

Fiscal Year 2020 Report of March 4, 2020 Closed Meeting  
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Under Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act

1. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) held a quarterly meeting in the Pentagon, Washington, DC on March 4, 2020 in Room 3E863.
2. A portion of the meeting was closed to the public from 7:40a.m. to 1:00p.m. The meeting was closed in accordance with provisions outlined by the Government in the Sunshine Act, as amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1) and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), as amended by 5 U.S.C. Appendix (Executive Order 13526 – Classified National Security Information). The agenda items covered during this period were the presentations from the Commander, United States Army Forces Command; Commander, United States Army North; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Army National Guard Assistant Director for Training and Operations; Commander, Air Mobility Command; and Commander, Air Combat Command. Secret level discussions are likely as they address military operations, readiness, availability, use, and performance of the National Guard and Reserve, and the future strategies for their use. The unclassified summary of each of the presentations is provided below:

a. **Commander, United States Army Forces Command**

General Michael Garrett, USA

- GEN Garrett opened offering a healthy appreciation for the Reserve Components (RCs), for their viability, and especially with how they have been employed. He admitted that he did not know much about the Reserve Components 6-7 years ago, but after 42 months at U.S. Army Central Command and 36 months as U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Chief of Staff and now Army Forces Command, he has nothing but good things to say.
- For the last 6 years, he stated that he focused on the Middle East every single day, and that every day he employed the Reserve Components as a consumer of readiness. As Commander U.S. Army Forces Command, he has to balance global requirements with the readiness of the forces and stated, “We would have failed without the RCs.”
- On any given day he is responsible for the training, readiness, and mobilization capability of about 745,000 soldiers, and current campaign plans require integration of the Total Force. He emphasized that he is serious about integration and that he is also responsible for the Army Total Force Policy.
- GEN Garrett recently made some minor changes in that policy to include:
  - Readiness – deliver decisive Total Army readiness, which is delivering the exact amount of readiness needed on any day and no more. Funds not spent on readiness are needed for Army modernization.
  - Mastering the basics – if we are excellent in the basics, we will win the fight.
  - Leader development.
  - Inform and influence the future force by talking about modernization. Modernization is an Army imperative. The Army must stay on modernization and training towards it or risk being out of the fight in the next 10 years.
  - Army campaign plan – transfer main efforts from readiness to modernization.
  - Take care of soldiers, families, and civilians – empower and execute reform.
- He noted that the Chief of Staff of the Army’s goal is that “People are #1, and I’m not coming off readiness.”
- He then stated that Secretary of Defense (SecDef) said: “I don’t see us coming off of readiness as #1, and that some days, modernization may be #1.”
- GEN Garrett explained that decisive Total Army readiness is with unit manpower, training, and equipment, and that readiness is fleeting. He gave an example of a National Guard Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) from North Carolina currently deployed in CENTCOM. He said that it took

a 4 year plan (now changed to 5 year plan) and lots of money and resources to get them ready. He gave a second example of a Stryker BCT from Idaho currently in its 4<sup>th</sup> of 5 year training cycle at the National Training Center (NTC), and the Army will not deploy them. He questioned the wisdom of using limited resources for a unit that would not be deployed.

