operational Support/Additional Duty</td>
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<td>FTNGD</td>
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<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(f)(1)(A)</td>
<td>Other Duty</td>
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<td>FTNGD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(a)</td>
<td>Full Mobilization</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12302</td>
<td>Partial Mobilization</td>
<td>Reserve &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>AD</td>
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</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL AUTHORITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE OF DUTY</th>
<th>APPLIES TO</th>
<th>TYPE OF DUTY</th>
</tr>
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<td>10 USC 12304</td>
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<td>10 USC 12503</td>
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<td>32 USC 115</td>
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<td>Medical Evaluation and Treatment</td>
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<td>Pending LOD for Response to Sexual Assault</td>
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<td>10 USC 688</td>
<td>Retiree Recall</td>
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<td>10 USC 802(d)</td>
<td>Disciplinary</td>
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<td>10 USC 10148</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Captive Status</td>
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<td>10 USC 12303</td>
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<td>Involuntary</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 12402</td>
<td>Duty at National Guard Bureau</td>
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<td>Voluntary</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 331</td>
<td>Insurrection</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 332</td>
<td>Insurrection</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 USC 12406</td>
<td>Insurrection</td>
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</table>
**Key Facts and Data**

The Department’s proposed construct consolidates over 30 RC duty statuses into distinct categories based on the nature of the duties the RC members perform and aligns a package of pay and benefits to each category of work. In Figure 2-5, using no more than eight statutory authorities grouped into four duty categories, the Department’s construct aligns the four categories to four compensation packages, while still preserving important distinctions between Title 10 and Title 32 service and retaining today’s inactive duty drill participation.

As shown in Figure 2-6, the proposal includes four categories (Category I – IV) and four distinct benefits packages (Benefits A – D) aligned to the four categories. Each category contains sub-purposes that capture the nature of the work performed by RC Members. This construct does not include National Guard State Active Duty provisions.

Category I includes active duty and full-time National Guard duty, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, in which the member may become involved in military actions, operations or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; provide federal assistance in response to a man-made disaster or proved federal service in response to civil unrest. Prior to deployment, employment and post deployment support, training and preparation associated with category I missions are included in this category. Examples include Title 10 USC Section 12302 – Partial Mobilization, Title 10 USC Section 12304(b) – Pre-Planned Missions and Title 32 Section 502(f)(2)(A) – National Guard at the Request of the President or Secretary of Defense.

Category II includes active service, as determined by the Service Secretary, that does not meet the Category I requirements. Examples include Title 10 USC Section 12323 – Pending Sexual Assault Line of Duty determination, Title 10 USC Section 12402 National Guard Bureau Assignment and Title 10 USC Section 12301(d) – Additional Training.

Category III includes time dedicated to readiness to include required training, administrative activities, support activities, additional training to prepare individuals and units to be ready for future use / mobilization. Examples include Title 10 USC Section 12503 and Title 32 USC Section 115 – Military Funeral Honors.

Category IV includes activities approved by the Secretary concerned for compensation upon successful completion of duties performed by an individual Reserve Component member through virtual or non-resident means while in a non-duty status and not under direct military supervision. Approved study courses or work assigned specifically and individually to a Reserve Component member are examples of category IV duties.
The overall concept for the alternate construct is to provide clarity, consistency and continuity. The Department would prefer that all pay and benefits be fully aligned to the four categories of work contained in the legislative proposal, however, in April 2019, the Department submitted its proposal to Congress with a number of unaligned benefits in order to overcome federal pay-as-you-go challenges.

Appropriately aligning pay and benefits with type of duty will further support the Total Force and ensure Reserve Component parity for the duties performed. The reform focuses on alignment of benefits to categories and duty types, alignment of survivor benefits and alignment of National Guard benefits.

The most critical unaligned benefit was Title 38 USC Section 3301 – Post 9/11 GI Bill (Chapter 33). Legislation enacted since 2016 ensured Reserve Component members supporting pre-planned missions, disaster response activities and emergencies, as well as those remaining on active duty for health care purposes, are eligible for the Post-9/11 GI Bill.

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Significant changes to benefits in the area of health care have ensured Total Force Integration and Active and Reserve Component benefits parity. Legislative changes since 2016 to Title 10 USC Section 1074(d) and Title 10 USC Section 1145 (a)(2)(B) allow Reserve Component members and their families, early access to health care (TRICARE Prime for 180 days) to meet military medical readiness requirements prior to deployment. Reserve component members and their families are now also entitled to post-deployment transitional health care (TRICARE Prime for 180 days) facilitating reintegration and post-deployment follow up.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY17 Section 642 mandated equal benefits under the survivor benefit plan for survivors of Reserve Component members who die in the line of duty during inactive-duty training after November 23, 2003. This corrected a discrepancy in the NDAA for FY04 Section 644, thus ensuring treatment of inactive-duty training in the same manner as active duty.

**Way Ahead**

The Department did not receive full coordination nor the certified costs required in order to meet the September 2019 deadline for inclusion in the FY21 legislative cycle. As a result, duty status reform legislation has been delayed. DoD has indicated it will work to submit the fully aligned DSR proposal to Congress in a future year’s legislative cycle.

The Department briefed the DSR proposal to the professional staff members of the House and Senate Armed Services Personnel Sub-committees, the House Veterans Affairs Committee, the senior executives of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the National Guard Adjutants General of the 54 states and territories, the DoD’s Reserve Forces Policy Board, and military and veterans service organizations. The proposal has received support from all agencies and organizations briefed, and DSR will require a multi-year legislative effort. The RFPB supports continued engagement to obtain clearance to implement DSR for inclusion in the NDAA for FY22. Furthermore, the RFPB endorses a provision enabling early implementation with Secretary of Defense Certification to Congress that DoD is ready to fully implement.

**Conclusion**

The Department’s proposal indicates that over 485 laws need to be changed to accommodate the proposed duty status reform construct. Additionally, over 280 DoD Issuances, 870 instances in Financial Management Regulations (FMR), 240 instances in the Joint Travel Regulation (JTR) and 300 instances in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) will need to be changed. If enacted, implementing the Department’s proposal will be very complex as it touches on areas throughout the Department and whole of government.

The importance of continued duty status reform and accelerating enactment cannot be understated. The proposed construct better aligns pay and benefits with duty
performed, eliminates existing pay and benefits inequities, allows for fewer changes in
duty status for continuous periods of duty, and consolidates unique duty statuses into
broader categories. The proposal does not constrain current provisions to activate the
Reserve Component for duty, and also aligns triggering events with the appropriate
official while providing greater flexibility for the use the Reserve and National Guard
and ensures continued judicious and prudent utilization.

The RFPB fully supports ongoing reform efforts and believes pursuit of duty status
reduction must remain a high priority and continuing bureaucratic impediments must be
overcome. The Reserve Forces Policy Board sees no reason why this cannot be enacted
in the FY22 NDAA.

Ms. Jerilyn Busch, Director of Military Compensation Policy Personnel and Readiness, briefed the Board on the
background leading up to Duty Status Reform (DSR) efforts in relation to the FY16 NDAA Sec 515 requirements.
2.5: ELIMINATE DISPARITY IN BENEFITS AND QUALIFICATIONS BETWEEN ACTIVE COMPONENT AND RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS

Reserve Component service members face the same dangers as Active Component service members while conducting readiness training in support of their military duties and missions. However, significant disparities have existed between the benefits granted to the survivors of AC and RC personnel when members are killed during training based solely on duty status. In the absence of broader duty status reform, the RFPB recommended changes to the survivor benefit plan in 2016 to ensure survivors of RC members received equal benefits if RC members died in the line of duty, regardless of duty status.

On April 3, 2013, the Reserve Forces Policy Board voted to recommend the Department ask Congress to change the law regarding the Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Plan (RCSBP). Specifically, the Board recommended:

- The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD staff to provide a Unified Legislation and Budgeting Process (ULB) proposal supporting ongoing legislative efforts by Congress to remove the distinctions between “Active Duty” and “Inactive Duty” as they apply to the current Survivor Benefit Plan and Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Plan. The ULB should also include provisions that address:
  - Removal of the word “active” from “active service” to enable equitable treatment under provisions in Title 10, USC, Chapter 73, Subchapter II, Survivor Benefit Plan, section 1451(c)(1)(A)(iii).
  - The calculation of annuity payments awarded to qualifying survivors.
  - The choice to extend eligibility directly to dependent children.
  - Eligibility for the Special Survivor Indemnity Allowance.
  - Annuity calculations based on a disability rating of “total.”

Section 642 of the FY17 NDAA addressed the disparity and provided equal benefits under the survivor benefit plan for survivors of RC members who die in the line of duty during inactive duty training. This change corrected a previous inequality for surviving spouses of RC members who were previously not eligible for retirement when their spouse died from a cause incurred or aggravated while on inactive duty training (IDT). This is a testament to the hard work of the Total Force and all who serve our great Nation and the sacrifices made by our military families. The RFPB was proud to support and see this resolution adopted.

To further address RC and AC parity, the RFPB voted in March 2020 to recommend changes in how joint credit is conferred for members of the Reserve Components in Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) billets. To ensure AC/RC equity, the board recommended adjusting
the Reserve Component joint credit calculation for joint qualification requirements to 6 joint credit points per qualifying year and 1 joint credit point per qualifying 6 days participation per year.

**Background and Discussion**

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 set the criteria and requirements for joint qualification of military officers. This law specifically addressed joint officer policies for Active Component officers and provided detailed requirements for their education, training, promotion and assignments. However, for Reserve Component (RC) officers, it only called for the Secretary of Defense to “establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers” and that “such policies shall, to the extent practicable...be similar to the policies” provided for the Active Component.98

Statutory changes in the FY07 NDAA enhanced GNA and afforded DoD more flexibility to recognize the dynamic and abbreviated joint experiences that are increasingly characteristic of 21st Century warfare. Under this revised direction from Congress, the Department established the requirement for Active Component officers to be designated a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) prior to appointment to the grade of Brigadier General99 as well as established the Joint Qualification System (JQS). The JQS provides opportunity for active and Reserve Component officers to attain joint qualification. The objective of the JQS is to ensure a systematic, progressive, career long development of officers in joint matters ensuring that officers serving in joint assignments have the requisite experience and education to be highly proficient in joint matters, as directed in Title 10, USC Chapter 38.100

Multiple DoD, CJCS and Service related instructions govern the JQS.

The NDAA of 2017 changed the definition of a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) tour to 24 months without an OSD approved waiver. The expectation is still that most officers will serve the full 36-month JDA tour length. Statutory changes to the definition of joint matters expand the types of joint activities considered joint matters, adding other essential joint functions, including command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver and protection or sustainment of operations under unified command.101 Joint matters102 are now defined in USC Title 10, Chapter 38 668(a) as matters related to any of the following:

- The development or achievement of strategic objectives through the synchronization, coordination and organization of integrated forces in operations across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment, including matters relating to any of the following:

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99 JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT (JOM) PROGRAM, 21 February 2018, p. 5.
101 JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT (JOM) PROGRAM, 21 February 2018, p. 2.
102 JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT (JOM) PROGRAM, 21 February 2018, p. 3.
• National military strategy
• Strategic planning and contingency planning
• Command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection or sustainment of operations under Unified Command
• National security planning with other Departments and Agencies of the U.S.
• Combined operations with military force of allied nations

• Acquisition matters conducted by members of the Armed Forces and covered under chapter 87 of the title involved in developing, testing, contracting or producing, or fielding of multi-service programs or systems.

• Other matters designated in regulation by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Even with the multitude of changes to the GNA over its thirty-year life span, the road to a joint force has been anything but smooth. Although the Services work better as a joint force now than any time in the history of the United States military, there is still significant room for improvement. This is especially true in the Reserve Component, which currently makes up almost 40% of the Total Force but has barely 1% of the Field Grade Officers (FGOs) as Joint Qualified Officers (JQOs). Why so few JQOs in the RC?

Building Joint Qualified Officers requires time, resources and funding, as well as joint billets for gaining experience and quotas at Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) granting schools. Joint qualification requires two things: (1) adequate joint experience (gained by two years in an Active Component joint billet or four years in a Reserve Component joint billet with 36 days/year of annual participation as a Traditional Reservist or Individual Mobilization Augmentee) and (2) completion of Joint Professional Military Education I & II (JPME I & II).

Experience

Experience can be gained through a variety of means including a Standard Joint Duty Assignment (S-JDA) or submitting for experience credit (E-JDA) due to serving in a joint position that is not on the JDAL, such as experience gained during a deployment or participating in joint exercises. The JDAL is a list of Secretary of Defense approved S-JDA positions for the Active and Reserve Component where an officer gains significant experience in joint matters. Successful completion of an assignment in one of these positions is the primary path towards completing experience criteria for designation as a Level III JQO.104

103 DMDC data as of February 2020
Nearly 20% of the JDAL billets are found in the RC. In 2015, there were a total of 2,086 RC JDAL billets broken out with the Army Reserve having 880, Marine Corps Reserve 125, Navy Reserve 436, Air Force Reserve 474, the Army National Guard 138 and the Air National Guard 33. While the number of Reserve Component JDAL billets paints an optimistic picture, the reality, “fill-rates” of these positions, proves abysmal, with an average “fill-rate” across all Services at ~60%. While the Sea Services and the Air Force enjoy 60%-80% and higher rates across the Combatant Commands, OSD and the Joint Staff, they only comprise 55% of all JDAL billets. Meanwhile, the Army alone captures the balance of 45% of the total JDAL billets and a total percentage fill rate at half that of the other Services (34%).

Education

Most RC Officers attend the Senior Service Colleges through Distance Education, which currently, for the most part, does not meet the acculturation requirements of Goldwater Nichols and therefore does not confer JPME II credit upon completion. The Army War College (Distance Education), however, is conducting a program that confers JPME II credit if the cohort has the requisite members from other Services to meet acculturation requirements. All officers serving in JDAL billets, whether AC or RC, should be afforded the opportunity to complete their JPME II education requirement so that they are academically prepared to perform their duties as joint qualified warfighters—implying that officers should complete JPME II before performing joint duty. Joint warfighting should serve as the overriding purpose for both determining requirements and attending JPME II.

For the Reserve Component, the primary method of receiving JPME-II credit is through the completion of the 40-week Joint and Combined Warfare School-Hybrid (JCWS-Hybrid) course (previously known as Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME)). Unfortunately, enrollment opportunities for JCWS-Hybrid have declined significantly over the last ten years. In 2008, the course had the capability to produce 460 graduates each year. By 2017, that number had decreased over 50% to 225. Additionally, the course has been opened to interdepartmental personnel as well as active duty, so the actual number of RC officer opportunities to attend decreased even further. JCWS-Hybrid slots have not increased nor were reservists allocated reciprocal slots in the 10-week course. While the changes significantly enhance opportunities for interdepartmental interactions post-class completion, it is a one-for-one reduction in the slots available for the RC. Furthermore, even though including active duty members in the classes goes a long way towards efforts to integrate the Total Force and address the long-standing cultural differences between the Active and Reserve Components, neither of these initiatives should have reduced the overall opportunities for RC members to attend.

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105 Information Paper put together by the Assistants to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Office for the Director of the Joint Staff 2016.
106 PROCESS FOR ACCREDITATION OF JOINT EDUCATION, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE JOINT STUDIES PROGRAM, 16-20 July 2018
As shown in Figures 2-7 and 2-8, two small changes to Table 3 in DoDI 1300.19 and an equitable account of Reserve member’s credit can correct this disparity

Reviewing the RC requirements in DoDI 1300.19, there is a need for two small changes and adjustments to Table 3 found on page 40. If full credit for active duty members for O-6 and below and O-7 and above is 24 joint points, the Board suggests the following two minor changes to Table 3 in DoDI 1300.19. If full credit for part-time RC members is 4 years, that equates to 6 points per year \((24/4 = 6)\). Performing 3 years of service should be worth \(3\frac{3}{4}\) credit or 18 points and therefore only six additional experience points should be needed vs. the current 10 points shown in Table 3. Using the same math for the two years of experience, only 12 additional points should be required vs. the current 18 shown in Table 3.

In addition, equitable credit needs to be given for time served less than four years. Due to service requirements, real world events or unforeseen circumstances, a Reserve Service member may need to leave a JDAL position before the four-year point. Currently, if they have no additional experience points to complete their full JDA credit, the formula for determining how many points they are awarded is to take the total number of days they have actively served during that period and divide it by 30.4. For example, if a member completes two years of a JDAL assignment and served 36 days each year (RC annual participation requirement) they currently do not get half credit towards their experience credit, they get \(72/30.4 = 2.4\) joint points instead of 12 points. It is possible for an Air Force Reserve member to complete two joint assignments of two years each during their career and only have five joint points, but if they had served the entire time in one period they would be awarded full 24 points for JDA credit. Six joint points per year should be awarded for each year of minimum annual participation towards the 24 points required for full JDA credit. See Figures 2-7 and 2-8 for proposed changes.

Summary

The Board is not asking to reduce the number of points required for joint qualification nor is it asking for a reduction in the time required to attain the aforementioned points. The Board is requesting the earned partial credit, both for total years completed less than the standard of four years and for total days completed within a particular year, if the Service Member needs to vacate the position early. This is a complicated issue because there are so many moving parts incorporated into what makes a Service Member joint qualified. All parts of the process must be understood in order see the full picture.

Additional work needs to be done to provide parity for the Reserve Component that aligns with the Active Component in special incentive pay, including career enlisted/officer special aviation incentive pays, diving special duty pay and pro-pay for medical professionals regardless of Reserve Component duty status. The RFPB is currently reviewing military occupational specialty bonus eligibility for Dual Status Military Technicians (MILTECH) to ensure equal benefits for equal burden.
Figure 2-7: RFPB Recommendation Change #1

RFPB Recommended Change #1

- DoD 1300.19, Table 3. RC Officer Paths to Earn the Equivalent of Full JDA Credit.
- Full credit for active duty members is 24 points.
- 24 points / 4 years RC service for full credit = 6 points per year.
- Example: 2 years should earn 12 points, leaving 12 points to earn in either another 2-year joint position or through experience points.
- Example: 3 years should earn 18 points, leaving 6 points to earn in either another 1-year joint position or through experience points.

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Figure 2-8: RFPB Recommendation Change #2

RFPB Recommended Change #2

- DoD 1300.19, Table 3. RC Officer Paths to Earn the Equivalent of Full JDA Credit.
- Any years where RC Officer does not meet the 36-day participation minimums should be credited at the rate of 1 point for every six days.
- Example: RC Officer serving 2 full years and 18 days in the third year before changing billets should earn 12 points plus 3 points = 15 points.
- Example: RC Officer serving 1 full year and 33 days in the second year before changing billets should earn 6 points plus 5 points = 11 points.

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3.0: OPTIMIZE THE TOTAL FORCE FOR THE LONG TERM

This chapter’s purpose is to provide leadership with a list of recommendations that facilitate optimization of the Total Force by improving and enhancing the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Reserve Components through integration and key reforms.
3.1: INTEGRATE THE RESERVE COMPONENT AND ENHANCE ACTIVE COMPONENT AND RESERVE COMPONENT PERMEABILITY

Members of the Reserve Component play a unique role in defending our nation because of two important characteristics. First, the RC is comprised of citizens located throughout the country living and working in their communities. Second, in today’s era of constrained resources and increasing global threats, use of the RC provides the nation a cost efficient, ready, and flexible capability in time of national emergencies. It is imperative to ensure the personnel system supports these characteristics of permeability between the AC and RC, activation, on and off boarding, improving career management, providing increased flexibility of service options, and capitalizes on civilian and military skills found in the reserve force.

Context

The current military personnel management system has not kept pace since its establishment at the outset of the Cold War with the changing personnel management statutes. The last comprehensive review occurred in the late 1970s. It is time to modernize the Department of Defense and its system for recruiting, developing and sustaining its military manpower.

The National Security community widely accepts the fully burdened and life-cycle costs of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), and predicted increase in cost under current policies is unsustainable. Simultaneously, demographic and social trends are reducing both the fitness and propensity to serve for service-eligible men and women. Those who choose to serve, rely heavily on access to information, technology, and the use of social media than ever before. There is a disconnect with today’s force which is increasingly comprised of millennials and is managed with a personnel management system established by baby boomers. Young adults entering the work force today have a tendency to fluctuate between employers, and do not possess the employer loyalty of their parents. Private sector prospects, along with other non-defense public sector opportunities and the gig economy, are the DoD’s primary competition for the best and the brightest for those considering military service. In short, the work force has changed, yet the system used to assess, manage and sustain personnel did not keep pace and needs to change to incentivize service for current and future generations.

Different Active and Reserve Systems

The fundamental statutory and policy frameworks governing the Active Component and Reserve Component are the same, the Services manage their respective Reserve Components differently. Their personnel systems are inherently different because members of the National Guard and Reserves generally perform their duties on a part time basis while also maintaining employment in the private/public sector. The RC personnel system offers greater flexibility compared to the AC system to accommodate this difference. The AC personnel management system is dominated by the requirements of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and centralized accession, training, assignment
IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE

and promotion from entry to separation; up or out advancement within a rigid time-in-service structure; pay based on time-in-grade; and cliff vesting for retirement. It is a system that former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates (head of the 1970 commission that recommended moving from conscription to the AVF) stated had to be changed for the AVF to be sustainable for the long-term. That was 50 years ago and very few of the changes the commission recommended have been made.

The RC personnel management system can be characterized as decentralized. The RC must comply with the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA), like DOPMA; to include it’s up or out advancement system. However, unlike the active force, RC members receive pay for duty performed and their retirement is deferred until age 60 for the majority of personnel. More significantly, RC accessions, training, assignments and promotions are decentralized. For example, a member can enter the reserves at mid-career (from another Service, component, or special branch); or can opt for a career intermission (possibly by transferring to their Service’s Individual Ready Reserve); they have assignment flexibility except for tenured jobs (they can move when they want to or need to and compete for the jobs they desire); and they have opportunities for accelerated, merit-based (vacancy position) promotions - although these are more limited than they could be.

Thoughts for a New System

The last several Secretaries of Defense have advocated for a new RC personnel management system and the RFPB agrees. This new system must be viewed by potential recruits as a desirable and competitive career option, and maintaining the best and the brightest for advancement and leadership of the Nation’s military services. The system must allow for the development of professionals, promote institutional values, embrace diversity and maintain key elements of service culture. It also must foster and be inclusive of a force that both represents and is connected to the population it protects. The system must be fair with transparent policies, practices and processes. It should be cost effective, produce ready and capable service members and be seamlessly integrated across components. It must be flexible and incorporate world-class business practices in terms of assignments, advance schooling and training, family considerations and non-traditional opportunities. Our Armed Forces must remain capable of deploying and sustaining military power rapidly in response to a variety of threats at home and abroad to win the Nation’s wars, support our allies and defend our national interests.

To create and incorporate the characteristics of the aforementioned personnel system, the Department should consider the following:

• Embrace the “Total Force.” The Department’s culture needs to embrace both active and reserve members, as well as their civilian employees, as members of the same team – not separate competing teams. To that end, the Department should encourage and incentivize continued service in the reserves to preserve talent from the AC that would be otherwise lost with Total Force reductions or otherwise routine transitions from the active force.
• Enhance Permeability by easing transitions. The Department should encourage transition between the service components and remove the barriers impeding it. A Total Force personnel system should be developed that allows for the seamless transition of service members within DoD (i.e. between the Services and their components). Greater permeability will allow service members to transition between the AC and RC, retaining valuable talent by providing service members flexibility that accommodates changing life circumstances. Reduction of statutory impediments and bureaucratic administrative requirements should be accomplished to ease these transitions.

• Create an integrated Total Force pay and personnel management system that is both modern and accessible through mobile technology. The Department should establish a system, which fosters transitions between components, and improve the ability of RC members to manage their careers by enabling seamless movement of all administrative and other records between components and military services. Improved quality, access and efficiency of human resource (HR) services will increase individual and overall Total Force readiness. It will enable DoD leadership to make data driven decisions using more accurate, timely and reliable data to meet mobilization timelines.

• Each of the Services is currently working to field their Integrated Pay and Personnel Systems – (IPPS). As of May 2020, the Marine Corps is the only Service with a fully integrated pay and personnel system including Active Component, Reserve Component, officer, enlisted, civilian and retired personnel. Initially established in 1994, it is known as Marine Corps Total Force System Family of Systems (MCTFS FoS). As part of the MyNavy HR Transformation Portfolio, the Navy’s NP2 – Navy Personnel and Pay update is designed to increase auditability, mass mobilization capability and full transparency of Sailor personnel and pay transactions to meet demands. Initial operating capability is anticipated in January 2022. The Air Force Integrated Personnel and Pay System (AFIPPS) Phase 1 includes training, basic capability, delivery and testing and is anticipated in January 2021. Phase 2 provides operational capability for the Total Force to include the Space Force and is forecast for January 2022. Integrated Personnel and Pay System Army (IPPS-A) is the critical enabler for the Army People Strategy and its transition to a talent management system and an HR data rich environment. Army National Guard HR functionality was complete in March 2020 for 54 states and territories. Active component, Army Reserve and Total Force talent management is expected to be deployed in December 2021 and offer full pay capability in 2025. Integral parts of any new DoD wide system should include:

• A single “cradle to grave” personnel record from recruitment to retirement, accessible regardless of component based on individual SSN/EDIPI.