- He then stated that 1<sup>st</sup> Army has transitioned from a post-mobilization force to a pre-mobilization force, saying “I think we do have an operational reserve and we need to talk about how to maintain it.”
- He noted that the Army had 10 mobilization generating locations (Compo 2) that were contracted to 4 in 2014 and then expanded to 11 in 2020. He then said that the mobilization support forces include a Brigadier General (Compo 3), who leads 1,800 admin, medical, and sustainment forces.
- He said that the Army needs to win at the point of contact and be faster than the enemy and that this is true regardless of military occupational specialties (MOS). He emphasized that individual training and mastery of the basics are what we do as an Army.
- He stated that transitioning from counterinsurgency to large scale ground combat ops was a bold shift, and that we have to move fast. He again emphasized the need to focus on individual training and unit training up through brigade level operations.
- He stated that we need to get away from focused readiness, and used as an example the Army Response Force, Immediate Response Force and Crisis Response Force, seen as recently as the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020. He noted that in the past we had 100,000 soldiers ready to go, but now we only have closer to 10,000 who are ready to go.
- GEN Garrett complemented The Adjutants General (TAGs) on their readiness levels and their complicated plans to get there. He noted that the 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) was not quite ready with every tank to get through entire training cycle, but was close.
- He also shared that RC forces he has worked with in CENTCOM are as good as any AC forces he worked with.
- He said that was not, however, the case with what he saw at NTC. He noted that with the RC forces they experienced multiple delays just getting established prior to training and that time was wasted. He believes we could do better in supporting RC troops with some of the basics and support functions.
- The 5 year workup cycle for RC troops is a lot to ask and part of our training doctrine is retraining.
- GEN Garrett said the Army’s intent is to deliver precision readiness, not perfect readiness, but the exact amount of readiness required to meet GFMAP readiness needs and not \$1 more.
- He stated that the last 3 fiscal years were good for the Army, but that we can still be more efficient with the budget.
- The Army needs to continue to take things off of the Commander’s requirements that are not directly related to lethality and readiness and continue to reduce the administrative burden.
- GEN Garrett shared that he is passionate, proud of, and mindful of the RC and the unique sacrifices they make to do what they do. While he is aware, he offered that AC forces often do not understand RC forces. GEN Garrett personally thinks we would have failed a long time ago if it was not for our RC forces.
- He said that the goal is to put the Total Army on the right azimuth with respect to readiness and modernization, and continue to reform and to be as efficient as possible.
- Chairman Punaro shared that GEN Garrett’s assessments are “spot on” and that 1 million RC members mobilized since 9/11, and the fully burdened and lifecycle cost reports are compelling reasons to leverage the RCs. He also shared his concerns with projected flat budgets for the services. He expressed that the reason RC members stay in is to be part of the force, and if we don’t keep them ready and relevant, they will quit. He then asked, “How do you prioritize which units are ready when?”
- GEN Garrett answered that moving away from focused readiness to the Army Response Force is how we will better leverage readiness and timing. The forces are aligned to Op Plans and the Secretary’s focus is on the NDS. As an example, we started pulling forces out of CENTCOM but

were recently reminded the enemy gets a vote. Readiness for a 10,000 soldier response force is much more manageable than 100,000. The Army is also going to look at assigned forces that others do not have access to, and look at options for multi-domain operational concepts.

- Board Member LTG (Ret) Barno asked with projected flat budgets, is there concern or friction between funding and resourcing between the Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC), noting that alignment has gotten better in the last decade but the budget going forward may add new constraints.
- GEN Garrett answered that Total Force Policy and relationships address this. He said that leadership needs to be mindful of relationships, and added that the Army structure may not be right and that we may have too much combat support in the RC. He shared that National Guard Bureau (NGB) was considering aligning National Guard units to Divisions. He offered that modernization will also help and used the integrated visual augmentation system as an example (only 10% of the Army will get them right now, across all 3 COMPOs). He closed stating that when it comes to relationships, he is setting the example for others to follow when it comes to Total Force and AC/RC integration.
- Chairman Punaro asked about associated units and personal relationships, and shared that the space mission force is all AC with the thought of adding RC later. He asked “Wouldn’t it be wise to leverage the civilian skillsets of the RC who work for advanced cyber and spaces activities and fields?”
- GEN Garrett offered that the Army had tried associated units before, and that it didn’t work out well, noting that the Army is huge, slow to turn and maneuver with the tendency to overcorrect.
- MG Quinn shared that the 116<sup>th</sup> ABCT in Idaho is important to him and that the 1:5 ratio was about right, and that there are risks associated with RC readiness.
- MajGen Whitman asked “what can the Board do to remove barriers for accessing the RCs and leveraging their use for the Army?” GEN Garrett answered that he knows there are issues with National Guard full time manning and equipment readiness, and that there is a difference between being ready and comfortable, and from what he has seen additional manning makes sense.
- Dr. Bensahel offered that it would be a waste to train the (RC) and not use it, and the RC would become demoralized. With deployment ops going down, how will RC readiness that has been built be used? GEN Garrett answered we may shift to do more elsewhere and use ARNG units for recurring requirements. He used the example of 4,300 soldiers currently on the SW border and considers that a very good RC mission. Timely notification is important for RC members and recurring requirements provide that. We are not always as agile as we want to be, and many M-day Guardsmen do up to 70 days of duty per year.
- GEN Garrett closed addressing the changes to the Army’s fitness test and that they still do not have it right. He stated that it is part of holistic health and fitness and a big idea to add professionalism inside the organization. He said that another goal is to reduce injuries, and that special operators have been doing it for decades and it is a proven concept. He noted, however, that they are a small force and to export this concept to the full Army has been challenging, but is a move in the right direction.

#### **b. Commander, United States Army North (ARNORTH)**

Lieutenant General Laura J. Richardson, USA

- Lieutenant General Richardson opened discussing ARNORTH’s main missions of Homeland Defense, Support to Civil Authorities, and Theater Security Cooperation. These missions draw on the Reserve Components and that the Unified Command Plan defines the AOR.
- She noted that ARNORTH provides Federal capabilities for Immediate Response Authority.
- LTG Richardson briefed ARNORTH’s new mission statement: USARNORTH conducts unified land operations in support of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in order to detect, deter and defeat threats to the Homeland, conduct support of civil authorities, and conduct security cooperation initiatives to defend the United States and its interests.
- She pointed out to the Board that ARNORTH is the smallest Army Service Component Command

- (by personnel assigned) but has 2 standing Joint Force Land Component Commands (JFLCCs): Southwest Border & Task Force 51 for DSCA events, such as Hurricane Dorian.
- When a JFLCC is stood up, it is for a short duration, then is replaced by a Corps or Division Headquarters to take over Command and Control for the duration.
  - In these operations, the Army is the Executive Agent for common user logistics.
  - LTG Richardson then talked about Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) and ARNORTH's role in it:
    - The United States needs to get units out of the Homeland to execute Dynamic Force Employment.
    - The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) acknowledges Homeland Defense as the #1 priority; our adversaries can bring the fight to us.
    - Adversaries just need to slow us down (Cyber, etc) in our Homeland to make an impact and delay forces getting to their objective.
    - Getting from Fort (Home Station) to Port will no longer be easy.
  - The next topic that she discussed was Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). She stated that DSCA incorporates these events: Hurricane Response, Cyber Attacks, CBRNE attacks (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives), Support to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the Southwest Border, large event security (Super Bowl, DNC/RNC) support, and foreign disaster response such as that provided to the Bahamas.
    - Local National Guard units are usually the first employed in a DSCA response, as they also have a State mission. The National Guard utilizes Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) to employ state forces to assist another state, when necessary.
    - A Presidential Emergency Declaration (12302) creates the Dual-Status Commander for the mission, who will report to both ARNORTH and the State Adjutant General where the emergency is located.
    - During times of need, a Contingency Command Post can be stood up and would be commanded by a 2-star General that would report directly to ARNORTH.
    - There are 10 Defense Coordinating Officers in the United States that report to ARNORTH. Each Defense Coordinating Element is commanded by a Colonel and has 8-10 personnel on staff.
    - With DSCA, the Army is ALWAYS in support of a Lead Federal Agency.
    - NORTHCOM is the DoD synchronizer for support to the Southwest Border.
  - LTG Richardson discussed preparations for Hurricane Dorian and how they moved a General Support Aviation Battalion from Fort Hood to Fort Rucker to stage. She said that this worked very well in support of the federal disaster response to the Bahamas, and that flying over water from CONUS to the Bahamas required extra training, but they were able to execute that training in preparation for the mission.
  - She stated that the Civil Support Training Activity is the CBRNE training and validation center for unit employment within the United States, and that this entity is assigned to ARNORTH.
  - She stated that Joint Task Force (JTF) North is a 1-star Mission Command Element (MCE) and is an allocated force to ARNORTH, and that they receive Operational Control (OPCON) of RC Forces when mobilized. She further said that ARNORTH is constantly competing for personnel resources for this entity under 12304b authority within the Army budget.
  - LTG Richardson mentioned that one of ARNORTH's biggest issues is getting Approval Authority to prepare for an expected event.
    - Access to supporting forces is a huge issue.
    - These units are Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) assigned, but that's it. There are no authorities that allow ARNORTH access to these units without a mobilization authority.
      - This is GFMIG policy, not law.
      - The policy does not account for Multi-component units.
  - She stated that the Homeland Defense responsibility within ARNORTH expanded within the last year, and that the portions of Homeland Defense that used to lie within Alaska Command has been

moved to ARNORTH.