• Improved inter-connectivity of IT systems to reduce redundant information requirements and flow between components/agencies. Integrated, commercial off the shelf, non-proprietary architecture and data, cloud based/hosted, relational databases are paramount and a single authoritative data source (ADS) is critical.
• Improved access to these systems, especially for RC personnel, who have limited in person or remote access to the current cumbersome personnel management systems necessary to monitor, manage and advance their careers. Web or Application based, non-CAC, should not be client hardware based, and enabled functionality should be prioritized.

• Incorporate Customer Relations Module (CRM) into design standards.

• Ensure data accuracy and timeliness by incorporating the following security attributes: confidentiality, authentication, authorization, non-repudiation.

• Data retrievability—the data must not suffer from latency and must be retrievable to respond instantly to legislative requests. The retrieval of data should include Budget Line Item Execution and provide full auditability to fulfill financial improvement and audit readiness (FIAR) compliance as well as provide auditable Treasure Direct Disbursing (TDD).

• Incorporate Customer Relations Module (CRM) into design standards in 2025.

• Develop a common lexicon across DoD to optimize IPPS across all military services and other government organizations (Treasury, VA and Labor).

• Elimination or mitigation of redundant “scrolling,” or appointment, requirements for AC personnel transferring to the RC as required by Title 10, Section 531 and Section 12203 respectively. Depending on the service, the process of appointing a member to the RC can take as long as six months due to the burdensome administrative process. Adopting a “Universal Appointment,” or a single service scroll, with no new nomination appointment requirement if a member moves within the same service would significantly streamline the process.

• Elimination of redundant medical screening requirements, and provide one medical standard to provide permeability of members.

• Portability of qualifications between services and components. Qualifications achieved for like fields in one service or component should be recognized or otherwise streamlined for acceptance during transition. Time and money is wasted retraining experienced personnel who could otherwise add immediate value. Licensing and certifications are currently contained in the Marine Corps Total Force System as an example.

• Streamlined processes to ‘cross-certify’ or provide constructive credit for civilian acquired knowledge, skills and abilities.

• Establishment of “Reverse Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS)” transition centers within or collocated with RC facilities who are partnered with government and non-government organizations to provide “one stop shops” across the United States to facilitate a smoother transition from military to civilian life. A more detailed concept paper on this topic is included later in this report.
• Reduced Duty Statuses. As mentioned in section 2.4 of this report, the Department should reduce the number of RC duty statuses to ease the transition between RC categories and make administration of the RC easier to manage as a whole. This recommendation is in progress under Duty Status Reform.

• Assignment Flexibility and Choice. The Department should employ best practices from the private sector to advertise, apply for, review and select best-qualified candidates for assignment to positions across the reserve force. The Navy's current APPLY board for Commander (O5) and above command leadership positions is an example of a best practice. Additionally, the Army has implemented a new Talent Management system that gives the Soldier and unit more decision-making authority on next assignments and career paths.

• Developmental Opportunities. The Department should ensure RC members have opportunities to compete for special assignments or educational opportunities that provide access to the deepest talent pool possible. These professional development opportunities are essential for effectively developing RC senior leaders. This includes access to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) billets as well as career broadening opportunities.

• “Downtime” - Sabbaticals. The Services are experimenting, on a very small scale, with sabbatical programs to allow service members on active duty to “take a knee” for educational or other personal reasons. Reservists, like their active counterparts, should have increased opportunities for the same, in order to meet the changing demands in their personal lives, for fulltime educational opportunities, or family and employment obligations. Congress authorized the Career Intermission Pilot Program (CIPP) in NDAA FY09 to provide greater flexibility in career paths for service members and to enhance retention. CIPP allows service members to take sabbaticals of up to 3 years in exchange for 2 months of obligated service for each month of sabbatical taken. In October 2015, the Navy was the only service to have participants who had completed sabbaticals. Originally set to expire in 2019, the Navy transitioned the program from pilot to permanent in 2018 because the career flexibility it provided met the personal and professional needs of AC participants and aided retention. The Navy retained valuable experienced and trained service members whom might otherwise have been lost by permanent separation. However, DoDI 1327.07, October 18, 2018, Career Intermission Program (CIP) for Service Members, authorizes Secretaries of the Military Departments to implement a CIP for members of the regular components and members on Active Guard and Reserve Duty. RC members, other than FTS, are not currently eligible.

• Increase ability for RC members to pause promotion clocks during periods where their military service availability is limited. During periods where personal needs or civilian professional requirements make military service difficult, pausing promotion clocks would prevent members from being forced out due to lack of competitiveness for promotion and allow them to continue service once these demands subside. Currently, Section 619(c)(2)(B) of Title 10, USC authorizes the Service Secretaries
to prescribe up to one year of deferred promotion eligibility for officers who have been recently placed on the Active Duty List (ADL). Additionally, changes to DoDI 1320.14 in March 2019 authorized the military services to approve an officer’s request to be excluded from consideration by a promotion selection board convened under Section 611(a) or Section 14101(a) of Title 10 USC. In October 2019, the Navy announced the opportunity for AC and FTS unrestricted line officers to request to defer promotion selection board consideration for FY21. RC officers are currently excluded from promotion selection board deferment. Expanding this deferment for the Total Force and at a time most beneficial to RC members could improve Total Force retention. Under the new Army Talent Management system, Lieutenant Colonels can Opt Out of a promotion board due to current life circumstances, without it counting against them.

• Modernize the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The Services maintain rosters of pre-trained talent for use during both peace and war. The Department should gather best practices and explore alternative management structures and methods to improve efficiency and optimize use of the IRR in support of the Total Force. This large pool of pre-trained manpower is largely underutilized (see Chapter 3, Reform the Individual Ready Reserve for Optimized Management and Use in the Total Force for additional information).

• Enable use of Civilian Acquired Skills. Reservists and Guardsmen often possess unique civilian acquired skills, which can complement or be different from their military specialties and missions. The Department collects civilian skills data, which resides within the RC but cannot leverage the information to provide decision makers with awareness of critical civilian skills when needed. Guard and Reserve members are required to register information about their civilian employer and job skills in order for the Department to meet three different requirements defined in law. The Department of Defense is required to:

  • Give consideration to civilian employment necessary to maintain national health, safety and interest when considering members for recall;
  • Ensure that members with critical civilian skills are not retained in numbers beyond those needed for those skills;
  • Inform employers of reservists of their rights and responsibilities under the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act.

Implementing these recommendations would optimize the Total Force and ensure RC and AC integration. It would also ensure we meet the needs of an evolving defense workforce in period of dramatic change.
3.2: PRIORITIZE AND MAINTAIN RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

Why is readiness important in the Reserve Components?

The Board was asked in 2012 by the Secretary of Defense, “What does it take to maintain a Strong Reserve?” Answering the question requires a brief review of Reserve employment and the critical role the Reserve Component plays in the Total Force. Our Nation, through 20 years of investment, conflict and war, has built a more capable, better equipped, battle-tested Guard and Reserve force than we have had at any time in our recent history. As of February 2020, more than one million Reserve Component personnel have been activated in support of named overseas operations since September 11, 2001, both at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{107} More than $399B in Base Budget funding and $13B in Overseas Contingency Funding has been invested in Reserve Component readiness and operational use since 2002.\textsuperscript{108} The National Defense Strategy (NDS) articulates the Department’s strategy to compete, deter and win in an increasingly complex security environment. The FY18 – FY22 National Defense Business Operation Plan (NDBOP) directly contributes to National Defense Strategy implementation and focuses on improving the Department’s business operations and support for the Secretary’s three major lines of effort:

- Rebuilding military readiness as we build a more lethal joint force;
- Strengthening alliances as we attract new partners; and,
- Reforming the Department’s business practices for greater performance and affordability

The readiness required to preserve the Nation’s capacity to deter and defeat aggression, while simultaneously strengthening the Department’s capacity to defend the Homeland and provide Support to Civil Authorities, and is at risk. The growing national debt, anticipated budget constraints due to the financial impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic response, multiple continuing resolutions and government shutdowns and the continued demand for active and reserve component support place the nation’s security at risk. Readiness is critical to defending the Nation’s interests at home and abroad. With steadily increasing costs for force modernization and active duty military manpower exerting extreme pressure on the size of the Active Component, the Reserve Components offer an affordable option, retaining trained personnel that can be used when needed. The Board strongly recommends the preservation of Reserve Component capabilities and the Department should actively


\textsuperscript{108} Pay and Allowances and Operations and Maintenance Costs
consider the Reserve Components to mitigate the increased risk associated with potential Active Component end strength reductions because of resource constraints. In FY19, Congress enacted the Defense Appropriations Act before the beginning of the fiscal year. The on-time enactment provided resource predictability and enabled the Military Departments to effectively and efficiently execute their annual training and operations plans for the entire fiscal year and to build Readiness at all three echelons – Tactical, Operational and Strategic. This kind of resource certainty is invaluable to the Department’s ability to generate and maintain readiness and support the National Defense Strategy. While this was extremely beneficial to the Department, recent history indicates that a repeat performance is unlikely.

**What will it cost going forward?**

For about $50B a year, the Nation presently maintains a strong National Guard and Reserve force that comprises approximately 38% of DoD military end strength while costing only 16% of the budget. The Department should not squander the benefits gained and the hard won experience from those investments. The Nation must maintain a Reserve Component that is accessible, available, lethal and agile to provide operational forces (when needed) to satisfy the range of potential missions required by Governors and the Combatant Commanders. The Department should institute policies and practices necessary for the continued efficient and effective use of the Reserve Components. Besides the continued use of the Reserve Components operationally, the Department should improve AC/RC integration and relationships; use available manpower more effectively; and invest in Reserve Component readiness. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and other non-base budget funding should be utilized in the near term to the greatest extent possible in support of the operational employment of reserve forces, while in the future the Department should program base budget funding for reserve forces.

**What is the best way to utilize the Reserves?**

In their role as an operational reserve, the best way to utilize the Reserve Components is to actually use them and avoid the inclination to place them “on the shelf” until the next major conflict. The Reserve Components have a demonstrated record of sustained accessibility, readiness and reliability. Reserve Components should maintain capability and capacity to reduce the national military risk associated with prosecuting major theater wars, long-term stability operations, or other combinations of significant or protracted force requirements. Operationally, the Reserve Components should continue to provide forces to help meet both steady state peacetime engagement and contingency requirements of the Combatant Commanders; both at home and abroad. The Reserve Components should be employed operationally as an integral component of our National Defense Strategy, although at a sustained level to acknowledge individual and employer fatigue. To advance Operational Readiness, the FY21 budget request will resource the Army’s Active Component to achieve brigade level proficiency and resource the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to platoon level proficiency. This budget request will
also resource air crews across the Total Army to achieve Active Component aviation battalion level proficiency and the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve at platoon plus and platoon levels, respectively. This level of disparity between AC and RC readiness further degrades the Total Force and does not generate the agility required for dynamic force employment as called for in the National Defense Strategy.

Further, the Reserve Components should be used to support each of the ten primary missions of the Armed Forces of the United States described in the Defense Strategic Guidance and in other capacities required by the President and Governors. An authority that will enhance readiness while increasing capacity for operational support resides in Title 10 USC, Section 12304b, which allows Service Secretaries to involuntary order to active duty, selected reserve members to augment forces for preplanned missions in support of Combatant Commands. The statute limits the duration to no more than 365 days and with no more than 60,000 reservists serving under this authority at any one time, providing the way but not the means for the support. Funding for 12304b remains a challenge and may require OSD to direct the Services to plan for and program 12304b funding to ensure it does not become an unfunded and underutilized authority. Accordingly, the RFPB recommends that:

- Both units and individual service members are mobilized on a regular and routine basis using 12304b.

- Services budget sufficient funding for significant 12304b use two years in advance of preplanned Combatant Command missions.

- Services should aggressively pursue and utilize overseas contingency operations funding to meet operational requirements.

- If the military services do not fund for 12304b use, a potential solution could be the establishment of a National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) style account for operational support, or “National Guard and Reserve Operational Support Account (NGROSA).”
3.3 CONTINUE TO INCLUDE THE RESERVE COMPONENT IN CYBER MISSION FORCE REQUIREMENTS

The Reserve Components contain a wealth of skillsets honed on a daily basis by dedicated professionals working in high-tech fields to include the cyber arena. As the Department of Defense continues to build and integrate the cyber force, use of these valuable skills developed by industry as well as from recent mobilizations, can provide immense benefits to the Department.

The cyber mission area provides a unique opportunity for DoD to capitalize on its reserve force. Since the RFPB’s publication of recommendations in 2014 included in the “Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on Department of Defense Cyber Approach: Use of the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force,” many of the recommendations have been adopted. The Department of Defense must continue to evaluate the proper force mix (between active, reserve and civilian personnel) required to optimize the force to advance the DoD cyber strategy. The RFPB will continue to monitor how the RC should be organized, manned, trained and equipped to meet the DoD strategy.

Successes since 2016 include making progress in sourcing manpower, developing training programs and enabling the employment guidance needed to field an operational Cyber Mission Force. Therefore, the RFPB makes the following recommendations based on the progress toward the 2016 recommendations:

- **The RCs should continue to be included in Cyber Mission Force (CMF) requirements.** At the time of the study, the Services had achieved the goal of presenting forces to U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), needed from each Service to meet the CMF 133-team requirement. This was a monumental effort in meeting the rapid timeline to achieve Full Operational Capability. This Full Operational Capability milestone was reached on 17 March 2018. The RFPB Cyber Task Group believed the inclusion of RC personnel in CMF requirements would reduce long-term costs, while leveraging civilian-acquired skills, Service-invested training and experience while enhancing continuity and longevity. These recommendations were implemented and are reaping dividends for our Nation as our RC teams are providing continuity and expertise to USCYBERCOM. Continuity and expertise is not achievable with a total Active Component force due to the rotational PCS cycles. The study also recommended USCYBERCOM and the Services review niche cyber needs outside the CMF construct to take advantage of the full range of civilian-acquired skills within the RC.

- **CMF requirements should be reassessed every two to three years.** As part of a Total Force solution leveraging RC advantages, the Services should reassess their CMF force presentation every two to three years to determine proper inclusion of the RC to meet the full-time CMF requirement. As the cyber threat changes and more data is collected on team effectiveness, capability and capacity, changes to the cyber team composition will be needed. A robust development of
performance-based metrics should be developed to quantify these types of future force decisions and provide a sound basis for return on investment and alternative resourcing decisions to include the AC/RC force mix. As of 2020, USCYBERCOM has reflected on the current team model and is considering a change to the construct based on the last 4 years. They have assured there will be no reduction in manpower and the restructuring of the teams will provide better utilization creating a larger capacity to meet the demand signal.

- **Executive responsibility for cyber schools should be assigned.** To achieve long-term cost efficiencies, the Department should study and assign executive agent responsibilities for common cyber schools to a single Service. By studying course content and re-aligning their structure, overlap with advanced courses can be reduced and Service redundancy eliminated.

- **Skilled personnel should be recruited through a professional accessions program.** Adopting a professional accessions program, similar to those used for medical officers and other highly trained and specialized fields has high potential as a paradigm shifting approach towards acquiring exceptionally qualified recruits.

Subsequent to the study’s completion, the RFPB has remained engaged with USCYBERCOM-sponsored, joint Reserve Component council efforts and attended numerous meetings and conference calls to track DoD efforts as they relate to implementation of the Board’s 2014 and 2016 recommendations and maintained awareness of other Total Force cyberspace capacity and capability developments. The DoD continues to expand its understanding of the cyberspace domain, including the scope of cyberspace operations required to defend U.S. national interests and the need for capacity and capability beyond that of the CMF.

The CMF is insufficient to ensure our freedom of maneuver and the ability for our forces to deliver not only cyber effects, but also kinetic effects. Hence, the Services are increasingly including and investigating new roles for the RC in cyberspace operations and as cyberspace enablers. Beyond the CMF, the Services recognize the greater contributions the RC can make in cyberspace operations and are fully integrating the Guard and Reserve to leverage RC advantages. One critical area not initially accounted for, but one where the RC will make a significant contribution is the Joint Force Headquarters Cyber (JFHQ-C) and Combatant Commander Cyber staffs (Joint Cyber Centers, Joint Task Force (JTF) and Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC)). The Department has leveraged specific individuals and units to fulfill niche roles and expertise in exercises and securing mission essential platforms. Cyber planning and synchronization of cyber effects requires experienced staff with unique expertise (e.g., Industrial Control Systems (ICS)/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)). Many of the RC units have evolved from other specialties within the service such as flying units, construction etc. and as they were incorporated into cyber and intelligence units they bring their previous knowledge forward to bring a common sense approach to both defending and targeting. The lengthy planning process and required intelligence and targeting expertise are mission areas, which the RC is well suited while serving in a traditional drilling status.
Cyberspace force development and employments are fluid and will continue to evolve. Additional changes to the CMF are likely after lessons are learned and metrics gathered following the initial 133-team build and employment and the RC should be an integral component of all future efforts. RC teams’ performance as part of the CMF will inform the Services and USCYBERCOM and provide valuable lessons on further integration opportunities for RC service members. The RC will have a role in critical joint cyberspace operations, planning and execution efforts, as well as non-CMF cyberspace operations as part of the Department’s effort to defend our National interests. Building the most effective cyber force necessitates using all available resources and the RC provides critically needed skills and expertise at little to no additional cost. Inclusion of the RC in the Cyber Force serves yet another example of RC’s contribution to the Total Force.

Superiority in the physical domain depends on superiority in the cyber domain. While technology capabilities underpin nearly every aspect of modern defense and warfighting strategies and objects, we cannot overlook the expertise and experience that RC members bring in the areas of artificial intelligence, cloud computing and cybersecurity. DoD should leverage the RC in the near term as we expand/grow the cyber force for the long-term.

The first national cyber strategy in 15 years was released September 21, 2018. The RC is uniquely qualified to leverage their civilian skill sets and directly support the four pillars:

- Protect American people, the homeland and the American way of life
- Promote American prosperity
- Preserve peace through strength
- Advance American influence

The RC supports the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) aligned with the National Preparedness System. The National Preparedness System outlines an organized process for the whole-of-community to move forward with their preparedness activities and achieve National Preparedness goals. The National Preparedness System integrates efforts across five areas – Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery. The NCIRP establishes the strategic framework and doctrine for a whole-of-Nation approach to mitigating, responding to and recovering from a cyber-incident.

An example of Defense Support of Civil Authorities is RC cyber election support at local, state and federal level. The RC is well poised to leverage their civilian skills and support their local communities and governments in which they live. The National Guard is providing election support in 2020 through a concept of CTAA (Coordinate, Train, Advise and Assist).
3.4 IMPLEMENT INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE MANAGEMENT REFORMS

As we adjust to a period of declining budgets that will likely reduce force structure while simultaneously dealing with increasing personnel costs and instability around the world, we must seek new approaches in personnel management that are necessary to maintain an effective fighting force. There are critical capabilities resident in the Reserve Components, some of which come at minimal cost to DoD, which we should employ to assist in this effort. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), a part of the Ready Reserve with more than 222,000 members, contains a pool of previously trained and talented personnel that has suffered from years of neglect and inefficient management as an all but forgotten resource. While the active force gets smaller and defense requirements remain the same or increase, the optimized use of all available talent will be critical moving forward. The ability to draw from the IRR in an effective and efficient manner, during times of national emergency or when critical skills are urgently needed, must be improved.

The IRR contains previously trained personnel with and without remaining service obligations. It also includes individuals with highly technical skills (e.g. cyber experience) who have already been trained at great expense to the Department. Members of the IRR are mostly inactive, are not obligated to drill and are generally not paid. However, they can volunteer for training or active duty assignments or be involuntarily mobilized for full or partial mobilizations, as well as for disaster response and other contingencies. While there is no IRR in the Army National Guard, there is a similar category called the Inactive National Guard (ING).

IRR/ING Manning has declined from 800,000 service members in 1993 to just over 222,000 today, comprising nearly 22% of the Ready Reserve. Reserve Component members not assigned to Selected Reserve units, Individual Mobilization Augmentee positions, Active Guard and Reserve duty, the Standby Reserve, the Retired Reserve, or on extended active duty are placed in the IRR or ING. This includes personnel in the following categories:

- Members separating from Active Duty or leaving the Selected Reserve with a remaining Military Service Obligation or other commitment to serve in the Ready Reserve but not placed into or designated as a member of the Selected Reserve.
- Members without prior service awaiting training before beginning service in a regular component or the Selected Reserve.
- Members in the delayed entry program.
- Members awaiting basic military training before beginning service in the Selected Reserve who are not authorized to attend Inactive Duty Training (IDT).
- Certain personnel participating in officer training programs, such as chaplain candidates and participants in the Armed Forces Health Professions Financial Assistance Programs.
• Members leaving Selected Reserve or AD status who are eligible for and desire to maintain or obtain status as a member of the Ready Reserve.

Problems with the IRR

The IRR is difficult to manage because each Service uses a different strategy and few Services view the IRR as a manpower source worthy of funding. This mindset exists for a variety of reasons:

• Access is a cumbersome and lengthy process and there is no central strategy for optimal utilization of the IRR’s skilled manpower.

• Several components have significant issues screening and tracking IRR personnel.

• Accurate databases are difficult to maintain due to outdated technology and lack of frequent contact with members.

• Physical musters are often not mandatory and are cost-prohibitive, leading to increased use of “virtual” mustering or “snail mail” as the primary means of maintaining contact and updating member information.

• IT systems are not interconnected with other agencies who could potentially assist in locating members when Services lose contact. These systems also contribute to delays in transitioning from other components into the IRR.

Difficulty in assessing, screening and tracking of personnel often leads to inefficiency in filling contingency requirements because of poor awareness of force readiness. Multiple individuals are normally required for call-up to source a single set of orders (sometimes as many as eight to ten notifications for every one billet filled) as many are unable to execute orders due to medical issues, poor physical fitness, inability to locate them, or other disqualifiers. Members who are difficult to find are also hard to train and often lose their qualifications. Additionally, most IRR members who want to train are not issued the Common Access Cards (CAC) necessary to complete on-line training.

Difficulties in accessing IRR members create such an administrative burden that the services essentially will not bother to employ their IRR service members, often creating an increased workload or higher deployment tempo for their remaining personnel. Since 2001, neither the Air Force nor the Navy significantly accessed their IRR populations. While the IRR comprises half of the Navy’s Ready Reserve, fewer than 100 members were mobilized and those who did activate were volunteers who filled administratively oriented billets. During this same period, the Navy uprooted thousands of AC personnel from their normal career fields to use as Individual Augmentees in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations, causing significant strain on the AC that could have been at least partially eliminated by using the IRR. The Air Force mobilized 1,133 IRR members for Desert Shield/Storm (with less than seven days’ notice) but mobilized zero for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Noble
Eagle. The U.S. Coast Guard, while boasting a very small IRR of just under 1,500 personnel, has never involuntarily mobilized IRR members and has recently cut nearly 70% of their manpower pool for lack of participation. While the Army and Marines have done much better, mobilizing nearly 30,000 members between them, the Army activated less than 4% while the Marines used just over 10% of their IRR members since 2001.

As mentioned, there is no central strategy for best utilization of the IRR’s skilled manpower. As we strive to meet our defense strategy and global force requirements, while also becoming more efficient, the Department and the Services must make consideration and integration of the IRR as part of the Total Force solution a top priority. The Nation has invested heavily in the capabilities and readiness of the Reserves over the last 19 years, but prioritization of reduced resources, restructuring of OSD-sponsored Screening of the Ready Reserve, and recent organizational changes in OSD reduce oversight and priority of the Reserves as a whole during a time in which we must leverage every available resource.

**How to optimize the IRR for the Total Force**

The RFPB met on September 2, 2015 and voted to recommend the Department establish a Joint Working Group comprised of subject matter experts from each of the Services, the Reserve Components and OSD to gather best practices, seek quick wins and explore alternative management structures and methods to improve efficiency and enable more effective use of the IRR in support of the Total Force. As is often the case with the IRR, while deemed important, reform of this critical resource was tabled while addressing other priorities. The Board recommends the following initiatives be investigated for possible improvements leading to a more efficient and effective IRR:

- Re-establishing the OSD-sponsored, annual IRR Conference.
- Expanded use of the IRR as a Continuum of Service option for members of the Selected Reserve as well as AC members.
- Transferring IRR management responsibilities and resources to their respective Reserve Components.
- Affiliation of IRR personnel with Selected Reserve (SELRES) units.
- Providing TRICARE Reserve Select coverage to IRR members.
- Providing incentives to IRR members to maintain current screening and contact information, immunizations, physical fitness, etc.
- Improving member access to virtual muster and distance learning sites through development of a CAC substitute and mobile device compatibility for accomplishment of on-line training and member screening.
- Updating and improving IT systems and data sharing to improve information flow between components/agencies.
• Mandating and maximizing the collection of civilian skills information to enable better decision making while sourcing current and future requirements, in and across services.

• Reviewing mobilization laws and policies for potential changes that would improve access to IRR personnel in support of mission requirements in peacetime as well as contingencies.

• Allowing IRR members increased ability to freeze promotion or high-year tenure (HYT) clocks for improved career flexibility without penalty.