- Alaska is part of NORTHCOM, but is also the rear area of Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).
- Exercise Arctic Edge takes place in Alaska, but is almost all U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) units.
- LTG Richardson mentioned that support from 4<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC, USAR) is difficult.
  - 12304a orders need to be utilized in order to put an Active Component Sustainment Brigade under the 4<sup>th</sup> ESC during a CONUS Contingency mission.
  - However, 12304a authority didn't work for Hurricane Dorian in the Bahamas, because the Bahamas are a sovereign country, not part of the United States.
- LTG Richardson closed out her brief mentioning that as a force, we need to plan better for Cyber. She noted that most people and organizations hand-waive cyber – “ARCYBER will take care of it”
  - She asked if a Cyber Security Team test would make sense.

### **c. Goals of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness**

Ms. Virginia Penrod, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASD MRA)

- Ms. Penrod noted that OUSD P&R was very busy answering advance policy questions since Secretary Donovan had just been officially nominated to serve as the USD P&R. As both she and Secretary Donovan were retired Air Force Officers, they have a good understanding of the importance of the Reserve Components and the fact that it is operational force.
- Ms. Penrod then provided an update on what P&R was working on in support of the Reserve Components. This included the following:
  - A Rand study looking at employer fatigue due to high reserve tempo.
  - A working group is looking at the best way to capture reserve active duty time, i.e. DD-214 or other means.
  - Reserve transition – are there gaps in the Transition Assistance Program, and what can be improved?
  - There is an effort looking at the best way to track personnel tempo and account for time spent on reserve duty.
  - A deploy to dwell study is currently underway.
- She stated Secretary Donovan wanted these studies to produce results and momentum to solve problems.
- She said that the need for the Reserve Components to meet the requirements of the NDS was acknowledged. She also said that Secretary Donovan would continue to push to get the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) signed in a timely manner so Reservists could sign up for Tricare and notify employers at the earliest opportunity in preparation for mobilization.
- She emphasized that the Department was pushing Duty Status Reform legislation, but the VA was still reviewing the proposal for impacts. Chairman Punaro noted that the reform would happen, but it would just be a matter of when and in what year's National Defense Authorization Act.
- She then stated that the elimination of Reserve General and Flag Officer exemptions was discussed with the thought that exemptions were likely to be reinstated.
- MG Quinn commented that in the current Duty Status Reform (DSR) proposal with 8 types of duty, the status for remote duty only applied to Title 10 service, not Title 32 Guard State Active Duty. He asked if there would be a 9<sup>th</sup> type of duty for Title 32 remote duty added. Ms. Penrod commented that this was a huge piece of legislation and the goal was to get it passed, with the understanding that there were still many issues such as this to work.

**d. National Guard Assistant Director for Training & Operations**

Brigadier General Anthony H. Adrian, ARNG

- Brigadier General Adrian began by discussing the National Guard on the Southwest border mission. Since 2006 the border mission has been an all-volunteer force from the National Guard with more than 15,000 Guardsmen serving. He stated that currently there are 2,300 ARNG personnel from 25 states, filling 80% of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) support requirements, and that this support includes operational missions, infrastructure, detection, surveillance and aviation personnel and assets.
- BG Adrian continued with the planning considerations for the border mission noting that ARNG support for the border mission will scale down as the wall is completed. He said that as the border mission has continued there has been a slowing of volunteerism. He stated that one consideration to improve the willingness of soldiers to volunteer is to allow soldiers to transfer from Title 32 status to Title 10 status, making the support to the border mission similar to a soldier being deployed outside the continental United States by providing certainty for the volunteering soldiers in terms of deploy-to-dwell timeline predictability.
- He also informed the Board that the States have a heads up right now for the requirement for a National Guard brigade level headquarters to be mobilized for command and control of the border mission, and the current plan is for a Movement Enhancement Brigade (MEB) headquarters to take over the border mission on October 1st.
- Chairman Punaro stated, "The RFPB supports this type of mission being a Title 10 status mission versus a Title 32 status mission." He also noted: "The Secretary of Defense wants the border mission support below 4,000 soldiers for FY 21." He then asked, "What is the projection for FY 21 on numbers mobilized?" BG Adrian responded that our current National Guard mobilization footprint is greater than 20,000 in total, and that we are currently at a 1 to 4 deploy to dwell for most units.
- Mr. Lyons added that AC/RC mix must be determined by affordability.
- Chairman Punaro added that talent management is also a factor in preparing for a great power competition and that high tech talent will primarily be in the Reserve Component, not the Active Component.
- Major General Ortner inquired on efforts to increase readiness in conjunction with conducting the border mission. Brigadier General Adrian explained that while many mission essential tasks (METLs) can be trained simultaneously with support for the border mission, there are times when actual METLs tasks are not trained to.