In the time since the Reserve Forces Policy Board transmitted this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, the operational reserve Subcommittee met with DoD officials to discuss improvements to IRR policy in terms of how it relates to wartime expansibility. Stakeholders noted the lack of DoD strategy to utilize the skilled manpower, and articulated what would be necessary to implement the RFPB’s previous recommendations. The IRR management construct has not changed significantly since the Cold War with the last legislative updates taking place in the 1980s while the Department dismantled most of the infrastructure (i.e. wartime personnel allowance).

Past work on this topic such as the 2004 USD (P&R) guidance, 2008 CNGR recommendations, 2015 RFPB recommendations, think tank contributions, and service audit findings have not led to enhancement of the IRR program. Without a demand signal communicated by the military services or the Joint Staff, the Department will not be able to justify allocating resources to improve IRR management. In practice, the Joint Staff views the IRR demand signal (i.e. size and response requirement) as a Service issue, while the Services view IRR management from only a supply side point of view without setting a target for that inventory. IRR management, usually follows supply side AC end strength without the detailed skill-based (High demand/low density) management detail advocated by the RFPB and OSD stakeholders.

The Department should consider the following strategic questions to frame any future improvement:

• Who sets the demand signal (requirement) for the IRR?

• How do the services shape their IRR to meet requirements (e.g. Top Secret Clearance, occupational skills)?

• What is the necessary size of the IRR as a strategic reserve?

• Is there a way to grow the IRR from the U.S. population for non-combat technical skills (cyber, supply chain, medical) that may potentially be needed during a national mobilization?
3.5 TRANSITION SERVICE MEMBERS AT HOME OF RECORD RESERVE COMPONENT SITES

The Department needs a longer-term, more collaborative process for preparing service members for reintegration into civilian communities as they conclude periods of active duty service. Military members are recruited and enter service from the communities in which they grew up and went to school. Members often return to these locations upon completing active service and some remain affiliated with the military by serving in a Guard or Reserve unit or by joining the Individual Ready Reserve. Others leave the military entirely and enter our Veteran ranks. The current transition process occurs at their last active duty location, which is rarely in the community from where they came or where they intend to live and work. While transition programs have improved, they do not cover transitions beyond discharge and are primarily focused on pre-discharge preparations. As a result, separating service members end their service in one location and must abruptly begin new lives with little or no coordination between their separation points and their ultimate home communities.

In order to provide a more holistic, coordinated transition and promote the well-being of our members, families and communities, DoD should integrate and facilitate collaboration of all of the government resources that are geared toward the transition process. This recommendation was outlined in the April 2012 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on Avoiding Past Drawdown Mistakes to Enhance Future Total Force Capabilities. In that report, the RFPB recommended the development of long-term “one stop shop” reserve community transition centers, utilizing existing, well-established programs in community facilities throughout the country including the locations such as Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), Guard armories, and Reserve centers throughout the United States.
Figure 3.2: Guard and Reserve Facility Footprint

Guard Reserve Drill Centers
TOTAL: 4,189 Locations Nationwide

- Army National Guard Readiness Center/Armed Forces Reserve Center: 66
- Navy Operational Support Center: 796
- Marine Corp Reserve Centers/Sites: 170
- Air National Guard Bases/ Stations/Tenant Locations/GSU (incl. 89 Flying Wings): 158
- Army Reserve Centers/Armed Forces Reserve Centers: 125
- Air Forces Reserve Bases/ Stations/Tenant Locations/GSU (incl. 33 Flying Wings): 2,874
3.6: MINIMIZE INSTALLATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE DUPLICATION AND ENSURE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE INSTALLATIONS RECEIVE ADEQUATE FUNDING

Opportunities for substantial cost savings and efficiencies exist in the Reserve Component’s physical infrastructure inventory and military construction programs, especially over the long-term. Thousands of sites are spread across the country and located in every state, territory and the District of Columbia, with many within a few miles of each other. While the RC relies heavily on demographics to determine where sites should be located for recruiting purposes, there are duplications in the basing of RC units. In addition, many sites, especially those established during the 1950s and 1960s, do not meet Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) requirements, placing personnel at greater risk. The old model of maintaining separate sites for each individual unit or service is no longer sustainable and ongoing efforts to consolidate sites and build joint centers must continue. Big box store regional distribution centers provide a model that illustrates the need for change and way forward for efficient operations. A typical regional distribution center carries inventory, which is distributed out to a large number of retail store sites within a geographic area. These regional distribution centers are spaced far enough apart to support a certain number of stores within their area, pushing products out using a hub and spoke model based on efficiency.

Reserve sites can be viewed as the inverse of a regional distribution center, more akin to a “regional integration center” for personnel. In the RC model, the reserve center serves as a hub where all manpower gathers for unit training, with reserve service members traveling to the site for events. While retail distribution centers (hubs) are never co-located in the same area because it wouldn’t make sense to duplicate a facility supporting the same mission, many of our reserve sites operate as hubs located either adjacent to or on top of each other. Since units and Services generally compete to recruit and retain within the same demographic area, does it really make sense to have multiple reserve sites located within a short proximity, at double, triple, or even more cost? Of course the answer is no, but that is exactly how many of current reserve sites are laid out. While DoD is not a for profit business and there may be reasons for exceptions, Figure 3-3 shows the opportunity for consolidation within Services and throughout the Department exists on a massive scale.
Figure 3-3: Example of overlap of Reserve sites within DoD

**IDEAL MODEL USED BY INDUSTRY**

- Example of “Hub and Spoke” Distribution Model

- Example of inefficient Reserve Center Duplication
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)/ Reserve Integration, annually compiles a facility footprint and the numbers are striking. As shown in Figure 3-4, the 2019 Summary of RC Facility Data shows that the RC operates 4,189 sites, consisting of 38,052 buildings with a plant replacement value (PRV) of $110.89B.

The 4,189 RC sites include Camps, Forts and Bases; Readiness Centers and Reserve Centers; Armed Forces Reserve Centers (with two or more Reserve Components); Ranges and Training Areas; military facilities on civilian airfields; and Geographically Separated Units (GSUs), including leased facilities.

Efforts to consolidate activities in joint facilities are not new as the statutory requirement to provide joint RC facilities to the greatest extent possible already exists in Title 10, Chapter 1803 (specifically Sections 18231(2) and 18234(2). In addition, DoDI 1225.08 (May 10, 2016), Reserve Component Facilities Programs and Unit Stationing addresses joint construction and consolidation opportunities by requiring each state that has at least one unit from two different RCs to annually host a State Facilities Board (SFB) to discuss future RC military construction (MILCON) projects, available or underutilized facilities and other potential cost saving initiatives. DoDI 1225.08 also established the Senior Engineer Steering Group (SESG), which meets twice a year and includes the senior engineer from each RC headquarters or the equivalent Service representative for each RC. The SESG explores joint construction opportunities, best business practices; excess or underutilized property held by each service and provides a venue for the services to exchange information. Together, the SFB and SESG institutionalize routine communication among service components that should ensure Federal and State property and funds are used efficiently. Additional implementation guidance for DoDI 1225.08 is provided in DoDM 1225.08 (December 19, 2017), Reserve Component Facilities, Construction, and Real Property Programs, which implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for acquiring and using Reserve Component facilities programs and unit stationing.

**Figure 3-4: Number of Guard and Reserve Facilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve Component</th>
<th>Buildings</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Plant Replacement Value ($Billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>24,776</td>
<td>2,874</td>
<td>$59.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>$16.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>471</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMCR</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>$1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>6,605</td>
<td>170</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFR</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>$7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,052</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,189</strong></td>
<td><strong>$110.89</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most recent large-scale consolidation effort was initiated by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations, which were approved by DoD, the BRAC Commission and Congress. The Army recommended the closure of 211 Army National Guard Armories and 176 Army Reserve Centers (387 total facilities), while directing the consolidation of both Army National Guard and Army Reserve units into 125 new joint Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs). A few of these AFRCs also included Navy Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve units. While the effort was successful, it was also very expensive. Any future BRAC is unlikely to have the amount of MILCON funding that was available in 2005, so future consolidations would likely occur on a much smaller scale and take place over decades. Despite these challenges, efforts to consolidate are worth pursuing and should be encouraged.

In 2012, OASD Reserve Affairs initiated a Joint Construction Efficiencies Analysis to:

- Analyze the value of joint military construction versus unilateral construction.
- Verify a realistic range of MILCON savings.
- Provide more incentive for the Reserve Components to identify, program and fund more joint construction projects in the future.

The analysis focused on 34 Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) built in 5 regions of the country during the 2005 BRAC and indicated an average cost savings of 27.9% from the estimated unilateral construction. While not all joint projects will garner this amount of savings, the study does provide tangible evidence that joint projects are more cost effective. Additionally, the study concluded that it costs approximately 47% more to operate unilateral facilities than an equivalent joint facility. The analysis also revealed the following Joint Construction Efficiencies Best Practices:

- **Optimized Pairings:** Pairing the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve was the most prevalent joint pairing and provided the most efficient use of space for joint facilities in which those two components are aligned.

- **Operational Efficiencies:** Do not mandate concurrent drill periods for units in a joint facility (as was required in some congressional insert projects). Maximum facility size savings will occur when the co-located units do not have (or are not required to have) the same drill periods.

- **Joint Facility Type Restrictions:** Consider joint construction for only similar facility types (e.g., Reserve Centers). Facility cost savings come from co-locating units with similar facility requirements.

- **Unilateral Facility Multiplier (UFM):** Application of the UFM to scale facility costs for the estimated unilateral costs is an effective method of estimating a number of non-quantifiable and lump sum costs, including non-facility items such as ATFP, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) integration and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs.
• **Joint Savings Factor Tool:** Use of the BRAC Joint Savings Factor Tool to estimate the unilateral facility space requirements provide a quick and accurate method for assessing potential joint project savings during planning.

• **Design Standardization:** The use of a small number of design companies and Design-Build construction contractors will, where appropriate, decrease overall project cost and time to project completion.

In light of the information presented here, the Board recommends that senior leadership within the Department and the Services continue to seek consolidation opportunities and pursue joint construction whenever practicable and that Military Departments give higher priority to funding joint construction projects in the future. Without a massive influx of additional MILCON funding in the annual DoD Budget or in another BRAC round, this effort will take decades to achieve meaningful consolidation results, but there are other options. One possible means to encourage joint construction would be to establish a joint MILCON account within the OUSD Comptroller. If Services could compete to acquire additional funding by building joint sites, this proposed account would incentivize the effort and spur competition for these additional “fenced” funds. While challenging, the effort to consolidate must remain as a strategic goal for the Department.

This is critically important as each Service’s Reserve Component installations programs have been consistently underfunded, with Military Departments continuing to accept risk in their infrastructure budgets to focus on higher priority programs, such as new weapon system acquisition. This constrained budget makes it more difficult for the RCs

*Figure 3-5: MILCON Parity FY19-21*
to prioritize their MILCON and Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) projects, as their funding is based upon their respective Plant Replacement Value (PRV). Despite Reserve forces constituting roughly 38% of the Total Force, the Reserve Components receive a small fraction of the Service’s total MILCON budget (Figure 3-5).

In addition to limited funding, another challenge facing the Reserve Component is that Military Departments do not always properly plan and program MILCON and FSRM funding in conjunction of a new or changing RC mission. This lack of synchronization does not ensure required facilities are pre-built or modified prior to the arrival of new aircraft or major equipment items. Recent examples of units receiving new equipment at locations with inadequate support facilities for the mission include the Navy Reserve C-40A squadron at Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay, HI and the Marine Corps Reserve MV-22 squadron at Naval Station Norfolk, VA. In cases where RC equipment parity does exist (the ultimate goal), new equipment is often fielded to RC units that cannot maintain them properly because the new vehicle dimensions are too large for the existing RC maintenance facilities. Recent examples are the need for new Army National Guard (ARNG) Vehicle Maintenance Shops (VMS) and Combined Support Maintenance Shops (CSMS), which have been included in the ARNG MILCON Future Years Defense Programs (FYDPs).

DoD must strive to restore, sustain, replace and build critical facilities supporting operational and training readiness. The Departments goals should be to attain this readiness while maintaining financial stewardship and accountability of taxpayer money. These capital improvement efforts align with Secretary Esper’s renewed emphasis on taking care of our service members and their families. Improving RC facilities today strengthens the Total Force and ensures everyone is ready for tomorrow’s fight!
3.7: REINSTATE RESERVE COMPONENT HEADSPACE EXEMPTIONS AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENT FOR RESERVE COMPONENT CHIEF AND DIRECTOR POSITIONS

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY17 made significant changes to the authorities in regards to Reserve Component General and Flag Officers (G/FOs). After careful review and analysis, the Reserve Forces Policy Board proposes the following recommendations.

**Recommendation #1:**

Reinstatement of RC exemptions that were eliminated as part of the FY17 NDAA. The Board supports reinstating language into Section 526a, Title 10, USC, authorizing the exclusion of certain RC General and Flag Officers (G/FO) serving on Active Duty.

**Background and Discussion**

The Board understands that if these exemptions are eliminated as planned, all RC General and Flag Officers (G/FO) serving on Active Duty, even for one day, will count against Active Component G/FO headspace. This will create numerous statutory issues; both in the Active Component and the Reserve Component, as RC G/FOs are required by law to conduct at least 14 days of Active Duty Annual Training per year. This would directly affect over 400 Reserve Component General and Flag Officers (Figure 3-6). The elimination of the 18 Chairman’s Reserve Positions, among other joint duty positions, would severely limit opportunities to gain joint experience to develop qualified candidates for O-9 and O-10 positions (Figure 3-6). The elimination of these RC exclusions also negatively affects Combatant Command (CCMD) and Natural Disaster Support and any support to emerging missions that need RC G/FO representation. These categories of RC G/FO support generally account for approximately 70 RC G/FOs per year.
**Figure 3-6: Reserve Component General and Flag Officers**

Reserve Component General and Flag Officers by 10 USC Section 12004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>SERVICE NUMBERS</th>
<th>* BY COMPONENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td>207</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USMC Reserve</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL AUTHORIZED</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* By Component = Service number broken down further by either Reserve or Guard

** Reserve Component General and Flag Officers In Joint Billets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>** JOINT POOL BILLET</th>
<th>IMA</th>
<th>CHAIRMAN RESERVE POSITIONS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BILLETS</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* RC G/FO officers in joint billets are exempt from Service G/FO Headspace

** Full time positions that are also open to AC G/FOs
**Recommendation #2:**

Direct a follow-on to the RAND study titled Realigning the Stars: A Methodology for Reviewing Active Component General and Flag Officer Requirements to include a review of Reserve Component General and Flag Officer positions and requirements in order to ensure consistent, proven leadership for the Total Force. Further, direct the Services to maintain current O-9 rank requirements for the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard and the Chiefs of each Reserve Component positions until the study is complete.

**Background and Discussion**

Previously, the RFPB met on 15 September 2016 and discussed recommendations pertaining to General and Flag Officer (G/FO) reductions and changes as outlined in S.2943 Sections 501, 502 and 925. Of particular note, S.2943 Section 502 eliminated the statutory requirement of O-9 rank for the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard and the Chiefs of each Reserve Component.

On 23 December 2016, S.2943 was signed into law as the National Defense Authorization Act for FY17. This change does not prohibit the position from being filled by an officer with the same, higher, or lower grade than the law currently requires. However, it would reverse the decision from the 2001 NDAA, which directed that the RC Chiefs and the Directors of Guard components be promoted to O-9 after the Services failed to exercise their discretionary authority to promote them granted in the 2000 NDAA.

**Impact of Changing Statutory O-9 Requirement for Reserve Component Chiefs as Directed by the FY17 NDAA**

Since 9/11, as reserve forces have transitioned from a purely strategic role to both an operational and strategic role, it is even more critical that changes in the rank structure for RC leaders only be made after deliberate and careful analysis. The O-9 ranks of the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard and the Chiefs of each Reserve Component should be retained. If reductions are needed, they should be aligned with similar reductions in the active force to retain parity on command structure and organizational relationships.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2001, Section 507 directed that the RC Chiefs and the Directors of the Air and Army National Guard be promoted to O-9. This was done after years of study and advocacy. In the 2000 NDAA, the Services had been given
authority to promote these positions, but they did not. Congress recognized that the positions carry responsibility and authority commensurate with the rank and equivalent to and sometimes exceeding, that of their AC counterparts\(^{109}\).

The RC Chiefs are dual-hatted as Component Chiefs and commanders. The O-9 rank for RC Chiefs and Directors is important within the Department of Defense to provide parity with Chiefs and Commanders who are their counterparts. The loss of O-9 positions for RC Chiefs will only result in a loss of influence in their respective service headquarters staffs, undoing years of progress in obtaining parity.

Without the statutory requirement of O-9 for National Guard positions, specifically the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, achieving the rank of O-10 and Chief of the National Guard could become unattainable. Further, the pool of prospective candidates for that position would be reduced. Although the National Guard Bureau could still compete to have the Service Secretaries designate one or more of these positions as O-9, the number of O-9 positions will be extremely limited due to corresponding reductions in G/FO grade positions.

In an era of the Total Force and an operational reserve, it is even more imperative that Reserve and National Guard leaders are aligned with their AC counterparts, commensurate with the duties they perform and responsibilities they hold. Ensuring the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard and the Chiefs of each Reserve Component retain the rank of O-9 ensures we have the depth and breadth of leadership necessary to lead the Armed Forces during a time of constant conflict. This provides our military with greater transparency, flexibility and choice in selecting the right leader with the right skills in a time of global power competition. Retain the rank of O-9 for the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard and the Chiefs of each Reserve Component.

At the time of this printing, FY 2021 House Armed Services Committee Marks for the National Defense Authorization Act within H.R. 6395 may reverse some changes that were made in the FY 2017 NDAA. The mark is not yet law and potentially reinstates headspace exemptions for general or flag officers of the reserve component who: are on active duty for training, under a call or order specifying a period of less than 180 days, or authorized by the Secretary of the Air Force to serve on active duty for a period of 180 days and not longer than 365.

3.8: INTEGRATE THE RESERVE COMPONENT INTO THE SPACE FORCE FROM THE OUTSET TO LEVERAGE THEIR UNIQUE SKILLSETS

The Reserve Components contain a wealth of skillsets honed on a daily basis by dedicated professionals working in high-tech fields to include the space domain. As the Department of Defense shapes the Space Force, use of these valuable skills developed by industry, at little to no cost to the government, can provide immense benefits to the Department.

Recognizing Space is a contested domain presents a unique opportunity for the DoD to capitalize on its reserve force. The RFPB is looking at the Department’s approach to building a Space Force with a focus on developing its organizations, policies, doctrine and practices for defensive and offensive space operations. The Board is monitoring the development of the force with a concern that the proper force mix is considered from the outset (between active, reserve and civilian personnel) in order to optimize the force and fully utilize available capabilities.

The National Guard remains a valued and loyal partner to our national security space enterprise. Our National Guard space units ensure we dominate this domain as it gains prominence in warfare. Since the United States Space Force was formally established by the December 20, 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the National Guard has supported and will continue to support the newest military service. Specifically, the National Guard supplies the Department of Defense 100% of its unit equipped, surge-to-war operational Reserve Component Space Force structure. To date, the National Guard provides 40% of the operational expeditionary space electronic warfare capabilities in the Space Force, and is rapidly growing to 60% with the addition of two squadrons in Guam and Hawaii. Furthermore, the National Guard retains decades of space-related depth and expertise. For example, every day the space professionals at Clear Air Force Station Alaska monitor missile threats in the Pacific, and National Guard space intelligence experts in Ohio monitor space threats. Most recently, space electronic warfare units from California and Florida returned from overseas deployments that were critical to combatant command success. For the future success of our newest service, it is vital the National Guard’s expertise and capabilities continue to be available to the Space Force enterprise.

As the new force is developed, the Board will maintain contact with senior space leaders at OSD, United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), the Service Space Component Commands and the Reserve Components in order to advocate for inclusion of reserve capabilities. Select board members will also attend space conferences and exercises as part of a continuing analysis. Initial recommendations include the following:

- The RCs should be included in Space Force (SF) requirements. As we initiated our review, the Space Force was signed into law on 20 December 2019. The Services had initiated planning efforts to determine their presentation and integration of forces to USSPACECOM, needed from each Service. The
Reserve Components accomplish missions in Space and some missions are only accomplished through the Reserve Components. The rapid timeline in building the Space Force could result in most Services approaching their service builds using only Active Component members. The RFPB believes the inclusion of RC personnel in Space Force requirements would reduce long-term costs, while leveraging civilian-acquired skills, Service-invested training and experience while enhancing continuity and longevity. When considering force mix, the RFPB recommends using a quantitative cost model such as the RFPB fully burdened and life cycle personnel cost model of the Reserve Components using CAPE endorsed methodology HYPERLINK “https://rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/Final%202019%20Fully%20Burdened%20Life%20Cycle%20Cost%20Methodology%20Report%20Update%2010%20Sep%202019_1.pdf” (RFPB Fully burdened and Life Cycle Personnel Costs for all Components in Total Force Analysis and for Budgetary Purposes). Additionally, in determining the force mix, the RFPB recommends measuring the qualitative elements such as continuity of operations, reduction in training costs, leveraging civilian skills and providing a surge component in time of need in determining force mix. The concept of a Reserve Component is illustrated in Carl Von Clausewitz’s manual On War where he explains “a reserve has two distinct purposes. One is to prolong and renew the action; the second to counter unforeseen threats”. The ability to surge to mobilized strength with Reserve Component personnel for the prolonged battle and renewal of personnel is existential to our democracy. The Board recommends the Secretary of Defense direct a Total Force approach toward staffing the Space Force. The Board also recommends USSPACECOM and the Services review niche space needs outside the Space Force construct to take advantage of the full range of civilian-acquired skills within the RC.

- **DoD should reassess Space Force requirements and Reserve Integration by FY22.** As part of a Total Force solution leveraging RC advantages, the Services should reassess their SF manpower presentation to determine proper inclusion of the RC to meet the full-time SF requirements. As of this writing, the FY20 NDAA did not include the Reserve Component in the Space Force. As the space threat changes and more data is collected on Total Force effectiveness, capability and capacity, changes to SF composition, number and distribution will be needed. A robust development of performance-based metrics should be developed to quantify these types of future force decisions and provide a sound basis for return on investment and alternative resourcing decisions, including AC/RC force mix.

- **Executive responsibility for Space schools should be assigned.** To achieve long-term cost efficiencies, the Department should study and assign executive agent responsibilities to a single service for common space schools. By studying course content and re-aligning their structure, overlap with advanced courses can be reduced and Service redundancy eliminated.
Skilled personnel should be recruited through a professional accessions program. In order to acquire exceptionally qualified recruits, SF should establish a professional accessions program similar to existing Air Force medical and cyber officer targeted recruiting programs.

The RFPB anticipates being engaged with USSPACECOM, Space Force and the Joint Reserve Component Council efforts subsequent to the Space Force’s establishment. Additionally, we plan on attending numerous meetings and conference calls to track DoD efforts as they relate to implementation and recommendations as well as providing situational awareness of other Total Force space capacity and capability developments. The DoD continues to expand its understanding of the space domain, including the full spectrum of space operations required to defend U.S. national interests and the need for capacity and capability beyond that of the Space Force.

The Services continue to evolve their Space Force portfolio and continue their efforts to operationalize space. There is recognition that the Space Force will contain elite space warfighters akin to Special Operations Forces. This elite SF force will be comprised of the Joint Staff-approved transference of approximately 1,450 personnel. While this effort provides initial manpower to meet current requirements, it is widely recognized that the space domain includes more than the defense of satellite constellations, it also requires defense of critical DoD infrastructure and weapons systems. The current force is insufficient to ensure our freedom of maneuver and the ability for our forces to deliver not only non-kinetic but also kinetic effects. Hence, the Services are increasingly including and investigating new roles for the RC in space operations and as space enablers.

As part of the FY20 NDAA, the DoD deferred the integration of the Reserve Component which is in direct conflict of Space Policy Directive-4 Sec 4(b) establish a United States Space Force as a sixth branch of the United States Armed Forces within the Department of the Air Force. Specifically it refutes/delays Section 4. The scope of the United States Space Force:

(b) The proposed United States Space Force should:

(i) Include, as determined by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the uniformed and civilian personnel conducting and directly supporting space operations from all Department of Defense Armed Forces

The Services recognize the greater contributions the RC can make and have fully integrated the Guard and Reserve to leverage RC advantages. One critical area not initially accounted for, but one where the RC will make a significant contribution is the Combatant Commander Space staffs (Joint Space Operation Centers, Joint Task Force (JTF) and Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC)). Space planning and synchronization of space effects requires experienced staff with unique expertise. The
lengthy planning process and required intelligence and targeting expertise are mission areas, which the RC is well suited while serving in a traditional drilling status.

Space force development and employments are fluid and will continue to evolve. Additional changes to the SF are likely after analyzing lessons learned and metrics following the initial AC build and employment, which will conclude that the RC should be an integral component of all future efforts. RC performance as part of the SF will inform the Services and USSPACECOM and provide valuable lessons on further integration opportunities for RC service members. The RC will have a role in critical joint space operations, planning and execution efforts as part of the Department’s effort to defend our National interests. Building the most effective Space Force necessitates using all available resources and the RC provides critically needed skills and expertise at little to no additional cost. Inclusion of the RC in the Space Force serves yet another example of RC’s contribution to the Total Force.

Recent and proposed commitments of funds ($18B in FY21 DoD budget), resources and personnel to the space domain strengthen our resilience, deterrence and warfighting options in space. Expeditiously building the U.S. Space Force and including the RC into U.S. Space Command provides singular focus to maintain a competitive advantage in space. These efforts will ensure the Total Force is prepared to complete, deter and win in a complex, unpredictable and multi-domain security environment.

The Honorable Robert L. Wilkie, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, provides an update on Personnel and Readiness priorities during the Board’s December 2017 meeting.
4.0 RESERVE COMPONENT USE

In Chapter 2 of this report, the Board recommended formalizing the transformation of the RC into an operational reserve to preserve the capabilities and skill sets developed after 20 years of war and conflict. Understanding how and why this transformation occurred provides the rationale for why these efforts must continue.

4.1 THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE CONCEPT

At the advent of the Cold War, the RC was designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the Armed Forces in the event of a major war with the Soviet Union and thus referred to as the strategic reserve. Reserve forces were not routinely employed to meet recurrent defense requirements but kept “on the shelf” in the case of war. The RC’s minimal involvement in Vietnam caused the RC to function as a strategic reserve until the first Gulf War when the RC was called up in record numbers. The RC played a major role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and performed admirably as a key component of the Total Force.

Despite the optimism and spread of Western Liberal Democracy at the end of the Cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union failed to reduce worldwide conflict and increased DoDs operational tempo as global commitments continued to expand. The AC was reduced in size during the 1990s and employment of the RC began to rise. This was evident as the RC became an essential element of the military’s operational forces, with reservists supporting operations in Haiti, the Balkans and other regional hot spots.

The RC rose to the occasion when our Nation was attacked on September 11, 2001. In response, the RC’s contribution increased to almost 5 times the level it was before September 11th. The number of RC service members supporting contingency operations increased from 12.7 million duty days in FY01 to a peak of 68.3 million duty days in FY05.

As of February 2020, more than one million reservists and Guardsmen have involuntarily mobilized in support of contingency operations since September 11, 2001. At their peak use in 2005, national guardsmen and reservists constituted nearly 40% of all U.S. military forces in Iraq.

The notion of an operational reserve developed almost by default as RC units mobilized on a recurring and rotational basis. Using the RC in this manner eliminated the need for a draft or full mobilization and enabled DoD to meet operational requirements supporting OIF and OEF. This use of the RC displayed the attributes that constitute an operational reserve. These attributes are – providing ready capabilities and capacity, which are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for missions with the Active Component. The DoDI 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force, recognized this change but instead of stating how an operational reserve would
be employed, focused on providing guidance and developing policies. Despite much
debate on the issue and recommendations from numerous commissions and think
tanks, the concept of the operational reserve remains undefined in formal policy.

The employment in roles and missions of the RC operationally also remains
disconnected from, corresponding changes in legislation and the approval of Congress.
The question on the proper role Reserve Component members should play in the
Nation’s defense is often posed as an either-or choice between two employment
models – a strategic reserve or an operational reserve. This supposition that a choice
must be made is false. The RC should be organized, manned, trained and equipped
as an operational reserve to ensure the surge capability envisioned in the Cold War
strategic reserve remains available. The Nation should sustain this capability while also
providing the RC with predictable and routine operations at home and abroad.

One essential way to maintain an “operational reserve” is to keep RC members
“operationally trained.” Additionally it is important to continue to assign them viable
and important missions; fund them for proper training and equipment to accomplish
assigned missions; and avoid the inclination to place them “on the shelf” while waiting
for the next major conflict. RC members have a demonstrated record of sustained
readiness, accessibility and performance. They should continue to be employed
operationally as an integral part of our National Defense Strategy.

Our Nation faces the prospect of continuous conflict and global competition. However,
facing these security threats with declining budgets presents an incredible challenge.
The answer, clearly lies with the RC—which is uniquely capable of responding in the
homeland, and maintained at a significant reduced cost when not mobilized and
employed operationally compared to that of the Active Component cost. This reliance
on the RC will continue and likely grow as flat budgets, active force structure cuts and
increased security threats leave no reasonable alternative. An operational reserve
provides flexible capabilities that are ready, accessible and routinely utilized to meet
needs both at home and abroad. Institutionalizing and defining this concept will ensure
the United States has a 21st Century Force prepared and ready to provide the dynamic
force employment required.
4.2: RESERVE COMPONENT COST COMPARISON AND EFFICIENCIES

A frequent discussion topic concerning Reserve Component forces has been the cost of RC service members as compared to Active Component service members. Senior Department of Defense (DoD) officials, Congressional leaders, think tanks and subject matter experts acknowledge the fully burdened and life cycle cost growth trends of the All-Volunteer Force are not sustainable as the Nation’s Economic Viability is a Security risk with our current National Debt. These acknowledgements sparked the interest of the Reserve Forces Policy Board to determine the fully burdened life cycle of the Reserve Component. The Reserve Forces Policy Board noted that senior leaders within DoD do not have complete or uniform data on the total costs of Active and Reserve Component forces. This often leads to the false assumption that RC members are more expensive than their AC counterparts.

Figure 4-1: “Why It Matters”

110 National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2018 (Green Book)
The RFPB concluded both in its 2013 Fully Burdened and Life Cycle Cost Report and again in this 2019 update, that the DoD lacks appropriate policy requiring a complete and consistent costing methodology to identify the true fully burdened and life cycle costs of military manpower. Both reports also identified that fully burdened RC per capita costs were less than 1/3 of the fully burdened AC per capita costs.

Consequently, the RFPB made three recommendations toward the establishment of appropriate DoD policy guidance to accurately and consistently capture the costs of both components to fill this data gap and proposed specific cost elements that should be included in them:

- Enact DoD policy/guidance for computing fully burdened Military Personnel Costs for the Total Force, including the Reserve Component.
- Calculate and report cost element figures annually using budgeted and actual costs.
- Develop a model to calculate and compare Active and Reserve Component fully burdened life cycle costs.

The purpose of these recommendations was to ensure senior DoD leaders are making data driven decisions and receive accurate analytical products that are based on current, complete and consistent data. The Board believes that the establishment of a standard costing method for determining complete individual component costs is essential when exploring AC/RC force mix and mission alternatives in a fiscally responsible environment.

The RFPB and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) Comptroller agree that the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) must take the lead for the Secretary of Defense in determining the cost methodology ground rules for the Military Departments and other DoD entities. This will ensure the DoD implements a comprehensive, fully burdened life cycle cost policy for all of its personnel to ensure informed decision making.

**Recommendation #1**

*Enact DoD policy/guidance for computing fully burdened Military Personnel Costs for the Total Force including Reserve Components.*

The DoD has no policy in place to define or require complete analytical data for the comparison of Active and Reserve Component costs to determine Total Force mix options. As a result, senior leaders within DoD do not have complete or uniform data on the total costs associated with such forces. Therefore, decisions about the optimal mix of future Active and Reserve Component forces are not informed and an “apples to apples” comparison is not possible.
DoD has a policy guiding the collection and analysis of comprehensive cost data for comparing military, government civilian and contractor full-time staffing options. Currently, DoDI 7041.04 identifies the cost elements necessary to calculate and compare the full cost of full-time staffing options. However, it does not examine part-time staffing.

Figure 4-2 shows a comparison of the metrics used to calculate the annual fully burdened costs for individuals. It further notes a significant difference in how “fully burdened” is defined. The RFPB defines fully burdened as including the cost metrics of Procurement, Military Construction, and Research Development Training and Evaluation (RDT&E). The current Full Cost of Manning (FCoM) tool incorporates only the costs identified in DoDI 7041.04 and does not represent a true fully burdened cost calculation.

Figure 4-2: CAPE and RFPB Fully Burdened Metrics Comparison
Figure 4-3 demonstrates how significant the cost metrics of Procurement, Military Construction and RDT&E are to a fully burdened cost calculation. Using the FCoM tool from CAPE to compare the annual cost of an Air Force O-5 and E-7 results in a cost estimate that misrepresents the fully burdened cost of an AC individual by more than $130,000. This degree of inaccuracy hinders the ability of senior decision makers to consider the cost of manpower when making force mix decisions.

Figure 4-3: AC FCoM vs AC FCoM + RFPB 2018 One Year Comparison

Figure 4-4 from the 2019 RFPB update report, Requiring the Use of Fully Burdened and Life Cycle Personnel Costs for all Components in Total Force Analysis and for Budgetary Purposes shows a comparison of the per capita cost to the Department of Defense for the AC and RC. This is not a fully burdened cost.

Figure 4-4: AC & RC Cost to DoD Comparison
Figure 4-5 shows the additional cost elements from other federal agencies, which are included in the FCoM calculation tool. When all of these metrics are added to the Department of Defense Grand Total, a fully burdened per capita cost is achieved. For 2018, the RC fully burdened per capita cost was 31.1% if the AC is based on the Base Budget Request.

During the March 2019 RFPB Quarterly meeting, board members and advisors recommended achieving greater accuracy in this analysis by performing the same calculations using actual data from the OUSD Comptroller ledger.

Figure 4-6 is a comparison of the AC and RC annual fully burdened costs to the U.S. Government based on the base budget requests for FY13, FY15 and FY18. This comparison shows a trend of the RC costing less than 1/3 of the AC for these years.
Figure 4-7 is a comparison of the same years from Figure 4-6, but using the actual obligations from the OUSD Comptroller’s ledger for those years. This comparison demonstrates the annual fully burdened cost of the RC is actually even less than 30% of the AC for 2013, 2015 and 2018.

Figure 4-7: AC vs RC Actual Fully Burdened Annual Per Capita Cost
Recommendation #2

Calculate and report cost element figures annually using budgeted and actual costs. The Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) or the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) should calculate and publish all cost elements for Total Force military personnel cost studies on an annual basis and provide guidance on their use in an appropriate memo or report.

Annual standardized calculations for both budgeted and actual numbers of the required critical cost elements will provide updated and consistent numbers for the Services and other DoD components to use in costing studies. Additionally, publishing such cost elements annually will demonstrate DoD commitment to tracking costs in an increasingly budget constrained environment.

Figure 4-8 is a comparison of fully burdened costs for AC and RC from FY11 to FY19 using the actual obligations from the OUSD Comptroller’s ledger for those years. This comparison confirms the actual annual fully burdened cost of the RC has been even less than 30% of the AC and in fact ranges between 26.8% and 28.7%.

Figure 4-8: AC vs RC Actual Fully Burdened Annual Per Capita Cost
Leveraging this analysis enables a rudimentary example of the type of force mix decisions that can be considered and analyzed. Using the actual per capita costs from 2019 generated from the OUSD Comptroller’s Advanced Analytics platform (ADVANA), we were able to generate an example of the cost savings available through operational employment of the RC. Figure 4-9 shows an operational mission (representing the National Defense Strategy) requiring on ground presence of a 3000 personnel unit for each year of a six year mission duration. Each green block represents an AC or RC deployed fully burdened annual cost. Each yellow block represents an increased RC pre-mobilization train up year equal to twice the fully burdened RC Inactive part time per capita cost. Each white block represents a RC fully burdened inactive per capita cost. It demonstrates not only the ability to reduce cost but also the simultaneous ability to increase dwell time for both AC and RC while maintaining a larger Total Force.

**Figure 4-9: Fully Burdened Cost Force Mix**

The Current 1 force mix applies the current force structure and deploy to dwell planning factors of approximately 60% AC with a deploy to dwell ratio of 1/3 and 40% RC with a deploy to dwell ratio of 1/5. Using the ADVANA platform per capita cost for 2019, this 15,000 personnel force costs $32.43B.

The Proposed 1 force mix applies a force structure and deploy to dwell planning factors of approximately 40% AC with a deploy to dwell ratio of 1/3 and 60% RC with a deploy to dwell...
ratio of 1/5. Using the ADVANA platform per capita cost for 2019, this 15,000 personnel force costs $27.67B. For this example force structure mix, the same Total Force strength of 15,000 personnel in support of this rudimentary National Defense Strategy saves $4.75B.

The Proposed 2 force mix applies a force structure and deploy to dwell planning factors of approximately 34% AC with a deploy to dwell ratio of 1/4 and 66% RC with a deploy to dwell ratio of 1/6. Using the ADVANA platform per capita cost for 2019, this 18,000 personnel force costs $31.60B. For this example force structure mix, a larger Total Force strength of 18,000 personnel, saves $831 Million and allows an additional year of dwell time for both the Active and Reserve Components. This force mix structure results in greater public support for missions requiring deployments in support of the National Defense Strategy, greater family and employer support of our soldiers and a far better recruiting and retention environment, providing further savings in the constant training of the force.

This same type of cost analysis can be applied on a much larger scale either to the entire force or to each service in support of the National Defense Strategy each year, saving a significant amount of money. The RFPB continues to work with OUSD Comptroller and Reserve Integration to further develop the ADVANA platform into a tool that can be uniformly used by each service individually for annual AC and RC cost comparison analytics and further for life cycle estimating.

**Recommendation #3**

*Develop a model to calculate and compare Active and Reserve Component fully burdened life cycle costs. The Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) should develop a model to calculate and compare the “life cycle” costs of Active and Reserve Component personnel.*

On an annual basis, the cost of a Reserve Component service member is 28% to 32% compared to their Active Component counterpart, depending on what cost elements are included (Appendix B). This potential model should include the ability to selectively add the metrics of RDT&E and other, Procurement and Military Construction as well as select the basis of the budget estimate or actual expenditures for a given year or group of years. The model should further have the ability to calculate the full life cycle for an individual by service, occupation specialty and the ability to account for time spent in different components, such as a combination of Active Component and Reserve Component service. Finally, it should be linked to Comptroller databases for budgets as well as actuaries which would assist our budget estimates in the out years.
Use Existing Work to Leverage in Developing a DoD Life Cycle Cost Model

To assist DoD with the development of a life cycle model, the Board provides an example that already exists where life cycle costs are examined and modeled. The “Individual Cost Assessment Model” or ICAM (presently used by the U.S. Air Force) draws on historical actual amounts and uses a stochastic model to account for the variation in service statuses (AC/RC) as well as lifespan.

Only by comparing the life cycle cost of Active and Reserve Component forces can information be quantified for data driven decisions. Fortunately, there has been some commendable work already done on the subject of identifying, calculating and using the life cycle costs of Reserve Component forces. In developing the model recommended above, DoD should leverage this existing work and translate the concepts and ideas for DoD wide use.

Air Force Reserve ICAM

The Air Force Reserve Command developed a manpower life cycle cost model known as the Individual Cost Assessment Model (ICAM). It was designed with the intent of building an enduring analytical tool and the capability to support decisions.

Figure 4-10 is an ICAM one-year cost comparison of an Active Component O5 and E7 versus a traditional Reserve Component Air Force O5 and E7 conducting only the 39 training days associated with a normal non-deploying year. It was based on elements associated with the fully burdened costs for a single individual, including blended retirement (Appendix B). However, RDT&E and Other, Procurement and Military Construction costs are not included, which the RFPB continues to argue provides an incomplete basis for analysis.

Figure 4-10: ICAM Five Year – One Deployment
Figure 4-11 illustrates the comparison of both an AC and RC Air Force O-5 and E-7 for a 20-year career and life span of 78 years. The amounts were calculated using the Air Force Individual Cost Assessment Model (ICAM) in combination with RFPB report metrics of RDT&E and Other, Procurement and Military Construction. These metrics are not included in the ICAM model. A 2.1% inflation factor was applied to these metrics in accordance with CAPE’s guidance for estimating future year costs.

The fully burdened and life cycle cost differential of a RC service member is 33% to 42% of the life cycle cost of an AC service member depending on number of deployments the RC service member conducted during the service member’s career. In this calculation, the same allocation of costs is given for AC and RC service members as was done in the 2013 report to maintain consistency of methodology. The RDT&E and Other line item represent nearly $1M in the fully burdened and life cycle cost for an RC service member. If the allocation of these costs were distributed to RC at 21.3% of AC costs, similar to the distribution of O&M costs for the same year, the Fully Burdened and Life Cycle Cost analysis would result in a significantly reduced RC service member life cycle cost of 22% to 34% of an AC service member depending on the number of deployments.

From January 29, 2012 to May 24, 2012 the Board’s project team convened 16 meetings with costing experts from across the Department in order to examine and compare current AC/RC costing practices across Services and Components. This “bottom-up” assessment of the current use of cost elements within the Department revealed the need for a new DoD policy and culminated in the Board’s Interim report delivered in June 2012. In subsequent months, the research team pursued a “top-down” quantitative analysis of the FY13 federal budget request as detailed in DoD’s “Green Book” and related budget materials. In total, the RFPB project team held more than 100 meetings for substantive discussion and examination of the data. The meetings provided quantitative validation of the relative importance and fully burdened value of the various cost elements and revealed the following findings:

- The cost of an RC service member, when not activated, is less than one-third that of their AC counterpart. According to RFPB analysis of the FY13 budget request, the RC per capita cost ranges from 22% to 32% of their AC counterparts’ per capita costs, depending on which cost elements are included.
• While Reserve Component forces account for 38% of military end strength, they consume only about 16% of the Defense budget.

• Reserve component members receive a smaller retirement than their Active Component counterparts do. The RC accounts for approximately 17% of DoD retiree payout. The FY13 average Retired Pay Accrual is $12,834 per AC service member, but only $3,419 per RC service member.

• Reserve component members incur lower health care costs. For FY13, DoD requested $32.5B for the Defense Health Program (plus nearly $8B in military medical personnel funds and nearly $7B in Medicare-eligible Retiree Health Care accrual funds) to serve more than 9.5M beneficiaries did. Only about 21% of those beneficiaries are from the Reserve Components and as a whole, the RC member uses the system less than AC members.

• RC members typically serve in their hometown and seldom incur military moving costs for “Permanent Change of Station,” for which DoD requested $3,260 per AC service member in FY13.

• With few exceptions, Reserve families do not send dependent children to DoD schools and only reservists serving on active duty are counted for Impact Aid calculations. For FY13, the DoD Education Activity requested $2.7B and the Department of Education’s “Impact Aid” program requested $505M. The project team estimates that reservists account for approximately 1% of the DoD’s and approximately 2% of the Department of Education’s funds to educate military dependents.

• Generally, reservists are ineligible to use the military family housing system, which required $1.3B to build and operate in FY13. Only reservists on active duty orders qualify for on-base housing and few use it.

• Reservists do not drive the need for military commissaries, which in FY13 cost $1.37B over and above revenue income in order to operate. Only 3% of commissary users are from the RC.

• Since the RC does not require as much infrastructure as the AC, it incurs a far lower cost for base operations support, such as maintenance, security and utilities costs associated with the housing, childcare and recreation facilities found on major bases. This is true whether the reservist is mobilized or in a drill status. Of the roughly $36B in DoD Base Operations Support costs, about 12% is appropriated for RC.
Reservists account for a relatively small portion of the contributions made by the U.S. Treasury over and above the DoD budget for defense-related costs.

The U.S. Treasury's direct contribution for “Concurrent Receipt” of both military retired pay and Veterans disability compensation was estimated at $6.95B for FY13, but only 9% is attributable to RC recipients.

The U.S. Treasury direct contribution for Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF) over and above the DoD contribution was estimated at $6.44B in FY13, but only 29% of the liability for that cost is attributable to the Reserve Components.

The U.S. Treasury direct contribution to the Military Retirement Fund over and above the DoD contribution was estimated at $67.18B in FY13, but only 17% of the payout from that fund is made to RC retirees.

During periods of economic uncertainty and declining and flat budgets, the RC provides incredible value for a reduced investment when compared to the AC. Using the RC as operational reserve will allow the Nation to meet Defense requirements at a reduced cost and provides the additional benefit of ensuring gains in RC readiness and capability are retained. Performance at home and abroad has proven the RCs value as an integral component of the Total Force and our Nation’s National Security. Formalizing the policy surrounding the operational reserve will preserve this vital asset.

111 National Defense Budget Estimates for FY15 (Green Book)
4.3: MYTHS CONCERNING RESERVE COMPONENT ACCESSIBILITY

While there are many specific authorities which govern RC employment, they create the false impression of an overly complex process of policy and statute-mandated advance notice requirements. This preconception of accessing the RC is often lamented by Active Component leaders as a barrier to their effective employment and a general argument against RC employment. It is critical that senior DoD civilian and military leaders have a basic comprehension of authorities and policy relating to mobilization of RC personnel and organizations. DoDI 1235.12, dated June 7, 2016, ensures the RC provides an operational capability and strategic depth in support of the national defense strategy by addressing authorities, procedures and timelines for accessing the RC.

Primary Involuntary Mobilization Authorities

Since 2001, Title 10 U.S. Code 12302, Partial Mobilization of the Reserve Component, has been used extensively for involuntary RC employment. This authority allows for the involuntary mobilization of up to one million members of the Ready Reserve at any one time, for a period not to exceed twenty-four months and requires a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency (DNE) in accordance with Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 USC 1622(d). President Bush signed the DNE on September 14, 2001 and every President has extended it on an annual basis. A letter from OSD in 2016 tasked the Services with devising plans for a transition of authorities to 12304b, anticipating that additional extension of the DNE would not be signed beyond FY17; the DNE has subsequently been extended annually to September 13, 2020.

Title 10 U.S. Code 12304b provides authority to Service Secretaries to involuntary order to active duty selected reserve members to augment forces for pre-planned and pre-budgeted missions in support of Combatant Commands. This statute limits the duration to no more than 365 consecutive days for a maximum of 60,000 reservists at any given time. As of July 5, 2016, according to the Defense Manpower Data Center, 25,107 RC members were serving in an involuntary activation status, so current requirements could potentially be met under the 12304b maximum if pre-planned and budgeted for by Services. While RC activation under 12304b allows flexibility by not requiring a DNE, it does mandate operations be pre-planned and pre-budgeted, thus driving services to commit to RC activations two years in advance due to budget cycle input requirements. The 365 consecutive day limit also will likely drive changes to some of the services’ deployment schedules, as the limit applies to pre-mobilization time, mobilization, post-mobilization time and leave accrued while mobilized.

112 Title 10 United States Code Armed Forces, Volume III Subtitle E Reserve Components, as amended 7 January 2011, Sections 12302, 2286.
113 Title 10 USC Section 12304b
Mobilization Authorities

Figure 4.13: A Wide Variety of Authorities Available to Use RC

Advanced Notification Requirements

Much of the perceived difficulty in accessing the RC is rooted in notification requirements. To improve AC/RC integration, predictability is a key factor in efficient use of the RC and predictability requires sufficient advance notice for the social contract between member, family and the member’s employer. DoD policy directs “Military Services will issue orders to RC members ordered to active duty in the most expeditious manner possible to facilitate members’ notification to employer and family and other planning considerations.” Furthermore, both policy and statute dictate specific minimum notice for RC activations, demobilizations and extensions, with provisions for emergent requirements.

114 Title 10 U.S. Code
The DoD standard for approval of an involuntary activation order is 180 days for Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), rotational and pre-planned requirements and 120 days for standard emergent requirements and while service secretaries may approve activations in advance of 120 days, anything less than 120 days prior to the activation date requires Secretary of Defense approval. For time-critical emergencies and some short-term (less than 30 day) activations, Service Secretaries retain approval authority until 30 days prior to activation, at which time approval authority reverts to Secretary of Defense. If the operational situation requires immediate activation of RC forces, the Secretary of Defense may approve activation as soon as the orders are issued, although congressional notification may be required.

In addition to predictability, stability is also critical in effective management of RC forces. DoDI 1235.12 states, “The period of activation will remain constant once approved and issued. This permits the RC member, their family and their employer to plan accordingly for their departure and return.” While conditions may arise requiring the extension of activation, combatant commanders may not unilaterally extend RC members. Service secretaries may authorize an extension if the extension is for less than 30 days and the approval occurs 30 or more days prior to the originally scheduled end date. If either of these conditions cannot be met, approval authority resides only with the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, authority to modify the activation start date can only be accomplished by a Service Secretary 45 days or more prior to the activation and for changes of 30 days or less. If either of these limits is exceeded, approval is limited to the Secretary of Defense.

**Mobilization-To-Dwell Ratio**

In addition to notification requirements, mobilization-to-dwell ratio requirements are another frequent source of RC accessibility-related confusion. The mobilization period starts on the date of involuntary activation and ends on the date of demobilization. The ratio of this period compared to the period between activations is the mobilization-to-dwell (mob-to-dwell) ratio. Generally, Secretary of Defense approval is required for individuals or units with a mob-to-dwell ratio of less than 1:4. Service secretaries may approve activations for units and individuals who agree to waive a lower than 1:4 dwell ratio.

Though real potential for confusion exists in the process of accessing the RC, advanced planning will allow for the predictability, stability and good communication required for effective RC employment and mechanisms do exist to provide the flexibility needed to operate in today’s often dynamic conditions. While additional requirements and prior notification may seem at times inconvenient to AC planners, it is important to note that these apply to partial, involuntary mobilization authorities and that emergent or critical requirements, such as the Partial Mobilization Authorized for COVID-19 by the President on March 27, 2020 would be met through specific authorities designed for those purposes. Voluntary mobilizations under separate authorities can also fill these requirements, often with fewer restrictions than detailed above.