**e. Commander, Air Mobility Command (CAMC) and Commander, Air Combat Command (CACC) (Secret)**

General Maryanne Miller, USAF, (CAMC) and General James Holmes, USAF (CCAC)

- General Miller opened her remarks by describing the capabilities and value of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) and the issue of the USAF tanker deficit before presenting a briefing on the USAF Air Mobility Command (AMC).
- The General offered this presentation in response to 4 questions posed by the RFPB and its review of the implications of the National Defense Strategy on the Reserve Components.
- General Miller first covered the AMC footprint and each weapons system's associated tempo:
  - The C-130 footprint contains a small active component (AC) presence compared to the reserve component portion. AC goals are 1:3 deploy to dwell while executing at 1:3.8 for the 12-month period ending February 2020. She noted that the Air National Guard (ANG) plans for 1:5 deploy to dwell.
  - For strategic airlift, General Miller described that 100 percent of AC units in that mission hosted associations with the Air Force Reserve. Since RC forces in strategic airlift do not mobilize in the same way as other forces, the traditional deploy to dwell metrics are not applicable. Instead,

- AMC relies on access to the RC by volunteerism and long term military personnel appropriation (MPA) orders. She highlighted that the AC personnel were stressed and the importance of utilizing commercial augmentation in order to create whitespace for AC units. General Miller viewed Combatant Command utilization of RC forces in this mission as beneficial to training.
- The tanker fleet is the most stressed, with AC forces utilized at a 1:3 to 1:4 deploy to dwell for the 12 month period ending February 2020. General Miller observed that 30% of ANG forces are on Title 10 active duty orders on any day and highlighted that the ANG 1:8 deploy to dwell statistic does not capture volunteerism and those guardsman signing up for orders via long term MPA. She pointed out the stress experienced by ANG crews and illustrated that this was the first year that AMC obtained less volunteer crews from the ANG than the command asked for. General Miller concluded by relating the importance of volunteer capacity to daily aircraft utilization using 2019 as an example.
- Gen Miller sought the Board's support on three RC policy issues:
  - First, Advocacy for Total Force Integration Active Associations in order to access ANG aircraft inventory and address challenges with both daily capacity and reliance on volunteerism in lieu of mobilization for the tanker alert mission.
  - Second, non-contingency MPA funding to underwrite the scale of volunteering necessary to maintain AMC's daily capacity for both Combatant Command and Service missions.
  - Third, flexibility in Title 10 section 12302 authority to move RC forces according to global demands in support of US Transportation Command.
- The final portion of Gen Miller's briefing addressed the four questions asked by the RFPB regarding her perspective on the Operational Reserve utilization model from a combatant command's air component perspective in addition to her thoughts on maintaining strategic depth while operationally employing reserve assets.
  - First, the Board asked: "Is the current Reserve force utilization model right (e.g. preplanned mobilization, volunteer mobilization, current DoD policies) to support each Combatant Commands requirements?" General Miller responded with "Yes" for pre-planned and rotational tasks and "No" for when global demand shifts dynamically (e.g. INDOPACOM or EUCOM crisis or DFE). She also highlighted that funding the non-12302 portion depends on competing well against the rest of the Air Force's MPA requirements.
  - Next, the board asked: "What are the Commander's thoughts on the necessary strategic depth to maintain while employing Reserve Forces operationally in your set of high demand missions?" General Miller described that AMC needs ARC readiness for strategic depth and continued high levels of volunteerism to maintain it. The RFPB noted the AMC staff's background paper that added acknowledgement that the metrics and operational credit scoring are not mature enough to support decision making and multi-component risk analysis.
  - Third, the Board asked: "What demands on the Reserve Components do the Commanders expect going forward with National Defense Strategy (NDS) implementation and Dynamic Force Employment (DFE)?" General Miller stated that the NDS and DFE would stress capacity with DFE becoming an active pick-up game. AMC background papers noted that in the long term, authorities need more flexibility than the restrictive 12302 rule set while AC forces needed more 'white space' on their calendar in order to meet crisis or rapidly developing demands.
  - Lastly, the Board asked "Do any Department of Defense (DoD) policies (mobilization, human resources, reserve utilization models) or DoD processes (GFM, etc.) need to be updated or improved to enable your mission? How can the Board assist? General Miller emphasized that the two changes that she considered necessary in the Department included making mobilization authorities more agile and widening the Total Force Integration best practice of active associate units. General Miller described her preference for adding active associate units to the force structure instead of moving aircraft around.