115 DoDI 1235.12, June 7, 2016, Accessing the Reserve Component, Section 13(a).
4.4: RESERVE COMPONENT PERFORMANCE IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

An exhaustive study conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) to assess RC performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and confirmed in a follow-on study for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) found no discernible difference between the AC and RC (Figure 4-14). The finding is even more impressive when considering the cost for a reserve unit is less than one-third that of an active unit. The study resulted from an RFPB meeting held on June 9, 2015, when Secretary of Defense Ash Carter requested the Board conduct an assessment to help him understand the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan relative to the Reserve Component.

The RFPB contracted with IDA to complete a study to assess the performance and operational effectiveness of RC forces during OIF from 2003 – 2011, and from 2001-2014 for OEF. IDA assembled a team of experts and set about completing the work in two phases, consisting of the following:

Phase 1: Investigation of Performance Data, Proof of Concept and Plan Development

- Obtain sufficient data associated with OIF and OEF operations that can be used to objectively analyze operational effectiveness.
  - Solicit input from the Services, Reserve Components, Joint Staff, OSD offices, specific combatant commands, Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.
  - Identify which data are most viable for quantitative assessment and where qualitative assessments might be justifiable.
  - Conduct a quantitative proof of concept via comparative analysis of the operational significant activities (SIGACTs) database.
  - Develop a plan for the performance assessment of RC forces employed in OIF and OEF.
  - Present both the proof of concept and plan for performance assessment to the sponsor in the form of a briefing.

Phase 2: Performance Assessment

- Review and assess the deployment and performance of RC forces during three phases of major military operations in OIF.
  - The initial deployment of RC forces to OIF.
  - The ‘OIF Surge’ of forces in 2007.
  - The troop reduction, transition to Operation New Dawn and withdrawal of U.S. forces.
• Review and assess the operational performance of Reserve Component forces in OEF from 2001 to 2014 along three primary lines of research.

• Analysis of mission report (MISREP) data from the combined air operations center (CAOC).

• Analysis of Army and Marine Corps significant activity reports (SIGACTs)

• Interrogation of interviews (archived interviews and those conducted by IDA) of participants in the campaign and leaders responsible for the various processes required to conduct and sustain OEF.

• Conduct comparative analyses when possible.

Figure 4.14: OIF Personnel Strength\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{OIF Personnel Strength.pdf}
\caption{OIF Military Personnel Strength (Expressed as a Percent) in OIF Countries Across All Services}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{116} Data collected and provided by Institute for Defense Analysis 2016
documents and synthesizing numerous sources of data to include manpower data, safety and casualty data, archived interview transcripts, histories, testimonies, surveys, after action reports, aviation strike data, mobility databases, significant activities (SIGACTs) reports from operations and other studies by research organizations. IDA also conducted about one hundred focused interviews with senior leaders involved in the critical activities and decision making associated with OIF. These leaders represented the DoD, the Joint Staff, the Combatant and warfighting commands and the Services. Research participants included Service Chiefs, Reserve Component Chiefs, Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau, the last two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders and warfighting commanders from the battalion or squadron level to the four star flag officer level.

The following observations highlight key takeaways from the OIF Study:

• Strategic leaders were overall pleased with RC contributions and performance in OIF.
  • Met their intent and when asked; RC forces and individuals stepped up and served.
  • The Nation could not have conducted the long campaigns and preserved the all-volunteer force.

• The decision to disaggregate the Time-Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD) from the execution of the OIF war plan had major impacts on how the Services utilized the RCs.
  • The doctrine of the DoD and all of the supporting decision making and synchronizing mechanisms and systems relied on the TPFDD; ad hoc processes had to suddenly be created, but could not be synchronized.
  • Less ready units were forced to be moved ahead of others for deployment, alert to mobilization times were extremely short and units arrived in theater without supporting organizations or without their equipment.

• Relationships between the AC and RC mattered.
  • There was purposeful employment of RC individuals and organizations in OIF based upon relationships with the AC of all Services.
  • These relationships, over time, helped build a foundation of trust.

• Readiness levels mattered (individual and collective).
  • Limited exposure to the equipment and systems of AC counterparts created a cycle of frustration and expectation mismatch between the AC and RC.
  • Operational communities and organizational staffs that had periodic operational/deployment, warfighter and training center experience with their AC counterparts and with joint entities, seemed to integrate easier.
  • Many institutions were not prepared for large-scale mobilizations at the onset.
  • Over time, increased resourcing levels and investments, equipment purchases and institutional experience, mitigated some of these impacts.
• From transcripts and interviews, in functions and missions where RC organizations and individuals brought to bear their vast, professional and sometime unique experiences, minimal performance friction with the AC seemed to exist.

• The greatest friction appeared in ground combat discussions at division level and below between AC Army and ARNG Infantry Brigades and between AC Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve Infantry Battalions.

• Performance data was not readily captured and made available for analyses; there was no single plan, systematic process or system to capture such data.

• Joint Doctrine states that operational assessments will take place with an emphasis on transparency and credibility.

• Aggregated tactical level data (SIGACTs, casualties, mishaps, strike) depict a shared burden, a shared risk and no sizeable differences in measurable metrics.

The following observations highlight key takeaways from the OEF Study:

• Analysis of aggregated tactical level data depicted no sizeable differences between AC and RC forces in measurable metrics.

• Leaders were generally pleased with RC contributions and performance in support of OEF.

• DoD was not well prepared for large-scale mobilizations.

• The operational environment and pre-deployment training was a concern for the AC and the RC; equipment shortages were a concern for the RC. Relationships between the AC and the RC mattered.

• Operational performance data was not systematically collected and archived DoD-wide.

The key takeaway IDA found after their exhaustive review was that there was no measurable difference between the AC and RC units when the RC units had adequate pre-deployment training. This finding, combined with the fact that RC units’ cost approximately one-third of the cost of an AC unit when not mobilized, highlight the incredible value the RC contributes to the Total Force (Figure 4-14). Senior leaders, both military and civilian, need to understand the significant capabilities that the RC can provide in support of the Nation’s Defense requirements and to ensure that improvements in RC readiness and experience are retained by continued employment as an operational reserve. Access to the same equipment, the same resources and the same benefits for the same missions is essential to maintaining this alignment. While the active force are forward deployed overseas and the National Guard and Reserve are mobilized in support, the National Guard and Reserve are forward deployed in the
U.S. homeland and should be the lead force in response as recommended by the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve. The CNGR recommendation that homeland defense be an equal priority has for all practical purposes been adopted.

4.5: ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

The Reserve Component is part of the synchronized Federal emergency response system providing assistance in order to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate property damage. The National Strategy for Homeland Security October 2007 calls for shared state and federal accountability for the security of the homeland. Federal Reserve units and service members can provide limited conditional support, while the National Guard, as an organization with shared state and federal mission objectives, is a routinely utilized fusion agent that synchronizes state, federal, homeland defense and security efforts.

At the national level, the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security still draw distinct lines between “defense” and “security” activities, with neither wanting to encroach upon the mission of the other (Figure 4-15).

At the state level, the National Guard straddles the operational, mission and fiscal lanes of these federal agencies and has mission responsibilities under both overarching national strategies. In more than half of the states and territories, the State Military Department is also responsible for the emergency management functions and for administering Department of Homeland Security grants in addition to Department of Defense funding.

When a major disaster or emergency occurs in an area subject to the laws of any State, Territory or District of Columbia, the Governor of the State affected normally should be the principal civil authority supported by the primary Federal agency and its supporting Federal entities. The Adjutant General of the State or his or her subordinate designee normally should be the principal military authority. As the Governor’s designated homeland security advisor in many states, the Adjutant General also deals routinely with the Secretary of Homeland Security in addition to civilian and uniformed officials of the Department of Defense. As a state agency, the Military Department can place National Guard members on state active duty (to the extent permitted by state law) and assign them duties that qualify for reimbursement under Department of Homeland Security Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) grants.
The legal framework that governs federal and state roles and responsibilities dictates which component can respond and in what capacity.

**Stafford Act (42 USC § 5121).** The Stafford Act was designed to bring an orderly and systemic means of federal natural disaster assistance for state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to aid citizens. Congress’ intention was to encourage states and localities to develop comprehensive disaster preparedness plans, prepare for better intergovernmental coordination in the face of a disaster, encourage the use of insurance coverage and provide Federal assistance programs for losses due to a disaster.

**Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (18 USC § 1385) Section 1385 of Title 18, United States Code (USC).** The PCA states: “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”

The PCA does not apply to the U.S. Coast Guard in peacetime or to the National Guard in Title 32 or State Active Duty status. The substantive prohibitions of the PCA were extended to all the services with the enactment of Title 10 USC, Section 375. As required by Title 10 USC, Section 375 the Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defense Directive 5525.5, which precludes members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps from direct participation in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.

The PCA generally prohibits U.S. military personnel from direct participation in law enforcement activities. Some of those law enforcement activities would include interdicting vehicles, vessels and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military’s role in domestic affairs.

The United States Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws of the U.S. The most common example is counterdrug assistance (Title 10 USC, Sections 371-381). Military support to civilian law enforcement is carried out in strict compliance with the Constitution and U.S. laws and under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense.

**Other relevant statutes and policies include:**

**The Insurrection Act (Title 10 USC, Sections 331-335).** This act allows the President to use U.S. military personnel at the request of a state legislature or governor to suppress insurrections. It also allows the President to use federal troops to enforce federal laws when rebellion against the authority of the U.S. makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the U.S.

**Assistance in the case of crimes involving nuclear materials (Title 18 USC, Section 831).** This statute permits DoD personnel to assist the Justice Department in enforcing prohibitions regarding nuclear materials, when the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an “emergency situation” exists posing a serious threat to U.S. interests and is beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies.
Emergencies involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (Title 10 USC, Section 382). When the attorney general and the secretary of defense jointly determine that an “emergency situation” exists that poses a serious threat to U.S. interests and is beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies, DoD personnel may assist the Justice Department in enforcing prohibitions regarding biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members; order to active duty other than during war or national emergency (10 USC Section 12304). While a federal response using RC Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines must comply with the legal framework listed above, members of the RC possess significant capabilities vital for supporting lead agencies during responses to domestic emergencies and disaster relief efforts. 10 USC Section 12304a, amended by the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act provides new authority for the Active and Reserve Components (Title 10) to assist citizens and communities in the United States during domestic emergencies to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage.

Title 10 USC Section 12304a authorizes Reservists to provide disaster assistance to a major natural disaster or emergency in the United States at the request of the governor of a state. Title 10 USC Section 12304b authorizes Federal Reserve units to respond to certain emergencies and humanitarian assistance in other nations. This includes the authority to order up to 200,000 members to active duty for a continuous period of up to 365 days to provide assistance to either the federal government or an individual state in time of a serious man-made disaster, accident or natural catastrophe.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DoD Directive 3025.18). Immediate Response is conducted by Reserve units and members under the Immediate Response Authority (IRA) outlined in this directive, which authorizes commanders, upon the request of local officials, to take action to save lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great property damage in a situation of urgency when there is insufficient time to get approval from higher headquarters.

Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) is a U.S. military reserve training opportunity that provides real world training opportunities for service members and units to prepare them for their wartime mission while supporting the needs of America’s underserved communities. Military Reserve Components provide medical care, dentistry, optometry, civil engineering, construction and public works projects to these communities at no additional cost.

**National Guard Specific Capabilities:**

**Dual Status Commander (DSC).** A DSC is an officer of the Army (ARNG) or Air National Guard (ANG) or a commissioned officer of the Regular Army or Regular Air Force (who has completed specialized training and certification and are jointly managed by the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and the Chief, National Guard Bureau) who may, by law, serve in two statuses (Federal and State) simultaneously. In state status, the DSC
is a member of the state chain of command, subject to the orders of the Governor and Adjutant General of the DSC’s State (exercises command of assigned State NG forces). In federal status, the DSC is a member of the federal chain of command, subject to the orders of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the supported Combatant Commander (Commander, U.S. Northern Command when in the 48 contiguous States, Alaska, D.C. and the territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands) or (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command when in Hawaii and the territory of Guam) and exercises command of assigned Federal military forces. The President and the governor of the state must both agree to the establishment of a DSC. Title 32, United States Code, Section 325 authorizes a National Guard officer to be placed on Active Component without losing their Guard component status. An active duty (T10) Army or Air Force officer is authorized to accept a commission in the NG of a state without losing his/her Active Component status (32 U.S. C. section 315).

In the event of a multi-state disaster or national event requiring a DSC, separate DSCs would be appointed to command in each of the affected states due to state law prohibitions (where appropriate/where required). Consistent with current laws and procedures, the governor of a state does not use the DSC to request DoD forces or equipment.

**Counterdrug Operations (Section 112, Title 32, United States Code (32 USC 112) (D)).**

The National Guard, as a component of the Department of Defense, is authorized to conduct counterdrug operations. The counterdrug mission supports the detection, interdiction, disruption and curtailment of drug trafficking activities through the use and application of the military’s unique skills and resources. This provides a bridge between civilian law enforcement and the military by bringing core DoD capabilities and resources to bear against drug related threats while leveraging the Guard’s unique legal ability to operate on U.S. soil and abroad.

**Emergency Management Assistant Compact (EMAC).** EMAC is a national mutual aid partnership agreement that allows state-to-state assistance during governor or federally declared emergencies. To date, all 50 states, 3 territories and the District of Columbia have authorized EMAC agreements. The EMAC concept was approved in Congress in 1996 (Public Law 104-321) and provides governors a means to quickly request assistance for any type of emergency, from earthquakes to acts of terrorism. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlighted the largest deployment of state-to-state aid in history and included the deployment of 46,488 National Guard members.

**Innovative Response Training (IRT).** The IRT mission provides real-world training opportunities for service members and units to prepare them for their wartime missions while supporting the needs of America’s underserved communities. The NG and along with their reserve counterparts, leverages innovative response training missions.

**Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS).** The Air National Guard’s EMEDS is a modular, scalable, rapid response medical package that can be used in humanitarian relief, wartime contingencies and disaster response operations. The package contains
three unique and distinct building blocks: EMEDS Health Response Team (HRT), EMEDS+10 and EMEDS+25 personnel and specialized equipment components. The Air National Guard Medical Service (ANGMS) began transitioning to EMEDS in 2002. Currently the ANGMS has three EMEDS HRTs and three EMEDS +25 personnel packages. To complement the personnel packages, ANGMS has acquired EMEDS equipment sets. Air National Guard rapid response EMEDS packages have deployed in support of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma and the tornado in Greensburg, KS. The ANGMS has dispersed EMEDS personnel capabilities throughout the Continental United States (CONUS) plus Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Alaska.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) and High-Yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP). CBRN and CERFP provide immediate CBRN incident response capabilities to the governor such as incident site research of collapsed building and structures, conducting rescue tasks to extract trapped casualties, providing mass decontamination, performing medical triage and initial treatment to stabilize patients for transport to medical facilities. There is at least one National Guard CERFP in each of the ten FEMA regions and 17 validated CERFP’s.

Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). WMD-CSTs are National Guard units designed to provide a specialized capability to respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents primarily in a Title 32 operational status within the United States, the District of Columbia, its territories and possessions, as established by 10 USC §12310. Congress, the President and DoD recognized that the WMD-CSTs, responding under the authority of the Governor, provide significant capabilities to assist local and state agencies that may be overwhelmed by a large-scale terrorist attack or where specific technical capabilities to identify CBRN materials are required. The mission of the WMD-CST is to support civil authorities at the direction of the Governor at domestic CBRN incident sites by identifying CBRN agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures and assisting with requests for additional support. The WMD-CST is comprised of 22 full time Title 32, AGR Army and Air National Guard personnel divided into six sections: command, operations, communications, administration/logistics, medical/analytical and survey. Each unit is staffed by 14 Army Military Occupational Skills and/or 57 Air Force Specialty Codes. The WMD-CST is required to maintain a level of readiness that will allow for a rapid response with Teams on alert and on standby 24/7/365. Teams are deployable within 90 minutes (advance team); main body deployable within three hours. The unit is specially trained and equipped to assist local, tribal, state and Federal emergency response organizations with state of the art equipment. They also have a technical and analytical reach back capability to other experts who may assist the local response. There are 55 WMD-CSTs spread out among the States and territories.

Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS). The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve C-130s equipped with Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS) provide...
the U.S. Forest Service additional aerial fire-fighting assets to assist after the capabilities of commercial and contract air tankers have been exhausted. Congress established the MAFFS to assist in the wildfire suppression program lessoning the risk to firefighters and civilians while protecting critical infrastructure and personal property. MAFFS aircrews receive specialized certification by the U.S. Forest Service and annual refresher certification and can respond within 24-28 hours. Air National Guard MAFFS crews have fought wildfires in the United States, Europe, Africa and Indonesia.

Critical Infrastructure Protection – Mission Assurance Assessment (CIP-MAA) and DHS Vulnerability Assessment Teams (VATs). The National Guard Bureau currently fields and provides program management oversight for three Critical Infrastructure Protection – Mission Assurance Assessment (CIP-MAA) teams. Each CIP-MAA team conducts all-hazard risk assessments on critical Defense Industrial Based (DIB) assets for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD). Conducting risk assessments on critical DIB assets is a key component to OASD’s overall responsibility set forth in Department of Defense Directive 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure. In addition to the CIP-MAA teams, the National Guard also fields nineteen DHS Vulnerability Assessment Teams (VATs) that assess prioritized critical infrastructure and key resource assets. Teams are situated in thirteen states and provide coverage for all ten FEMA regions.

Cyber Defense Team. The Department of Defense depends on cyberspace to execute its national security mission; provide a timely response to crisis or contingency operations; project power abroad and ensure the safety of our troops. Governors have the authority to command National Guard cyber forces just like other National Guard capabilities when in a state status. The Army National Guard is establishing a Cyber Brigade with 5 Cyber Battalions, 10 Cyber Protection Teams (CPT) (one in each FEMA region), 5 Cyber Support Companies and 5 Cyber Warfare Companies under State authority (Title 32) between FY16 – FY22. The Air National Guard currently has 12 Cyberspace Operations Squadrons; seven Network Warfare Squadrons, two Information Operations Squadrons, one Information Aggressor Squadrons and a small number of other more limited cyber capable units. Cyber Shield is an unclassified National Guard hosted exercise focusing on the defense of Guard Net and state-directed coordination actions.

State Partnership Program (SPP). The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), codified in Title 10 USC Section 341, builds international relationships that enhance global security, understanding and cooperation. The SPP is a Department of Defense program managed by the National Guard Bureau but executed by the individual states. The SPP links a state’s National Guard with a partner Nation’s military/security forces in a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship that supports Combatant Command and Embassy security cooperation objectives. Built on enduring relationships that enhance influence and promote access, the SPP is currently comprised of 78 unique partnerships with 84 nations. The Start Partnership Program further enhances DoD’s ability to strengthen alliances and attract new partners, as desired in the National Defense Strategy.

These National Guard missions and responsibilities add immeasurably to the state’s overall domestic security preparedness. They also make the adjutant general a crucial
“go to” official in time of crisis. The Governor expects the adjutant general to exercise control over all military forces operating within his or her state. This expectation is satisfied when National Guard forces employed within the state are in State Active Duty or Title 32 status. Title 32 allows the Governor, with the approval of the President or the Secretary of Defense, to order a member to duty for operational Homeland Defense activities in accordance with the provisions of Title 32. The expectations and requirements are also met when National Guard forces from supporting states are operating within a supported state. Title 10 means full-time duty in the active military service of the U.S. and allows the President to “federalize” the National Guard forces by ordering them to active duty in their Reserve Component status or by calling them into Federal service in their militia status in accordance with provisions of Title 10. Thus, Guardsman can serve on active duty in either Title 32 or Title 10, depending upon requirements, which are discussed further in this paper.

**National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF).** Critical to the first line of defense in counter-terrorism, the National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) is a specially trained force comprised of Soldiers and Airman from existing National Guard units that provide each state, territory and the District of Columbia with a rapid response capability focused on incidents requiring law enforcement and security support. The NGRF is designed to respond to an incident ahead of federal assets and capable of delivering an initial force of 75-125 personnel within eight hours and a follow-on force of up to 375 personnel within 24 hours. The NGRFs are organized as temporary task forces and perform their mission primarily under the command and control of their home state, territory, or the District of Columbia.

The Army and Air National Guard are often the face of the military in the case of domestic disasters. Living and working in every community, they connect the U.S. military to the American people. The National Guard forces were called upon 286 times and logged more than 547,100 man-days responding to emergencies, performing steady state operations, or supporting National Special Security Events (NSSEs) in the homeland in FY15. The National Guard elements responded to 80 natural disaster, wildfire and severe weather homeland events in FY15. On any given day, up to 4,000 National Guardsmen are on duty providing support to civil authorities. These Soldiers and Airman live and serve in nearly every zip code in the U.S. In a domestic emergency response, the equation is simple: less time and distance equals, more lives saved.

**Homeland Response Force (HRF).** Homeland Response Forces bridges coordination between NG response and Federal capabilities. When directed by proper authority and upon consent of the governor(s), the HRF alerts and assembles; on order, deploys and conducts command and control; and works along with first responders in casualty assistance, search and rescue, decontamination, medical triage and stabilization and recovery efforts to save lives and mitigate human suffering. There are a total of 10 HRF’s, aligned to each of the FEMA regions, that can respond to regional and national events. Each HRF is comprised of around 583 NG personnel. The core of each HRF is Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) response capability
similar to that found in the existing 17 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFPs), HRFs have substantial command and control and security capability. The HRFs operate alongside other NG-sourced CBRNE Consequence Management forces like Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) and CERFPs, as well as federal-controlled elements of the enterprise, including Defense CBRN Response Force Command and Control CBRNE Response Elements and follow-on forces, when necessary. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) remains the mechanism for interstate employment – under state control.

National Guard support for Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO) in 2020 renewed the need to review rules for the use of force (RUF). National Guard forces, when in Title 32 or State Active Duty (SAD), follow state RUF when engaged in civil disturbance and law enforcement operations. Each state develops its own RUF based on state law and the laws of the state in which they are serving govern National Guard forces.117 As of July 1, 2020, 824 National Guard members were mobilized in support of CDO.118

For U.S. Armed Forces operating under Title 10, civil disturbance operations are conducted in accordance with Enclosures L and N to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (SRUF). Guidance on how and when forces can use force in a CDO mission is classified, however Annex L is not, and can be shared with our mission partners.

The following should be considered when drafting state RUF for NG law enforcement, law enforcement support, security missions, or civil disturbance operations conducted in SAD or Title 32:

- States that provide NG personnel in SAD or Title 32 to another state normally adopt the RUF of the supported state while deployed to the supported state. Before deployment, the states involved will determine which RUF the supporting units and personnel will follow
- The right of self-defense
- The use of force must be restricted to the minimum degree consistent with mission requirements. The use of deadly force can be justified only by extreme necessity
- The proper level of force
- Force options such as the use of Personnel Protective Equipment and non-lethal weapons
- Arming orders
- Actions on apprehension and detention
- The force continuum

118 NBG JOC 20200701 OPSUM
• Pre-commitment briefing topics and training. This list is advisory, not directive or regulatory by National Guard Regulation

• Failure to provide RUF or train National Guard members in the RUF may result in civil or criminal personal liability for commanders at all echelons resulting from subordinates’ unlawful acts, negligence or failure to comply with statutory guidance. Failure to comply with the RUF may result in criminal prosecution.

Each state’s Domestic Operations Plan should have a RUF annex or incorporate the steady state RUF for use during emergencies. Additionally, Staff Judge Advocates and state civilian attorneys should be consulted when developing RUF applicable to specific National Guard domestic operations missions. Each specific steady state mission, (e.g., counter drug, CST, etc.) has specific RUF.

The National Guard also supports FEMA’s Emergency Support Functions, FEMA’s All Hazards Emergency Operations Plan and the National Guard Bureau’s All Hazards Support Plan. One of DoD’s challenges during DSCA events is anticipating which resources will be available or overwhelmed at the local, state and Federal level. This was the situation during both COVID-19 pandemic and Civil Disturbance responses of 2020. Secondarily, DoD must balance providing the required capabilities while maintaining unit readiness. The National Guard is structured to deploy as a unit and not designed to deploy individually for DSCA support. In certain instances, the deployment or absence of one member can affect the readiness of an entire unit. It is paramount the Department re-think its approach to National Security with a renewed focus on internal as well as external threats.

Flat and declining budgets affect planning and training required to maintain proficiency, discipline and unity of effort for DSCA events. Traditional readiness reporting for the designed operational capability of a unit may not accurately reflect a degradation in DSCA response capabilities.
5.0: THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

This chapter provides an overview of the Reserve Components and summarizes each of them individually. The term “Reserve Component” refers collectively to the seven individual Reserve Components of the Armed Forces: Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.”
5.1 RESERVE COMPONENT 101

“The concept of citizen soldiers dates back to the Greek City States and has evolved through the centuries. The oldest component is the National Guard, which dates back to 1636. The purpose of the seven Reserve Components, as codified in 10 USC 10102, is to “provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.” The Army and Air National Guard also have a state role: operating under the control of their governor, they respond to various domestic emergencies, such as disasters and civil disorders.

The Reserve Component is comprised of the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve. All members of the Reserve Component are assigned to one of the three Reserve Component categories based on service responsibilities and commitment status.

The Ready Reserve comprises military members of the Reserve and National Guard, organized in units or as individuals, liable for recall to active duty to augment the Active Components in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve consists of three Reserve Component subcategories: Selected Reserve (SELRES), Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING)

- The Selected Reserve consists of those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. Members of the Selected Reserve are generally required to perform one weekend a month (inactive duty for training (IDT) or drill weekend) and two weeks of training each year (annual training (AT)), for which they receive pay and benefits. Members of the Selected Reserve can be involuntarily ordered to active duty under each of the main activation authorities. The Selected Reserve consists of additional sub-subcategories:
  - Drilling Reservists/Traditional Reservists (TR) - Unit Program/Traditional Guardsmen (TG) - Unit Program/Troop Program Units (TPUs) are trained unit members who participate in unit training activities on a part-time basis.
  - Training Pipeline (non-deployable account) personnel are enlisted members of the Selected Reserve who have not yet completed initial active duty for training (IADT) and officers who are in training for professional categories or in undergraduate flight training.
  - Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) are trained individuals assigned to an Active Component, Selective Service System or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) organization’s billet which must be filled on or shortly after mobilization. IMAs participate in training activities on a part-time basis with an Active Component, Selective Service or FEMA unit in preparation for recall in event of a mobilization.
**Improving the Total Force**

- Active Guard Reserve (AGR) and Full Time Support (FTS) are National Guard or Reserve members of the Selected Reserve who are ordered to active duty or full-time National Guard duty. As authorized in Title 10, Title 5 and Title 32 USC, full-time support personnel are “assigned to organize; administer; instruct; recruit and train; maintain supplies, equipment and aircraft; and perform other functions required on a daily basis in the execution of operational missions and readiness preparations.” Active Guard and Reserve are members of a Reserve Component placed on active duty or full-time National Guard duty for a period of 180 days or more for the purpose of “organizing, administering, recruiting, instruction or training the Reserve Components.”

- Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel provide a manpower pool composed principally of individuals having had training, having previously served in an active duty component or in the Selected Reserve, or having some period of their military service obligation (MSO) remaining. IRR personnel are not obligated to drill, conduct annual training or participate in any military activities (except for periodic muster activities). Members of the IRR can volunteer for training or active duty and may be involuntarily ordered to active duty under a full mobilization, partial mobilization, or a disaster response activation.

- Inactive National Guard (ING) are National Guard personnel in an inactive status in the Ready Reserve, not in the Selected Reserve, attached to a specific National Guard unit, who are required to muster once a year with their assigned unit but do not participate in training activities. Members may be involuntarily ordered to active duty with their unit if the unit they are attached to is activated under a full mobilization or partial mobilization. They are not subject to activation under a Presidential Reserve Call-up.

The **Standby Reserve** consists of personnel who maintain their affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve, who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship or disability. They are not required to perform training and are not part of a unit but create a pool of trained individuals who could be mobilized if necessary as a last resort to fill manpower needs in specific skill areas. Members may be involuntarily ordered to active duty only with a full mobilization. Membership in the Standby Reserve is limited to one year, after which the member must transfer to the IRR or a Selected Reserve drilling unit. The Standby Reserve consists of two subcategories:

- **Active Status List** are those Standby Reservists temporarily assigned for hardship or other cogent reason; those not having fulfilled their military service obligation or those retained in active status when provided for by law; or those members of Congress and others identified by their employers as “key personnel” and who have been removed from the Ready Reserve because they are critical to the national security in their civilian employment.
• Inactive Status List are those Standby Reservists who are not required by law or regulation to remain in an active program and who retain their reserve affiliation in a non-participating status and those who have skills which may be of possible future use to the Armed Force concerned.

The Retired Reserve consists of all reserve officers and enlisted personnel who receive retired pay on the basis of active duty or reserve service; all reserve officers and enlisted personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay but have not reached age sixty, who have not elected discharge and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve; and other retired reservists under certain conditions. Members may be involuntarily ordered to active duty in the event of a recall of retirees.

Brigadier General Anthony H. Adrian, National Guard Assistant Director for Training & Operations, addresses the Board at the quarterly meeting in March 2020.
5.2: ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Mission

The Army National Guard, a community-based operational force that serves as a primary combat reserve of the Army, provides ready units to support global and domestic requirements.

The Army National Guard has a dual mission—supporting the states under the command of their governors when not mobilized for federal service and supporting the President when activated for federal missions. Governors have broad authority to use their Army National Guard assets, from saving lives and protecting property during natural disasters to maintaining peace during civil emergencies.

During FY19, Army National Guard soldiers continued service in combat operations in Afghanistan and in support of other missions globally. From September 11, 2001 through June 2020, more than 425,201 Army National Guard Soldiers mobilized for deployments to federal missions around the world.

Vision

A premier, unit-based force comprised of resilient, adaptable, relevant and ready Citizen Soldiers accessible for war and domestic crises.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is defined in law as a joint activity of the DoD. The NGB is the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the ARNG between the Department of the Army and the individual states, administering policies and overseeing federal funding for the National Guards of the states, territories and the District of Columbia.

Composition

As an integral part of the Army team, the Reserve Component is more than 50% of the Total Army. The Army National Guard makes up approximately 39% of the Army Operational Force.

- FY19 End Strength 343,500
- $148.5B Total Army budget for FY19 ($16.3B for ARNG personnel, operations, maintenance, facilities)
- 2431 Communities
- 78 State Partnerships with 85 Nations

Command Structure:

The Army National Guard (ARNG) is a Reserve Component (RC) of the Army, as well as the militia of the states, territories and the District of Columbia when not in federal service. The governor of each state serves as the commander in chief of that state’s guard forces when
those components are not in federal service. Each state or territory also has a Adjutant General, or "TAG," who is typically a two-star general responsible for the training and readiness of Soldiers and Airmen within his or her state or territory (Note: The District of Columbia National Guard is a federal militia, with a commanding general appointed by the President who serves the same function as the TAGs in the states and territories). The President serves as commander in chief of ARNG units activated for federal service, as well as the District of Columbia National Guard.

The NGB is led by the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). The DARNG and Director, Air National Guard (DANG) assist the CNGB in his duties and communicate directly with the TAGs of the states on behalf of the CNGB. The CNGB is a full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The CNGB may communicate his advice directly to the Secretary of Defense, though these communications typically are channeled through the Chairman of the JCS.

**FY2021 Posture Statement**


**Army National Guard Strategic Imperatives**


For additional information visit: https://www.nationalguard.com/

RFPB members (Left to Right Mr. Brett B. Lambert, Major General A.C. Roper, Major General Burke W. Whitman) at the March 7, 2018 quarterly meeting.
5.3: ARMY RESERVE

Mission

America’s Army Reserve generates combat-ready units and Soldiers for the Army and Joint Warfighter that are trained, equipped and lethal to win our Nation’s wars.

Vision

America’s Army Reserve - the most capable, combat-ready and lethal Federal Reserve Force in the history of the Nation.

Composition

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>189,500 STRONG, THE ARMY RESERVE ENABLES THE FORCE BY PROVIDING:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theater bulk petroleum (92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs (87%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains (81%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation units (54%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical units (53%)</td>
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The Army Reserve provides sustainment commands to support corps and theater level logistics operations and 25% of the Army’s generating force capabilities, Soldier Initial Entry Basic and Advanced Individual training, ROTC Cadet Command support, Total Army School System (TASS) and medical support.

Unified and Accessible

Command authority of the Army Reserve rests under a single individual who is both the Chief of the Army Reserve and the Commanding General of U.S. Army Reserve Command, ensuring unity of command and unity of effort in the resourcing, training and accessing of the Army Reserve. This enables the support of every Army Service Component Command and Combatant Command with an Army Reserve footprint in all 50 States, 5 territories and more than 30 countries. The Army Reserve is uniquely designed from the ground up to meet the needs of the joint force under this single unified command authority.

Critical Enabling Capabilities

The Army Reserve trains, organizes and postures itself to be able to respond on short notice by identifying early-deploying formations, aggregating additional capabilities and moving rapidly to complete post-mobilization training tasks and meet the warfighter’s time-sensitive requirements. Ready Force X is the way in which we focus energy, optimize processes and prioritize resourcing to deliver capabilities at the speed of relevance for a major war.

Early-deploying Ready Force X (RFX) units and capabilities need to be able to move quickly – in some cases in days or weeks – in order to support the joint force in any significant conflict or demonstration of national resolve. Under this construct, key early-deploying force capabilities are postured to aggregate
and deploy rapidly with the requisite mobility, survivability, lethality and netted mission command architecture to fight and win on the battlefield.

The Army Reserve does this by leveraging a dispersed and dynamic phalanx of Soldiers and leaders with civilian-acquired or retained skills from more than 140 different career fields. Many of these correspond to core military capabilities in high-demand fields such as science, cyber, artificial intelligence – bringing the brains and brawn of the Nation to bear for the Army and the Joint Warfighter.

Support in the Homeland

With Soldiers, facilities and capabilities in more than a thousand communities across the Nation, America’s Army Reserve is well postured to respond quickly when disaster strikes and our fellow Americans are in their time of greatest need. Our key responsive capabilities include search and rescue units, aviation assets, route clearance engineers, medical units, water and fuel distribution operations, water purification and communications support; many of these forces have been well-tested over the recent past. While we fully acknowledge that our first responsibility is to leverage our unique capabilities to support the Army in winning the Nation’s wars, we also embrace our opportunity and mandate to respond to need, on no-notice, in the Homeland. The Army Reserve is fully integrated into the standing Department of Defense task force postured for response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) events.

America’s Army Reserve is structured with dual-purpose capabilities and, as such, is a Federal Response Partner, maintaining a ready posture for Defense Support to Civil Authorities operations as a resource and capability provider. The Army Reserve includes substantial capabilities vital in disaster response and stands ready to support lead agencies for domestic emergencies and disaster relief efforts. Requested capabilities may include aviation lift, search and rescue or extraction, quartermaster (food, shelter, potable water, heated tents, etc.), civil affairs and public information as well as a significant portion of full-spectrum engineer capability. Army Reserve heavy-lift helicopters can rapidly deliver critical supplies, equipment and construction material into affected areas. Additionally, the Army Reserve is fully integrated into the standing Department of Defense task force postured for response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) events.

The Army Reserve will conduct DSCA response in two ways — immediate and deliberate. These responses differ in the authorities under which they are conducted and the source of the support request. Immediate Response is conducted by Army Reserve units and Soldiers under Immediate Response authority (IRA), which authorizes local commanders to take action to save lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great property damage in an urgent situation when there is insufficient time to get approval from higher headquarters.

Always Ready

Today’s Army Reserve is the most battle-tested and experienced in our Nation’s history. As the dedicated Federal reserve of the Army, the Army Reserve exists to serve the Army and the Nation and has never failed to accomplish its mission. The Army Reserve is ready now and in the future for whatever threats and challenges lie ahead.

For additional information visit: https://www.goarmy.com/reserve.html
5.4: MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Mission

Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (COMMARFORRES) commands and controls assigned forces for the purpose of augmenting and reinforcing the Active Component with trained units and individual Marines as a sustainable and ready operational reserve in order to augment and reinforce active forces for employment across the full spectrum of crisis and global engagement. COMMARFORRES is the principal advisor to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on matters pertaining to Marine Forces Reserve.

Vision

Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) units, including the Individual Ready Reserve, will serve as a strategic hedge able to respond to OPLAN/CONPLAN sourcing as required and as an operational force supporting a variety of missions across the globe. MARFORRES will satisfy Combatant Commander Requirements that might otherwise go unsourced with an AC only force, assist with readiness recovery of AC capabilities and maintain and institutional readiness for large-scale mobilization. Keeping the Reserve Component (RC) in a ready status via continued operational employment will enable the Marine Corps to respond to contingencies and crises upon a moment’s notice.

Composition and Marine Corps Reserve Resourcing Value

The Marine Corps Reserve consists of over 38,000 Marines and Sailors who constitute 17% of the Marines Total Force, resourced with approximately 4% of the total Marine Corps budget.
**Marine Corps Total Force**

The Marine Corps AC and RC are integrated as a Total Force. The AC and RC forces are similarly manned, trained and equipped enabling RC forces to be seamlessly employed as an integral part of the Marine Corps operating forces. The RC serves to augment, reinforce and sustain AC Marine Air Ground Task Forces, but also maintains the capability to task-organize entirely with Reserve units. Maintaining the same fundamental individual and unit training standards enables the RC to conduct assigned missions in a manner commensurate to their AC counterparts. Although substantially mirrored with the AC in order to facilitate integration, MARFORRES also provides Civil Affairs, Personnel Recovery and Aviation Adversary capabilities that are not resident in the AC.

*MARFORRES has units in over 150 sites spread throughout 47 states and Puerto Rico (No USMCR in South Dakota, Vermont or Wyoming).*

**Marine Corps Force Design**

As the U.S. Marine Corps modernizes the force and prepares strategies to deter and win against a peer threat, releasable specifics about our capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures will be limited. The Corps’ primary force design challenge is that the force today is not optimized to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy. Current force design initiatives and planning efforts are focused on adapting capabilities to properly shape the Marine Corps’ contributions to the joint fight. Reserve Marines successfully adapt to and are comfortable with any change required to best defend the Nation regardless of the threat. Specific details of the recommended divestments and investments from the USMCR will be forthcoming.

For more information visit: [https://www.marforres.marines.mil/](https://www.marforres.marines.mil/).
5.5: NAVY RESERVE

Mission
Deliver strategic depth and operational capability to the Navy, Marine Corps and joint forces.

Vision
The Navy Reserve provides essential naval warfighting capabilities and expertise, strategically aligned with mission requirements - valued for our readiness, innovation and agility.

- We deliver timely, cost-effective operational capabilities. Our flexibility, responsiveness and ability to serve across a wide spectrum of operations clearly enhance the Navy Total Force.
- We provide the Navy with strategic depth by maintaining unsurpassed individual, command and force readiness. We are ready to surge forward - anytime, anywhere.
- Our polices, processes and administrative systems are transparent and seamless, making it easier for sailors and their families to serve.
- We are a diverse Force and provide opportunities for all Sailors through a continuum of service.

Composition and Navy Reserve Responsibilities
The Navy Reserve prides itself on being a ready, agile force that provides valuable, vital support to the Navy and the Nation. In 2020, the Ready Reserve Force consists of 59,641 Selected Reserve Sailors (including 10,153 Full Time Support members) 43,754 Individual Ready Reserve members and 422 civilians. This Ready Reserve Force of over 100,000 deliver strategic depth and operational capability to the Navy and Marine Corps team and the Joint Force in times of peace and war.

Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) operates six regional headquarters and 123 Navy Operational Support Centers (NOSCs), located in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and Guam. NOSCs are the readiness generation centers of the Navy Reserve that provide administrative, training and readiness support to Reservists.

Commander, Naval Air Forces Reserve (CNAFR), is composed of one Naval Air Facility, two Joint Reserve Bases, one air logistics scheduling agency and three air wings. Fleet Logistics Support Wing and Tactical Support Wing both reside at Naval Air Station-Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, while Maritime Support Wing is headquartered at Naval Air Station North Island, CA. The three air wings consist of 21 squadrons with 167 aircraft assigned.
Commander, Naval Information Force Reserve (CNIFR), based in Fort Worth, TX, is the executive agent for nine Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs) located throughout the country. In partnership with the Defense Intelligence Agency Joint Reserve Intelligence Program, these facilities provide fully capable intelligence and cyber warfare centers enabling wartime readiness through training and operations, and real-time intelligence support to Combatant Commands.

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia, NECC is comprised of Coastal Riverine and Naval Construction Forces; Explosive Ordinance Disposal, Diving and Salvage Units; and expeditionary units providing logistics capabilities.

Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret), Chairman, RFPB, swears in Rear Admiral Andrew McKinley, USCGR Deputy Commandant for Operations, to the RFPB.
Force Structure:

For additional information, visit our website at www.navyreserve.navy.mil.
5.6: AIR FORCE RESERVE

Mission
To provide combat-ready forces to fly, fight and win.

Vision
Reserve Citizen Airman – An agile, combat ready force answering our Nation’s call Always There!

Composition
The Air Force Reserve is the Federal Reserve Component of the U.S. Air Force. As an integral component of the Total Force, the Air Force Reserve provides experienced manpower and critical capabilities for our National Defense. Citizen Airmen are interchangeable, interoperable, and integrated across the Total Force to execute the full spectrum of Department of the Air Force missions while operating daily at a fraction of the cost of a standing force. The Air Force Reserve is predominately a part time force with rapid surge capability and strategic depth for national defense. On average, over 6,000 Reserve Citizen Airmen contribute globally to operations every day while two thirds are typically volunteers.\(^{119}\)

- 70,100 End strength (FY19)
- $5.17B budget in FY19
- Provides 37 wings and 322 aircraft to the Air Force as of December 2019.\(^{120}\)

In addition to the 322 aircraft assigned to the Air Force Reserve, the Component contains 69 units that share aircraft and primary missions assigned to Active Component units called “classic associate units” under the Total Force Integration concept. Classic associate maintenance personnel, aircrews, weapons system operators, and support personnel are collocated with AC units, utilize AC equipment and often are employed within an AC crew. The U.S. Air Force also maintains 10 Active associate units that contain AC personnel that collocate and work with Air Force Reserve unit-equipped formations in the same manner as the Classic Associate format.

Current Mobilizations
At the end of FY19, there were 5,008 Air Force Reservists mobilized or operationally supporting the U.S. Air Force and the following Combatant Commands: USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USOUTHCOM, USAFRICOM, USINDOPACOM, USNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM.

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119 Testimony Before the House Appropriations Committee on Defense, Guard and Reserve Hearing, Statement of Lt Gen Richard W. Scobee, March 3, 2020
Command Relationships

The Air Force Reserve operates and maintains total active inventory of 322 aircraft while comprising the force structure in each of the Air Force Core Functions such as space superiority, cyberspace superiority and agile combat support. Air Force Reservists operate the following Air Force aircraft, capabilities and missions:

- **Space Superiority**: GPS, Joint Space Operations Center, Missile Warning, Environmental Intelligence and Weather, Space Control, and Space Education
- **Cyberspace Superiority**: Cyberspace Command and Control, Cyberspace Defense, Cyber Protection Teams, Extend the Net, and Information Network Operations
- **Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance**: Acquisition Intelligence, Airborne Crypto Linguist, Distributed Common Ground System, Targeting, MQ-1, MQ-9, RQ-4, and WC-130J Hurricane Hunters
- **Command and Control**: Air and Space Operations Center, E-3
- **Air Superiority**: F-22
- **Global Precision Attack**: B-52, B-1, A-10, F-16, F-35
- **Special Operations**: AC-130U, C-145, MC-130H, C-145A, C-146A, U-28A
- **Personnel Recovery**: HC-130N/P, HH-60G, and Guardian Angel
- **Nuclear Deterrence Operations**: B-52, KC135R
- **Rapid Global Mobility**: Aeromedical Evacuation, Aerial Port, KC-10, KC-135, KC-46A, C-40C, C-5, C-17A, C-130H, C-130J, and 100% of DoD’s hurricane hunter and aerial spray capability
- **Education and Training**: T-1, T-6, T-38, AT-38 in addition to formal training units of 12 other aircraft and aeromedical evacuation
- **Agile Combat Support**: logistics, civil engineer, and medical among a wide portfolio of support functions

More information can be found by visiting: [http://www.afrc.af.mil/AboutUs.aspx](http://www.afrc.af.mil/AboutUs.aspx).
5.7: AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mission
As provided for in the Constitution, the Air National Guard (ANG) has both state and federal missions. The state mission of the ANG is to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order and public safety. The federal mission is to support national security objectives by providing properly trained and equipped units when mobilized for war, national emergency, or when otherwise needed. During peacetime, the combat-ready units and support units are assigned to most Air Force major commands to carry out missions compatible with training, mobilization readiness, humanitarian and contingency operations.

Vision
The Air National Guard will meet 21st century challenges by proactively shaping our future with combat-ready, adaptable Airmen at our core. Together with our partners, we will provide the capabilities necessary to guard America at home and defend freedom worldwide.

Composition
The Air National Guard is approximately 21% of the Total Air Force and is the fifth largest Air Force in the world. The Air National Guard Readiness Center is based at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. Its mission is to ensure the combat readiness of Air National Guard units and act as a liaison between the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the individual states and territories on Air National Guard operational activities. Individual units report to the governor of their respective state, territory (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands) or the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard. Each of the 54 National Guard organizations is supervised by the adjutant general of the state or territory.

Overview
The Air National Guard commitment to readiness provides our Nation and Air Force with significant flexibility. After more than two decades as a proven operational force, the ANG has become a critical component to the Nation’s strategic deterrence, operational capability and first-in capability. Furthermore, the ANG possesses strategic capacity across each of the Air Force Core Competencies: Air and Space Superiority; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Rapid Global Mobility; Global Strike; and Command and Control. As an agile and inclusive component of the United States Air Force (USAF), the ANG is integral to the overall success of USAF strategy and the defense of the Nation. The ANG will continue to thrive in all five AF core missions as a unit-equipped community based steady state, engaged operational force that provides strategic depth for the Air Force. The cost effectiveness of the ANG will continue to provide return on investment for the Nation and USAF by preserving capability and capacity for the joint force during a fiscally constrained era. Additionally, this cost effectiveness and increased capability and capacity benefits the USAF writ large while it recapitalizes and modernizes USAF capabilities. The dual-use value of the ANG will continue to deliver homeland forces to the Nation, states, territories and district in times of need and strengthen enduring relationships at home and abroad. 93% of ANG equipment
is dual-use and 100% of ANG Airmen are dual-use. An experienced multi-faceted force is the heritage that the ANG provides. As a Nation, an increased reliance on the ANG is as viable now as it ever has been.

- 107,197 Drilling/Participating members
- $8.97B budget in FY19
- 90 Wings in 54 states, territories and the District of Columbia, providing 250 geographically separated units and approximately 1,084 aircraft to the Air Force force structure

Current Mobilizations (May 1st 2020)

There are currently 5,375 Air National Guard members mobilized or supporting combat operations, contingencies, humanitarian response, or other requirements worldwide.

Command Relationships

The ANG is a Reserve Component of the Air Force, as well as the militia of the states, territories and the District of Columbia when not in federal service. The governor of each state serves as the commander in chief of that state’s ARNG and ANG when those components are not in federal service. Each state or territory also has an Adjutant General, typically a two-star general who in most cases is appointed by the governor and is responsible for the training and readiness of Soldiers and Airmen within his or her state or territory (Note: The District of Columbia National Guard is a federal militia, with a commanding general appointed by the President who serves the same function as the Adjutant General (TAG) in the states and territories). The President serves as commander in chief of ANG units activated for federal service, as well as the District of Columbia National Guard. Air National Guard units and individuals are trained, equipped and evaluated to the same standards as the active Air Force and can deploy to anywhere in the world in less than 72 hours with no need for additional training.

Our People are our greatest asset, but here is a look at some of our Aviation Hardware

The Air National Guard has a total active inventory of 1040 aircraft and it provides support to each of the Air Force Core Functions. Air National Guardsman operate the following aircraft: A-10, C-17, C-32, C-40, C-130H, C-130J, E-8, F-15, F-16, F22, F-35A, HH-60, HC-130J, KC-135, KC-46, MQ-9, LC-130H, and EC-130J.

For more information on the Air National Guard go to https://www.goang.com/ or to find an Air National Guard Recruiter go to https://www.goang.com/now.html
5.8: COAST GUARD RESERVE

Mission

Provide operationally capable and ready personnel to support Coast Guard surge and mobilization requirements in the Homeland and abroad.

Vision

The Coast Guard’s only dedicated surge force, the Reserve is a contingency-based workforce trained locally and deployed globally to provide appropriately trained personnel to meet mission requirements within the prioritized focus areas of Defense Operations; Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security; Incident Response and Management; and Mission Support.

Composition

The Coast Guard is a federal law enforcement agency, a regulatory body, a first responder, a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community and a military service and branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times offering specialized and unique capabilities across the full spectrum of maritime activities, from security cooperation up to armed conflict.

Coast Guard mission requirements fit within six operational mission programs: (1) Maritime Law Enforcement; (2) Maritime Response; (3) Maritime Prevention; (4) Marine Transportation System Management; (5) Maritime Security Operations; and (6) Defense Operations. The mission activities and competencies required to conduct surge and contingency operations in support of the operational mission programs are then identified, assigned and tracked to support data-driven, risk-based, resource decisions.

When required, the Coast Guard Reserve can be activated and deployed domestically to

122 14 USC §101; 10 USC §101
respond to natural or man-made disasters, accidents, catastrophes, acts of terrorism, or transportation security incidents within 48 hours by utilizing specialized activation authority granted to the Secretary of Homeland Security under Title 14. The Coast Guard Reserve can also be activated under numerous provisions of Title 10 in support of defense operations domestically and abroad.