– General James Holmes, USAF, (CACC)

- General Holmes began his remarks by describing the conclusions of a Propublica report on the recent US Navy mishaps. He stated that the report's author wrote about strategic problems in the Navy where the service valued operations over training and acquisition over sustainment.
- He connected this environment to the Air Force's challenge of sustaining the size of the overseas fighter force from the small number of CONUS-based active component (AC) units in terms of pilot retention. General Holmes considered this small AC number as the only forces that ACC considered assured access to compared to the larger RC number.
- General Holmes next described that the Department's authorities, tools, and processes handle rotational requirements very well, but exist as barriers to implement the National Defense Strategy and the response layers of the global operating model. The General considered making the RC fighter force fit into that construct.
- When it comes to the RC fighter force, General Holmes highlighted Hill Air Force Base as an example, comprising three squadrons with almost half of the aircrew and maintenance manpower in the Air Force Reserve. The General described that the Total Force Integration unit type code packages appropriately contain both AC and RC leadership opportunities that the Air Force needs to sustain the enterprise, but the arrangement presents issues in an environment where Combatant Commanders expect heel-to-toe replacements from the Air Force.
- General Holmes stated that he had no doubt that the Guard and Reserve could mobilize in less than 30 days if needed. The issue is that no one wants to notify Congress of this action and that costs the Air Force money. The Air Force's aversion to these two actions drives the behavior of pulling active component forces for emergent requirements. He stated that the Air Force is consistently 3,000 to 4,000 man days short while OMB reduced the overseas contingency operation requests to deploy.
- In addition to the problems with the emergent requirement process, General Holmes stated that the Secretary of Defense Orders Book does not cover total force associations. This drives the behavior of going out the door with RC volunteers only and then having to transition to a new authority.
- General Holmes stated that what worked for RC funding and utilization authorities since 9/11 does not support the concepts in the National Defense Strategy.
- RFPB Chairman Punaro agreed with General Holmes, stating that his was a great observation. The Chairman agreed with needing to remove the micromanagement and suggested that a board subcommittee look at the issue
- A staff officer from OASD M&RA asked the presenters what their perspective was in terms of increasing the amount of involuntary mobilization. Gen Holmes replied that he thought it was best to manage that choice at the appropriate command level within the Air Force instead of the Secretary of Defense.
- Mr. Lyons from OASD M&RA Reserve Integration added that what General Holmes explained seemed to be aimed at increasing the Secretary of Defense's decision space by delegating mobilization within 30 days to the Secretary of the Air Force. When Mr. Lyons asked General Holmes if this was the Air Force position, the General responded that these were his thoughts without the Air Force looking at this yet through Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
- Chairman Punaro replied that he considered it best to push the decision level to within the Military Department since the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff are already involved in the issue.
- Board member LTG (Ret) Barno asked: "Do we know if the value of Dynamic Force Employment is worth the return on investment or are we breaking the Reserve Component? Is it working?"
- Board member Dr. Bensahel asked if the fundamental tenet of the NDS was correct, in that the Department would be able to focus on great power competition over contingencies. She then asked whether Dynamic Force Employment would work if CENTCOM and other real world requirements



were reduced, while noting this was not likely. Gen Holmes responded that Dynamic Force Employment would work in that case.

- Gen Miller added that laying in more active associations would guarantee the concept's support and that that the only limiting factor at the moment was Air Mobility Command buying the force structure.



Arnold L. Punaro  
Major General, USMCR (Ret)  
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board