**Current Mobilizations**

As of 31 December 2019: 569 activations

- 283 reservists serving on voluntary orders under 10 USC 12301(d)
- 286 reservists serving on involuntary orders under 10 USC 12302

The Coast Guard Reserve is headed by the Assistant Commandant for Reserve who serves “as the principal advisor to the Commandant on Coast Guard Reserve matters” among other functions as directed by the Commandant. Personnel resources funded by appropriations made in support of the Reserve are distributed across the Coast Guard Headquarters and field organizations to recruit, train and maintain the Reserve workforce as part of the Coast Guard’s fully integrated model.

As a fully integrated force, unit commanders and commanding officers hold ultimate responsibility and are directly accountable for their Total Force, which includes the readiness of assigned reservists. In doing so, the Reserve Component maintains mobilization readiness, while providing increased capacity to local commands for daily, steady-state mission execution.

Reservists are assigned to positions at regular Coast Guard units to obtain and maintain proficiency and readiness through a combination of training and augmentation. These units include Coast Guard Areas, Districts, Sectors and Bases along with eight Coast Guard Port Security Units (PSUs) and five Reserve Units assigned to certain Combatant Commands (USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, USINDOPACOM and USTRANSCOM).

PSUs provide expeditionary forces primarily responsible for providing the Department of Defense layered defensive protection utilizing both waterside and landside security forces. Since 2001, Coast Guard PSUs have been used to support operations in Iraq, Kuwait and Guantanamo Bay.

For additional information, you may visit our website at [https://reserve.uscg.mil](https://reserve.uscg.mil).

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123 14 USC §3713
124 14 USC 309
APPENDIX A: BOARD MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

Major General (Ret) Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

Arnold Punaro is the chief executive officer of The Punaro Group, LLC, a Washington-based firm he founded in 2010 specializing in federal budget and market analysis, business strategy and capture, acquisition due diligence, government relations, communications, sensitive operations, business risk analysis and compliance, and crisis management. He consults for a broad array of Fortune 100 companies and has been recognized by Defense News as one of the 100 most influential individuals in U.S. Defense. He also leads Punaro Capital, LLC, a firm specializing in national security investments, and Punaro Press, LLC, a company that specializes in national security publications.

In November 2015, Mr. Punaro completed a four-year term, first as Vice-Chairman, then as Chairman of the National Defense Industrial Association, the country’s largest defense industry association with over 1,600 corporate and nearly 70,000 individual members. As NDIA Chairman Emeritus, he served as Chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee from 2015 to 2018. He began a new two-year term as Vice-Chairman in October 2018 and will serve another two-year term as Chairman beginning in October 2020.

Since September 2011, he has been Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board which serves as an independent advisor to the Secretary of Defense on Reserve and National Guard matters. He served on the Defense Business Board (DBB) as a founding member at its inception in 2002 until 2013. He resumed serving on the DBB in 2015. In 2020, he co-chaired a congressionally-mandated independent study for the Secretary of Defense titled the “Assessment of Responsibilities and Authorities of the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense.”


As an executive vice president at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) from 1997 to 2010, at the time a $10 billion company, Mr. Punaro served as a sector manager, deputy president of the Federal Business Segment, and led SAIC’s Corporate Business Development organization. He was the senior corporate official responsible for SAIC’s government affairs, worldwide communications and support operations, to include crisis and risk management, as well as general manager of their Washington operations and supervisor of SAIC’s corporate Small and Disadvantaged Business office.

From 1973 to 1997, Mr. Punaro worked for Senator Sam Nunn in national security matters. He served as his director of National Security Affairs and then as Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee (eight years) and Staff Director for the Minority (five years). In his work with Senator Nunn
and the Senate Armed Services Committee, he was involved in the formulation of all major defense and intelligence legislation, the oversight and review of all policy and programs, and civilian and military nominations.

A retired U.S. Marine Corps Major General, he served as the Director of the Marine Corps Reserve, Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Mobilization), and for three years as the Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division. Other assignments were Commanding General, Marine Corps Mobilization Command, and Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Reserve. In December 1990, he was mobilized for Operation Desert Shield. In December 1993, he completed a tour of active duty as Commander of Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Forward) in the former Yugoslavia. He was mobilized for a third time in May 2003 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. He served on active duty as an Infantry Platoon Commander in Vietnam where he was awarded the Bronze Star for valor and the Purple Heart.

He is on the Board of Advisors for the Center for a New American Security, a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and on the Advisory Council of the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He serves on the non-profit boards of the University of Georgia’s School of Public and International Affairs and the Georgia Institute of Technology Sam Nunn School of International Affairs. He has served on other non-profit boards, including the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, Chairman of the Board of the Tragedy Assistant Programs for Survivors, the Wolf Trap Foundation Board, and as a visiting scholar for the Bipartisan Policy Center. He served on the for-profit board of Sourcefire, helping take the company public and ultimately being sold to Cisco for $2.7B.

Mr. Punaro is the recipient of numerous recognitions including the Secretary of Defense “Medal for Distinguished Public Service” and two awards of the Secretary of Defense “Medal for Exceptional Public Service.” He received the Marine Corps League’s “Iron Mike Award” in 1993 for “exceptionally outstanding service” and “unwavering commitment” for over 20 years to “ensuring a strong national defense.” He has received the Air Force Association’s “Exceptional Service Award,” the National Guard “Minuteman Award,” the Army’s “Meritorious Public Service Medal,” and the Secretary of the Army “Public Service Award”, the Reserve Officers Association’s “Minuteman of the Year Award”, the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation “Commandants’ Award,” CAUSE’s Jack London Award, the NDIA Forrestal Award for industry leadership, and was the recipient of the SAIC’s “Founders Award” and two special CEO awards. He has over 20 military awards and decorations to include the Distinguished Service Medal as well as numerous civic awards.

He has a Masters of Arts degree from the University of Georgia and a Masters of Arts degree from Georgetown University, the latter in national security studies. He was on the Adjunct Faculty of the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University for ten years where he taught an annual graduate level course entitled “National Security Decision Making.”

He is the author of the book, On War and Politics: The Battlefield Inside Washington’s Beltway, that was published by the Naval Institute Press in October 2016. He is completing his second book, The Ever-Shrinking Fighting Force, which will be published in 2021.
Major General Blake C. Ortner, ARNG  
Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Board Member

Major General Blake C. Ortner recently served as the Commander, 29th Infantry Division, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Prior to this assignment, he served as the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, 29th Infantry Division, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia.

General Ortner is a 1983 graduate of University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, Minn., where he received a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations. He also holds a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College Class of 2010.

He received a Regular Army commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps as an Infantry officer and served on active duty until 1987. In 1989, General Ortner joined the Virginia Army National Guard, serving in numerous assignments during more than 20 years in the 116th Infantry Regiment and 29th Infantry Division to include rifle company commander, battalion operations officer, battalion commander, brigade operations officer, brigade executive officer, brigade deputy commander, brigade commander and division operations officer. In 2001, General Ortner served as the Division Chief of Operations, Multi-National Division – North as part of the 29th Infantry Division support of Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia-Herzegovinian.

General Ortner commanded 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment and deployed the battalion in 2004 to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom as the first Virginia National Guard infantry battalion to deploy to combat since World War II. In 2007, General Ortner was assigned as the deputy commander of the 116th Infantry Brigade Combat Team and deployed to Baghdad, Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom where he served as a member of the Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF–I) Area Support Group and later as the chief of operations for MNF–I. He assumed command of the 116th IBCT in June 2009. In May 2011 the brigade headquarters was mobilized for combat operations in Afghanistan supporting Operation Enduring Freedom where he commanded Combined Team Zabul which included active duty and NATO Romanian infantry battalions. In November 2016 the 29th Infantry Division headquarters was mobilized to establish the first division headquarters for Operation Spartan Shield under Army Central in Kuwait. General Ortner was responsible for 5 brigades of Army Active, Reserve and National Guard brigades with forces in 10 countries including Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.

He resides in Stafford and is employed by Paralyzed Veterans of America in Washington, D.C., as the Deputy Government Relations Director working with Congress to support veterans benefits and healthcare services.
Sergeant Major Michael J. Lewis, ARNG
Senior Enlisted Advisor, Reserve Forces Policy Board
Board Member

SGM Michael J. Lewis assumed the position of Senior Enlisted Advisor on September 15, 2016, and serves as the subject matter expert for personnel, mobilization and readiness issues. Prior to this assignment, Sergeant Major Lewis was the 6th State Command Sergeant Major and Senior Enlisted Leader for the Rhode Island National Guard.

Born in Westerly, Rhode Island, SGM Lewis graduated from Chariho Regional High School in June 1982. Entering active duty upon graduation, he completed One Station Unit Training as an infantryman and was then assigned to 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Ranger Battalion. Upon completion of his initial enlistment, Sergeant Major Lewis joined the Rhode Island Army National Guard where he was assigned to Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne). In Special Forces, SGM Lewis served as Junior Weapons Sergeant, Senior Weapons Sergeant, Operations/Intelligence Sergeant, Special Forces Team Sergeant and Company Sergeant Major. In August 2006, SGM Lewis was assigned as the first Command Sergeant Major of the newly formed Special Operations Detachment – Global.

SGM Lewis’s military education includes all levels of NCOES culminating with the Army Sergeants Major Academy. He also attended Basic Airborne School, Jungle Operations Training Center, Ranger School, Special Forces Qualification Course, Jump Master, USASOC Mountain Master Course (Distinguished Honor Graduate) and Level 1 Mountaineer, ARNG Mountain Warfare School Winter, Summer and Lead Climber Courses, Marine Corps Scout Sniper School and Northern Warfare Training Center. SGM Lewis’ civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration and a Master of Science in Cybersecurity Technology.

SGM Lewis has deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan), Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Caribbean and Central America (SOCSOUTH), Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Iraq), Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo), Operation DESERT SPRING (Kuwait), Operation JOINT FORGE (Bosnia), Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) and Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada).

His Military awards include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal (1st OLC), Meritorious Service Medal (4th OLC), Army Commendation Medal (3rd OLC), Army Achievement Medal (2nd OLC), Army Good Conduct Medal (3rd Award), Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (4th Award), National Defense Service Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (3rd Award w/Arrowhead device), Kosovo Campaign Medal, Iraqi Campaign Medal (2 stars), Afghanistan Campaign Medal, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Armed Forces Service Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Medal, NCO Professional Development Ribbon (Numeral 4), Army Service Ribbon, Army Overseas Ribbon, Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon, United Nations Medal and NATO Medal (3rd Award), Special Forces Tab, Ranger Tab, Combat Infantryman Badge (2nd Award), Expert Infantryman Badge and the Master Parachutist Badge.
Ms. Sid Ashworth  
*Board Member (Nominated)*

Sid Ashworth is currently a senior advisor with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Sid Ashworth recently retired as corporate vice president of government relations for Northrop Grumman Corporation, a leader in global security.

In that role, she was responsible for providing effective guidance, coordination and support for all company relationships with the U.S. government. She provided strategic guidance and insights to inform business decisions, including long-term planning and investment strategies. She was also a member of the company’s corporate policy council.

Ashworth joined Northrop Grumman from GE Aviation, where she was vice president of its Washington Operations. Prior to joining GE Aviation, she was principal of the Ashworth Group.

She has more than 25 years of experience in the legislative and executive government branches, including 14 years as a professional staff member with the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations. She also served as the staff directors of the Defense Subcommittee and the Military Construction Subcommittee on Appropriations. During Ashworth’s tenure with the Defense Subcommittee, she was responsible for formulating funding and legislation recommendations for defense and intelligence spending in excess of $600B annually. She also worked as a civilian in the Department of the Army, focused on resource management, force structure and strategy. She served as a Special Advisor to the Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific and led a senior task force to consolidate Army command and control throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Ashworth also held several senior analyst positions with Eighth U.S. Army and U.S. Forces Korea in which she took an active role in rebuilding and shaping the U.S. military forces assigned to Korea.

Ashworth has also held positions at several academic institutions. She is a Senior Adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and has served as an adjutant professor with the University of Maryland, Far East Division. She has appeared as a guest lecturer on the legislative process at Indiana University, The Brookings Institute and Georgetown University and was a Senior Executive Fellow at Harvard University’s JFK School of Government.

Ashworth earned a master’s degree in business administration from Campbell University and a bachelor’s degree in management from the University of Maryland.

She is the recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, Secretary of the Navy Medal for Distinguished Public Service, Department of the Army Meritorious Civilian Service Award and the National Guard Major General G.V. “Sonny Montgomery” Award. Ashworth serves on the Executive Committee of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA). She also serves on the Board of the National Military Family Association and as a Trustee of the U.S. Air Force Academy Falcon Foundation. She is a member of the Daughters of the American Revolution.
Lieutenant General (Ret) David W. Barno, USA
Board Member

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) was appointed by Secretary of Defense as Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on March 11, 2015. He also was appointed Chairman to the RFPB subcommittee of the Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve on October 2017, focusing on retaining the operational capability and experience within the Reserve Components to meet future threats.

General Barno is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow at the Merrill Center at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Contributing Editor and Columnist for War on the Rocks and an Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

General Barno completed a thirty-year active duty Army career where he commanded at every level, serving as an infantry officer, Ranger and paratrooper. He completed three tours in special operations forces, serving with Army Ranger battalions in combat during both the Panama and Grenada invasions. In 2003, he was selected to establish a new three-star operational headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan and take command of the 20,000 U.S. and coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. For nineteen months as the senior American commander, Barno was responsible for overall coalition military leadership of the war in Afghanistan, implementing a new counterinsurgency strategy in close partnership with the U.S. embassy and coalition allies.

Following his military career, Barno served for four years as the Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Concurrently, he was the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Veterans and Families from 2007-2009. Following his time at NDU, he spent nearly five years as a Senior Fellow and later Co-Director of the Responsible Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, a national security think tank based in Washington, D.C. He also later served as a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

General Barno currently serves on the Secretary of Defense’s Reserve Forces Policy Board and is a member of the U.S. Army War College Board of Visitors. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Prior to his present academic position, he was a Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at American University's School of International Service where he taught graduate and undergraduate programs. He speaks and writes frequently on national security policy, civil-military issues, and the changing character of conflict and leader development. Since leaving military service, he has published extensively and testified before Congress over a dozen times.

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, General Barno earned his master’s degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He has received numerous awards for his military and public service.
Dr. Nora J. Bensahel
Board Member

Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow of the Merrill Center at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She is also a Contributing Editor and Columnist for War on the Rocks and an Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. She writes and lectures frequently on U.S. defense policy, U.S. and coalition military operations and leader development and also serves as a member of the Secretary of Defense’s Reserve Forces Policy Board and the RFPB subcommittee of the Ensuring a Ready, Capable, Available and Sustainable Operational Reserve, focusing on retaining the operational capability and experience within the Reserve Components to meet future threats.

Before joining SAIS, Dr. Bensahel was a Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the School of International Service at American University and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Prior to that, she was a senior fellow and co-director of the Responsible Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. Her recent publications include The Future of the Army: Today, Tomorrow and the Day After Tomorrow; Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity; Building Better Generals; Battlefields and Boardrooms: Women’s Leadership in the Military and the Private Sector; and The Seven Deadly Sins of Defense Spending.

Dr. Bensahel’s early career included over eleven years at the RAND Corporation, where she rose to the position of senior political scientist. She authored numerous reports at RAND including After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq and “The Experiences of Foreign Militaries,” in Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy. Dr. Bensahel has also written several book chapters and has published articles in Survival, Journal of Strategic Studies, Joint Force Quarterly, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Defence Studies and European Security.

Dr. Bensahel spent more than a decade as an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, where she taught M.A.-level classes and received the Alumni Leadership Council Teaching Award. Dr. Bensahel is a frequent commentator in well-known media publications and programs and has testified before Congress. Dr. Bensahel received her Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University and her B.A. magna cum laude from Cornell University. While at Stanford, she worked as a research assistant for former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry. She held fellowships at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. She currently serves as a member of the President’s Council on Cornell Women.
Major General Jody J. Daniels, USAR
Board Member

Major General Jody J. Daniels, USAR is the Commanding General of the 88th Readiness Division (RD). In this capacity she oversees the services and Base Operations Support to more than 52,000 Army Reserve Soldiers, 2,594 Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Soldiers and 2,524 Civilians serving in 606 units at 277 sites with 579 facilities totaling 10,341,955 square feet of facility space on 18,113 acres of land throughout 19 states in the northwestern U.S. from the Ohio River Valley to the Pacific Coast. Also, since May 2019, she has been a Board Member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which serves as an independent advisor to Secretary of Defense on Reserve and National Guard matters.

Prior to assuming command, MG Daniels was the Chief of Staff at U.S. Army Forces Command. She has over 35 years of active and reserve military service. She previously served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff G-2, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff; G-2 Deputy Director and Director, Intelligence and Knowledge Development Directorate (J2) for U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany; dual-hatted as the Commanding General, 87th Army Reserve Support Command (East), Birmingham, Alabama and Deputy Commanding General, Support, for First Army Division East, Fort Meade, Maryland; and as the Assistant Chief of Staff for U.S. Africa Command. She has served as Commander of the Theater Support Command, which consisted of 11 military intelligence (MI) battalions and in numerous military leadership positions including command of a MI company in Korea, a basic training battalion in New Jersey and a MI group in Massachusetts. She has completed a Civil Affairs deployment to Kosovo as well as a deployment to Iraq where she served as the Chief of Plans and Integration and then as the Director for Intelligence (J2) for the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I).

In her civilian career, MG Daniels was previously the Director of Advanced Programs for Lockheed Martin's Advanced Technology Laboratories (LM ATL). Prior to that, she was the Director of the Contextual Systems Laboratory where she led a research and development laboratory of 30 personnel in two technology software areas. She also worked as a manager and engineer in LM ATL's Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. She also has served on the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency (DARPA) Information Science and Technology (ISAT) Review Board for five years, on the ISAT Steering Committee for a year and Drexel University's Computer Science Department Advisory Board for three years.

MG Daniels holds a B.S. in Applied Mathematics (Computer Science) from Carnegie Mellon University, a M.S. and Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), a M.S. in Strategic Studies from the U. S. Army War College and an honorary Ph.D. in Public Service from the University of Massachusetts (Amherst). Her awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit (with two oak leaf clusters), Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (with four oak leaf clusters), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (with three oak leaf clusters), Joint Service Achievement Medal, Army Achievement Medal (with oak leaf cluster), Combat Action Badge, Joint Meritorious Unit Award (with two oak leaf clusters), Army Superior Unit Award (with oak leaf cluster) and Knowlton Award. MG Daniels enjoys whitewater kayaking and other water sports, trail running and reading.
Rear Admiral Lower Half James M. Kelly, USCGR
Board Member

Rear Admiral James M. Kelly is the Director of the U. S. Coast Guard – Defense Innovation Unit Detachment Team, where he leads senior leaders in establishing the inaugural Coast Guard presence at the premier Department of Defense innovation consortium. Prior to this assignment, he led the Reserve Component Governance Team, which resulted in the first-ever Assistant Commandant for Reserve and wholesale restructuring of the Coast Guard Reserve executive governance.

Rear Admiral Kelly was earlier recalled to active duty to lead the Coast Guard’s National Capital Region Consolidation Project, the Maritime Enforcement Specialist Implementation Team and additionally to lead the Maritime Border Security Division. In his Reserve capacity, Rear Admiral Kelly responded to Hurricane Maria and earlier to Port-au-Prince following the Haiti Earthquake, to the Deepwater Horizon-Gulf of Mexico oil spill and to New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.

Enlisting in the Coast Guard Reserve in 1977, Rear Admiral Kelly began his career as a mechanic on a 44’ motor lifeboat and served at search and rescue stations on the East Coast. Upon receiving his commission, Rear Admiral Kelly served as a Marine Safety Office Officer of the Day and Command Duty Officer, an Investigation Officer and later as a boat operations chief, passenger-vessel inspector and a Liaison Officer. Before being called to active duty to lead the restructuring of the Coast Guard Reserve, Rear Admiral Kelly’s earlier Reserve positions include Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard Reserve Unit – U. S. Southern Command in Doral, Fla., Senior Reserve Officer of Coast Guard District Nine, based in Cleveland, Ohio, which encompasses the Great Lakes and as the Senior Reserve Officer of Sector Houston-Galveston.

In addition to the Coast Guard Reserve, Mr. Kelly served in his civilian capacity as the Special Assistant to the President of the United States for Intergovernmental Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs with the U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs and as a Member of the Maryland General Assembly. Additionally, he has commercial banking experience and served as a State Trooper with the Maryland State Police.

Rear Admiral Kelly earned a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College and is a graduate of the U. S. Joint Forces Staff College – Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Hybrid. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Business and Management as a graduate of the University of Maryland – University College, having completed his studies through night school while serving in the Maryland State Police.
Ms. Laura Parker McAleer
Board Member (Nominated)

Ms. McAleer is the University of Notre Dame’s Associate Vice President for Federal and Washington Relations, responsible for the development and execution of the University’s priorities in the Nation’s capital. In this capacity, she seeks to strengthen Notre Dame’s strategic impact with key research and policy thought leaders and constituencies, as well as provide campus leadership with advice and counsel related to federal policies and regulations that may affect the University. She brings more than twenty years of civilian and military experience to this current position.

Prior to joining Notre Dame, Ms. McAleer served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Senate Affairs and acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, leading the Department of Defense’s strategic engagement and advocacy with the U.S. Congress. In addition to serving as a principal representative and spokesperson on defense legislative priorities, her responsibilities included managing the Senate confirmation process for over 50 senior civilian leaders of the Department.

Previously, Ms. McAleer worked as a senior legislative advisor on Capitol Hill for more than a decade, holding staff positions in both the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives. Beginning on the Majority Staff of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, she subsequently served as a national security and foreign policy advisor to four U.S. Senators, leading legislative and appropriations portfolios pertaining to defense, homeland security, intelligence, veterans and foreign affairs.

In addition to her congressional background, Ms. McAleer has worked in a wide range of executive branch capacities, to include service as a strategy and plans officer for U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, as an analyst and program manager with the Office of Naval Intelligence and as a visiting scholar at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. She also served as the Director for Strategic Initiatives for the Secretary of the Navy, responsible for the development and oversight of key organizational and personnel efforts.

Ms. McAleer graduated Magna Cum Laude from the University of Notre Dame with a Bachelor of Arts in Government/International Studies and Spanish. Subsequently, she earned a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, an Advanced Project Manager Certification from Stanford University and was an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve. Ms. McAleer’s professional awards include the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, the Department of the Army Superior Civilian Service Award and the Department of the Navy Superior Public Service Award.
Major General (Ret) Timothy E. Orr, ARNG
Board Member

Major General Timothy E. Orr was appointed by Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter as Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on September 18, 2015. He also was appointed as Chairman to the RFPB subcommittee of Enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland, focusing on improving the capability and capacity of the Reserve Component to address the increasing threats to the homeland.

General Orr assumed the duties as The Adjutant General, Iowa on 26 March 2009 and also served as the Director, Iowa Department of Public Defense. He provided command and control of more than 100 Army and Air National Guard units with approximately 9,400 assigned Soldiers and Airmen. His primary mission was to ensure the Iowa National Guard trained, mobilized, deployed, sustained and reconstituted units, ensuring the state provided ready forces in support of community, state and national requirements. General Orr retired 23 May 2019, after 40 years of military service.

General Orr began his military career by enlisting into the Iowa Army National Guard in December 1978. He received his officer’s commission through the United States Army Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning on 20 August 1985. He has commanded at the detachment, company, battalion and brigade level. His most recent command assignment was Commander, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division, Iowa Army National Guard, from October 2004 to September 2007. Following that assignment, General Orr served as Chief of Staff, Iowa Army National Guard, from October 2007 to December 2008 and as the Deputy Adjutant General from December 2008 to March 2009.
Major General Matthew T. Quinn, ARNG
Board Member (Nominated)

Major General Matthew T. Quinn is the Adjutant General for the State of Montana; serving as Commander of the Montana National Guard and the Director of the Department of Military Affairs. He is responsible to the Governor of Montana to provide Army and Air National Guard military forces that are ready to deploy worldwide and accomplish military missions in support of national defense, homeland security, natural disasters, domestic emergencies and military support to state and local governments. As The Adjutant General Major General Quinn serves on the Governor’s cabinet as the principal military advisor and is responsible to the Governor for State Disaster and Emergency Management, Homeland Security, Veteran Affairs, Counter-Drug Support to Civilian Law Enforcement, the Montana National Guard Youth Challenge Program and the STARBASE Program. Prior to his appointment as the Adjutant General he served as the Assistant Adjutant General-Army, Commander, 95th Troop Command, Vice Chief of the Joint Staff, J-6 and 495th Transportation Battalion Commander. General Quinn is a veteran of both Operation DESERT STORM, 1991, where he served as Commander of A Company, 34th Signal Battalion and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 2003 – 2004, where he served as Commander of the 495th Transportation Battalion.
Major General Torrence W. Saxe, ANG
Board Member (Nominated)

Major General. Torrence W. Saxe is the Adjutant General, Alaska National Guard and the Commissioner, Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. As the adjutant general, he is the senior military advisor to the governor of Alaska and Commander of the Alaska National Guard, responsible for overseeing the training and readiness of 3,900 Airmen and Soldiers. He also oversees the Alaska State Defense Force, Alaska Naval Militia, Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Veterans’ Affairs Office and Alaska Military Youth Academy. Brig Gen Saxe is the official liaison between the state and federal Department of Veterans Affairs, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and all military forces in Alaska.

General Saxe entered the Air Force in 1995 as a distinguished graduate of the Officer Training School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. General Saxe joined the Alaska Air National Guard in 2004, serving at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, as Commander of the 213th Space Warning Squadron and the 13th Space Warning Squadron. As the 13th Space Warning Squadron Commander he was dual hatted as the Federal Installation Commander. He also served as the Commander of the 168th Wing, Eielson AFB, Alaska. Prior to his current position, General Saxe was the Commander of the Alaska Air National Guard, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.
Lieutenant General (Ret)
Charles E. Stenner, Jr., USAFR
Board Member

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles E. Stenner, Jr was appointed by Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter as a Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on December 24, 2015. He was also appointed as Chairman of the RFPB subcommittee, Supporting & Sustaining Reserve Component Personnel, to assess whether the current Service member, families and employers personnel programs and policies are meeting the needs of an operational reserve. He was reappointed for a second term in June 2019.

General Stenner most recently served as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the 21st Century Partnership in Warner Robins, Georgia from August 2014 to December 2015. He was responsible for implementation of the vision, mission and strategies of the Partnership, a Georgia nonprofit corporation.

Prior to joining the Partnership, General Stenner served as the Chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Ga. As the Chief of Air Force Reserve, he served as principal adviser on Reserve matters to the Air Force Chief of Staff. As Commander of Air Force Reserve Command, he had full responsibility for the supervision of all U.S. Air Force Reserve units around the world.

General Stenner was commissioned a second lieutenant upon completing Officer Training School in 1973. He has served in various operational and staff assignments, including duty as an F-4C/D pilot, an F-16C pilot and an A-10 instructor pilot and operations officer. He has commanded four operations groups and two fighter wings. The general is a command pilot with more than 3,500 flying hours in the F-4, A-10 and F-16.

General Stenner is a lifetime member of the Air Force Association (AFA), Retired Officers Association (ROA), Airlift and Tanker Association (A/TA) and Military Officers Association of America (MOAA).

He is married to Diedra “Dee” Stenner. They have four children and ten grandchildren.
Major General (Ret),
R. Martin Umbarger, ARNG
Board Member

General (Ret) Martin Umbarger, ARNG is a senior policy advisor with Bose Public Affairs Group. General Umbarger has extensive experience in the agriculture and defense sectors and will be working out of the Indianapolis and Washington, D.C., office. Also, since May 2019, he has been a Board Member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which serves as an independent advisor to Secretary of Defense on Reserve and National Guard matters.

General Umbarger served 46 years in the Indiana National Guard, retiring in May 2015 as Adjutant General of Indiana, a position to which former Governor Joe Kernan appointed him in early 2004. He was reappointed by Governor Mitch Daniels in December 2004 and by Vice President-elect, Mike Pence, in December 2012. General Umbarger received praise from leaders, including Pence, who praised General Umbarger for his lifelong service to our state and Nation.

During his tenure as the Adjutant General, General Umbarger was instrumental in the establishment of the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center as a nationally recognized training facility for both military and civilian first responders. He also led the expansion of Camp Atterbury into a state-of-the-art simulations, cyber, mobilization and training facility.
Rear Admiral Lower Half (Ret)
Linda R. Wackerman, USN
Board Member

Rear Adm. Linda Wackerman grew up in Key Biscayne, Florida. She is a graduate from Metropolitan State College in Denver, Colorado with a B.S. in Aerospace Science, M.A. with Pennsylvania State University in Homeland Security and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI alumni. She was designated a Naval Aviator in October 1987.

Her active duty tours include HC-3, the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS); and fleet tour assignment with HC-11, NASNI, California flying the H-46D and deployed to WESTPAC. Wackerman was assigned to shore duty with VT-6 and the Instructor Training Unit, NAS Whiting Field, Florida instructing flight training in the T-34C Mentor. Her Full Time Support (FTS) officer duty assignments were both at NAS JRB Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, as the Assistant Reserve Program Director for 2,300 reservists and flying the UC-12B; and VR-52, flying the C-9B/DC-9 providing worldwide fleet logistics support.

Rear Admiral Wackerman became a Selected Reservist (SELRES) with VR-52 in June 1999 where she became the Commanding Officer of VR-52. Subsequent SELRES tours include training officer of Navy Reserve Capabilities Assessment Unit (OPNAV N8) in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. She served as the Commanding Officer for Navy Reserve, Commander, Navy Region Mid Atlantic, Region Operations Center (ROC) in Norfolk, Virginia. She then served as Commanding Officer, Navy Reserve, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Operations and Planning N3/N5 unit in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. She was assigned as Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (NEPLO) for the state of Pennsylvania and Deputy Commander for the NEPLO Program at Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC). She then served as the Commander, NR CNIC NEPLO leading the NEPLO Program; and COS for the WNY Shooting. Also, since September 2016, she has been a Board Member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which serves as an independent advisor to Secretary of Defense on Reserve and National Guard matters.

Her flag assignments include Reserve Deputy Director, Assessment Division, OPNAV N81 and Deputy, Naval Inspector General and Deputy Commander USNAVSO and FOURTH Fleet.

Rear Admiral Wackerman’s personal military decorations include the Legion of Merit (4th Award), Meritorious Service Medal (3rd Award), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2nd award), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (3rd award). She was selected as 2005 Federal Women and 1995 NAS JRB Willow Grove Women of the Year. She is a 757/767 International Pilot with American Airlines where she has accumulated over 5,400 military and 9,000 civilian flight hours.
Major General (Ret)
Burke W. Whitman, USMCR
Board Member

Burke W. Whitman serves as an American leader of business, national, and civil society organizations. Currently he is CEO of Colmar Holdings, a board director of Omega Healthcare Investors (NYSE: OHI) and Amicus Therapeutics (Nasdaq: FOLD), member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, trustee of the Lovett School, and lay leader in the Anglican Church. He has served as CEO and CFO of two Fortune 500 companies and as a reserve general officer in command of 4th Marine Division and Marine Forces Reserve.

Previously in business, he served as the chief executive office and chief financial officer of two Fortune 500 Companies publicly-listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Health Management Associates, Inc. (then NYSE: HMA) and Triad Hospitals, Inc. (then NYSE: TRI), both successfully sold. Before that he was president and vice president of two other companies, Deerfield Healthcare Corporation (Private: DHC) and Almost Family (Nasdaq: AFAM), also sold. Prior to that he was as an investment banker with Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS) in corporate real estate and corporate finance. In its annual rankings, Institutional Investor Magazine has named him a repeat Best CFO and Best CEO.

Concurrently in service to Nation, he served for three decades as a reserve officer of the U.S. Marine Corps. Called to full-time active duty 1985-88 and again 2009-18, he took leave from his corporate executive activity. Among many deployments, he led combat deployments to Bosnia, Iraq twice and Afghanistan twice. As a commanding officer, he commanded at every level: platoon, company, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion, and 25th Marine Regiment. As a general officer, he served as the Commanding General of 4th Marine Division and Marine Forces Reserve, and the Secretary of Defense tapped him to serve as the first Uniformed Spokesperson for the Department of Defense. Following his completion of temporary full-time service, he elected to retire as a major general and the Corps’ senior reservist in order to return to primary civilian activity. His decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, two Legion of Merit Medals, Bronze Star Medal, two Combat Action Ribbons, and Presidential Unit Citation, among others.

Concurrently in service to civil society, he served previously on the Board of Directors of the Federation of American Hospitals, the Board of Directors of the Toys for Tots Foundation, the Board of Visitors of Marine Corps University, and the Founders Group of the National Museum of the Marine Corps. A regular public speaker, he has delivered, among other speeches, the annual commencement address at the Lovett School, the annual veterans address at Harvard University, and the annual Marine Corps address at the Union League Club in New York. In 2013 he received from Dartmouth College its first annual award for an alumnus whose “lifetime exemplifies the ideals of service, college, country,” the James Wright Award for Distinguished Service.

Reared in Atlanta, he earned a Bachelor of Arts on scholarship from Dartmouth College where he played rugby and was inducted into the Sphinx senior society; a Master of Business Administration from Harvard University; a Master in Strategic Studies degree from the United States Army War College; and is earning a Master of Ministry degree from Nashotah House Theological Seminary. He resides in Atlanta.
Major General Cornell A Wilson, Jr., USMCR
Board Member

Major General Cornell A Wilson was appointed by the Secretary of Defense, as a Board member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) on March 2015. He also was appointed to the RFPB subcommittee of Enhancing DoD’s Role in the Homeland, focusing on improving the capability and capacity of the Reserve Component to address the increasing threats to the homeland.

General Wilson recently served Governor Pat McCrory of North Carolina’s cabinet as the Secretary for the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs and formerly as the Governor’s Military Advisor since 2013. His responsibilities included protecting the state’s military installations, working with the military communities around the installations, helping military families and veterans get the support and services they need and helping connect veterans with jobs.

A graduate of the University of South Carolina with a B.S. in Chemistry, he received his commission in the United States Marine Corps through the Navy ROTC program in 1972. He has a long and distinguished record of service to our country in both active and reserve duty assignments. He has commanded Combat Arms and Combat Service Support units from the Company, Battalion, Group and Brigade levels. His staff assignments included service in manpower, operations and logistics positions. Selected as a General Officer in 1999, he served as a Deputy Commanding General for Marine Forces Central Command and the Deputy J3 for Central Command in Tampa, Fl; Commanding General for 4th Logistics Service Support Group in New Orleans, La; Commanding General for II MACE, 2nd Brigade Commanding General and the Deputy Commanding General II MEF at Camp Lejeune, NC; Director, Manpower and Reserve Affairs at Headquarters Marine Corps in Quantico, Va.; Commanding General Marine Forces Europe and Africa in Stuttgart, Germany; Deputy Commanding General Marine Forces Command in Norfolk, Va and Commanding General Marine Forces Southern Command in Miami, Fl. In 2003, he commanded a Joint Task Force of Coalition Partners in combat in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom based in Kuwait.

His professional military education includes the Harvard University Program for Senior Executives for National and International Security, Marshall Center Senior Executive Seminar in Garmisch, Germany; NATO Defense College General and Flag Officer Course, Rome, Italy; National Defense University’s Capstone Course and the Logtech Executive Course.

He currently serves as a board member for the Toys4Tots Foundation. He also serves as an advisor for Veteans Bridge Home and has previously served on the Veterans Administration Advisory Council for Minority Veterans and as a Trustee for St. Augustine’s University.

He and his wife of 39 years have 3 adult children and 4 grandchildren.
APPENDIX B: RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSE

The use of Reserve Component as part of the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic re-enforces the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommendation from 2008, which called for the National Guard and Reserve to be the lead forces for operations in defense of the homeland. Senior leaders, both military and civilian, need to understand the unique capabilities the RC provides in support of the Nation’s homeland security, defense support for civil authorities (DSCA), and pandemic responses. With the RC costing less than 30% of their AC counterparts, they represent a potential cost savings for the Total Force, as the Nation continues to rely on, and expand, the operational use of the RC.

Based on the significant and visible impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the United States, our adversaries will likely have noticed and may seek to exploit a perceived vulnerability. We must be prepared to provide a national response with the required speed and scale to both defeat viruses like COVID-19 and deter further use of such attacks by adversaries. As we have just witnessed, the Reserve Component will be a critical part of a pandemic response. Therefore, the RC must also ensure appropriate speed and scale in its ability to mobilize and deploy within the Continental United States (CONUS) in response to such a threat. This need for speed and agility applies to all facets of such an RC mobilization: access, administration, finance, benefits, entitlements, logistics, operations, and command and control.

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) classified the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic. This was followed by President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency on March 13, 2020 triggering authorities associated with the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act allows the U.S. Government to provide assistance to state and local governments after a disaster or during an emergency, to include funding National Guard state active duty for a state mission or full time National Guard duty – operational support (FTNGD-OS) for a federal mission. DSCA policy allows DoD to assist states if reimbursed by another federal agency, such as FEMA (DoD Directive (DoDD) 3025.18).

On March 19, 2020, the Council of Governors asked the Secretary of Defense to establish a separate DSCA 502(f) activation authority approval process for governors. President Trump then issued a memorandum directing FEMA reimbursement of DSCA 502(f) activation authority for some states on March 22, 2020. The Department of Defense, on March 27, 2020 also responded to the Council of Governors request by creating a conditional pre-authorization to ensure accelerated federal funding for National Guard 502(f) activation. This pre-authorization was subject to the following conditions:

- States and territories, or FEMA, must identify specific requirements for COVID-19 support in accordance with the Stafford Act.
- Requirements originating from the states and territories must be submitted to FEMA.
- FEMA provides DoD with a fully reimbursable mission assignment.

125 https://defense360.csis.org/series/combating-covid-19/
The Secretary of Defense also delegated authority to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security to approve mission assignment requests meeting these conditions. The Department of Defense also issued a statement modifying DoDI 3025.22 DSCA 502(f) activation authority approval process on March 30th, and added California, New York, Washington, Guam, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and Massachusetts National Guard on a reimbursable basis and requested their governors activate the National Guard under 502(f) to fulfill FEMA missions assigned to DoD.126

Between March 27, 2020 – May 16, 2020, USNS Mercy was deployed to Los Angeles, California and between March 30, 2020 – April 30, 2020, USNS Comfort was deployed to New York City, New York; both ships provided medical support for COVID-19. On April 10, 2020, the 807th Medical Command was activated to support the fight against COVID-19. The 807th represents the largest Army Reserve medical command, based in Utah with 11,000 troops across 17 states west of the Mississippi. The

126 https://defense360.csis.org/series/combating-covid-19/
command deployed 900 activated Army Reserve medical personnel to fight COVID-19. They fielded fifteen Urban Augmentee Medical Task Forces (UAMTFs), newly created Army Reserve units designed to support civilian medical care facilities across the United States. In mid-May, DoD reported activating more than 6,700 reservists from the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve and Navy Reserve on military orders supporting COVID-19 operations.127

National Guard units were activated in a state status (Title 32) to combat the Coronavirus. Nationalization (Title 10) was not desired, nor required, for COVID-19. The below graphic displays how National Guard activations have grown over time in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.128

As of May 5th, 86 percent of activated National Guard service members supporting the COVID-19 response efforts were on federally funded orders. The status change from Title 32 to Title 10, aligned benefits and entitlement between AC and RC, to include access to health care for mobilization orders more than 30 days.129

At its peak on May 8, 2020, 46,700 Army and Air National Guard service members were activated in

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128 DoD Media Fact Sheet, 13 May
130 Ibid
response to COVID-19. This represents a small percentage of the 443,000 service members in the Army and Air Force National Guard.\textsuperscript{131}

The National Guard COVID-19 response missions included, but were not limited to augmenting medical staff at hospitals, nursing homes and assisted living facilities to protect our most vulnerable populations.\textsuperscript{132} The states employed the National Guard across a range of functions:

- Supporting warehouse operations and logistics efforts to help deliver and distribute lifesaving medical equipment and critical supplies
- Delivering and distributing food in hard-hit communities and supporting food banks
- Working with industry and civilian partners to satisfy demand for personal protective equipment used by essential staff and first responders
- Providing mortuary affairs assistance
- Building, staffing, and outfitting alternate care facilities to alleviate stress on medical infrastructure
- Manufacturing, sewing and distributing masks and other personal protective equipment for mission essential personnel
- Full-time 24 hour state Emergency Operations Center staffing to synchronize National Guard efforts with local and state mission partners to execute an effective response
- Providing timesaving support to local law enforcement, freeing officers to perform their duty in the communities they serve
- Conducting traffic control support and helping manage foot traffic in public spaces and community shelters
- Manning call centers to be a knowledgeable and calming voice
- Providing vital PPE training and delivery to civilian first responders
- Conducting force health protection assessments to ensure our Guardsmen are cared for
- Performing mobile testing, sample delivery and processing
- Providing support and symptoms screening to testing facilities and passenger terminals
- Disinfecting facilities crucial to the bottom line mission of saving lives

National Guard activations largely plateaued by the end of April and actually began to decline. On May 12, 2020, U.S. Army North Commander Lieutenant General Laura Richardson announced that some Army forces would redeploy from COVID-19 support.\textsuperscript{133}

One issue that materialized as part of the RC response efforts centered on the benefits tied to the length of activation. Most National Guard personnel were restricted to orders of 89 days or less, which limited benefits related to early retirement and education. On May 19, 2020,

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid

\textsuperscript{132} DoD Media Fact Sheet, 13 May

the DoD and the White House began discussions on extending orders for those facing time limits. On May 26, 2020, The National Guard Association pressed Congress to enact legislation to give National Guard personnel activated for COVID-19 six months of Tricare coverage after their federally-funded Title 32 duty ended. On May 28, 2020, President Trump extended the National Guard’s COVID-19 mission through mid-August. There had been concern federal funding would run out when the current set of 89-day orders expired.

RC medical personnel deployed in support of COVID-19 encountered state medical licensure issues when their medical license did not transfer across state lines. As of June 2020, the federation of state medical boards illustrates that all 54 states, territories and the District of Columbia, have medical waivers for Physicians with state licenses. The Board recommends a National level effort to streamline a process for permeability of licensed physicians in a time of crisis.

As of June, 2020, DoD deployments to fight the pandemic continue to decline. As of June 12, 2020, DoD stopped providing data on troop deployments related to the pandemic. The last available data showed that deployments were declining and publicly released information indicates that those declines are likely continuing. As of June 23, 2020, 49,523 National Guard and Reserve had been activated to support the pandemic; 35,443 remained activated. Over 42,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen were activated for domestic operations across the United States under the control of state governors. Over 36,000 Guard Soldiers and Airmen in all 50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia continue to support COVID-19 response efforts. Just over 1,300 Guard members in nine states and the District of Columbia are assisting law enforcement authorities with ongoing civil disturbance. Additionally, more than 29,000 Guard Soldiers and Airmen are deployed supporting critical combatant command national security missions. In total, there are nearly 78,000 Guard men and women engaged in homeland and overseas missions.

Further, Basic Training for all services has resumed with a quarantine for new trainees up front, along with social distancing, testing and wearing of personal protective equipment. However, these precautions slow the flow of training, and are not sustainable. The length of these implemented precautions will determine how long it takes the RC to recover from COVID-19 induced accession shortages.

Many of the personnel issues that arose during 2020 (duty status, travel, orders, and retirement) are a result of rigid policies designed for standard business operations and not for a pandemic or civil disturbance. DoD’s policies lack agility to respond in a timely manner and require an iterative policy approach with multiple time consuming amendments. DoD should review is personnel policies using lessons learned from the pandemic response, stop movement, isolation, quarantine, and restriction of movement orders.

134 Ibid
135 Ibid
136 Ibid
137 OSD COVID-19 Activation Response Weekly Report 200623
138 NGB Senior Leader Brief June 24, 2020
The military continues its support to civil authorities with National Guard personnel for construction of temporary hospitals, deployments of active-duty units, and recent deployments of reserve personnel. Despite significant support and resources from the RC, the comparatively slow intake of patients at all temporary military hospitals and the two hospital ships, USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort, raised questions about how effective some of these responses have been, and how the military can be best adapted to assist the fight against a highly contagious virus.  

Between March 27, 2020 – May 16, 2020, USNS Mercy was deployed to Los Angeles, California and between March 30, 2020 – April 30, 2020, USNS Comfort was deployed to New York City, New York; both ships provided medical support for COVID-19. On April 10, 2020, the 807th Medical Command was activated to support the fight against COVID-19. The 807th, represents the largest Army Reserve medical command, based in Utah with 11,000 troops across 17 states west of the Mississippi. The command deployed 900 activated Army Reserve medical personnel to fight COVID-19. They fielded fifteen Urban Augmentee Medical Task Forces (UAMTFs), newly created Army Reserve units designed to support civilian medical care facilities across the United States. In mid-May, DoD reported activating more than 6,700 reservists from the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve and Navy Reserve on military orders supporting COVID-19 operations.

National Guard units were activated in a state status (Title 32) to combat the Coronavirus. Nationalization (Title 10) was not desired, nor required, for COVID-19. The below graphic displays how National Guard activations have grown over time in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

As of May 5th, 86 percent of activated National Guard service members supporting the COVID-19 response efforts were on federally funded orders. The status change from Title 32 to Title 10, aligned benefits and entitlement between AC and RC, to include access to health care for mobilization orders more than 30 days.

At its peak on May 8, 2020, 46,700 Army and Air National Guard service members were activated in response to COVID-19. This represents a small percentage of the 443,000 service members in the Army and Air Force National Guard.

The National Guard COVID-19 response missions included, but were not limited to:

- Augmenting medical staff at hospitals, nursing homes and assisted living facilities to protect our most vulnerable populations;
- Supporting warehouse operations and logistics efforts to help deliver and distribute lifesaving medical equipment and critical supplies;
- Delivering and distributing food in hard-hit communities and supporting food banks;

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140 Ibid
142 Ibid
143 Ibid
144 DoD Media Fact Sheet, 13 May
• Working with industry and civilian partners to satisfy demand for personal protective equipment used by essential staff and first responders;
• Providing mortuary affairs assistance as needed, Guardsmen conduct this important mission with respect and dignity;
• Building, staffing, and outfitting alternate care facilities to alleviate stress on medical infrastructure;
• Manufacturing, sewing and distributing masks and other personal protective equipment for mission essential personnel;
• Full-time 24 hour state Emergency Operations Center staffing to synchronize National Guard efforts with local and state mission partners to execute an effective response;
• Providing timesaving support to local law enforcement, freeing officers to perform their duty in the communities they serve;
• Conducting traffic control support and helping manage foot traffic in public spaces and community shelters;
• Manning call centers to be a knowledgeable and calming voice;
• Providing vital PPE training and delivery to civilian first responders;
• Conducting force health protection assessments to ensure our Guardsmen are cared for;
• Performing mobile testing, sample delivery and processing;
• Providing support and symptoms screening to testing facilities and passenger terminals;
• Disinfecting facilities crucial to the bottom line mission of saving lives

National Guard activations largely plateaued by the end of April, and began to decline. On May 12, 2020, U.S. Army North Commander Lieutenant General Laura Richardson announced that some Army forces would redeploy from COVID-19 support.145

One issue that materialized as part of the RC response efforts centered on the benefits tied to the length of activation. Most National Guard personnel were restricted to orders of 89 days or less, which limited benefits related to early retirement and education. On May 19, 2020, the DoD and the White House began discussions on extending orders for those facing time limits.146 On May 26, 2020, The National Guard Association pressed Congress to enact legislation to give National Guard personnel activated for COVID-19, six months of Tricare coverage after their federally-funded Title 32 duty ended.147 On May 28, 2020, President Trump extended the National Guard’s COVID-19 mission through mid-August. There had been concern federal funding would run out when the current set of 89-day orders expired.148

RC medical personnel deployed in support of COVID-19 encountered state medical licensure issues

146 Ibid
147 Ibid
148 Ibid
when their medical license did not transfer across state lines. As of June 2020, the federation of state medical boards illustrates that all 54 states, territories and the District of Columbia, have medical waivers for Physicians with state licenses. The Board recommends a National level effort to streamline a process for permeability of licensed physicians in a time of crisis.

As of June, 2020, DoD deployments to fight the pandemic continue to decline. As of June 12, 2020, DoD stopped providing data on troop deployments related to the pandemic. The last available data showed that deployments were declining and publicly released information indicates that those declines are likely continuing. As of June 23, 2020, 49,523 National Guard and Reserve had been activated to support the pandemic; 35,443 remained activated. Over 42,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen were activated for domestic operations across the United States under the control of state governors. Over 36,000 Guard Soldiers and Airmen in all 50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia continue to support COVID-19 response efforts. Just over 1,300 Guard members in nine states and the District of Columbia are assisting law enforcement authorities with ongoing civil disturbance. Additionally, more than 29,000 Guard Soldiers and Airmen are deployed supporting critical combatant command national security missions. In total, there are nearly 78,000 Guard men and women engaged in homeland and overseas missions.149

Further, Basic Training for all services has resumed accepting new trainees with quarantine up front, social distancing, testing and personal protective equipment. However, these precautions slow the flow of training, and are not sustainable. The length of these implemented precautions will determine how long it takes the RC to recover from COVID-19 induced accession shortages.150

Many of the personnel issues that arose during 2020 (duty status, travel, orders, and retirement) are a result of rigid policies designed for standard business operations and not for a pandemic or civil disturbance. DoD’s policies lack agility to respond in a timely manner and require an iterative policy approach with multiple time consuming amendments. DoD should review is personnel policies using lessons learned from the pandemic response, stop movement, isolation, quarantine, and restriction of movement orders.

The military continues its support to civil authorities with National Guard personnel for construction of temporary hospitals, deployments of active-duty units, and recent deployments of reserve personnel. Despite significant support and resources from the RC, the comparatively slow intake of patients at all temporary military hospitals and the two hospital ships, USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort, raised questions about how effective some of these responses have been, and how the military can be best adapted to assist the fight against a highly contagious virus.

149 NGB Senior Leader Brief June 24, 2020